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(i) 
PREFACE 
It was through the author's therapeutic work with "moody" 
individuals 'and the search for a valid perspective on their 
experience that he became aware of the indeterminate status 
of "mood" as a topic in contemporary psychology. A rev1ew 
of the psychological literature yielded a bewildering array 
of definitions, incomplete models, mixed metaphors and in-
conclusive theoretical argumentation. Yet clinical experience 
consistently yielded basic dimensions, certain features of 
experience were repeatedly declared by clients themselves. 
This recurrence of elements suggested that mood might have 
unique attributes in terms of its qualitative structure as a 
process or realized potential; it appeared that there might 
be individual mood-specific constraints, and a global effect 
on cognition, affect, and behaviour. In order to confirm and 
possibly extend these initial observations and conceptual 
intuitions, a study of mood phenomena in a sample of 105 
volunteer female university students was undertaken. 
The study is most properly viewed as an exerc1se 1n propaedeutics: 
it seeks to determine the effects of one specially designed 
technique on mood; to examine the logic of the concept "mood" 
and criteria for the identification and classification of moods; 
to indicate the range and structure of subjects' mood experience, 
and to ascertain the causes and reasons for such experience. 
It 1s hoped that the clinical data and the theoretical analyses 
of this work, taken conjointly, can contribute to establishing 
general defining features for mood. Perhaps a more refined 
conceptual organization and increased clinical discernment will 
be forthcoming from a systematic investigation of the different 
levels of mood, both as a concept and as an experience. 
(ii) 
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ABSTRACT 
The effect of a mood analysis technique on dimensions of mood in 105 
volunteer female university students was exanined. Subjects identified 
as "moody" by two different criteria t.•ere disting;.:ished by variables on 
standard personality tests. Clinical data from 15 intensive study 
volunteers was analyzed to tentatively establish the features and 
attributes of mood. As a necessary supplement, the concept "mood" was 
dissected and the implications for mood research were set out. 
The Nowlis Mood Adjective Check List (M.ACL) was used to assess :nood 
change across four treatments: personality testir.g; an experimenter 
adUJinistration of the Hood Analyd.s Technique (HAT); engaging in quiet 
activities; and a self-administration of. the ~.AT. 
The experimental findings indicated that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (~~T), has a global influence on 
mood, ·influences mood dimensions in ways different from the other 
experimental sessions, and influences negative moods in predominantly 
positive ways. Different patterns of personality variables were 
significantly correlated with the two types of "moody" subject studied. 
Psycho-linguistic data established that the term "mood" is used both to 
report feeling qualities and to· perfor~ social-judgemental actions. 
The findings suggested: the ~.AT operates to change mood and increase 
awareness; "m0ody" subjects differ from their "non-moody" counterparts 
on major personality dimensions; mood experience has systematic 
features and attributes; and the cc.ncept "mood" is generated, logically, 
at the interface of psycho-social, phy'Siological, and affective c!omains. 
SUHMARY 
Traditionally "moc.d" has been considered a "nuisance variable" in experimental psychology 
(Borgatta, 1961), a syst2.matic modulator of mental state and behaviour, that is diffic;.J!t 
to control and which introduces a fluctuating margin of uncertainty into experimental work. 
Like inclement weather, itl-health, or the "chance and absurdity factors", it ~•as viewed 
as an unavoidable and undesirable complication, one that ideally would have been eliminated. 
Clinically orientated researchers, while o:ten aware of the distorting effects of mood. 
were sometimes content with a simple cognizance of mood as general feeling tor.e, belie•.'ing 
that this was sufficient to explain the operation and "causal" properties of ~cod. However, 
this one-sided simplificativn runs counter to psycho-dynamic clinical experience, and even 
to the coliiillon linguistic asage cf the ter~ "mood"; in relatively few of the analyses and 
investigations surveyed was there an active fostering of an impartial and consistent 
listening to what individuals themselves actually say about their mood experience. 
Clinical necessity coupled with an awareness of the difficulties that individuals often 
experience in talking about their moods, integrating them into their self-concept and 
personal cognitive structures, suggested the need for a technique that would facilitate 
the representation of mood to clients, clinicians, and clinical researchers. However, the 
attainment of a series of valid mood representations is not by itself sufficient to 
establish adequacy. Any analytic technique should aspire to examine critically its o·~ 
presuppositions; to explicate its methodology and the network of correlated conc~pts, 
its particular perspective and implicit ~·10rld view. Th.:! achic:vco J:eSiJlt should be ~l"'c:..rly 
situated with respect to ether alternative viewpoints. For these reasons the logic of the 
(iv) 
conce!)t "mood" is examined, and considerable attention is given to den:onstrating the logical 
conunitments and biases, the perspectival constrictions of different mood viewpoints and 
experimental approaches. 
Although in most cases the author believes he has fulfilled the duties of neutral arbiter 
between the different mood viewpoints, nevertheless the act of arbitration itself in con-
junction with clinical experience has lead to several biases. The reader may legitimately 
request to know these biases for a conceptual "settling of accounts". An explicit and 
comprehensive list divided into methodological and clinical biases would have to include: 
Methodological Biases 
1. The joint need for conceptual analysis and thorough data collection. 
2. The need to establish in advance criteria for the identification of mood. 
3. The equal importance of techniques for analysis and synthesis. 
Clinical Biases 
l. The clinical utility of a tacking procedure between tW'o guiding "images" of mood--mocid 
as a process and mood as experienced potentials. 
2. The "being" or "truth" of a particular mood lies in its source, trend, and the conditions 
of its completion or termination. 
3. The importance of acts of self-expression and self-awareness for understanding mood. 
4. The necessity for qualitative description to be responsible to both internal pot~ntials 
and concrete environmental situations. 
AUlS AND ORIENTATWN OF THE STUDY 
The study is a multifaceted approach to the experience and the concept of mood. It utilizes 
techniques of clinical, experimental, and conceptual analysis to uncover the fundamental 
elements, structures, and qualities of mood. 
General Aims 
i To determine the effect of one specially designed technique (The Mood Analysi~ Technique) 
on basic dimensions of subjects' mood. 
ii To provide a broad perspective on "mood" through examining the concept and its inter-
connections with empirical data. 
iii To outline the "problem ar.eas" of mood on an experimental plant!, an empiricial plane, 
and a theoretical plane. 
Specific Aims 
To establish the parameters and necessary conceptual elements of the concept "mood"; 
to determine the basic elements in different theoretical perspectives in order to 
assess their congruence with clinical data, and to lay the ground work for a conceptual 
synthesis and increased clinical understanding. 
ii To establish the historically relevant studies that have predet~rmined the limits of 
contempo1·ary approa..:hes to mood study. 
iii To establish the perso~ality variables correlated with different mood criteria and 
their defining concepts. 
(v) 
iv To establish the global effect of the Mood Analysis Techniqua (MAT); its effect 
relative to the other experimental treatments; its effect on "moody" vs. "non-moody" 
subjects; and especially its effect on moods classified as positive, neutral and 
negative. 
v To establish through the analysis of subjects' own definition of "mood", a primary 
empirical base that any theoretical or conceptual analysis should be orientated to 
and capable of accounting for through its network of elements. 
vi · To use psycho-·linguistic data (particularly a functional analysis of sentences using 
the word "mood") to establish the outlines of what can meaningfully be said about 
mood both as an experience and a concept. 
vii To examine clinical mood data in order to determine qualitative features, recurring 
attributes, structural and systemic aspects, and causes and reasons for mood experience. 
TNTRODUCT ION 
This study is a multifaceted approach to the basic phenomena of mood. It gives attention to 
the experimental investigation of parameters of mood, the adequacy of current concepts of 
mood, the metalogic of sentences employing the term "mood", and the structure, causes and 
reasons for subjects' reported mood experience • 
. The relative adequacy and relative success of the work may be gauged in terms of its ability 
to present, articulate, and partially resolve em?irical constrictions, conceptual ambiguities, 
and methodological impasses, that fall under these problem areas: 
The Experimental Problem 
The experimental problem has two aspects: to develop a technique that will institute 
explorations of mood and facilitate its representation to individuals through an organized 
but open-ended series of questions; and to establish with a reasonable degree of confidence 
the effects such a technique has on basic dimensions of mood• 
The Conceptual Problem 
The conceptual problem is the necessity of rendering the logic of the concept "mood" problematic, 
in order to develop a criti~al perspective capable of surmounting both conceptual orthodox')' 
for its own sake and the lure of attractive but non-utilitarian formulations. 
The Problems of Voice, Language and Unity 
Y2!~~ 
The work is multivocal, but the different voices are not arbitrary, and stem from the stated 
.aim of approaching "mood" from clifferent persp.:;ctives anu on different levels. The conceptual 
voice speaks a language of logic, hierarchies, and seeks the grounds of adequacy. The 
experimental voice speaks a language of statist:i~al notation, prese.nts probabilistic state-
ments, and seeks e~perimental demo~ztr~tion. The experiential voice speaks an expressive 
langusge of symbolic pre.;ei1tation, atterapts c,·mstitution through the medium of language, 
portrays linguistically, and seeks essential metaphorical description. 
!:i!!!S!.!~Z~ 
Language is capable of serving many diff~rent !:'unctions, ~.g. the sharp d~lineation of facts 
(vi) 
and the "knitting together" of the "interstitial tissue" of experience. The work makes full 
use of the total resource of language to ferret out, reveal and express the nature of "mood" 
as a concept and experience; it states facts, portrays experience, and attempts to precipi-
tate a new awareness of "mood" and its probl-ems. 
!l!!.!!Y 
The unity of the work lies in the inter-relatedness of its parts, the organization of values 
and structural hierarchies, the cooperation of its parts towards a goal and its consistent 
emphasis on the functions of adaptation and self-expression. It stresses the indwelling 
integrity of 1nood experience, the need for open-ended hierarchies, limited but precise 
integrations of conceptual elements and structural features of experience, and the develop-
ment of experience through expressive portrayals. 
The Physiological Probleo 
The role of physiological variables in mood states is bracketed and held in suspension. 
This is not to deny the role of such variables, but rather to delimit the focus of attention 
to those variables that are psycho-social in nature. 
The Experiential Problem 
The experiential "problem" can be framed 1n t.:rms of the ultimate inability of cogr.ition 
alone to establish the "truth" of meeds. Cog!lition ·alone does cot encompass the ":neaning" 
of mood, rather it is awareness, clarity, and self-expression in conjunction with cognitive 
acts that reflexively establishes a momentaJ;y balance point eq.ui;ralent to understanding. 
The Concept "Hood" 
An understanding of the concept "mood" requires several routes of access, a viewing fro:n 
multiple perspectives. From the vantage point of common linguistic usage, where a reduction 
to static elements has been achieved through the analysis of dictionary definitions, we 
find these conceptual elements necessary: 
"state of mind", "feeling", "inclination", "disposition", and "pcervasiveness". 
This analysis of historically stratified meening was supplemented by determining how subjects 
define "mood" in ten~s of their m•n experience. Here, these elements were necessary: 
"mood as a state of mind or feeling", "mood characterized as pervasive", "mood as having a 
causal effect", "mood as the result of both internal and external factors", and "mood as en 
attitude". 
Linguistic use, the employment of the word "mood" in sente'.lces whas,e action potential is 
explicated, suggests that mood sentences ~re used to perform socia1-judgemental action~ 
and evaluations, and to report feeling experience. 
Taken as ~ unit these three approaches suggest that the concept ''=od" 'is generated at the 
interface of three interpenetrating realms--a psycho-social real~ a physiological realm, 
and a realm defined by a system of dynamic qualities applicable t.~;~ sentient, motivat-ed, and 
developing human agents. 
(vii) 
It becomes apparent th.at the concept "mood" is open-text'..!red, an overlapping of logically 
necessary and empirically salient elements; "mood" is also a contextual term, a signific·ant 
proportion of its meaning is acquired through its deployment--the way in which 'it is 
inserted into humar, activity. Endemic to the concept are "images", "models", or "plans" 
of various orders. 
On one level· "mood" denotes hypothetical centres of pm•ers and systemic properties {e.g. the 
disposition approach--reflected in common usage as "inclination"); it refers to conditions 
.and attributes of a psychological sentient subject (e.g. the state approach--reflected in 
common usage as "state of mind" or "feeling"). It can also be maintained that "mood" is 
an iconic term, its meaning (its peculiar oscillation in reference) gives a "picture" of, 
or is isomorphic to, what by one definition it denotes--changeability that is simple, 
mediated, or complex; a complexity that includes the pattern of oscillation. 
"mood" is also a self-expressive concept, a cover for tendencies to self-expression, . 
subjective expressive unity, and the inner dynamism of a striving consciousness. 
Part of its technical meaning stems from its employment as an hypothetical construct--it 
denotes experience but is also an organizational concept on more than one level. It may 
stand for an observed collection of behaviours, or for the abstracted arrangement of that 
behavioural array (e.g. Nowlis, 1965); it may logically bridge the gap between personality 
and environment--or between "self" and "world'' (e.g. Stein, 1970). It can function as an 
higher-order theoretical term with a low coefficient of empirical reduction, or at an 
intermediate level may refer to a modulator' and sensitizer that changes the values of 
multiple personality dimensions and affects the perceptual-interaction ~ith the environment 
(e.g. Cattell, 1963). 
Conceptual· analysis, theoretical gleanings, and clinical experience, have established this 
inclusive range of meaning for the concept "mood": 
1. protracted feeling states of moderate or high intensity 
2. quickly changing or vacillating elements of affect 
3. general feeling tone 
4. susceptibility.to spells of irritability and bad temper 
5. basic desires or inclinations 
6. peripheral affective shadings, background elements and structures of potential affect 
7. some combination of affect, attitude, self-concept and perceptual set 
8. a collection of behaviours, or higher-order organizations of affect and behaviour 
9. a synthetic unit of "seeing", "feeling", and "being"; a sensitivity and resonance 
uniting conscious with the environment and revealing aspects ~f the self structure. 
Theories of Mood 
Theories of "moo<:l" are not 1.n an advanced stage of development. Strictly speaking, no mood 
viewpoint is sufficiently defined, ordered, and internally regulazed to the extent of 
providing explicit formal language systems (pure or interpreted), axiomatic or deductive 
systems with determined predictive pmver. Definition: systems are usually weak or vague, 
with a high coefficient of density and no clear exi)lication. Cer.::ainly no viewpoint is 
capable of claiming to have satisfied the requirement of providin&: 'a $Ct of systen1atically 
(viii) 
related statements, including some lawlike generalizations, that is empirically testable' 
(Rudner, 1966, p.lO). Cattell has offered a theory of modulato=s, and here there is an 
interconnecting of descriptions with inferential linkages, but no clear operational 
definitions, criteria of identification, and uncertain predictive power. 
However, several viev1points offer empirical models, or systematized metaphors upon which 
their higher-order propositions are based. To give one example from the three major 
perspectives: 
Disposition Hodels 
(e.g. Nowlis, 1965). 
Definition: 'Mood is the effect on a person of his own configurations of acuvl.ty. 
These configurations tnay be conceptualized as fundamental patterns of general functioning 
and orientation •••• ' 
Type of Model: negative feedback, implicitly self-regulating; multi-dimensional 
Constituent Elements: mood is the feedback effect on a person of his o~~ configurations 
of activity; mood is mediated by a variety o£ cues and a reinforcement history; mood 
serves a monitoring and controlling function 
Assets: closely linked with experimental and. statistical procedures; c::ood measurement 
the product of an over.t theoretical conception; attention devoted to a range of possible 
mood dimensions; stress on rnonopolar mood factors consonant with clinical data; 
recognizes the interconnection between mood and self-concept; provides a degree of 
conceptual analysis 
Liabilities: insufficient attention given to qualitative and process aspects of mood; 
tendencies towards a "granular analysis"; ;;1 global conception provided, but without 
internal differentiation; imposes the logical forms of a natural science paradigm on 
psycho-social data; no clear demarcation of observation and theoretical terms. 
CONCEPTUAL k~D THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Chapter 1 is a detailed presentation and appraisal of rr~jor conceptual and theoretical issues 
in the domain of mood. The way is paved for an empirical study of mood by examinir.g the 
concept of "mood" and several different theoretical approaches. It is determined that there 
is a necessity for having an adequate concept of mood and criteria for the identification 
of mood prior to any experimental undertaking. Concepts and criteria are seen to be inter-
dependent. 
The status of mood reports as "knowledge by acquaintance" is advocated. Such reports, how-
ever, are not incorrigible. 
The conceptual pitfall£ of a Cartesian bias, i.e. separating behavioural aspects of mood 
from the feeling aspects, are to be avoided. An alternative approach co-ordinating feeling, 
situation, and behaviour, is proposed. From this vantage point the concept 11disposition" 
is seen prescriptively to have both a phenomenal and a behavioural reference. 
Mood criteria involving parameters of intensity, duration, and pervasiveness, are given 
concrete applications. Model cases, related cases, and borderline cases are established. 
The basic elerner..ts in ten different vieHpoints of moo<! ar.:: set out. As disposition theories 
currently predominate, the logical and experiential difficulties are examined. Although 
(ix) 
useful for research purposes, disposition theories are in need o( supplementation and 
completion. 
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE OBSERVATIONAL AND EXPERIHENTAL INVESTIGATION OF' HOOD 
Chapte~ 2 shows that the history of mood study has not been one of continuous linear develop-
ment. Rather, it reveals a series of intermittent motions, stops and starts, advancements 
and .periods of inactivity, hesitancies and crosscurrents of dispute, sudden enthusiasms and 
emphases dictated by psychological fashion. It is a history largely ignored in current mood 
studies. Therefore to the extent that the present is both a culmination of the past and a 
prefiguring of the future, it merits a clear and careful examination. 
A Schematic Presentation o( the Developmental Trends and Contemporary Issues ~n the Studv of 
Hood 
The structuralists Wundt and Titchener recognized the natural vigour and quiddity of.,,~ffective 
experience and held the firm conviction that self-observation (as introspection) and elemental 
analysis offered a reliable tool and procedure. 
Their search for the "elements" or "constituents" of consciousness resulted in intransitive 
and disjunctive units separated from their wider context. It was not sufficiently acknow-
ledged that these units may net be homogeneous, may require contextual definitions, and can 
participate in different logical and experiential orders. 
In general, inadequate attention was given to establishing criteria of identification; 
logical and experiential orders were not distinguished; and the determining role of semantics 
was left unexplicated. 
Early studies (e.g. Koch, 1913; Krueger, 1928) suggest the need for a molar process vietv. 
of mood. Mood processes may be internally complex. Evidence to support both these views 
is provided by the qualitative data of this study. Ruckmick (1936) offers mood criteria 
potentially amenable to experimental study. 
1934-1945 
1945-1959 
Mood conce.ptual:Lzed as the general feeling tone of the organism. Psycho-social 
factors are stressed. The role of physiological variables and the problem of 
mediation are considered. Psychoanalysts provide information on the develop-
mental and psychodynamic aspects of mood. 
The most frequent conceptualization of mood during this period was as the general 
feeling tone of the organism, either as a result of internal processes, or the 
impingement of the social environment. A variety of techniques were used for the 
study and induction of mood. The most popular mood ~asure was the bi-polar 
rating scale. It was used alone, in combination with questionnaires, in 
combination with experimental tests utilizing tests, behavioural and cognitive 
measures, and in combination with verbal reports. 
Mood linked to specific motivational sub-systems. A homeostatic model is developed. 
Experimental research concerned prima=ily with the effects and correlates of mood. 
Insufficient attention given to the logical ~hifts that should accompany procedural 
1960-1970 
1971-1977 
(x) 
shi.fts. Self-rating scales widely used to measure mood. 
New emphases began to emerge in the literature for this period, for some authors 
mood was still equivalent to general feeling tone, but now it was viewed as the 
resultant of a network of specific feeling tones grounded in operative aspecl;'.s 
of the individual's motivational system. "Mood" was also conceptualized as the 
affective aspect of psychic equilibrium following the resolution of conflict or 
excitement. Strictly speaking this period was dominated by a study of the effects 
and correlates of mood, the relationship between mood and associative responses 
being the preferred area of study. The usual technique was to employ mood self-
rating scales, a listing of associative responses and then to compare associative 
responses produced under different ratings of mood. The ratings most frequently 
chosen were "high" and "low" mood. 
The disposition view of mood becomes prominent. Mood seen as a consequence of the 
interaction between personality and situation. Clinically, the fluctuation!> of 
mood over extended time periods are studied. Factor analytically derived mood 
adjective check lists used to measure mood. Dimensions of the Nowlis MACL are 
replicated. Labelling of affective states shown to be a joint function of physio-
logical· arousal and cognitive factors. 
_A new conceptual sophistication emerges during this period. It is emphasized 
that there are two broad approaches to refining the concept "mood", ·i.e. atl;'.ention 
can be directed to the situations and sequences of situations that produce mood 
states attention can be directed to the moods themselves, to the experience 
of mood. It was not however sufficiently noted that the situation approach must 
face the difficulty that there may be no necessary one-to-one correspondence 
betwt!en situation and mood, particularly if mood is a cumulative effect, or the 
result of the mutual interaction and polarization' of physiological factors, 
personality structure, and psycho-social input (a ~ummary effect of multiple 
interactions). In addition moods of internal origination may overridingly 
determine perception, evaluation, and behaviour, and in this sense "create" the 
environmental potentials perceived and assimilated. Such a subjective idealism 
matches some subjects• mood experience. 
'fhe representation of mood by monopolar factors is challenged. "Mood" as an 
entity occurring within a matrix of psychological, psycho-social, and physio-
logical factors. Social-developmental and conflict models proposed. Evidence 
for interrelationships bet1-1een cognitive styles and mood states. A systematic 
· contemporary application of phenomenological principles is offered. 
During this period it is widely assumed that the individual is always in one mood 
or another. However, this is not as straightforwa<d a principle as it appears, 
it can involve a commitment to a variety of assumptions. lts meaning varies in 
the context of a particular theoretical view and in its theory-free inflection. 
It tends to equate mood with any affective state. At best it is a type of sununary 
statement that ranges rather freely over an undefined, unregulated, and un-
differentiated set of data. 
(xi) 
METHOD 
Subjects were all volunteer female university students between the ages of 16 and 32. Mean 
age was 19,12 years, with a standard deviation of 2,67 years. Sample size was 105: 
Three personality measures, the Cattell Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire, the Edwards 
Personal Preference Schedule, and the Gough Adjective Check List, were used as part of an 
experimental treatment and to determine personality variables that significantly distinguish 
"moody" from "r.on-moody" individuals. 
A M~od Analysis Questionnaire was developed and its overall effect on mood as well as moods 
classified as positive, neutral, and negative was determined. The Mood Analysis Question-
naire was also designed to elicit basic information on mood. 
The Nowlis Hood Adjective Check List was used to assess mood change across four different 
treatments. Treatment 1 (N=lOS) measured mood change resulting from the completion of 
personality tests; Treatment 2 (N=l05) measured mood change resulting from an experimenter 
administration of the Mood Analysis Questionnaire; Treatment 3 (N=l05) measured mood change 
resulting from engaging in q~iet activitic£; Treatment 4 (N=lOS) measured mood change 
resulting from a self-administration of the Mood Analysis Questionnaire; subjects also 
defined mood in terms of their own e:h"Perience, and used the word "mood" in four grammatical 
sentences. Each subject had a feedback and discussion meeting with the experimenter. 
An additional sessicn was given to 43 subjects in order to discuss their mood states. F::..fteen 
of these subjects volunteered for :urther intensive study of their moods. Descriptions .were 
obtained of basic recurring mood states. 
The statistical procedure involved both univariate and multivariate techniques of analysis. 
Exoerimental and Empirical Questions Considered 
The collection of experimental and qualitative data is orientated around a preliminary attempt 
at resolving a number of general and questions concerning "mood" and mood experience. 
The queseions considered can be grouped under four headings: Personality Variables that 
distinguish "Moody" from "Non-Moody" individuals, The Influ~nce of the Mood Analysis Techniq!.!e 
(HAT) on Hood, Psycho-linguistic Data Pertinent to the Concept Mood, and Qualitative Data 
Presenting the Basic Features and Attributes of Mood. 
1. Personality Variables that distinguish "Moody" from "Non-Hooey" Individuals 
Can standard personality tests provide a set of variables that distinguish "moody" from 
"non-moody" subjects? .Do different criteria of "moodiness" corresponding to different 
conceptions of "moody" establish identical or dissimilar patt~?:r:ts of variables? Are 
some variables constant regardless of the criterion of "moody"? 
2. The Influence of tht! Mood Analysis Technique (HAT) on Mood 
Does the Mood Analysis Technique have a greater global effect on mood than the other 
experim.ontal sessions·? !s the Mood Analysis Technique influencing particular dimensions 
of mood differently from the other exnerimental sessions, i.e. is its influence selective? 
Is the Mood Analysis Technique influe~cing "mood:;" individuals differently fr~m "non-
moody" individuals? l~hat is the effect of the Hood Analy:lis TechniQue on different 
. categories of mood, i.e. positive, neutral and negative moods?· wnat are the subjects' 
own appraisals of the Mood_Analysis Technique? 
(xii) 
3. Psycho-linguistic Data Pertinent to the Concept "Mood'' _ 
Car.. subjects' definition of "mood" in terms of their own experience contribute to our 
understanding of what mood is and he~,; it functions? What is the range of psycho-
linguistic actions that mood sentences perform? ir.>at significance does this have for 
·an ad.equate conceptualizatior.. of "mood"? Is "mood" primarily a state or a process 
concept? Can it be assimilated to an organizational concept for patterns of 
.behaviour? Does it operate exclusively to make social-evaluative attributions? 
4. ·Qualitative Data Presenting the Basic Features and Attributes of Mood 
What is the range of mood experience? What kinds of mood do subjects typically have? 
,How do subjects formulate the qualitative structure, the causes and reasons for their 
experience? Is there a wider matrix of contributing factors? When moods are grouped 
into positive, neutral and negative categories, are there common features across these 
categories? How do subjects perceive themselves and their environment when in specific 
moods? What aspects of self-concept may be said to be operating? 
RESULTS 
Personalitv Variables 
The two criteria used to identify "moody" individuals (each criterion corresponding to a 
different conception of "moody") yielded at a level of statistical significance personality 
variables that distinguished "moody" from "non-moody" subjects. Each criterion yielded a 
different set of personality variables, and there were ten personality variables co~~on to 
the two criteria. 
The effect of the i~\T on mood (overview) 
The argument that Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (~~T), 
has a determinate and specifiable effect on mood proceeds through four sequential stages: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Establishing that the technique has a major global effect across the set of mood dimensions 
Establishing that the technique has salient effects on particular mood dimensions 
Establishing that the technique brings new elements of affect into awareness 
Establishing that the technique has a differential effect on positive, neutral, and 
negative moods, and in particular functions to decrease the intensity or meliorate the 
quality of negative moods. 
The evidence is not absolutely conclusive, but it is believed to be sufficiently persuasive 
to suggest that the Mood Analysis Technique does have a major global influence, influences 
mood in ways different from the other experimental sessions, may influence mood irrespecti•1e 
of whether or not the individual is a "moody" person, and in particular has a positive effect 
on moods classified as '.'negative". 
Absolute magnitude of change scores 
We might P.xpect that Session 2, the experimenter ad~inistered Xood Analysis Technique (~T), 
would have a relatively high absolute magnitude of c!1ange sco:.-e (global change across the 
12 Nowlis Mood Factors) owing to its design as a probe and facilitatcr.of mood change. This 
expectation is fulfilled experimentally, at a level of statistical significance. However, we 
cannot say that the absolute magnitude of change score for Session 2 is greater than the 
absolute ·magnitude of change score for Session 1, the personality testing session. 
(xiii) 
~nitude of change scores 
An analysis of the magnitude of change sccres (discrete change on the 12 Nowlis Hood Factol:s) 
sho,vs that there is an overall difference in group means across the four experimental sessions 
at a level of statistical significance. Examining the individual Nowlis Mood Factors, those 
factors significantly distinguishing the four experimental sessions were: Aggression, Surgency, 
Social Affection, Sadness, Egotism and Scepticism. Focusing on Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Hood Analysis Technique (NAT), it was found: Session 2 increased the mood factors 
Aggression, Social Affection, Sadness and Egotism; and showed a lesser decrease in Surgency 
and Scepticism. 
Component change scores 
An analysis of the component change scores (internal change on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors) shows 
that the most salient component change scores for Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood 
Analysis Technique (~~T) relative to the other experimental sessions, occurred on these factors: 
Aggression (Session 2 had the ability to generate new components), Anxiety (Session 2 had the 
ability to generate nevi componen,ts and make components disapp<3ar--i t was the most active experi-
mental session in terms of this dimension), Social Affection (Session 2 had the ability to 
generate more new components than any of the other experimental sessions), and Sadness (Session 
2 shmved more total change and more new components). 
Interpretations 
In general the patterns of effect for Session 2 were parallel to Session 4, the self-administered 
MAT, and both sessions tended to be dissimiiar to Session 1, the personality testing session, 
and Session 3, the quiet ~ctivities session. 
The magnitude of change score results can be explained in terms of the design and format of the 
MAT, its ability to locate presen~ feeling in terms of past feeling, the latent and shadow 
aspects of present feeling, and the projection of future feeling--all aspects being made 
immanent th~ough th2 search for expressive metaphors. 
The component change scores suggest that Session 2 has the ability to generate more new 
components over seve~al mood dimensions, and provide substantial support for the argument that 
Session 2 is functioning to bring new feeling elements into awareness and to reveal potentials 
for feeling. 
The effect of the MAT on "moody" vs •. "non-moody" subjects 
An analysis of the effects of the different experimental sessions on "moody" vs. "non-moody" 
subjects revealed no sfatistical differences. With respect to the Nood Analysis Technique {HAT) 
this suggests that the MAT is influencing mood irrespective of whether or not the subject is 
a "moody" individual. However due to the general lack of statistical significance, this result 
must be interpreted circumspectly. 
The effect of the HAT on positive, neutral and negative moods 
Subjects' mood states were divided into positive, neutral and nq;:c:ti·.·e 0 t:~oods in order to deter-
mine the effect of Session 2, the experimenter administ:ered Mood il.nalysis Techniq'ue {!·l<\T), on 
different categories of mood, and in particular to determine the effect of the HAT on negative 
moods. It was found that Group 3 (negative moods) had a greater ~ean absolute magnitude of 
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change score than Group 2 (neutral moods). This suggests that Session 2 was globally 
influencing negative moods to a greater extent than more neutral moods. It appears that the .· 
negative ~oods are amenable to change and less resistant to change than the neutral moods. 
In order to establish that the greater glob~l effect represents an improvement in the negative 
moods, individual Nowlis }!ood Factors were examined in conjunction with subjects' indication 
of qualitative or intensity changes upon cor:Jpletion of Session 2. It was found that Group 3 
(negative moods) showed a decrease in Anxiety; and increases for the mood dimensions Surgency · 
and Elation. In each case these results can be interpreted as <m improvement in the negati•Je 
moods. The qualitative data establishes that overall, Session 2 operated to improve the 
qual'ity of negative moods or reduce their intensity. 
Subjects' conunents and appraisals of the HAT 
An analysis of subjects' comments upon completion of Session 2, revealed that the response 
categories "Changed Mood" and "Increased Awareness" had particularly high frequencies, and the 
response categories "Didn't Like Imagination Questions" and "Frustrating-Irritating" had 
particularly low frequencies. These results suggest that the MAT had the ability to influence 
mood, and did so in such a way that subjects' self-awareness and understanding of the generati•Je 
conditions, the source and trend of the mood was enhanced. Some subjects felt the }~T was too 
long and repetitious, but this was a minority opinion. 
Psycho-linguistic data 
Subjects' definition of "mood" 
An analysis of subjects' definition of "mooCI" 1.n terms of their 01m experience showed: 
Response categories with particularly high frequencies 
1. Mood as a state of mind or feeling 
2. Mood characterized as pervasive 
3. Mood as having a causal effect 
4. Mood as the result of both internal and external factors 
s. Mood as an attitude 
It is suggested that the data of this section provides an empirical base that any theorecical 
view should be able to accommodate. 
Language acts of sentences using the word "mood" 
An analysis of the. language acts performed by sentences using the word "ruood" shows that mood 
terms are used both to perform social-judgemental actions and to report feeling qualities. 
The data obtained is used as part of the continuing effort to determine the parameters of what 
can meaningfully be said about "mood" as both a concept and an experience. Specifically, the 
data is used to confirm or disconfirm two theses: 
1. that mood is not any sort of experience or process and 
2. that linguistic expressions referring to moods are not nec~ssarily functioning to inform 
of psychological facts and that these expressions presuppose various social and institu-
tional concepts. 
In addition we ~•ish to consider how this data in its interpreted fo~ might contribute to the 
configuration of a comprehensive concept or model for mood. 
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Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data is presented which will permit a determination of the causal factors and 
reasons for a range of mood types; for positive, neutral and negative moods, it will suggest 
the aspects of personal identity operating, the role of goals and the self-concept, the type 
and quality of interpersonal relationships fostered, the intrinsic modulations in self and 
environment perception, and the degree to which the subject herself may play an active end 
decisive role in the production and maintenance of the mood. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion 
Personality Variables 
Personality sketches of the two types of "moody" individual 
The self-opinion criterion 
(moody in the sense of having protracted feeling states of moderate intensity and/or 
susceptibility to irritability and spells of bad temper) 
The individual is suspicicus, tense, apprehensive--she knows doubt and self-division, and 
above all is strongly affected by her feelings. She usually has poor personal adjustment, 
but is open about her needs and feelings. In her contacts with the external world her 
relatively high autonomy need and low need for affiliation and nurturance may lend an air 
of confident superiority to her actions, but her internal matrix of feelings and attitudes 
belies this confidence. 
The high and low mean variability criterion 
(moody in the sense of variability in feelings over a given unit of time) 
The individual is impulsive, unpredictable and emotionally explosive. Her aggressive assertive-
ness tends to establish its own law and authority. The variability of her feeling makes all 
her interests spasmodic, former urgencies are forgotten as new emotions demand different 
investments. Her low integration, disregard for social demands and restrictions, propel her 
into difficult and complex interpersonal situations. She finds that she cannot trust herself 
because of her changing feelings. The multiform nature of her affective life produces 
confusion, a sense of maladjustment end discontent. 
The effect of the M.I\T on mood dimensions 
Absolute mag~itude of change scores 
The main findings discussed are the lack of statistical difference between Session 2, the. 
experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (~~T), and Session 1, the personality testing 
session. Also, the relatively low absolute magnitude of change score for Session 4, the self-
administered ~~T. 
The reason for the lack o( statistical difference lies in the similarity of the cognitive 
processes instituted by the two sessions. Both sessions constitute a 'serious prpbing of the 
subject's affects and behaviour (alth.oligh the personality tests have a more shallow.a~d 
scattered effect). 
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Session 4, the self-ad!ninistered HAT, was the final experimental session, thus it did not have 
the novelty of Session 1, and there may hcve been a lingering practice effer.t from Session 2. 
This points to a deficiency in the experimental procedure. 
Magnitude of change scores 
The salient effects of Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (K-\T). 
Relative to the other experimental se~sions, the salient effects of Session 2, were increases 
on the mood factors Aggression, Social Affection, Sadness and Egotism. It is most liltcly that 
in-depth and concerted attention on needs and feelings was responsible for the increase in 
Egotism. But this in itself does not explain the increases on such widely divergent factors 
as Aggression, Social Affection and Sadness. In order to put this finding into perspective, 
it should be re-emphasized that the Mood Analysis Technique was designed to focus on present 
feeling, to encourage its intensification and unfolding into new affect. In addition, it 
brought background and peripheral feelings to the foreground. Emphasis was also placed on 
"protensional vectors", i.e. the revelation of potentials for feeling through the ;>os::ulation 
of possible feelings in the near future (e.g. the questions 'Do you think your mood needs 
something to be completed or fulfilled? Do you think the mood is stable, or will it change 
into a different mood?'). The imaginative portrayal of immediate feelings against both inner 
and outer horizons (proximal and uistal limiting conditions) was simultaneously encouraged. 
Thus although it ~s a post hoc argument, it becomes co~prehensible that such diverse factors 
were increased, and that such a basic, almo~t primitive affective cluster as Aggression, 
Social Affection and Sadness was activat-ed, manifested and developed. 
The examination of the significant mood factors under the headings affective factors, ener~y 
factors, and cognitive factors permits the conclusion that the MAT is basically affect 
stimulating, energy reducing (but less so than Session 1), and cognition promoting. Increases 
on the factor Egotism, which is an indicator of self-involvement and self-concern, are 
interpreted not as increases in stagnant or morbid self-concern, but as the generation and 
development of a d)<lamic self-awareness that is one prerequisite fer affective change. 
Component change scores· 
Component change scores- for mood factors that showed significant magnitude of change scores. 
What we wish to determine is whether the argument that Session 2, the experimenter administered 
Mood Analysis Technique (K~T), is functioning to bring laten:: or peripheral feeling elements 
into awareness and reveal potentials for feeling, is cogent. If it is, then we should expect 
Session 2 to be associated with a greater number of new components. 
The argument receives support from the component change scores on the mood factors: Aggression, 
Surgency, Social Affection, Sadness and Egotism. 
Comparison of Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Te.chnique (MAT), with 
Session 4, the self-administered MAT 
For the factor Social Affection, Session 2 showed more new compunents and more total change 
than Session 4. For the factor· Sadness, Session 2 showed more total change than Session 4. 
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The differences can be vieHed in either one or both of two ways. The experimenter's verbal 
involvement on Session 2 may have been responsible for greater changes in Sadness and Social 
Affection; or Session 4 being the final ~xperimental session and basically a repetition of 
Session 2, may consequently have produced relatively less change on these dimensions. There 
is evidence that the differences between Sessions 2 and 4 cannot be wholly attributed to the 
experimenter's verbal involvement; it is more likely a joint function of experimental order 
and verbal involvement. 
Component change scores for mood factors that did not show significant magnitude of change 
scores 
There were several major mood faccors which did not show significant magnitude of change 
scores across the four experimental sessions but which nevertheless did show significant 
co~ponent change scores. These factors provide further evidence that Session 2 is 
functioning to intensify mood, bring new feeling elements into awareness, and pro~ote affective 
change. 
In particular, Session 2 was the most active experimental session in terms of influencing 
the mood factor Anxiety. It had the ability both to generate new components and to make 
components disappear. Thus the factor Anxiety also tends to support the argument. 
The effect of the ~AT on positive, neutral and negative moods 
The discussion section primarily focuses on. determining che effect of the MAT on negative moods. 
Confidence in the utility of the ~~Twill be enhanced if it can be shown to influence negative 
moods by: bringing about a global change, modifying major dimensions in a positive way, and 
decreasing their intensity or shifting their negative quality. 
Group 3 (negative moods) showed a greater absolute magnitude of change than Group 2 (neur.ral 
moods). This suggests that overall the negative moods are amenable to change by the ~~T, and 
less resistant to change than .the more neutral moods. But it must be clearly established that 
this greater global effect represents an improvement in these moods. This can be done by 
examining the individual Nowlis Mood Factors. 
For the mood factor Anxiety, Group 3 (negative moods) showed a decrease, while Group l 
(positive moods) and Group 2 (neutral moods) both showed an increase. 
For the mood factor Surgency, Group 3 (negative moods) showed an increase, while Group 1 
(positive moods) and Group 2 (neutral moods) both showed a decrease. 
For the mood factor Elation, Group 3 (negative moods) showed an increase, while Group 1 
(positive moods) showed a decrease. 
Thus the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors suggest that Session 2, the 
experimenter administered Hood Analysis Technique (HAT), was influencing negacive moods by: 
reducing tension, uncertainty and apprehension; increasing the availa~ility of exuberant 
energy; and increasing vitality, vibrancy and warm excitement. 
Examining the quality and intensity changes for the negative moods in terms of improvements, 
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stabilizations and deteriorations, it was found that the ~~T is gerrerally effective in 
improving negative moods. In the cnse of the four negative moods that appeared to deteriorate, 
there were nevertheless new elements of understanding, an increased awareness of the total 
problem, the satisfaction of integration through self-expression, and a cognizance of the 
range, potential and pressure of the component feeling processes. 
The effect of the four experimental s~ssions on "moody'* vs. "non-moody" subjects 
There were no statistical differences between "moody" and "non-moody" subjects across the 
four experimental sessions. Focusing on Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood 
Analysis Technique n~T), this finding suggests that either the MAT is deficient and not 
influencing "moody" indi·,.riduals, or that the MAT influences mood irrespective of whether or 
not the individual can be classified as "moody". The previous analyses of magnitude of 
change scores and comp.onent change scores, as well as subjECts' comments upon completion of 
Session 2, suggest the latter alternative is the most adequate explanation. 
Subjects' comments and a?praisals of the ~~T 
By and large subjects' comments indicate that the MAT had the ability to influence mood, and 
did so in such a way that the mood experience was altered in predominantly positive ways and 
resulted in increas~d understanding and insight. Those cases where subjects gave 
comments (and it was part of the design to encourage this in order to avoid "acquiescent" 
and "socially desirable" responses) occurred in physically tired moads, or moods demanding 
immediate action and energetic physical responses. 
Subjects' definition of "mood" 
In eAamining the meaning and import of the statistically significant definition elements, the 
following issues are pertinent: 
Mood as a state of mind or feeling 
This element suggests that mood as experienced represents the affective realization of maltiple 
tendencies and capacities. ].load as a state of consciousness should take precedent over higher-
order disposition formulations. Mood as a state of mind or feeling suggests a c~ndition of the 
mind, the self, the doer and the observer. With this emphasis the existential view of mood as 
"tone" or "attunement" is analogically descriptive. It further brings to light the issue of 
mood as a general condition of the organism. To speak of a general feeling in any sense other 
than as "dominant", "overriding", "pervasive", "diversely influential", "exclusive" or 
"resultant", may be ambiguous. "Mood" can exist conceptually, or may be experienced as a 
of awareness (sensing, perceiving, conceiving, experiencing through feeling, taken immediately 
and synthetically); this implies a colligation, a co-ordination, an interdependency of elements, 
and an inter-animation of dimensions. 
Mood characterized as pervasive 
This category is comprised of definition elements that conform closely to the usage of the 
adjective "pervasive", i.e. indicates the quality of something which permeates, saturates, cr 
diffuses through; but no commitment is made to an hydraulic illodel, it is rather a metaphorical 
indication of general influence. The term "pervasive" can be reconstrti.cted in two ways: as 
the experience of pervasiveness, in this form it bears affinities to the psychoanalytic idea 
of "colouration" and the existential ideas of "tone", "reverberation" and "attunemer:.t"; in 
the second way it refers to the avowal of pervasiveness, in thP sense that the individual is 
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willing to say that the mood influences everything she thinks, feels, says and does. This 
latter reconstruction is in accord with several of the disposition approaches. 
Mood characterized as having a causal effect 
This definition element suggests that "mood" may have a direct and readily discernible effect 
on the individual. Under the rubric "causal" we can distinguish a strong sense of causal 
effect, where mood operates directly and immeuiately to determine one's thoughts, feelings, 
and actions--though not in the sense of implying an antecedent that invariably and uncondition-
ally produces a specific set of responses. There is also a weaker sense of "causal". where 
mood operates to influence, to stimulate and functions as a co-determinator of one's thoughts, 
feelings and actions. In the exist~ntial view mood is not so much "causal" as "pre-emptive". 
Here, mood represents an inner complicity, a mutual prepossessing, that supports the actions 
which shape the world that shapes the psychological subject. It is the prepotent experience 
and relational vector by which the self discovers its agency and freedo~ in relation to a world. 
Mood characterized as the result of both internal and external factors 
Subjects provided definition elements that suggest, logically, that the locus of fo•mation for 
mood concepts should lie in a region that integrates external factors (environment) and internal 
factors (feelings, associations--a personal network). The most common tendency was to ascribe 
formative power to internal and external factors acting conjointly. This suggests that the 
concept may stand (or be generated) at the interface of at least two unique but inter-
penetrating domains. The most adequate, coherent and experientially consistent configuration 
for "mood" may require the interlinking of <; psycho-social domain, a physiological domain, <1nd 
an affective domain. 
Mood characterized as an attitude 
It is important to determine to what extent the two concepts "mood" and "attitude" are sir..:ilar. 
The differentiation of "mood" from "attitude" is a difficult problem both theoretically and 
empirically. Some conceptualizations of attitude are so global that almost any affective or 
cognitive phenomenon (or disposition) could be subsumed under them. There are some possible 
distinctions that should be kept in mind. They are: 
1. Mood is primarily a phenomenal state with a central feeling component, which can usually 
be termed "pervasive". 
2. The cognitive element in mood is often less marked, sometimes absent, and not necessary to 
the concept of mood. In the case of attitude, some central idea, evaluation, cognitively 
deployed .preference or judgement, does seem to be essentr"al. 
3. Moods may be distinguished from attitudes in terms of their performing different functions. 
4. Moods are probably more closely linked to physiological variables than attitudes are, ~ut 
both entities are closely linked with psycho-social variables. 
Language Acts of se:1tences using the word "mood" 
The discussion of this section suggests that the use of linguistic expressions employing the 
term "mood" establishes mood discourse as being linked •lith: 
1. Phenomena capable of being reported as felt and concerning ••hich various discriminations 
can be made; this incluGes the not~on of systematic regularities and correlations with 
different types of circumstance and cognitive and behavioural consequences. 
2. Tendencies towards making judgements and appraisals coru::.orlling oneself and others. 
However, the possibility is raised that only on a conceptual level can there be a complete 
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separation of these aspects. !n the abstract it is difficult to see how these disparate 
meaning components or aspects (the one favouring a state and process view, the othe!" favouring 
a cognitive and disposition view) can be reconciled •. It is also seen that in at least some 
cases the two aspects may he complementary. This raises the question of the necessity for a 
complementarity principle for describing mood. 
A conservative conclusion would be to say that the social-judgemental function of mood dis-
course predominates, but not to the exclusion of the function of reporting qualities of 
affective experience. It is most likely that both general functions are necessary to encompass 
the ·diversity of mood discourse and constitute the core meanings of mood terms. 
The wider ramifications of these issues suggest that the identification and re-identification 
of mood is partially dependent on a puLlic language embedded in a background of social con-
vention, habits, traditions and personal intentions. But what makes mood identifiable as a 
particular individual's mood, is its quality of feeling, its general interconnectedness, its 
outward movement or its self-encapsulation. 
A Structural Analvsis of the Qualitative Data 
In this section a composite representation is constructed for each of the three categories of 
mood: positive, neutral and negative. The analysis is structural in that the composite 
representations construe mood as a system and seek to articulate this system and the "laws" 
or "rules" that govern it. Attention is given to the smooth or reticulated surfaces of 
phenomena, and contributions are .IT~de to their elaboration, but the primary intent is always 
a seeking to fathom underlying levels and generative conditions. 
In the case of the positive moods, the descriptive elements and metaphorical portrayals are 
united around four themes: the concentration of energy; an irradiation of the environment; 
unt!"ammelled movement and communication; .and feeling natural and bound to the earth. 
Focusing on the most "elevated" and dynamically charged positive moods, it was found that the 
subjects all experienced concentration of energy, dilated fullness, they themselves became an 
irradiating source. This concentration of energy can operate as wilful determination, proud 
self-sufficiency, liberating self-acceptance, or as an intransitive union in consciousness 
with an ideal object, without the intercession of mind or brain. But dissolution is inevitable, 
for the .mood is internally mediated and sustained only by its unique intensity. In forging 
an external relationship it.c:reates the nurturing condition for its mm self-division. Never-
theless in the mood's passing something is achieved and one particular role in the overall 
system is enacted, the lineaments of a particular type of understanding are drawn. The 
achievement can be gauged by subjects' own statements concerning the mood's functioning. 
In the later phases of the experience fear almost invariably comes to the surface. Although 
the mood revitalizes, it infuses where something has been lost--the inner conviction of the 
supportive quality of life. The fear is a projection of the fore-knowledge of the mood's 
collapse, an approaching divestment of strength. On the most concrete level, it is a f~ar 
of failure in emotional relationships, social disapproval, having no one to lean on, O!" 
co.nversely losing one's individuality. More abstractly, it is a fear of "corruption", "the 
untrust..-orthiness of the world", and "the condition that things are often not what they appear 
to be". 
The general picture that emerges is the existence of internal potentials stimulated by either 
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one small event or larger events occurring against a background of positive social relation-
ships. !t is ~he personal value of enviro~mental factors aligning with or gearing into 
internal potentials and rhythms, which is responsible for the positive moods. 
Conclusions 
Mood as Concept and Experience 
"Mood" is the most general affective parameter; as a logical vector, ·it functions pre-
posi,tionally and connectively, lodged in the "gap" between personality and behaviour, or 
between "self" and "world"; as a boundary form of affective discourse, it is capable of 
positing both individual qualitative experience and social actions; as a class of functions 
and behaviours, it is highly elastic, defined by a range of idiosyncratic elements. 
"Mood" refers to an organized inflection in the subtle or mundane current of affective life. 
Mood (and denotes) not only a personal liability, but also a sensitivity, an appropriation 
of individuality, and a self-revealing in an inimical or nurturant world. 
Mood Attributes 
General mood attributes are given under the headings: global modulation, organismic arousal, 
.perception and environmental interactions, and self-concept. 
Perspectival mood attributes are established from: teleological, process, state, structural, 
functional, disposition, relational, and cognitive viewpoints. 
The Structure and Functioning of Hood 
(a psycho-dynamic construction is offered which combines elements from diverse models; it 
is clinically useful but systemically incongruous) 
The qualitative data of this study suggests that although moods may exhibit an original and 
prevailing feeling tone of singular quality, nevertheless there is often an internal complexi~y 
of various elements and processes. A ~ood has its own characteristic rate of change, its 
required phases and balance points. Moods tend to have dual roots, they are anchored in 
childhood experiences and needs, and in subliminal processes. Their evolution is primarily 
a cognitive differentiation which remains attuned to basic physiological rhythms. The basic 
mood potential involves a sensitization to a range of factors, and the individual typically 
will be constrained to feel, perceive, evaluate and behave in characteristic ways. 
The Mood Analysis Technique (~~T) 
The Mood Analysis Technique, which was d~signed as a facilitator of mood change and as an 
instru~ent to probe the different levels of mood in order to bring new elements of affect into 
awareness and increase understanding, has been shown to have a determinate and specifiable 
effect on mood. Confidence in its empirical effect comes from statistical analyses that 
indicate the MAT has a global effect across several mood dimensions, influences mood in ways 
different from the other experimental sessions, may influence ~ooti irrespective of whether or 
not the individual can be considered a "moody" person, and brings .about intensity and quality 
modifications in mood states. Especially noteworthy, is the ability of the HAT to influence 
"negative moods" in predominantly positive ways·, i.e. to reduce the intensity or meliorate 
the quality cf negative moods. 
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Personality Variables that Significantly Distinguish "Hoody" from "Non-Moody" Subjects 
It has been established that "moody" subjects can be distinguished from "non-moody" subjects 
in terms of personality variables revealed by standard tests and that different criteria of 
"moodiness" corresponding to different conceptions of "moody" are each corr.elated with unique 
set~ of personality variables. However, ten personality variables were found to be common 
to the two ·criteria. 
The personality data suggests the general conclusion that "moody" subjects can be distinguished 
fro~ "non-moody" subjects in terms of persor,ali ty variables revealed by standard tests. 
"Moody" subjects may be different from their "non-moody" counterparts in terms of their needs, 
values, actions and modes of responding. There is also sufficient evidence to conclude, 
conceptually, that the concepts of "moodiness" associated with the two different criteria 
should be given a degree of logical independence; and empirically, that the unique variables 
enclose different segments of personality dispositions. However, the existence of a core set 
of variables common to both criteria requires the conclusion that conceptually the two 
perspectives of "moodiness" may span a more fundamental logical entity; and empirically 
there may be a more basic entity, pattern, or factor underlying the revealed variables. 
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AIMS AND ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY 
The study 1s a multifaceted approach to the experience and the concept 
of mood. It ut_ilizes techniques of clinical, experimental, and con-
ceptual analysis to uncover the fundamental elements, structures, and 
qualities of mood. Projecting the goals of. clarity and comprehension 
through the collecting and strenuous opposing of multiple perspectives, 
it gives primary importance to s.ubjects' own descriptions of mood, and 
to the unfolding, concatenating, articulating, and integrating of mood 
exper1ence. 
General Aims 
1 To determine the effect of one specially designed technique 
(The Mood Analysis Technique) on basic dimensions,of subjects' 
mood. 
11 To provide a broad perspective on "mood" through examining the 
concept and its interconnections with empirical data. 
111 To outline the "problem areas" of mood on an experimental plane, 
an empirical plane, and a theoretical plane. 
Specific Aims 
i To establish the parameters and necessary conceptual elements 
of the concept "mood"; to determine the basic elements in 
different theoretical perspQctives 1n order to assess their 
congruence with clinical data, and to lay the ground work for 
a conceptual synthesis and increased clinical understanding. 
ii To establish the historically relevant studies that have pre-
determined the limits of contemporary approaches to mood study. 
111 To establish the personality variables correlated with different· 
mood criteria and their defining concepts. 
1v To establish the globaL effect of the Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT); its effect relative to other experimental treatments; 
its effect on "moody" vs. "non-moody" subjects; and especially 
its effect on moods classified as positive, ri.eutraL and negative. 
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v To establish through the analysis of subjects' own definition 
of "mood", a primary empirical base that any theoretical or 
conceptual analysis should be orientated to and capable of 
accounting for through its network of elements. 
vi To use psycho-1 tic data (particularly a functional 
analysis of sentences using the.word "mood") to establish the 
outlines of what can meaningfully be said about mood both as 
an experience and a concept. 
vii To exam1ne clinical mood data in order to determine qualitat 
features, recurring attributes, structural and systemic aspects, 
and causes and reasons for mood experience. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Null Hypothesis H0 
It is hypothesized that the two different criteria of 
moodiness (the self-opinion criterion and the criterion 
of high and low mean variability) will not yield 
different patterns of significant personality variables. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 : 
It is hypothesized that the two different criteria of 
moodiness (the self-opinion criterion and the criterion 
of high and lo~ mean variability) will yield different 
patterns of si cant personality variables. 
Null Hypothesis H0 
It is hypothesized that the mean absolute magnitude of 
change score for Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not differ 
from the mean absolute magnitude of change score for 
Session 1, the personality testing session. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 : 
It is hypothes that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will have 
a different mean absolute magnitude of change score 
than Session 1, the personality testing session. 
Null Hypothesis H0 
It is hypothesized that the mean absolute magnitude of 
change score for Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analys Technique (MAT), will not differ 
from the mean absolute magnitude of change score for 
Session 3, the quiet activities session. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 : 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will have 
a different mean absolute magnitude of change score 
than Session 3, the quiet activities session. 
Null Hypothesis Ho 
It is hypothesized that the mean absolute magnitude of 
change score for Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not differ 
4.2.1.6 
4.3.1.1 
4.3.1.2 
4.3.1.3 
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from the mean absolute magnitude of change score 
for Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis 
Technique. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analys Technique (MAT), will have 
a different mean absolute magnitude of change score 
than Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis 
Technique. 
Null Hypothesis H0 
It is. hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not 
differ from Session 4, the self-administered Mood 
Analys Technique in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will be 
different from Session 4, the self-administered Mood 
Analysis Technique in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
Null Hypothesis H0 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not 
differ from Session 1, the personality testing session, 
and Session 3, the quiet activities session in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective.Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
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Alternative Hypothesis H1 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), t.J"ill be 
different from Session 1, the personality testing 
session, and Session 3, the quiet activities session 
in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
Null Hypothesis H0 
It is hypothesized that Session 4, the self-administered 
l 
Mood Analysis Technique, will not differ from Session 1, 
the personality testing session and Session 3, the quiet 
activities session 1n terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new,and total change in mood components. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 
It is hypothesized that Session 4, the self-administered 
Hood Analysis Technique, will be different from Session 1, 
the personality testing session, and Session 3, the quiet 
activities session 1n terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
~ood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
Null Hypothesis H0 
It is hypothesized that the four experimental sessions 
will not differ in their effects on the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors for moody vs. non-moody subjects. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 
It is hypothesized that the four experimental sess1ons 
will yield different effects on the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors for moody vs. non-moody subjects. 
4.5.~.1 
4.5.1.2 
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Null Hypothesis H0 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not 
differ in its effect on the absolute magnitude of 
change scores for the three mood groups. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 · 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will 
differ in its effect on the absolute magnitude of 
change scores for the three mood groups. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study is a multifaceted approach to the basic phenomenon of mood. 
It gives attention to the experimental investigation of parameters of 
mood, the adequacy of current concepts of mood, the metalogic of 
sentences employing the term "mood", and the structure, causes and 
reasons for subjects' reported mood experience. 
The Experimental Problem 
The experimental "problem" was twofold: to develop a technique that 
would institute explorations of mood and facilitate its representation 
to individuals through an organized but open-ended series of questions. 
The ability to interrogate one's own affective experience is considered 
fundamental to self-knowledge, person-perception, and individual growth. 
The second aspect of the experimental problem was to establish with a 
reasonable degree of confidence the effects such a technique has on 
basic dimensions of mood. The argument that this technique has a 
determinate and specifiable effect on "mood" proceeds through four 
sequential stages: 
1. Establishing that the technique has a major global influence on 
mood dimensions (section 4.2). 
2. Establishing that the technique has salient effects on mood 
dimensions (section 4.31). 
3. Establishing that the technique brings new elements of affect 
into awareness (section 4.32) and 
4. Establishing that the technique has a differential effect on 
different categories of mood, and in particular functions to 
change the intensity or·quality of negative moods (section 4.5). 
The Conceptual Problem 
A technique implies a methodology and a network of correlated concepts; 
a technique that aspires to reflect the developing mode of awareness 
within the texture of affective experience requires a concept for its 
dynamic orientation. For this reason there is a conceptual "problem", 
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which is to say that the logic of the concept of mood is rendered 
problematic. In advance, the puckered rind of conceptual orthodoxy 
for its own sake--is rejected, as is the air-distended pith of 
attractive but non-utilitarian formulations. Previous attempts at 
~onceptualizing "mood11 should be considered and revised in light of 
subjects' individual experience. It is quite possible that the most 
adequate concept will surmount standard correspondence or coherence 
models of truth value. From this critical perspective (critical as 
both incisive and crucial) the operative concepts and theories of 
mood are approached with a view to determining their underlying 
structure and import with respect to the experience of mood. What 1s 
sought is the framework for a concept that is both rigorous and 
stable,, and of circumscribed boundaries: a concept that can be limited 
and filled with the actualities of living experience-~congruent with 
the force, motion, and individual life-relevant patterns of self-
progression. 
The work to be presented does not purport to be the final word, and 
only a working concept is presented. However the work does cast a 
wide net, does sift, gather up, and bring together the major elements 
for a concept that is both genuine and vital. The work presented is 
a laying down of boundaries, a clearing space that listens to all the 
varieties of mood discourse and speaks the essentials of what has been 
heard. 
A word of caution is also necessary. The term "mood" in its common 
usage and in its technical solidifications shifts, realigns, twists 
and turns to accommodate a variety of entities, and personal intentions. 
Major inflections are: mood as general feeling tone, mood as vari-
ability in feeling, and mood as a protracted feeling state of moderate 
intensity. "Mood" can be studied under any or all of these headings. 
It would perhaps be preferable to select one definition and trace it 
conceptually and experimentally through its various possible trans-
formations. However, one aim of the study was to study "mood" in its 
diverse aspects, and for that reason "mood" was considered under each 
of these headings. The degree of disunity introduced by this multi..: 
plicity can be reduced if we consider the study as being primarily 
descriptive, approaching "mood" from several perspectives, and 
secondarily as being presentational and prescriptive--the problems are 
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identified, mapped out, and a general recommendation is made, i.e. any 
concept of mood should be congruent with experiential variables and 
responsible to environmental factors. The concepts associated with 
each of this work's subsections' are: personality data- mood as vari-
ability of feeling and mood as a protracted feeling state of moderate 
intensity; experimental data - mood as the general feeling tone of 
the individual; qualitative data - mood as a protracted feeling state 
of moderate intensity. 
There are two main pitfalls associated with the study of mood and mood 
concepts. Firstly, the concept of mood shorn of a particular context 
tends to be both ambiguous and misleading, or vaporized by successive 
abstractions it is easy to make the concept so general that it will 
fit any affective data. Secondly, there is the perennial threat of 
reification, a tendency to think that the term and concept "mood" 
brings into existence and attaches itself to an inertial "thing" in 
the same way that environmental objects are named. There may 1n fact 
be a double reification: the word "mood" taken as naming totally 
"concrete" and "palpable" entities (feeling entities) and feeling 
entities taken as existing in a substantive mode, rather than as 
experienced potentials and processes. 
The Problems of Voice, Language and Unity 
Voice 
It might appear that the work is gratuitously multivocal, that it 
speaks with different inflections, to different purposes, in the 
various sections, and at no time consents to a univocal mode of dis-
course. 
The work is multivocal, but the different "voices" are not arbitrary, 
and stem from the stated aim of approaching "mood" from different 
perspectives and on different levels. The conceptual voice speaks a 
I 
language of logic, hier~rchies, and seeks the grounds of adequacy. 
The experimental voice speaks a language of statistical notation, 
presents probabilistic statements, and seeks experimental demonstration. 
The experiential voice speaks an expressive language of symbolic 
'· 
presentation, attempts constitution through the medium of language, 
portrays linguistically, and seeks essential metaphorical description. 
\. 
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Each voice and language, within its own limited purview, establishes 
a valid perspective. The net effect of multiple perspectives is an 
expansion and contraction of v1s1on, it intends a stereoscopic vision 
of a multidimensional entity (mood)*, and a place where the relative 
utility of particular concepts can be demonstrated. 
There can be a depth created by multiple interlocking descriptions 
(part of the aim is to show just where the different descriptions do 
interlock), and both knowledge and freedom in balancing and opposing 
diverse perspectives. Where an overarching unity would be a falsi-
fication of what there is, an ordered diversity may establish a 
dynamic and constructive repose. 
Language is capable of serv1ng many different functions, e.g. the 
sharp delineation of facts and the "knitting together" of the "inter-
sti,tial tissue" of experience. 
The work makes full use of the total resource of language to ferret 
out, reveal and express the nature of "mood" both as a concept and 
experience: it states facts, portrays experience, and attempts to 
precipitate a new awareness of "mood" and its problems. The reader 
may expect to encounter an increase in language density and complexity 
from Chapter 1 to Chapter 5. Chapter 1 seeks to exclude, to bring to 
light the minimum necessary conceptual elements that are basic to 
beginning an empirical study. Chapter 5, on the other hand, seeks to 
include, to collect and bring into focus the maximum number of valid 
perspectives (relative to the empirical data) and to establish their 
relevance. For example, each of the three mood categories, positive, 
neutral and negative (section 5.11) is linked with a particular gram-
matical formation. This act of linkage is not fortuitous, but 
neither is it sufficient for an understanding of the mood categories 
--it is an analogy, a correspondence, it is developed because it puts 
the data into. an additional perspective that may qualify (support or 
* Note: It might also be correct to say that the "vision" is multi-
dimensional, converging on and being resolved by an unknown 
entity called "mood". 
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detract from) other perspectives, and functions to shape our overall 
understanding. 
The establishing of multiple perspectives is seen as essential to 
explicating the plenum of "truth". It is the reflection of a dia-
lectic or adversary system of knowledge--where the tensions and 
contradictions may ultimately, through a process of abrasion and 
paring away, result in an adequate representation beyond the dis-
tortions (limitations and omissions) of individual viewpoints. 
Language, through its attributes of malleability and functional 
diversity, is an adequate method for instituting, sustaining, and 
bringing this process to completion. 
If we v~ew "mood" only as a state or process, we will miss under-
standing how it functions as an organizational concept for a range of 
behaviours; and if we view "mood" only as an organizational concept, 
we will fail to see how it operates as a dynamic and motivational 
concept resting ultimately in the determination of individually felt 
qualities. We need to have all the perspectives, before any legiti-
mate synthesis can be made. The collecting of multiple perspectives 
and multiple language functions, orienting them toward a body of 
empirical data, is the first phase of this abrasive process that 
intends a future synthesis. Each perspective highlights a different 
series or cluster of aspects and formulates it in a language that 
functions in a particular way; for example, from one perspective 
"mood" is an experience which may reflect individual needs whileit 
is an action that moulds perception and understand~ng, appropriates 
qualitie~and values, and adjusts the individual matrix to the social 
matrix, and here we can expect that the use of expressive language 
will be one perspectival requirement. 
The work to be presented has many modes, and it is legitimate to query 
the nature of its unity. Here we will not be arguing for the unity of 
the work, but rather will suggest in what realms it may be said to lie. 
The unity of the work is not similar to the unity of an organ~c 
entity, ~.e. its unity is,not guaranteed by its own intrinsic nature--
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it must be an achieved unity. Its unity 1s neither that of a singular 
determinate parameter nor a homogeneous construct--its unity is "open 
textured", an overlapping and crisscrossing of conceptually necessary 
and empirically salient elements. It is a unity made manifest through 
a series of both implicit and explicit synthetic acts that inter-
connect its subdivisions and provide an awareness of its content, 
development, and goals. To give some examples: Chapter 1 extracts 
the principal conceptual elements of several mood viewpoints and 
Chapter 5 relates these elements to a body of empirical data. Chapter 
2 presents a history of mood study and in conjunction with Chapter 1 
establishes that in many cases adequate conceptual preliminaries were 
not performed. Chapter 5 then shows how conceptual elements and 
empirical data can be related. 
The expressive unity of the work is similar to the unity of a mood 
system itself, it lies in the primary coherence of facts and values 
that co-exist together because they are a faithful reflection and 
expression of what is the case. For example, the qualitative data 
presented in Chapter 4 1s accepted as it is, as a valid representa-
tion of subjects' mood experience on an immediate level, however it 
is further articulated, reconstructed, and given a series of values 
through a structural analysis provided in Chapter 5. Also, the work 
as a constructed arti.fact has its unity in the intentions deliberately 
adopted or tacitly permitted--most especially in the intention to 
adequately, vigorously, and at times sceptically: present, articulate, 
and reconstruct the data of "mood". 
In summary, the unity of the work lies in the inter-relatedness of its 
parts, the organization of values and structural hierarchies, the co-
operation of its parts towards a goal and its consistent emphasis on 
the functions of adaptation and self-expression. It stresses the 
indwelling integrity of mood experience, the need for open-ended 
hierarchies, limited integrations of conceptual elements and structural 
features of experience, and the development of experience through 
expressive portrayals. 
The Physiological Problem 
The physiological "problem", 1.e. the role of physiological variables 
in mood states, was bracketed and held in suspension. This is not to 
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deny the role of such variables, variables whose importance becomes 
apparent to qnyone studying affective states, but rather to delimit 
the focus of attention to those variables that are psycho-social in 
nature. However section 5.9 offers speculation concerning.the 
integration of physiological constructs into a concept or model for 
mood. 
The Experiential Problem 
The experiential "problem" can be framed in terms of the ultimate 
inability of cognition alone to establish the "truth" of moods, i.e. 
the source, trend, and completion of a given mood experience. 
Cognition alone does not encompass the "meaning" of mood, rather it 
is awareness, clarity, and self-expression in conjunction with 
cognitive acts that reflexively establishes a momentary balance point 
~ equivalent to understanding. The limits of cognition are not the 
limits of experience; cognition can add on to, articulate, and educe, 
but "mood" itself may be a type of self-constitution that points both 
outward and inward, a process and search that is in itself ~ miniature 
fulfilment. Mood as an experience is a beginning, a repetition, an 
anticipation, a shaping, a deployment of the self, and a point on a 
trajectory that ends just short of the horizon. It is for these 
reasons that the Mood Analysis Technique was designed to probe but 
also to facilitate, to give the opportunity for self-expression, and 
to permit the process of mood to evolve its unique potentials .. 
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CHAPTER 1 CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Summary 
This chapter paves the way for an empirical study of mood by examining the concept of 
mood and several different theoretical approaches. There is a necessity for having an 
adequate concept of mood and criteria for the identification of mood. Concepts and 
criteria are interdependent. 
The status of mood reports as "knowledge by acquaintance" is advocated, Such report:;;, 
however, are not incorrigible. Linguistic considerations suggest an adequate mood 
concept should incorporate the elements: "state of mind", "feeling", "inclination", 
"disposition", and "pervasiveness". 
The conceptual pitfalls of a Cartesian bias, i.e. separating behavioural aspects of mood 
from the feeling aspects, are to be avoided. An alternative approach co-ordinating 
feeling, situation, and behaviour is proposed. From this vantage point the concept 
"disposition" is seen to have both a phenomenal and a behavioural reference. 
Mood criteria involving parameters of intensity, duration, and pervasiveness, are given 
concrete applications. Model cases, related cases, and borderline cases are established. 
The basic elements in ten different viewpoints of mood are set out. As disposition 
theories of mood currently predominate, the logical and experiential difficulties are 
·examined. Although useful for research purposes, disposition theories are in need of 
supplementation and completion. 
Content Summary 
Introduction 
1.1 Preliminaries 
1.2 An analogy 
1.3 Public objects and private states 
1.4 The resolution of discrepancies in psychological reports 
1.41 Reports of public objects 
1.42 Reports of private states and two epistemological questions 
1.43 Answering the epistemological questions 
1.5 Types of knowledge (with respect to affective states) 
1.6 The search for an initial formulation of mood 
1.7 The Cartesian bias in mood theory 
1.8 The concept of a disposition 
1.9 Conclusions and summary--a working concept 
1.10 Mood criteria and their application 
1.11 Ten viewpoints on mood: 
Cattell 
Now lis 
Arnold 
Ewert 
Evans 
Weinshel 
Pribram • 
Charlton 
Stein 
Koclc.E!lmans: 
Mood as a modulator and sensitizer 
Mood as the effect on an individual of his own configurations of activity 
Mood as the feeling response to general organismic functioning 
Mood as a diffuse background experience 
Mood--a general psychiatric view 
Mood--a psychoanalytic view 
Mood--a physiological view 
Mood as a mode uf awareness 
Mood as attunement 
Mood as part of a primordial praxis 
1.12 A critique of disposition theories of mood 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Any study claiming to be an investigation of mood must come to terms 
with the multiple reference and ambiguity of the term "mood". The 
term mood is a cover for a variety of concepts and theories which are 
neither simple nor straightforward. It is also possible that "mood" 
is an empty concept, a concept like that of "unicorn" which has no 
empirical f~lfilment. Another possibility is that the concept mood 
may not map out a domain independent of other psychological concepts, 
e.g. is the concept "mood 11 independent of the concept "attitude"? 
(This question is considered in Chapter 5). These are the brute facts 
that must be faced. 
Chapter 1 faces these facts. It clears the way for an empirical study 
of mood by examining the concept mood and several mood theories. Here 
also, the epistemological status of mood reports is considered. A 
"working" concept of mood as well as criteria for identification are 
established. 
The Concept of Mood 
The concept of mood can be approached and illuminated from three 
perspectives: 
L The perspective of its structure as a concept 
This approach centres on the basic elements that constitute the 
concept mood. Linguistic usage (section 1.6 below) will show 
that the elements "state of mind", "feeling", "inclination", 
"disposition", and "pervasiveness" are basic. 
2. The perspective of common linguistic use 
This approach centres on the psycho-social actions individuals 
perform when using the word mood. The range of actions is wide, 
including acts of reporting one's own experience, evaluating 
(both oneself and others), characterizing mood experience itself, 
and idiosyncratic actions. The analysis of the contribution of 
linguistic use to an understanding of the concept mood is reserved 
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for Chapter 5. Here the implications of the relevant empirical 
data presented in Chapter 4, are examined. 
3. The perspective of its status as a designator of experience 
Although "mood 11 often functions as an hypothetical construct, e.g .• 
in Cattell's disposition viewpoint (section 1.11), it also 
designates an affective experience. Much confusion has arisen 
because of the study of mood has not paid full attention to this 
oscillation in reference. For this reason careful attention is 
given to criteria for the empirical identification of mood 
(section 1.10). T'he concept of a "disposition" is examined 
(section 1.8) to emphasize that it refers to both feeling and 
behaviour. Disposition concepts are logically complex, they 
function both as hypothetical constructs and as designators of 
experience. This complexity requires that they be clearly. 
related to their data base in the empirical world. These issues 
are explicated in section 1.12. 
Theories of Mood 
Theories of mood are not in an advanced stage of development. Indeed 
"theory" implies a degree of systematization and predictive power that 
is non-existent in current viewpoints. A review of the literature 
suggests that models, metaphors, and amplified definitions are des-
criptive terms closer to the true state of affairs. Chapter 1 
(section 1.11) scrutinizes the various mood viewpoints, highlighting 
their achievements and t~rowing their liabilities into relief. 
Currently there are three major approaches to mood: the disposition 
approach (Nowlis 1963, 1965, 1970; Pribram 1970; Ryle 1940), the 
psychoanalytic approach (Weinshel 1970; Jacobson 1957), and the 
existential approach (Stein 1970; Kockelmans 1970). The disposition 
approach has the advantage of being a formulation that is closely 
linked to experimental and statistical procedures. The work of Nowlis 
(1965, 1970) has been demonstrated to be a theoretical position with 
some statistical substantiation. However, logical and experiential 
difficulties suggest that the, disposition view is in need of both 
completion as a theory and supplementation as a general approach 
(section 1.12). The psychoanalytic approach has the advantage of a 
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broad clinical base but is burdened by a top-heavy metatheory and 
adherence to a hydraulic model of the psychic apparatus (section 1.11). 
The existential approach~ although suggestive and able to generate new 
concepts, e.g. the concepts of "attunement" and "syntony", remains 
highly metaphorical and the general validity of its application is 
questionable (section 1.11). 
Sections 1.1 - 1.4 stress the need for both an adequate concept of mood 
and criteria for the empirical identification of mood. It would be 
irresponsible to conduct an l.nv~:stif.,ation without circumscribing to a 
reasonable degree, the objrct.Lo be'studied. It is this general lack 
of careful circumscription in the mood literature that makes the study 
of mood difficult. 
Granted that a concept of mood and criteria can be established, then 
the epistemological status of mood reports becomes important. Are 
mood reports valid? Do they represent knowledge? This question of 
epistemological status involves the issues of error, certainty, and 
sincerity (sections 1.43- 1.5). Attention is also directed to the 
type of distinctions individuals can and do make concerning their own 
affective experience. 
Sections 1.6 - 1.8 focus on the contribution linguistic usage can make 
to the formulation of an initial concept and criteria for the empirical 
identification of mood. Major ingredients for an adequate and com-
prehensive definition of mood are collected. Before a synthesis of 
these elements is carried out, Section 1.7 suggests that we stand back 
and take a broad perspective on mood and acknowledge one type of bias, 
i.e. the Cartesian split, that may implicitly be distorting our view. 
Strawson (1973) has suggested that a mood concept should span both 
feeling and behavioural aspects. This recommendation is adopted. 
From this higher vantage point the concept "dispositionu should be re- · 
examined. Section 1.8 indicates that "disposition" should be construed 
as having both a feeling and a behavioural reference--an equal emphasis. 
Section 1.9 sets forth the general conclusion that both a concept of 
mood and an empirical approach to mood must adequately formulate: 
experience, situational referents, and behavioural aspects. One 
possible "working" concept for mood research is proposed. 
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. Section 1.10 advances three criteria for the identification of mood in 
terms of pervasiveness (either as a quality or an avowal of general 
influence), intensity and duration. These criteria are shown in 
concrete application. 
cases are indicated. 
Model cases, borderline cases, and related 
Section 1.11 presents and examines ten different viewpoints on mood. 
l'lliere pertinent, descriptive data from the mood study is introduced to 
support, modify, or contravene the principles (e.g. p. 36 ). Each 
mood viewpoint is characterized as to its fundamental elements. The 
intent here is to set out the basic elements so that evaluation may 
take place. 
Section 1.12 gives a detailed examination of the disposition viewpoint 
advocated by Nowlis (1963, 1965, 1970) and Ryle (1949). The logical 
and experiential difficulties are' set out and examined. 
1.1 Preliminaries 
In ord~r to investigate the phenomenon of mood, and assuming that 
mood may be more than a concept or a convenient rubric for 
ordering data--more than a theoretical fiction, it will be 
necessary to have criteria for empirical identification. These 
criteria of identification must be capable of distinguishing mood 
from a variety of similar and related psychological phenomena. 
Rooted in this methodlogical exhortation is a paradox and a , 
circularity. In the beginning, whether we turn our attention to 
concepts or criteria, there seems to be no adequate way to begin 
--and that is no acceptable beginning. The circularity stems 
from two interdependent requirements: 
1) Before criteria of identification can be established, a 
concept of mood is necessary. This concept should entail 
a rough cognitive pointing or indication of what a mood is, 
where and under what conditions it can be found. 
2) At the same time, the fullness and cogency of the concept 
will depend on an empirical base, for in the empirical 
tradition concepts without percepts are empty. 
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Hence criteria must be guided by a concept, and the concept 
requires criteria of identification or application, if it is to 
have an empirical content. 
dependent. 
The two requirements are inter-
The suggested resolution of the paradox maintains that the con-
cept and its attendant criteria are not formulated in a vacuum, 
and should proceed from a consideration of the major features of 
"mood", as a theoretical entity and empirical state, established 
by prior research and cortceptual analysis. 
1.2 An Analogy 
The problem of establishing criteria and the more general problem 
of epistemological adequacy can be brought into focus by con-
sidering an analogy: 
A naturalist has heard of some exotic animal, the locals call it 
a "Pim", and the naturalist has become very interested in 
investigating Pims. However, if the naturalist rushes forth in 
his enthusiasm, he is lost. There have been conflicting reports 
on the nature of Pims. They also seem to have a number of 
features in common with their neighbours, the "Poms". There 
have even been reports of crossbreeding to produce "Pim-Poms". 
The point is, there exists a need for some basic parameters of 
identification and classification. Expressed succinctly, the 
naturalist needs to know a Pim when he sees one. This same 
point, although in different terminology, has been made by J. 
Mehrabian (1968). 
1.3 Public Objects and Private States 
At this point, it might be suggested that the analogy is mis-
placed, for if Pims exist and they are such things as can be 
found then they exist publically, i.e. they are open to public 
observation in a way that sensations, teelings, and moods are 
not. Unless a mood is nothing more than a collection of 
behaviours, there will remain a large portion of mood experience 
that is available immediately only to the subject of the mood 
; . 
\ 
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experience and hence beyond direct public confirmation or dis-
confirmation. Accordingly, some will insist that the episterna-
logical credentials of descriptive statements concerning mood 
phenomena are questionable or of an inferior status. A number 
of issues are condensed here. If the investigator is prepared 
to accept reports of "private states" as having some vali9,ity, 
and this is not as contentious a position as it once was 
(Whitely, 1973), then the pivotal issue becomes the degree of 
validity such reports may be said to have and the type of know-
ledge they represent. A pragmatic approach to this issue, is 
to examine how discrepancies concerning reports of public objects 
are to be resolved, relative to how discrepancies in reports 
concerning the experience of private states (e.g. mood reports) 
are to be resolved. 
1.4 The Resolution of Discrepancies in Psychological Reports 
Consider the following cases: 
1.41 Reports of Public Objects 
(perception) 
In the case of observing a public object a number of 
individuals are functioning under a given condition, e.g. 
the presence of a Pim in their perceptual field. They will 
give a description of their relevant experience, i.e. a 
verbal formulation of their perceptual experience under the 
given condition. Should major discrepancies arise in 
their verbal formulations, e.g. one person insisting that 
Pims are four-legged and another person insisting that 
Pims are six-legged, the resolution of this discrepancy 
will involve a further perceptual experience, i.e. looking 
more closely, paying attention to the legs rather than the 
overall shape of a Pim; this subsequent experience will 
also have a verbal formulation. 
1.42 Reports of Private States 
(an affect where the environmental source is known) 
In the case of a mood, taken for the moment very generally, 
as a pervasive affective response of moderate intensity and 
duration, and occurring in response to knoWn environmental 
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sources, there are a number of individuals functioning 
under a given condition, e.g. forest land that has been 
recently decimated by a fire. One individual may report 
sadness over the ravaged land and another individual may 
report anger at the careless act responsible for the 
destruction. 
Now it is true that the ~ of discrepancy involved in 
first case is different from the ~ of discrepancy 
involved in the second case. But the difference is not 
that the first type of discrepancy is resolvable and the 
the 
second type is not. The difference lies in the fact that 
the first type of discrepancy is something to be settled by 
further experience and the second type is not something to 
be settled at all, but rather explicated, justified, or 
amended in a wider context. 
In the first case and the second case there is an experience 
and known circumstances generating that experience, plus a 
verbal formulation of the experience. The status of the 
two types of experience, the one perceptual, and the other 
affective, becomes problematic only when there are dis-
crepancies to be resolved. The former case requires 
further experience, the latter case a development and 
justification (statement or portrayal of relevant aspects 
and conditions) of that experience, e.g. a specification of 
the attitudes operating and the perspectives taken. Both 
cases are dependent on individual experience and its formu-
lation in a consistent public language. It is suggested 
that we do not have a disjunction in objectivity, but rather 
a different emphasis in the methods used for discrepancy 
resolution. 
Reports of Private States 
(an affect where the environment sources are .unknown) 
For the purpose of this chapter, I omit the case where the 
environmental source is not the primary cause but merely 
the object of the mood, e.g. the individual is depressed 
over an insult received, but the actual cause (more significant 
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reason) is his deteriorating financial situation. 
In the case of giving descriptions and making characteriza-
tions when the environmental source of the mood is either 
unknown, or vague, or ill-defined, e.g. the individual says 
he is depressed, but is unable to give the source or object 
of his depression, the case two type of justification and 
explication is not available. There is no public object 
toward which an attitude can be held or a perspective taken. 
Two questions then immediately arise: 
1) Could the individual conceivably make any descriptive 
statements or characterizations concerning his feeling 
state? 
2) If such statements could be made, what epistemological 
status (if any) would these statements have? 
1.43 ·Answering the Epistemological Questions 
The first question 
In order to answer the first question, let it be assumed 
that the individual in question has a genuine desire to 
describe and characterize his experience in an open fashion, 
what can be called sincerity (or freedom from dissimulation), 
rather than making statements in search of help, sympathy, 
or consolation. If this is the case, then from the per-
spective of mood as a phenomenal state the following types 
of description and characterization could be made: 
a) The individual could with some degree of accuracy, make 
descriptions in the sense of relating intensity, 
duration, number of components, complexity of organiza-
tion, and the periodicity of certain aspects. 
b) The individual could ~escribe the feeling in the sense 
of giving some (but not necessarily all) of his feelings 
a bodily location. 
In a more extended sense of the word "description", the 
individual could make characterizations of his experience 
under the following conditions: 
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c) If the individual were able to attend to his bodily 
activity, to the patterning of sensation and internal 
bodily activity, then he might be able to further 
describe and qualify his experience, e.g. if a depressed 
person had general feelings of dullness, heaviness, and 
fatigue, he might qualify his experience as a "lethargic 
depression". On the other hand, if there were a taut-
ness of the muscles, a pounding of the chest, a tremulous 
feel to the fingers, as well as a dull feeling, he might 
qualify his experience as an "agitated depression". 
d) If the individual were able to attend to his immediate 
situation, to its details, to its recent past and near 
future, to how it is opening up to him, to how it is 
now impinging on him, to his evaluation of it, then he 
might be able to further describe and qualify his 
' 
experience. For example, the depressed person might 
become aware of impediments or hindrances to some goal 
he had established for himself. In this case he might 
describe his depression as one of frustration or defeat 
in the presence of unattainable goals. 
e) If the individual were able to say what his mood made 
him feel like doing, and how he would do this (e.g. 
briskly, with determination, etc.) then he might be able 
to further describe and qualify his experience. For 
example, a depressed individual might say that he felt 
like going off somewhere and being by himself, but he 
would probably even do this very slowly and listlessly. 
f) If the individual were able to make expressive meta-
phorical statements concerning his mood state, then he 
might be further able to describe and qualify his 
experience. For example, a depressed individual might 
say that he felt like a dinner table littered with dirty 
plates and utensils. A consideration of this and other 
statements might lead to further qualifications about 
the mood state, e.g. the type of self-evaluation operating. 
The second question 
In order to determine what epistemological status the above 
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statements might have, it is necessary to establish a family 
of epistemological interrogations. It is pertinent to ask: 
Could an individual be in error when making the kinds of 
determinations listed above? Could the individual be in-
accurate? What type of knowledge does an individual have 
with regard to his own experience? Is it correc~ to speak 
at all of knowledge here? If so, what kind of knowledge is 
it? I propose to call these questions the family of epis-
temological interrogations for first-person descriptive and 
metaphorical statements concerning mood state. The central 
concern being the determination of the type of knowledge 
represented by such statements and the degree of certainty 
such knowledge may be said to have. 
1.5 Types of Knowledge 
(concerning one's own affective states) 
Knowledge by acquaintance: 
The individual can have "knowledge" of his affective states in the 
sense of experiencing them or undergoing them. This is a know-
ledge of acquaintance that is gained when an individual has a 
definite experience on a number of specific occasions and he is 
capable of becoming aware that this kind of experience is similar 
to other kinds of experience he has and yet is different to many 
other kinds of experience he has. It is the sort of knowledge 
which would permit him to answer in a confident way such questions 
as: In what other situations do you feel this way? Can you 
remember when these experiences began? 
the experience more (or less) intense? 
What factors seem to make 
This type of knowledge can be called a disposition form of know-
ledge, because although the individual may never have explicitly 
set forth his acquaintance with the feeling, he nevertheless has 
the ability to do so when questioned. His knowledge is dis-
positional; he can say and knows that he knows, when we ask him. 
Yet this is inadequate as a claim to knowledge in the traditional 
sense. To count as knowledge in the traditional sense, the 
individual must not only know explicitly, i.e. have formulated it 
for himself on at least one occasion, given evidence that he knows~ 
and know that he knows, but there must also be a difference between 
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being correct and merely thinking that one is correct about a 
given state of affairs (Pears, 1972). There should be an 
independent criterion and a process of checking. It is suggested 
that this is too stringent a requirement for the type of knowledge 
one does have concerning one's own affective states. 
Knowledge by privileged awareness: 
The individual might be said to have knowledge of his affective 
states in the sense of having a direct and privileged awareness 
of his own experiencing. If this is the case, then it must 
follow that there is an incorrigibility to the individual's state-
ments concerning his own affective states. But surely this is 
too lax. Although the individual is in a unique position to 
describe and form judgements about his experience, and should be 
the final arbiter of any characterizations of his experience, he 
may be imprecise, hasty in forming his judgements, uncognizant of 
relevant circumstances, or biased to see himself in a particular 
light. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the investigator to 
encourage the individual to explore in an open manner a wide 
range of possib~lities for the description, characterization, and 
evaluation of his experience. 
Knowledge through behaviour: 
Another approach to knowledge concerning one's own affective states 
is to de-emphasize any internal processes that may be operating and 
to emphasize the public behavioural aspects. In this view state-
ments that claim to be descriptions of affective states or 
processes, are to be considered as learned linguistic behaviour. 
For example, the statement "I am in pain" is learned pain behaviour, 
i.e. a statement one has learned to utter in certain circumstances, 
but which has no ultimate reference to inner experience. It is 
sometimes stressed that our knowledge of affects (our own as well 
as others) is knowledge of behaviour. While this viewpoint avoids 
a number of philosophical difficulties concerning the nature and 
connexion of experience, language and behaviour, it reduces the 
basic phenomenal aspects of feelings, sensations, and moods, which 
subjects avow.as motivators of many of their actions. 
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Discussion 
It is often the case that although the individual doesn't "observe" 
his experience, he does reflect, consider, weigh, formulate and re-
formulate, highlight various aspects, and assign a lesser importance 
to other aspects of his experience. The individual does seek to 
determine essential components of his experience, and this is , 
accomplished through an intention to do so, an intention that may 
be born of need, curiosity, or exasperation. To speak of know-
ledge here is to speak of a self-awareness established in the light 
of a familiarity with one's multiple goals, one's recurring 
pleasures and frustrations. The certainty of this knowledge is 
always provisional and dependent on the individual's "stage of 
life". It is always legitimate to inquire: 'How do you know?' 
'Could you be mistaken?' 'What will.the future be like?' 
Conclusions 
At this early stage of the investigation, it is suggested that an 
individu~l can make descriptive statements concerning his own 
affective states (as suggested in section 1.43). These descriptive 
statements are considered, tentatively, to have the epistemological 
status of being a form of knowledge by acquaintance, existing in 
either an implicit (disposition) form or in an explicit form when 
they are formulated in spoken or written language. These state-
ments are not incorrigible, i.e. their validity is not guaranteed 
by any privileged awareness of the individual. These statements 
are subject to various processes of validation, in which the 
individual himself plays a major and uniq4e role as the final 
arbiter for their truth value. 
1. 6 The Search for an Initial Formulation of "Mood" 
(linguistic considerations) 
In this section the contribution that linguistic usage can make to 
the establishment of an initial concept and criteria for the 
identification of mood phenomena, is considered. The procedure 
will be to examine an informal definition of mood, to set forth 
this definition in more general terms, and to compare it with 
several dictionary definitions of mood. 
At this point someone might interject with a facile optimism and 
say: 
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I was in a mood last Thursday. I was feeling pretty 
low, nothing seemed to be going right for me. I had 
no energy, felt sluggish,.my thoughts kept returning 
to an argument I had with a friend. My thoughts were 
pretty negative, both about him and myself. I felt 
like being alone. It lasted most of Thursday, 
influencing most of my thoughts and feelings. 
Formulated in general terms this definition becomes: a mood is a 
complex negative feeling state occurring over moderately extended 
periods of time. 
Is this an adequate definition? For ~xample, is it in accordance 
with common linguistic usage? The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
defines mood: 
n. State of mind or feeling; in the mood; in no mood, 
inclined, disinclined, (for thing, to do). 
With respect to the phrase, 'state of mind or feeling', the 
assumption is made that the 'or' is being used as a conjunction 
between two related possibilities, rather than to pose mutually 
.exclusive alternatives. The phrase 'state of mind' seems to 
imply the presence of some aspect or condition of mind, perhaps 
regulated and structured in some way, persisting long enough to 
be identified as a state of mind. Accordingly, the minimal 
reference seems to be a phenomenal one. The introduction of 
'feeling' also imparts a dynamic qualification to 'state of mind'. 
These dynamic, structural, and phenomenal aspects of the concept 
"mood" have been combined in the initial formulation of mood as 
the idea of a feeling state. "Feeling state" should be con-
sidered as something which is internally complex, i.e. composed 
of a number of components and enduring over time. However,· the 
notion of "inclination" is introduced, i.e. the idiomatic phrases. 
of "in the mood for", "in the mood to", and their negations. How 
is this to be handled? The initial formulation does not specifically 
incorporate the notion of 11inclination". 
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• Rather than modifying the definition at this point, I will continue. 
gathering the major ingredients for an adequate and comprehensive 
definition of mood. It will be necessary to consult a more com-
prehensive dictionary in the quest for conceptual clarification. 
It might be argued that this is not a valid procedure, because it 
is a reversal of the actual lexicographical process which·first 
gathers then systematizes and reduces the linguistic data. How-
ever, the intent is not to establish a new definition of mood, 
nor to avoid the difficulty of complexity. The intent is to both 
face the complexity and obtain a clear and comprehensive view. 
This can be best done, it is suggested, by starting with the clear 
and concise, unfolding the background diversity and re-integrating 
the diversity. Webster's New International Dictionary defines 
mood in the following ways: 
1. Mind; thought; spirit. 
This is considered to be too general a level of definition for 
the present purpose. 
2. A particular state or temper of mind. 
This concept has been dealt with, but now something new has been 
added: 'especially as affected by emotion', and once again 
inclination, 'as to be in the mood to work'. It appears that an 
adequate formulation of mood will have to encompass the notions 
·of "state of mind" (especially state of mind as a feeling state), 
"inclination", and the relationship(s) between mood and emotion 
will have to be mapped out. 
3. Specifically: anger, temper. A sullen or morose state of 
mind; bad temper. 
The word "mood" is frequently used in this fashion, but this usage 
is an instantiation of a more general sense. 
sense that is sought. 
It is this general 
4. Temper of mind; tone or disposition of consciousness; 
humor; esp. the sum of those mental dispositions which 
give the dominant emotional character or cast of mind; 
as, a man of somber mood. 
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It is the element of "disposition", taken as providing the ,"tone" 
or "colouration" of consciousness, which is important here. At 
this stage, it is also necessary to note the dual aspect of "dis-
position", L e. as a tendency or inclination and as a setting in 
order, an arrangement, the relative positioning of parts. 
With the introduction of the notion of "disposition", the 
previously met ideas of inclination, organization, plus the co-
ordinate idea of arrangement, are encompassed. In addition the 
sum of dispositions, or perhaps more accurately, the aggregate of 
dispositions, is viewed as leading to a tone or temper of 
consciousness. 
As synonyms of mood, Webster lists: 
Disposition, frame of mind, vein; whim, caprice, 
freak. Mood and humor agree in the idea of a more 
or less shifting and transitory state of mind or 
feeling. Mood often suggests a more compelling or 
pervasive temper of mind than humor, which emphasizes 
more strongly the element of whim or caprice. 
Pervasiveness and its reconstructions 
The notion of "pervasiveness" is an addition. However, its 
potential descriptive function relative to psychological phenomena, 
must be made clear. A mood does not diffuse, or spread over, or 
, through anything. The mind is not a membrane that can be 
permeated by a fluid like something called a mood. Yet the notion 
of pervasiveness is important. To make it useful for psychological 
research it should be reconstructed. 
will be reconstructed in two ways: 
The notion of pervasiveness 
1. In the first way, pervasiveness will be said to refer to a 
subject's avowal that a particular mood state influences 
everything that he thinks, feels, says, and does. On the 
theoretical plane this is represented by the postulate that 
the construct mood interacts with other constructs concern-
ing the individual's cognitive, motivational, and affect~ve 
subsystems. 
2. In the second way, pervasiveness will be said to refer to 
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the experience of pervas~veness. Metaphorical descriptions 
of this experience gleaned from the study include: 
a) 'It comes out of every vessel in one's body and 
captures you. ' 
b) 'It takes over your mind and emotions and affects 
your personality.' 
1.7 The Cartesian Bias in Mood Theory 
Before setting out a working conception of mood, it will.be use-
ful to stand back and take a broad perspective on mood, to 
acknowledge theoretical and epistemological biases that may, 
implicitly, be distorting our view. It can be said, and the 
suggestion is not new (e.g .. Strawson, 1973) that 'there is a 
Cartesian bias (or split between mental and physical perspectives) 
operating in most formulations concerning affective experience. 
This produces a separation of the phenomenal aspects, what A 
experiences when he undergoes the mood X, from the behavioural' 
aspects, what B observes about A during A's mood X. Welded onto 
this separation of the mental from the behavioural, is a tendency 
to postulate the necessity of the experiential over the 
behavioural, or conversely the behavioural over the experiential. 
The consequence has been formulations of mood that on the one 
hand, stress the "private" experiential aspects, or on the other 
hand, stress the "public" behavioural aspects. Thus the experien-
tial approach tends to cover what is experienced by A, but not 
what is observed by B, and the behavioural approach tends to cover 
what is observed by B, but not what is experienced by A (Strawson, 
op.cit.). It becomes apparent that these views are distortions 
in opposite directions, each distortion proliferating in the 
atmosphere of its own self-sufficient eccentricity. 
With this in mind, it is useful to attend to the idea that mood 
is a concept which spans both feeling and behaviour (Strawson, 
1973). The implication is that feeling words like "mood" are 
acquired with both a feeling and a behavioural reference, and 
that the two are interconnected. To have a feeling x, is to be 
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in a situation y, doing z. To be doing z, is to be in a 
situation y, feeling x. To be in a situation y, is to be doing 
z, and feeling x. Each element is not independent of the 
others, rather they go together in a complex network of mutual 
influence. When describing or formulating mood phenomena the 
essential characteristics of each element: experience, situation, 
and behaviour should be specified, and at least a ground-plan of 
their possible interaction should be established. 
1.8 The Concept of a Disposition 
The dual reference of the concept "dispositio?": 
The dictionary has established the notion of "disposition" as a 
constituent of the concept of mood, and bearing in mind Strawson's 
suggestion that the concept of mood spans both feeling and 
behaviour, an attempt will be made to explicate both the feeling 
and behavioural reference of the concept. This is considered 
necessary because disposition formulations of mood occupy a 
prominent place in mood theorizing, and it is often "disposition" 
with a behavioural emphasis within a natural or physical science 
paradigm that has been advocated. 
1. The behavioural reference 
Nowlis (1963) writes: 
To say that mood is dispositional is to place 
it in a large class of commonly used concepts 
which refer to properties which are not 
continuously available for direct observation 
but which must be defined in terms of tendencies. 
Typically, we attribute a disposition to an 
animate or inanimate object when and only when 
certain test conditions bring about certain 
specified results. Dispositional terms like 
"soluble", "breakable" and "magnetic" are applied 
to inanimate objects; terms like "instinct", 
"emotion" and "drive" are applied to organisms. 
Thus mood, as disposition, is never directly 
observed but is attributed to a person when 
certain features of the environment draw forth 
certain items of behaviour or experience. 
Furthermore, while some dispositions refer to 
enduring properties, mood is applied to temporary 
or recurrent reversible dispositions (p.74). · 
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Nowlis is placing his emphasis on "disposition" as a 
theoretical term covering aspects of the environment that 
' / 
ellicit specific behaviours (items of behaviour), 
behavioural chains, and experience. The base analogy is 
that of powers and properties of entities as used in the 
natural and physical sciences. 
A number of important issues arise here, and should be noted 
at this point. They are: 
a) Nowlis assumes that the notion of "disposition", in the 
sense of a special power or property of a physical 
object cah be carried over (presumably with little re-
orientation of meaning) to the psychological sphere. 
Consider the term "soluble"; sodium chloride will dis-
solve in water, by the general laws governing the ionic 
structure of sodium chloride and charge displacement in 
the polar water molecule; but is there the same entail-
ment (type of entailment) when 'certain features of the 
environment draw forth certain items of behaviour or 
experience'? A number of contemporary theorists would 
answer with a resounding 'No'. They are theorists of 
the school that emphasize the social and intentional 
attributes of persons, e.g. Roche, 1973. 
b) To formulate mood as a dispositional property of the 
individual, is to offer a concept that summarizes what 
the individual tends to do or feel, or is likely on the 
whole to do or feel, but this is not conducive to making 
predictions concerning what he will do or feel. It also 
fails to tell us what he is now doing or feeling. Hence 
it lacks explanatory power, in the usual hypothetico-
deductive sense, nor does it increase our understanding 
of particular phenomenal occasions. 
The quarrel is not with the inclusion of behavioural 
tendencies under the rubric of "disposition", but rather 
with an exclusive emphasis on such tendencies and the 
imposition of a natural or physical science paradigm that 
may not be appropriate to subjects' statements concerning 
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mood. 
2. The phenomenal reference 
The dictionary definition of "disposition" as a tendency or 
inclination and as an arrangement, the relative positioning 
of parts, provides the background for the phenomenal (or 
experiential) reference. It is suggested that experience 
can be viewed as a dynamic configuration of psychological 
elements: Essentially I am adopting the position of Schrag 
(1969) who writes: 
In speaking of experience as a configuration we 
mean that it is an interlacing of the constituents 
of experience. These constituents we understand 
to include experiencer, act of experiencing, 
figure and background. The presentational complex 
of the experiential field 'is that of experiencer~ 
experiencing-figure-with-background. The insertion 
of hyphens between the words is neither arbitrary 
nor accidental. They are grammatical indices of 
the bonds or connective tissues within experience 
and are essential for grasping the field notion 
itself. Experience, in its lived concreteness, 
is the act of experiencing figures (objects, events, 
situations, persons, moods, chimeras, hallucinations) 
not in isolation but contextualized within both 
determinate and indeterminate backgrounds (p.l8). 
Two important issues arise here: 
a) Although Schrag's conception of experience may be a use-
ful approach to understanding experience, it is by no 
means obvious that these distinctions are given 
immediately in experience. I think that upon reflection 
and analysis, something corresponding to this scheme of 
distinctions can be discerned and the scheme justified. 
b) Schrag's concept underplays the behaviou~al and 
situational correlates of experience. It is suggested 
that any approach to experience is only intelligible if 
it can be connected with characteristic behaviours and/or 
characteristic situations. 
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1.9 Conclusions and Summary a working concept 
Conclusions 
What is required is not only a concept of mood, but also an approach 
to mood, that spans the behavioural and phenomenal realms. Such 
an approach must adequately formulate the experiential aspects, and 
at the same time provide the situational referents and behavioural 
components or consequences of the mood state. 
Summary a working concept 
In summary, an adequate initial formulation of mood, a working 
concept, should integrate the notions of nstate of mind 11 , "feeling", 
"inclination", "disposition" (as a conceptual element spanning 
tendencies toward both experience and behaviour) and "pervasiveness" 
(as a conceptual element referring to either the avowal of general 
influence, or the report of an experience of pervasiveness). The 
definition should be applicable to both experiential and behavioural 
aspects. It is formulated: 
A mood is an organized, complex and recurring feeling state which 
is pervasive in its nature. Mood involves distinctive changes in 
the cognitive, perceptual, and motivational subsystems of the 
individual and tends to be expressed in the experience, the 
behaviours and the actions (including linguistic actions) of the 
individual. 
1.10 Mood Criteria and their application 
An initial concept of mood has been established and one criterion 
of identification (pervasiveness) has been set forth. Two other 
criteria of identification will now be established, in the light of 
the definitions of mood that exist in the psychological dictionaries. 
Wessman and. Ricks (1966) write: 
The definitions of mood in the psychological dictionaries 
(Drever, 1952; English and English, 1958; Warren, 1934) 
all indicate its shifting and temporal features. Moods 
are generally defined as states of emotional or affective 
arousal of varying, but not permanent duration. They are 
usually seen as milder than full-blown emotions, which are 
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more intense and of shorter duration. Often they are 
held to be emotions in a state of subexcitation or decay. 
They are also presented as predispositions to respond in 
certain emotional ways and experience certain feelings 
(p. 9). 
Two key indices embedded in this review are "intensity" and 
"duration". These have been selected, along with the felt quality 
of "pervasiveness", or the avowal of "pervasiveness", as the 
general identifying criteria of mood. 
Specifically, if an individual (1) affirms that his present feeling 
state determines or influences everything he feels, thinks, says, 
and does (general influence) or reports an experience of pervasive-
ness and if (2) this state has been in effect from between three 
hours to three days, and (3) rates the intensity of his feeling 
state from moderately strong to intense (+1 to +3) on a seven point 
rating scale, then the individual is said to be in a mood, the 
quality of which is to be gauged by the description he proffers. 
All three of these criteria must be met. (This is not the only 
way mood could have been identified. However it is an approach 
resulting from an explication of the concept mood, and is considered 
to be potentially fruitful for the clinical study of mood.) 
Can these conceptual distinctions be applied to actual experience? 
Several affective experiences will be considered, all elicited 
within the context of the mood study. In addition to the applica-
tion of the mood criteria, it will be a useful procedure to 
distinguish model cases for mood, related and borderline cases, in 
the attempt to attain a goal of reasonable clarity and confidence. 
Example 1* 
* Note: 
I feel in a state of suspended or pent-up emotion (of 
some kind) which does not however make me feel tense, 
rather relaxed, receptive and very aware. I feel rather 
amused generally, as if something funny could easily 
happen. I feel as if it's important that I notice 
everything going on around me, as if it is significant. 
' The examples in section 1.10 are reports of affective experience 
provided by the mood study volunteers. Examples 1, 2 and 5 were 
in response to the question 'What are you feeling now?'. Examples 
3 and 4 were in response to the request to bring in reports of 
affective experience. 
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Subject's ratings: 
Intensity: +2 
Duration: approximately 4 hours 
Pervasiveness: The subject indicated that'the feeling state had 
a general influence on her with a qualification: 
It doesn't colour or influence everything I do in the 
sense that it changes my behaviour but it modifies my 
whole attitude to everything I think and to things 
going on around me. 
This feeling state is judged to be a mood by virtue of the three 
criteria being met. The avowal of pervasiveness in the sense of. 
the feeling state influencing everything the subject feels, thinks, 
says, and does, is partially deficient in that everything is 
modified through the mediation of an attitude.* This feeling 
state is classified as a mood, but a deviation from the ideal is 
noted. 
Example 2 
* Note: 
I imagine a planet where there is just water, on the 
water are islands, a floating mass of something, each 
one is individual, multi-coloured. There are animals 
and life on the islands, but they are very small, you 
could walk across them in five minutes. The waves of 
the sea are enormous but they never break. There are 
dolphins and porpoises in the sea, other creatures 
come out of the sea on to the land. The sky is pink 
and at different angles it is a different colour. 
There is a feeling of innocence, being untouched by 
evil humans. It's very exotic, each island masses 
together in the evening, they become one for five 
minutes and then go apart. The current forces them 
together. It never gets really dark, it always stays 
at a blue twilight. When it rains it rains very pale 
yellow drops that make little crowns when they fall. 
There is no stable land at all. The air is a higher 
form of intelligence that brings the islands together. 
I could live there and be myself, I wouldn't be white, 
I'd be green, a green man. We wouldn't talk, there'd 
be telepathic thought and I would communicate with the 
animals, no killing or violence, just natural death. 
There is evil there, but it has no form, you can always 
feel it. It threatens to bring humanity on to the 
Strictly speaking the description of experience must initially 
be taken as the subject gives it. Statements of attitude and 
behaviour in principle can be followed up by observing the 
subject. However, this type of corroboration was not attempted. 
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planet, death, injustice, etc. The evil is like a lamp 
in a room you're very used to, it's just there, it 
doesn't threaten you, no harm will come of it. I would 
swim, run around, hop from island to island, talk to 
the animals, talk about the evil that is there. 
(This data was obtained from an intensive mood study volunteer 
during a session devoted to the exploration of affective imagery, 
in response to the question 'What are you experiencing now?') 
Subject's ratings: 
Intensity: 
Duration: 
Pervasiveness: 
+1 
approximately 1/2 hour 
The subject indicated that the feeling state did 
not influence everything she thought, said, felt 
and did, nor di'd she report an experience of 
pervasiveness. Hence the pervasiveness criterion 
was not met. 
The subject indicated that she considered this a phantasy which 
seemed to absorb all of her attention. She was of the opinion 
that it was a 'temporary attraction' rather than a determinant 
of all her thoughts, feelings and actions. Feelings of sadness, 
hope, and longing did accompany the phantasy, but did not persist. 
Conceivably this phantasy could produce a mood, or develop into 
one, but in this case it did not. 
Example 3 
Walked home from campus at twilight in the rain, felt very 
quiet and pensive. Had a sudden vision of having a very 
small place among all the people. Also suddenly thought 
of the incredible number of theorists I have come across 
in studying social science and how little I cared for what 
they thought. Thought how essentially meaningless such 
things and most other things in life are. Thought about 
all the taboos, social rules, that exist. Came to the 
conclusion that whatever happens to me in life, I shall 
always be essentially alone. A certain loneliness and 
frustration accompanied these thoughts, but they were 
surprisingly bearable. Incredible feeling of self-
sufficiency which I have felt before. I often find other 
people's actions and works are very empty - just in a 
split second I feel this. Then I reason and rationalize 
and "excuse" them. Just felt like walking along with my 
head bowed, very quietly and unobtrusively. Felt distress_-
at having to come back to residence, needed to carry on 
walking that that. Wanted to walk and walk and walk and 
then fall asleep somewhere warm, comfortable and pleasant 
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and wake up tomorrow back in my own bed. Also felt a 
horrible thing, felt my own warm blood coming from a gash 
on my arms in my imagination. Thought to myself I must 
conquer this feeling of revulsion. When I walked into 
residence, felt essentially shallow and mean, horrified 
at the thought of making small talk, bright banter with 
flatmates. 
(This data was obtained in the form of a written report from an 
intensive mood study volunteer on one of the additional sessions.-) 
Subject's ratings: 
Intensity: 
Duration: 
Pervasiveness: 
+2 
approximately 1/2 hour 
The subject indicated that the feeling state had 
not influenced everything she thought, felt, said 
and did, nor had she had an experience of 
pervasiveness. Hence the pervasiveness criterion 
was not met. 
The subject indicated that she experienced several different 
feelings in succession. The feelings seemed to intertwine with 
various thoughts, and a phantasy element. At the beginning of 
the experiential sequence, when the subject was walking home in 
the rain feeling quiet and pensive, there was a mood like state 
dominated by several cognitions and their related feelings. This 
seemed to culminate in a phantasy e~pressing vulnerability and 
isolation. Example 3 is certainly a borderline case. It 
escapes being classified as a mood due to its short duration and 
the criterion of pervasiveness not being fulfilled. 
Example 4 
Today the world is grey, full of pastel shades. It is 
a day without movement, but something is going to move. 
I'll will something to happen. People look just like 
shadows .. Even shadows can stir events to happen. I'm 
sitting inside myself looking out. There is a block of 
flats opposite. I can see the figure of a man standing 
still as a statue, looking out. Maybe he~s contemplating 
suicide. Maybe he's a figure of my imagination, maybe 
he's real. His hair is black and fuzzy on his.shoulders. 
It's like a black fuzzy halo around his face. He has a 
white shirt on, a dark jacket and dark pants. He is 
absolutely motionless. Maybe he's part of the furnishings 
that looks like a man from here. The world seems so still 
except for the buzzing of the traffic. Silent and grey,· 
the same as my world inside. He is still there, he can't 
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be real. I want action and there is none. I'm just 
willing something to h~ppen. Nothing will happen. 
Last evening I dreamt about the strange figure at the 
window, it was - I don•t know. 
(This data was obtained in the form of a written report from an 
intensive mood study volunteer on one of the additional sessions.) 
Subject's ratings: 
Intensity: 
Duration: 
Pervasiveness: 
+2 
approximately 3 hours 
The subject indicated that the feeling state did 
influence everything she thought, felt, said and 
did. 
In this experience there seemed to be strong elements of antici-
pation, expectation and striving. The subject was living out of 
her basic feeling. There are certain resemblances to an attitude 
here, but I would say that the mood became focused as an attitude 
toward this real or imaginary figure. This example is classified 
as a mood; the three criteria were met. It approaches being a 
~odel case, as it is internally complext it has disposition elements, 
and definitely involved shifts in the subject's cognition, 
perception and motivation. Hence it is also classified as a mood 
in terms of the definition offered in section 1.9. 
Example 5 
I feel angry but indignant at the same time. I don't feel 
belligerent but just an irritated type of angry. I feel 
like striking back at the source of my anger and irritation, 
teaching that person a lesson. I'm quite warm and a bit 
tense - not completely relaxed. I tend to frown and my 
chest feels a bit tight. As I think about the situation 
I become more wound up and angry, you could say something 
between angry and furious. 
(This data was obtained from a mood subject on Session 4, the 
self-administered Mood Analysis session .. It was given in response 
to the question 'What are you feeling right now?') 
Subject's ratings: 
Intensity: +3 
Duration: approximately 2 hours 
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I 
Pervasiveness: The subject reported that the feeling state did 
not influence everything she thought, felt, said 
and did, nor did she report an experience of 
pervasiveness. 
The subject's anger was the immediate reaction to an event (being 
short-changed by a fruit vendor). It was not the sort of feeling 
that influenced everything else she felt, said and did. It was 
more like a centre of irritation that flared up from time to time 
and filled her awareness. It has the characteristics of an 
emotion in that: 
1. It is directed at a specific object; 
2. It is of high intensity and 
3.. It constitutes a specific attitude toward its object. 
It is perhaps unusual in that it persisted for a relatively long 
period of time. This could be due to the physiological arousal 
that was not expressed in motor activity. It is classified as a 
related case, an emotion. (A related case because it is a member 
of the affective family--feeling, emotion, and mood.) 
1.11 Ten Viewpoints on Mood 
~sychological viewpoints 
Cattell: Mood as Modulator and Sensitizer 
R. Cattell (1963) conceptualizes mood as a higher order dis-
position entity and as a modulating factor, which in a manner 
similar, but not equivalent to "rolen, serves to activate other 
factors. Most generally, mood as a modulating factor is a 
condition of temporary and systematic influence that changes 
personality and/or situational perception, to bring about changes 
in behaviour in a particular situation. 
a modulator factor in the following way: 
Cattell (1967) defines 
A factor which is brought into action as a temporary 
state in a person, such a~ a role or mood, by some 
ambient stimulus which provokes the state and affects 
all subsequent behaviour for a while (p.371). 
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Cattell also classifies mood as an organism dimension modulator 
and offers this conceptualization: 
These (organism dimension modulators) like moods, 
humors, and new learning experiences, produce reversible 
and irreversible changes on organism dimensions, in the , 
form of a unique pattern for each modulator, and thus 
affect all situations while the modulation persists, 
through the ordinary specification equation (R. Cattell, 
1963, p.l2). 
In his system, a specification equation or a behavioural equation 
·is a linear equation in which each trait operating within the 
personality is gi~en a value (for that person in that particular 
situation) and which is multiplied by a 'behavioural index' common 
to all people functioning in that situation. 
Cattell is careful to point out that the modulating effect of a 
higher order mood factor is not simply a change in the weighting 
of a particular factor in a given situation, but rather, there 
is a multidimensional change within the organism, i.e. mood as 
modulator and sensitizer changes the loadings of a large number 
of source traits, as well as the 'perceptual-interaction' with 
the environment (Cattell, 1963, p.l2). What Cattell seeks to 
gain with his concept of a modulator is a factor that will 
temporarily but systematically operate to modify both the 
perception of the stimulus condition and the trait system of the 
organism, without introducing a construct that will require an 
elaborate conceptual justification. 
The construct mood acquires its distinctive identity as a general 
modulator through a contrast with "role", a more specific type of 
modulator. In the case of role, the modulating effect could be 
conceptualized as either a change in personality (the traits that 
constitute personality) or as a change in the perceptual meaning 
of the situation. In the case of role, Cattell argues for the 
latter alternative. However, in the case of mood, Cattell does 
not see it 'only as a change in the situational indices'; it is 
not a choice between a change in source traits and a change in 
perceptual meaning. The modulating effect of mood is global, it 
involves a change in both source traits and perceptual meaning. 
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The global effect of mood is a high level sensitization of factors. 
In response to Cattell it should be noted that: the clear-cut 
distinction between role and mood may exist only on the theoretical 
level, particularly when the complexities of human motivation are 
taken into account. In the present mood study it was found that: 
1. Some subj,ects assume a mood as part of a role-playing gambit, 
due to the reinforcement value of playing a particular role. 
2. Some subjects describe their moods as merely an.additional 
way of seeing things, i.e. a perspectival awareness that co-
exists with a more neutral or non-perspectival awareness. 
It could be argued that these are exceptional or aberrant cases. 
However, even if this is the case, they are still in need of 
classification. Such a classification is not provided by Cattell's 
scheme of theoretical distinctions. 
A Clinical Consequent of Cattell's Viewpoint 
From the classification of mood as an 'organism dimension 
modulator', it follows that in some sense the individual is 
different in each mood (although the. pattern of traits or organism 
dimensions may remain the same), as the modulation effect influences 
large numbers of personality factors. 
At a clinical level, individuals suffering from the vicissitudes 
of intense and well articulated mood systems do report that they 
seem to be different people in different moods. They often report 
that they are 'unable to trust themselves', i.e. their values and 
judgements in one mood may be dissonant with their values and 
judgements in subsequent moods of their mood system.' Therapeutic 
intervention is sometimes required. Clinically, the problem may 
become one of integrating the different, personality elements and 
establishing value hierarchies that are independent of the 
vicissitudes of mood. 
Cattell's Situational Meaning Determinants of Mood 
Cattell distinguishes between "focal", "ambient" and "global" 
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meaning situations. The focal stimulus meaning is the perceptual 
meaning of a given situation as established by the meaning 
(perceptual response) it would have.for a hypothetical "ordinary" 
person. The ambient stimulus meaning, or role cue, is the meaning 
of a particular situation for an individual in a particular role. 
The global stimulus meaning then becomes equivalent to the sum of 
the focal stimulus meaning and the ambient stimulus meaning. This 
is expressed as: 
s (j) + (rj) 
(focal) + (ambient) 
Cattell writes: 
(jr) 
(global) 
••..• the ~arne physical focal stimulus is differently 
perceived in the global context of the role. This 
implies that in the latter there exists for the role-
trained person only, some additional ambient stimulus 
or role cue which is capable of converting the simple 
focal stimulus meaning into the modified global 
stimulus meaning, which indicates that he must react 
to it as being in a role .... this ambient stimulus can 
be several things, e.g. something that occurs before 
the focal stimulus is re-encountered, but, whatever 
its nature, it results, for the role-trained persop 
in an increment of meaning (1963, p.-5). 
I 
I 
How then can mood induction be viewed in terms of focal, ambient 
and global stimuli? 
If we are prepared to conceive of mood as similar to a temporary 
role, except that it is: 
1. maintained across a wider variety of situations and 
2. is slower in onset, i.e. develops over time 
3. involves a degree of change in source traits 
then it is the ambient stimulus or role cue that becomes of primary 
importance. In Cattell's vi.ew this ambient stimulus institutes 
mood change which is referable to either a preceding experience, 
a learning experience, or to physiological conditions. Cattell 
(1963) has discussed the statistical procedures necessary to develop 
a taxonomy of such stimulus situations. 
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- Here the obvious, though perhaps-neglected, point is that an 
environmental stimulus (focal stimulus) typically does not 
operate independently of other factors. The effect of the 
stimulus is mediated by its meaning for a particular subject . 
. The meaning is determined by the intrinsic properties of the 
stimulus and by prior learning. 
Summary: The major elements of Cattell's view 
1. Mood is an organism dimension modulator, a factor of 
temporary and systematic influence that produces change on a 
variety of organism dimensions in the form of a unique 
pattern for each mood. 
2. Mood is a higher order factor which "sensitizes" other 
factors, bringing about a selective orientation and establish-
ing tendencies toward similar responses in a wide variety of 
situations. 
3. Mood is a function of both focal and ambient stimuli. 
V. Nowlis: Mood as the Effect on an Individual of his Own 
Configuration of Activities 
In Nowlis' view (1965): 
Mood is the effect on a person of his own configurations 
of activity. These configurations may be conceptualized 
as fundamental patterns of general functioning and orienta-
tion, such as level of activation, level 9f control, level 
of concentration, direction of social orientation, and 
positive (pleasant) or negative (unpleasant) general 
appraisal. The effect of these general patterns on the 
person may be mediated by cues associated with them in the 
life history and involves affective, cognitive, motivational, 
and motor responses to the cues, such responses may in turn 
become functionally related to the general patterns and may 
modify, maintain, or even instigate them (p.353). 
Nowlis believes the major function of mood is to monitor and 
control behaviour. A full discussion and critique of Nowlis' 
position is given below in the section on disposition formulations 
of mood. 
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The Determinants of Mood 
In an independent'contribution, Nowlis (1963) has classified mood 
inducers under the headings of "habitability factors", "organic 
factors", and "emotional provocations". He sets them out in the 
following way: 
1. Habitability factors include: persisting aspects of the 
external environment such as temperature and other atmospheric 
features, light, colour, sound, vibration, size of chamber, 
and overall level of stimulation. 
2. Organic factors include: drugs, endocrines, toxins, bio-
chemical activities, nutritional factors, disease, degenera-
tive and regenerative factors, physical trauma, and various 
other non-neural physiological activities of the body. 
3. Emotional provocations include: successes, failures, 
frustrations, commitments, arrivals, departures, interruptions, 
resumptions, separations and reunions, tasks, duties, decisions, 
demands and the vicarious sharing of the emotions of others 
through stories, news, social interaction in all its forms, 
and through all the myriad forms of art, entertainment, and 
recreation (pp.83-84). 
Summary: The major elements of Nowlis' view 
1. Mood is the feedback effect on a person of his own con-
figurations of activity. 
2. Mood is mediated by a variety of cues and a reinforcement 
history. 
3. Mood serves a controlling and monitoring function. 
M.B. Arnold: Mood as the Feeling Response to General Organismic 
Functioning 
M.B. Arnold (1960) views mood as 'the feeling response to general 
organismic functioning'. In her view any stimulus that can 
"enhance" or "interfere" with that functioning will produce an 
alteration in mood. She suggests that a pleasant surprise or a 
great joy will induce a mood of elation, while a disappointment, 
a sorrow, or a bout of anxiety will induce a depressed mood. She 
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writes: 
But mood can also be depressed by ill health, by lack 
of exercise or of congenial activity, by anything that 
affects us adversely. Even dream emotions will have 
effects on organismic functioning and will contribute 
their share to the general mood (p.80). 
Arnold and Gasson (1954), after acknowledging the difficulty of 
distinguishing between feelings, emotions and moods, formulate 
mood in the following way: 
When there is a feeling state which is not ascribed to 
a particular sensation, but which reflects the total 
inner state, the total functioning, and this feeling 
state is protracted, we call it a mood ••.. Feelings and 
moods, then, are indicators of the~oth or difficult 
functioning of the organism. As such, they can act 
as danger signals to induce the individual to take steps 
toward re-establishment of effective physiological and 
psychological functioning (p.298). 
Murray (1968) has set out Arnold's .cognitive and physiological 
view of emotion, with respect to its developmental sequence: 
1. Perception: the neutral reception of external 
stimuli (e.g. a bomber pilot sees a fighter plane 
approaching him). 
2. Appraisal: a judgement of the stimuli as good and 
beneficial or bad and harmful (the pilot recognises 
the plane as an enemy who could shoot him down). 
3. Emotion: a felt tendency towards stimuli judged as 
good and away from those judged as .bad (the pilot 
has a tendency to flee). 
4. Expression: a pattern of physiological changes 
organized towards approach or withdrawal, differing 
from emotion, which accompanies the felt tendency 
(the pilot's heart pounds, his muscles tense, his 
mouth dries, he breaks out in a cold sweat, and he 
has butterflies in his stomach). 
5. Action: approach or withdrawal may occur if another 
emotion does not interfere (the pilot may not actually 
flee because of a sense of duty, a desire for glory, 
and so on)(p.Sl). 
To what extent (if any) Arnold would wish to extend this account 
to mood is conjectural, however appraisal as a determining stage 
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in either emotion or mood has been criticized by Strongman (1973). 
Strongman writes: 
Arnold regards correct appraisals and consequent actions 
as requ~r~ng: (1) memories of sensory and motor events; 
(2) memories of previous positive and negative attitudes; 
and (3) the rehearsal in imagination of the appropriate 
actions .••.• It would seem that cognitive notions such as 
appraisal can basically never be more than subjective. 
It is unlikely that physiology will enable us to say how 
an appraisal occurs or where an affective memory is stored 
and in what way our imaginations allow us to rehearse 
appropriate emotional actions ..•.• it is difficult to see 
what predictions can be made from her concept of cognitive 
appraisal, especially as it is a process which she regards 
as occurring almost instantaneously (p.Sl). 
Two issues, one implicit and one explicit, arise from Strongman's 
criticisms. The implicit issue is whether the constructs of a 
cognitive theory of affect must at all points correspond to 
physiological constructs. Strongman seems to be suggesting that 
advancements in a cognitive approach must be constrained by the 
state of development of physiological theories. This is a 
reductive approach that arbitrarily limits the autonomy of any 
cognitive approach. To the extent that a cognitive approach 
utilizes physiological constructs, there is a need for corres-
pondence between the physiological constructs and physiological 
facts--but this does not mean that all the cognitive constructs 
must be correlated with physiological facts. In fact there is 
some historical evidence that refinements in cognitive approaches 
may occur only when a particular cognitive approach is emancipated 
from a physiological context, e.g. Freud's abandonment of a 
neurological context (his general neurological theory of neurosis) 
for his conceptualization of neurosis, enabled him to develop his 
psychodynamic formulations of patient's complaints. 
The explicit issue is whether the element of "appraisal" in a 
cognitive approach can give rise to determinate predictions. 
Independent of whether or not "appraisal" is a valid and useful 
construct, I believe Strongman has missed Arnold's point by a wide 
margin. In Arnold's theory "appraisal" is only one element in a 
chain of constructs. It is the entire chain or system as a whole 
that either can or cannot give rise to predictions. It would be 
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prudent and more accurate to say that Arnold's system remains 
untested and perhaps is untestable, but not to say (as Strongman 
does) that it is difficult to see what predictions can be made 
from one element of the system. Theories are overthrown, or 
rather superceded because of internal anomalies, internal in-
consistencies, or the greater power of rival theories--but not 
because one element may be deficient. 
Summary: The major elements of Arnold's view: 
1. Mood is a protracted feeling state which is the result of 
the total organismic state of the individual. 
2. Moods indicate the smooth or difficult functioning of the 
individual. 
3. Moods may act as signals to enhance the functioning of the 
individual. 
E.W. Ewert: Mood as a Diffuse Background Experience 
In Ewert's view (1954): 
Moods are background experiences of a diffuse nature. 
There is no differentiation of experienced self and 
experienced world. Thus moods do not refer to persons, 
things or events. They possess no object reference. 
Although it is likely that the total state of the 
organism has something to do with elated or depressed 
moods, it is possible to distinguish moods from organic 
sensations. Accelerated heartbeat, retarded respiration, 
menstrual difficulties, are experienced in the form of 
organic sensations and differ sharply from elated or 
depressed moods (pp.233-234). 
As an illustration of his concept, Ewert distinguishes between 
grief and depression. In a state of depression an individual is 
able to discriminate grief over the death of a close friend (the 
object reference), from the more general background, experience of 
depression which seems to "seep into" all his conscious experience. 
Metaphorically speaking, for there are no spatial coo~dinates to 
affective experience itself, grief is a "sharp" experience, 
clearly delineated by its object reference in the emergent fore-
ground. Depression is the background experience, diffuse yet 
"supporting" the emergent foreground of grief. 
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The two major aspects of Ewert's conception are: 
1. mood as a diffuse background experience and 
2, mood as lacking in object reference. 
In the case of 1, calling mood a diffuse background experience may 
be assimilated to characterizing mood as pervasive and suggesting 
that it is of a lesser intensity (not as sharp) as an emotion. 
To this, Ewert adds the spatial figure-ground metaphor. The need 
for reconstructing pervasiveness as the experience of pervasiveness 
or as a judgement to the effect that mood influences everything the 
individual says, thinks, feels and does, has already been established 
(sect ion 1. 8) . In the case of 2, to consider mood as lacking in 
object reference, is chiefly a conceptual or procedural choice, as 
it depends on the way in which "object" is defined. For example, 
in some moods the object reference may be something general, some-
thing intangible, or something presently non-existent: the depth 
and quality of one's friendships, uncertainty concerning future 
events, or approaching old age. Here to be uncertain about the 
object of a mood is to say that its objects may be vague or ill 
defined, not necessarily that there is no object. On the other 
hand, not all moods may have objects. It is conceivable that moods 
of purely physiological origin may have sources, e.g. the bio-
chemical conditions they reflect, but not objects. For these 
reasons it is unwise to make the presence or absence of object 
reference a distinguishing criterion of mood. 
Summary: the major elements of Ewert's view: 
1. Mood is a diffuse background experience. 
2. Mood is lacking in object reference. 
Evans: A General Psychiatric View of Mood 
Evans (1974) has set forth what he believes to be a representative 
psychiatric view of mood: 
Mood is a complex background state of the organism, the 
subjective feeling state being accompanied by changes in 
cognition with appropriate colouring of the thought 
content, in motor behaviour, in autonomic activities, 
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and in state of arousal. Description of mood state 
will hence involve a complex statement of behaviour, 
feeling, bodily state, thought content, and a description 
of these components will also form the basis of the 
description of an affective disorder. The description 
will not be complete unless the environmental situation 
to which the response is geared is specified and the 
effect of the altered mood state on the subsequent 
behaviour is outlined. 
In addition to the changes in mood owing to environmental 
factors, there is evidence in normal individuals of slow 
shifts in mood lasting hours or days at a time, apparently 
unrelated to immediate situational factors. Physiological 
events such as menstruation and the puerperium are often 
associated with shifts in mood (p.6). 
Evans illustrates the application of the psychiatric schema by 
considering the typical components of bereavement and grief: 
1. Cognition: ruminations about the deceased. 
2. Perception: perceptual disturbances, illusions and mis-
identifications. 
3. Affect: frozen emotion, agitation and hostility. 
4. Somatic symptoms: changes in autonomic activity, headaches, 
indigestion, constipation and weakness. 
5. Behaviour: aimless activity, searching behaviour, tendencies 
to cling to the possessions of the deceased and general social 
withdrawal. 
A description and classification of mood states along the co-
ordinates of cognition, perception, affect, somatic symptoms and 
behaviour, is an important first step in the understanding of mood. 
However, it is only a classification of dimensions. To classify 
dimensions, is not necessarily to have full comprehension. 
Psychiatric mood descriptions need to be more closely linked with 
outward criteria, e.g. situational aspects, behaviour and language 
functioning. In addition, when a mood is multi-dimensional, it 
is important to have a determination of the basic (most important) 
,elements as they appear to the individual. Ideally these basic 
elements should be coordinated with constant or fluctuating aspects 
of the social and environmental situation. 
Psychiatric phenomenologists, e.g. Ellenberger (1958), have shown 
that the manner in which the individual experiences the coordinates 
' 
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of space, time, materiality, and causality are fundamental to the 
understanding of particular mood states. There is also a growing 
body of psychiatric literature, e.g. Harris (1971), that suggests 
that an important factor in the production and maintenance of mood 
states is the·occurrence of events that influence the self-esteem 
or self-concept of the individual. A review of the clinical 
literature suggests that a theory of the self is important for the 
conceptualization of mood states. 
Summary: the major elements of Evan's general psychiatric view: 
1. Mood is a complex background state of the organism. 
2. Mood involves characteristic changes in cognition, motor 
behaviour, autonomic activity an~ state of arousal. 
3. The description of mood state involves reference to behaviour, 
feeling, bodily state, and thought content. 
Weinshel: A Psychoanalytical View 
E.M. Weinshel (1970) in his review of the current (up to 1969) and 
past psychoanalytical literature on mood, points out that although 
there are relatively few psychoanalytical contributions focused 
primarily on mood phenomena themselves, the majority of psycho-
analytical theoreticians have commented on mood in their discussions 
of the more general concept of "affect". These authors include 
Rapaport (1951, 1953), Rapaport and Gill (1959, 1960a,b), Bibring 
(1953), Brierly (1937), Fenichel (1941), Glover (1939, 1946), 
Jones (1929), Novey (1959, 1961), Rangel! (1955, 1967), Schafer 
(1964), Schur (1953, 1958), Landauer (1938), Lewin (1950), Greenson 
(1954) and Jacobson (1957). To Weinshel's list could be added 
Schur (1969), Niederland (1970), Pao (1970) and Leaff (1971). 
After his survey of the psychoanalytical literature, Weinshel comes 
to the conclusion that: 
A thoroughly comprehensive mood theory would have to 
include the relationship of moods to affect theory in 
general, to structure formation, and to the higher level 
regulatory principles such as the synthetic and organizing 
function. Further, it would be incumbent on such a 
comprehensive theory to differentiate moods more sharply 
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than we are presently doing from certain related psycho-
logical states. We recognize that moods are both 
complex and enduring affective configurations; but 
certainly not all affective states that are either 
complex or enduring, or both, can correctly be labelled 
as moods. We should distinguish moods from, on the one 
hand, such enduring affective states as chronic anxiety 
or 'love' and, on the other hand, from certain character 
traits (p.313). 
It should be noted that R. Cattell and his associates have directed 
attention to this latter question, e.g. in their distinctions 
between anxiety as a trait and as a state. In addition Nowlis 
(1963) has considered the type of theory necessary for dealing 
with this issue. He writes: 
The philosopher Broad has suggested that there is also a 
hierarchical structure of dispositions in organisms, so 
that the likelihood of acquiring a lower-order disposition 
depends on prior acquisition of a higher-order disposition. 
In common-sense psychology, temperament sometimes refers 
to a third-order and enduring disposition, mood to a short-
term disposition of the second order, and emotion to a 
brief,· first-order disposition. We may thus better under-
stand why temperament is often defined as "susceptibility 
to moods", and mood as "susceptibility to emotions", since 
a higher-order disposition may be defined in terms of the 
probability of occurrence of relevant lower-order dis-
positions. But many serious problems arise in studying 
psychological events which may be classified with respect 
to dispositions of several orders, since there is little 
or no agreement·on the criteria for identifying the order 
of disposition to which the events can most usefully be 
referred. It may be that the higher the order of dis-
position, the longer the temporal span through which we 
find it uninterruptedly potentially relevant to behaviour 
and experience (p.45). 
Heinshel reviews the two major psychoanalytical definitions of 
mood that are presently available, i.e. Greenson (1954) and Jacobson 
. (1957). Greenson sets forth mood as: 'A compound of different 
affects which give a specific character or ~oloring to one's 
emotional state'. Jacobson defines mood as: 'Temporary fixations 
of generalized discharge modifications induced by a significant 
experience whose discharge pattern lends its quality to all dis-
charge patterns'. 
stating: 
Jacobson (1957) summarizes her own view in 
Moods-are ego states characterized by generalized dis-
charge modifications which temporarily influence the 
q~alities of all feelings, thoughts and actions. They 
are evoked by intense experiences which cause high 
energic tensions leading to an overflow and spreading 
of energy throughout the ego by virtue of cathetic shifts. 
These processes go along with generalized transference 
phenomena, a point that emphasizes the difference between 
moods and object-directed feeling states. The latter are 
characterized by libidinous or aggressive investments in 
specific objects. But the moods transfer the qualities 
of the provocative experience to all objects and experiences; 
thus they impart a special coloring to the whole world and 
hence also to the self. Since they permit gradual, 
repetitive discharge with reality testing on many objects, 
they must be regarded as a primitive economic modality of 
the ego (p.86). 
Weinshel maintains that Jacobson's formulations express what is 
observable at the clinical level. However, it is apparent that 
these formulations are heavily theory laden and contain a number 
of metapsychological intrusions, and as such could not themselves 
be directly observable at a clinical level. Many of Jacobson's 
statements are higher-order theoretical propositions, without 
specific empirical and operational linkages. Given this intract-
able state of affairs, analysis and evaluation becomes very 
difficult. 
Rychlak (1968) has suggested four functions for the appraisal of 
theoretical terminology: 
1. The descriptive function -
This function stresses the reliability of descriptions 
derived from the theoretical terminology. 
2. The delimiting function -
This function stresses the degree to which a clear content 
area is mapped out by the theoretical terms. 
3. The generative function -
This function stresses the ability of the theoretical network 
to generate testable hypotheses. 
4. The integrative function -
This function stresses systematization, parsimony, and the 
ability of the theoretical network to account for diverse 
data. 
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It would be a major contribution to the understanding of mood 
phenomena if psychoanalytic theory could be reformulated to fulfil 
these four functions. 
Weinshel's considerations can be divided into the following areas: 
1. Mood as a complex psychological structure with affective, 
behavioural and cognitive components. 
2. Mood as an ego state. 
3. The pervasiveness of mood. 
4. Mood as the result of a distortion of reality and as a com-
promise with reality testing. 
5. Nosological difficulties with mood. 
6. The functions of mood. 
For the purpose of a critical discussion, Weinshel's major points 
are highlighted: 
1. Mood as a complex psychological structure with affective, 
behavioural and cognitive components. 
Weinshel emphasizes the necessity of giving equal weight to the 
affective, behavioural and cognitive components of mood states in 
the conceptualization of mood. For Weinshel, the affective 
component is perhaps the major feature and he suggests that 
attention be given to both the general affective tone and the 
constituent affective components responsible for the general tone, 
especially with regard to their stratification, interaction, and 
defensive functioning. 
Jacobson stresses the general economic (energy regulating) function 
of mood, i.e. mood provides a means for the gradual release of 
moderate amounts of cathectic charge. Weinshel is at variance with 
this position. He suggests that the affective discharge may at 
times be massive (implying a global and/or intense discharge) and 
relatively archaic (implying an explosive mode of discharge, in-
discriminate as to object). 
Weinshel also suggests that, at other times, the discharge may be 
differentiated (by discharge through differentiated channels) and 
relatively neutralized (of sexual and aggressive investments), or 
both extremes may coexist. It ca.n be. argued, that in the latter 
case it is controversial whether both modes of discharge could 
exist simultaneously for the same affect. Assuming that different 
affects could be discharged simultaneously in a given mood, it 
seems likely that the more archaic discharge pattern would pre-empt 
or mask the more differentiated mode of discharge, and hence we 
would be unaware of its presence. 
In the former case (massive and archaic discharge) it might be more 
appropriate to speak of an emotional outburst or an affective storm 
than of a mood proper. In any case intensity and differentiation 
of discharge are not sufficient criteria for the ascription of mood 
states. Weinshel's more general point that mood is a complex state 
which involves reference to affect, behaviour and cognition, is 
accepted. 
2. Mood as an ego state 
In Weinshel's view: 'mood represents a revival under specific 
circumstances of a previous, invariably infantile, ego state which 
has undergone certain modifications and elaborations' (P·315). 
As an ego state mood can be considered to have both a manifest and 
a latent structure. The latent structure is equivalent to a 
dynamic organization of infantile events, various representations 
of the infantile events, the response tendencies to the infantile 
events, and correlative self representations. The manifest 
structure is equivalent to a surface layer of contemporaneous 
events eliciting the mood and their organization by the process of 
reality testing; mood itself is the affective response to the 
synthesis of manifest and latent structures. 
Weinshel is alerted to a major difficulty in this notion, i.e. the 
status of mood as the revival of an infantile ego state. This 
position would require: 
1. A knowledge of infantile ego states. 
Information in this area is very scanty. It tends to be 
highly inferential due to the lack of language development 
in the infant and young child. 
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2. A knowledge of the mechanism of retrieval. 
This psychological mecha.nism of retrieval or . revival would 
have to be consonant with the general psychoanalytical view-
point. 
In response to the issue of infantile ego states, Weinshel merely 
reaffirms the psychoanalytical bias. He writes: 'the analysis 
of adult moods would appear to demonstrate quite convincingly the 
relationship of adult moods to the repression and fixation of early 
experiences, of significant frustration and/or gratification' 
(p. 315). It might be maintained by Weinshel that a mood contains 
at its core as a major element affective memories. These memories 
are connected with "significant" infantile experiences, and the 
mood experience itself operates as an affective sign that is 
intentional with regard to those particular infantile experiences, 
and is activated by conditions that are similar to those that 
produced the infantile experience. However a psychoanalytical 
mechanism for the revival or retrieval of the infantile ego state 
has not been put forward. 
3. Pervasiveness 
Jacobson (1957) stresses that moods do not have a unique object or 
content by which they can be defined, rather they: 'find 
expression in specific qualities attached to all feelings, thoughts 
and actions, they may indeed be called a barometer of the ego 
state'·. Weinshel commenting on Jacobson writes: 
Moods, she stresses, represent a unit with a ubiquitous 
and uniform coloring and with obvious connections between 
its various manifestations; and .•. it is this quality 
which permits us 'to guess a person's mood from his 
facial expression and behaviour even if he is not fully 
aware of it'. Jacobson puts particular emphasis on the 
complementary shifts that take place in both the patient's 
self- and object-representations under the influence of a 
particular mood (p.316). 
The analogy of pervasiveness as a ucolouration" is adequate up to 
a point, i.e. as an initial verbal formulation of one aspect of 
mood experience. It should also be noted that the analogy is 
functional as a metaphorical description embedded in ordinary 
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language, e.g. as a subject in the mood study said: 'A mood is 
like a coloured slide placed over all your senses so that every-
thing you feel is coloured in a certain way'. However, the 
metaphor should not be given the status of an explanatory entity. 
Specifically, pervasiveness as a colouration in the psycho-
analytical sense of imbuing or impregnating diverse entities with 
a particular quality, especially as a quality that can be "attached" 
to all feelings, thoughts and attitudes, is lacking in a clear 
denotative sense. 
It has already been indicated (section 1. 6) that "pervasiveness" 
can be reconstructed as either the experience of pervasiveness or 
as an avowal that the mood influences everything the individual 
says, thinks, feels, and does. Theoretically this amounts to 
saying that the theoretical entity "mood" influences cognitive, 
affective, behavioural and motivational subsystems. 
Also vulnerable to criticism, is the notion that it is the 
colouring quality itself which permits us 'to guess a person's 
mood from his facial expression and behaviour even if he is not 
fully aware of it'. The intended force of the "permits" as well 
as the "to guess" is not clear. 
There is no pre-emptive requirement to postulate a special feeling 
quality as necessary for the ascription of mood terms to persons. 
This is not to deny the possibility of a special feeling quality 
in a particular mood, but rather to deny its necessity or 
sufficiency in all cases for the ascription of mood terms. It 
should also be added that the connections between the various 
manifestations of a mood state need not be obvious. Ryle (1949) 
maintains that the different manifestations of mood are only 
'loosely affiliated' and indeed, in the psychoanalytical view it 
may take major excavation (resistance and transference analysis) 
to reveal the unconscious motivational sources that can render 
the different manifestations coherent and intelligible. 
\-leinshel maintains: 
The mood then reflects the common qualities of the sum 
total of discharge processes which develop over a certain 
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period of time; there then results a 'temporary fixation 
of generalized discharge modifications'which will affect 
the pattern of response to all stimuli (p.316). 
It is possible, by analogy with physics, to conceive of a discharge 
process as having intensity and direction, i.e. as being a vector 
quantity, but the addition of 'common qualities' to the 'sum total 
of discharge processes' would require extensive justification, even 
within a paradigm based on physical processes. However, some 
notion of mood as a generalized or global feeling response to a 
variety of physical or psychological processes (Weinshel's 'sum 
total of discharge processes') seems to be important at a theoretical 
level. The notion is present in both Nowlis' and Arnold's 
theoretical views, though in less of an inflated form than Weinshel's. 
Nowlis speaks of the effect on the individual of general con-
figurations of activity and he believes that mood involves the 
total individual. Arnold speaks of the feeling response to general 
organismic functioning. Either of these formulations seems 
preferable (more parsimonious) to Weinshel's formulation, particu-
larly as t\feinshel links his 'common qualities' to Jacobson's 
'temporary fixation of generalized discharge modifications', 
producing a rather baroque theoretical amalgamation. 
4. Mood as a distortion of reality and as a compromise with 
reality testing. 
\Jeinshel maintains that every mood involves a distortion of reality 
to a varying degree, such that the greater the distortion, the more 
pathological the mood state. Weinshel is presuming some standard 
or yardstick for reality (presumably the psychoanalyst's) that can 
be uniformly applied. There is perhaps a commonsense validity to 
this, yet on the other hand, the mood state is to a greater or 
lesser extent, the individual's reality at the moment he is 
experiencing it. If it deviates from the consensus on reality, 
then what we want to know are the salient features and constitutive 
structure of that reality. What is required is a return to the 
individual's reality as experienced and the establishment of 
"justifications" (essential structures and reasons) for the 
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individual's special sensitivity to (and in) a situation. Weinshel 
writes: 
Under the influence of the mood an individual perceives 
the world and himself not as they are, but through the 
specific coloration (or discoloration) of the mood. 
This involves a considerable amount of 'selective 
perception', which may be quite subtle and limited in 
some cases, but quite gross and extensive in others. 
The hypercathexis of some percepts, together with the 
mechanisms of repression, negation, isolation and pro-
jection - and complex combinations thereof - all play 
a significant role in this regard; and it should be 
pointed out that this 'selection' extends to memories 
as well as to external perceptions. Those memories 
which are consistent with the mood are admitted into 
consciousness; those which would tend to contradict the 
trend of the mood are not (p.316). 
If mood is conceptualized as something akin to an attitudinal set 
or role (Cattell, 1963) that influences broad repertoires of 
experience and behaviour (Nowlis, 1963), .then the concept of 
selective perception is a useful coordinate concept. In 
addition, the notion of the operation of defence mechanisms is a 
contribution to the understanding of mood. However, a systematic 
interrelationship of mood as an attitudinal set or role, selective 
perception, and the defence mechanisms, is presently not available. 
Weinshel suggests that anticipation plays an important role in mood 
states and is one of the factors responsible for the distortion of 
reality that accompanies or is a part of mood states. It is the 
operation of unconscious phantasy that determines the form and 
content of the anticipation component. In Weinshel's view the 
three major elements of anticipation are: 
1. a mass of previous experience of frustration and/or gratifi-
cation 
2. the presence of both conscious and unconscious phantasies and 
3. the individual's assessment of the salient features of his 
internal and external environments. 
There is a parallel here, as far as the external environment is 
concerned, with Aknold's appraisal view of emotion. 
\.J'einshel writes: 
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Thus the anticipation of what the world will be like 
helps shape our behaviour patterns and may help to 
evoke from the external world and its objects precisely 
those responses a.nd reactions which are best designed 
to perpetuate the mood (p.317). 
This suggests that for Weinshel, thro~gh its anticipatory component, 
mood becomes a positive feedback system which functions to guarantee 
through self-augmentation its own continuing existence. Whether 
vleinshel intends this to be characteristic of all moods is not clear. 
This function of mood is clinically observable in such phenomena as 
"injustice collecting" and the self-criticism that occurs in some 
forms of depression. However, this positive feedback model may 
only be appropriate to "pathological" moods or moods with an un-
conscious self-destructive element. It should be noted that Nowlis 
is offering a negative feedback model, i.e. a model where the effects 
of mood feed back information to the organism, altering experience and 
behaviour in response to the environment--rather than in response to 
intrapsychic functioning. 
5. Nosological difficulties concerning mood 
Heinshel makes the point that the classification of mood phenomena 
has proved a difficult task. He suggests that the major classi-
ficatory systems are of two types: 1. classification by emotive 
content or the feeling reaction to that content, and 2. classi-
fication according to the anticipation of gratification or the 
anticipation of frustration. 
There are at least two other classificatory schemes worthy of note 
that have become prominent (one prior and the other subsequent to 
1\Teinshel' s review). They are: 
1. classification according to the numerical value (obtained 
from self-ratings on a mood adjective check list) of various 
general patterns of activity that are operating, e.g. ratings 
on the dimensions of aggression, anxiety, surgency, elation, 
concentration, fatigue, vigour, social affection, sadness, 
egotism, deactivation, and scepticism (Nowlis, 1965) and 
2. classification according to the differential role of cognitive, 
affective, and conative components (Fleetwood, 1970). 
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The first classification system is important because it permits 
the measurement of mood, di!nens:J:ons; and the second system allows 
a description of mood experience along three major qualitative 
axes. 
6. Hypothesized functions of mood 
The following functions of mood can be extracted from Weinshel 1 s 
discussion: 
1. Mood serves as economic function 
Mood regulates the flow and flux of energy in the psyche. It 
serves to bind and tame primitive affect. Weinshel writes: 
As structures, moods provide a variable and relative 
degree of stability ..•• which not only permits the 
repeated discharge of small quantities of cathexes 
but also play a part in preventing a more haphazard 
affect discharge. Without the anchorage offered by 
these mood structures, the discharge of affects •••• 
could under many circumstances become disordered or 
relatively chaotic (p.318). 
The notion that mood can permit the discharge of primitive or 
intense affect in a relatively ego syntonic fashion is 
supported by one subject in the mood study who defined mood: 
'A mood is a strong emotional feeling which must be 
experienced by an individual to allow him/her to let out the 
appropriate feelings from within and by so doing, feel better 
afterwards'. This subject's experience suggests that mood 
can function as a safety valve for the gradual release of pent 
up feelings that might otherwise disturb the homeostatic 
balance. 
2. Mood serves as integrating function 
In Weinshel's view~ mood integrates with varying degrees of 
success a diversity of mental processes and elements. He 
writes: 
Consideration should be given ... not only to the 
complexity and the stability of these mood structures 
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but to the 'elegance' with which the ego is often 
able to combine diverse psychic elements, emanating 
from varied sources and reflecting multiple levels 
of development, into some semblance of unity and 
harmony. I would also like to stress, of course, 
that this is not distinctive of all moods and that 
the degree of elegance, harmony and stability shows 
a marked variation in different moods and in the 
same mood at different times (p.318). 
3. Mood serves a general adaptational function 
Weinshel cites Hartmann (1939a,b; 1947 and 1956) as indicating 
that for the optimal functioning of the individual, there must 
be a viable combination of the archaic with the differentiated, 
the rational with the irrational, and primary process modes of 
experiencing with secondary process modes. It is suggested by 
Weinshel that mood is one way of accomplishing this. 
In conclusion Weinshel suggests that future investigations should 
be orientated toward answering the questions: How are moods 
maintained over a period of time? How does a given mood end? How 
can we explain oscillations of moods? What is the relationship 
of moods to object relations and to identifications? 
I would add that two important general questions are: What are the 
most effective techniques for the analysis of mood? What are the 
limits of what can be meaningfully said about mood phenomena? The 
present study is in part an attempt to develop an effective technique 
for the analysis of mood, to establish a framework for what can be 
said about mood phenomena, and to provide some answers for the type 
of questions Weinshel sets out. 
Summary: The major elements of the psychoanalytical view 
1. Mood is a complex psychological structure with affective, 
behavioural and cognitive components. 
2. Moods are ego states, they have a manifest and latent 
structure and operate in accordance with ego functioning, 
i.e. they perform the functions of synthesis, adaptation, 
the binding of instinctual energy, and executive controlling. 
3. Moods can be characterized as "pervasive", they permit a 
generalized discharge of psychic energy through diverse 
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channels. They influence thinking, feeling and action 
tendencies. 
4. Moods are evoked by intense psychological experiences and 
transfer the qualities of those experiences to a wide range 
of objects. 
5. Moods serve a variety of functions. In particular they 
serve an economic function, they permit reality testing 
through the repetitive discharge of psychic energy on a 
variety of objects. 
Pribram: A Physiological View 
K. Pribram (1970) directing his attention to the neural organization 
of moods, writes: 
Feelings arise from the operation of multiple inter-
connected core brain structures characterized by short 
fine-fibered, many-branched neurons. The pattern of 
organization of neural pptentials can be expected to 
depart considerably from that which occurs in flat 
sheets of horizontally connected cells cutting across 
parallel lines of nerve transmission. Little is 
known as yet of the results of excitatory and inhibitory 
interactions which take place in such networks. From 
the anatomical picture one might conjecture that these 
interactions blend into a device which governs the 
reciprocity between excitation and inhibition (operating 
somewhat like a gyroscope to keep the system tuned) .•• 
This special combination of control and sensitivity 
could be expected to make o~ these brain structures 
superb instruments for continuously monitor:ing their 
own state, a requirement ba?ic to any conception of 
mood (p.51). ( 
Summary: the major elements of Pribram's view' 
1. A model of mood can be developed from neurological facts. 
2. A gyroscope type model may be appropriate for mood phenomena. 
3. Such a model should combine the principles of control and 
sensitivity. 
4. Such a model implies that mood functions to monitor its own 
state. 
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Philosophical viewpoints 
Charlton: Mood as a Mode of Awareness 
W. Charlton (1970) maintains that to feel angry (an emotion) or to 
feel depressed (a mood) is to be aware of objects in a particular 
way, i.e. to perceive and think about things in one, or a variety 
of ways, that can be considered as different cognitive modes basic 
to the affective experience. Closely linked with the cognitive 
emphasis, is the well justified assertion that part of being in a 
particular affective state, is exhibiting the behaviours commonly 
associated with that state. To be in an affective state x, is to 
be characteristically aware of an object, or a range of objects 
each under a particular description and to act in accordance with 
those descriptions. Charlton writes: 
Is there anything more to anger or fear than thinking 
of something in a certain way, and behaving appropriately? 
Some philosophers feel it perverse to deny that there is 
also an inner feeling, discernible by introspection, but 
their case is not, I think, made out. True enough, a 
man sometimes knows better than anyone else what his 
emotional state is, but he need not know this by intro-
spection; it may simply be that he knows better than 
we the descriptions under which things appear to him. 
It is also true that an emotion may involve bodily 
sensations, feelings of sickness, cold and the like; 
but these are not so much objects of introspective aware-
ness as themselves awarenesses or modes of awareness of 
changes and the like in the body, sometimes even of 
external things (p.88). 
A number of issues should be raised at this point, not so much to 
provide definitive solutions, as to provide point and counterpoint, 
to provide some conceptual "easement" or access across a complex 
terrain, and to prevent a settlement for a simplified but in-
adequate view. Charlton has obviously eliminated feeling in the 
sense of an "inner feeling" that I have acquaintance with through 
introspection. Clearly Charlton is performing in the vein of 
many modern philosophers in rejecting the Lockean tradition which 
postulates an "inner mental faculty" or "mind's eye" capable of 
perceiving an indubitable inner feeling. There is no quarrel 
with rejecting this analogy, as an analogy. It is what remains 
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after this analogy is dispelled that is the important question. 
In Charlton's view, what remains are descriptions of the way 
objects appear, the thoughts about these objects, and the appro-
priate behaviours. However, this is not quite all, for Charlton 
suggests that we are 'moved by' (emotion as e-movere) the objects 
under these descriptions and we sense patterns of bodily sensations. 
It is suggested that Charlton is merely emphasizing the cognitive 
and behavioural factors in emotion and mood, and makes a further 
contribution to the literature that rejects introspection as 
"perception" by an inner mental faculty. He has not erradicated 
the dual functioning of mood words in everyday language, as 
designators of feeling and motivation. It may be that the feeling 
use can be made to collapse into the cognitive and behavioural 
use, but Charlton has not demonstrated this. 
Charlton distinguishes between object directed and non-object 
directed affective states. Emotion is an object directed state, 
and mood is not. He writes: 
Some feelings, for instance depression (here different 
from grief), and gaiety, have no definite object. There 
seems also to be objectless feelings of anger, fear and 
the like. Let us call these undirected emotional states 
moods. A mood is not, any more than a directed emotion, 
an object of introspection. To be in a mood is not to 
be conscious of a special feeling in yourself, but to be 
conscious of other things in a special way. You notice 
things which you normally overlook, and vice versa; you 
have sensations you would not normally have, and the 
reverse; and what you would normally think of in one 
way, you think of in a different way .••. being in a mood 
is still, just as much as having a feeling directed at 
an object, a matter of thinking of things under certain 
descriptions. It follows that feelings generally are 
themselves accurately describable in words. Words like 
'anger' and 'depression' are indeed generic in character; 
they are not expressions for specific feelings like 
'equilateral triangle', and 'regular tetrahedron' are 
expressions for specific shapes. Rather, each covers 
a perhaps unlimited number of similar feelings (p.89). 
The question of object reference as a distinguishing characteristic 
has already been touched upon and will not be taken up again 
(Ewert's view, p.43). Rather, an examination is made of Charlton's 
statement that: 'To be in a mood is not to be conscious of a 
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special feeling in yourself, but to be conscious of other things 
in a special way'. What can this mean? It hinges on the 
notion of "special" and "feeling". Charlton cannot be denying 
the existence of feelings in some sense, because in the last line 
he has said: 'Rather, each covers a perhaps unlimited number of 
similar feelings'. It is not clear whether this is consistent 
with his previous statement: 'Is there anything more to anger or 
fear than thinking of something in a particular way, and behaving 
appropriately?'. 
The main thrust of Charlton's position is the denial of the 
presence of a special feeling that is the essence of a mood. By 
special feeling, it is believed that Charlton means one particular 
feeling that would uniquely characterize the mood and which could 
serve as the necessary and sufficient condition for the ascription 
of that particular mood. In support of Charlton, there are 
notorious difficulties in the notion of a unique "special feeling". 
These are largely problems of identification and re-identification: 
How could the individual ever be certain that this particular 
feeling is the feeling that he calls feeling x and how does he 
become aware of it? What are the criteria for correctly 
recognizing this as an x feeling and the same as x feelings that 
were experienced in the past? 
have? 
What meaning would the word "same" 
It is suggested that there can be a "central feeling", which at a 
conceptual level can be said to be a complex composed of bodily 
sensations, feeling tone, and action.tendencies. This central 
feeling is something the individual undergoes or experiences in 
either a constant or an intermittent fashion. It is identifiable 
in terms of situational referents, behaviour, and reports of 
feeling state. This complex is often conveyed in metaphorical 
terms by subjects. 
Consider the feeling an individual might have when he finds him-
self being reprimanded by a superior. This can be metaphorically 
expressed as a "sinking" feeling and a "cringing". He finds his 
heart palpitating and his hands sweating, there is a felt tendency 
(or behavioural disposition) to flee, yet at the same time he finds 
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himself apologizing and making excuses. This complex state may 
endure over time, the general arousal and the strength of the 
response tendencies may lose some of their initial intensity, but 
can still influence everything the individual thinks, feels, says 
and does. It is precisely through these different but related 
processes that the feeling is known and identified as that feeling 
the individual has when being reprimanded by a superior. 
It is the combination of these elements which in the context of a 
particular situation, and a life-history of experiencing, makes 
possible the identification of the central feeling. The correct 
assignment of the feeling to a general class of feelings is 
dependent on the individual's sincerity, his attention to 
situational cues, his use of language, the knowledge he has of his 
own personality, and the ability to question his responses. 
Expressed tersely--Charlton's stress on the cognitive and 
behavioural aspects of mood does not make the feeling and moti-
vational aspects disappear. 
Summary: the major elements of Charlton's view 
1. To be in a mood is to be aware of things in a special way, 
to be thinking of things under certain descriptions and to 
behave appropriately. 
2. The word "mood" is generic in character and does not stand 
for specific feelings. 
3. Moods are not the objects of introspection. 
4. Moods are not object directed. 
Stein: Mood as Attunement 
W. Stein (1970) sees mood as "the prototype of feeling", and 
suggests that it displays, as an attunement, the individual's 
relationship to the world. Before proceeding further with Stein's 
view, it will be useful to review the dictionary definition of 
"attunement". Webster's Dictionary defines attunement and the 
related concept of "syntony" as follows: 
at-tune verb transitive; at-tuned; at-tuning 1. To tune 
or put in tune; to make melodious or harmonious; to 
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adjust to, or use with, the right pitch or tone; 
specifically in Physics, to bring into syntony; as, 
to attune the voice to a harp. 2. To arrange fitly; 
to make accordant. 
attunement; noun. An attuning; specifically Physics, 
syntony. 
syntony, Physics. State of being adjusted to a certain 
wavelength; agreement or tuning between the time 
period of an apparatus emitting electric oscillations 
and that of a receiving apparatus, esp. in wireless 
telegraphy. 
Stein is aware that she is using the concept of mood as an attune-
ment, in a metaphorical way. 
writes: 
In developing the metaphor she 
An attunement requires at least two tones which are in 
tune, though once the attunement is achieved, the two 
tones can no longer be clearly distinguished. A mood 
surrounds and envelops one, as sound does, so that one 
experiences himself as in it, in contrast with finding 
himself over against an object which he sees. 
Enveloped as he is in his mood, he cannot distinguish 
the "tone" in himself from the "tone~' of the world. 
For instance, when I feel good, I at the same time feel 
that things are going well, that the world is good too. 
This means that when one is actually in a mood, the 
"feeling tone" is both in the subject and in the world 
as their attunement ••.. In a mood, then both I and my 
relation to the world which I see and now experience 
as having a feeling tone, are present. The mood 
simultaneously vibrates in me as feeler and reverberates 
in the world and reverberates in me. Since this attune-
ment is seldom perfect, I continue to distinguish between 
my own tone and the tone of the world. Such lack of 
attunement plays a role in considering the expression 
of moods ... A mood, and I think particularly of Heidegger's 
and Freud's anxiety, does not have a specific object. 
It lingers on, hangs over, or reverberates in the world 
as such and presents man with the fact of his being in 
it (p.220). 
It is the imperfection in attunement prior to the achievement of 
syntony, and the instability of the state of syntony itself, that 
provides the necessary hiatus or disengagement which enables the 
individual to attain "knowledge" of his predicament. Mood in this 
sense is protoepistemological. Mood is an embryonic meaning 
structure or vehicle for meaning. It is however in need of 
reflection and symbolization, in order to be developed and raised 
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in status to knowledge. 
For Stein, one finds oneself in a mood in the midst of a concrete 
and enveloping relationship with something "other" than the self. 
But the self is so aligned with, adjusted to, and harmonious with, 
the "otherness", that there is an impression of sameness. At the 
same time a degree of difference and self identity remains in the 
enveloping "sameness". This is similar to Mahler's (1968) psycho-
analytic view of "symbiotic union". This concept represents a 
relationship where there is a maximum of similarity (bodily 
collusion, syncretic identity, and a primitive psychosomatic 
empathy) and a minimum of "otherness" (differentiation, separation, 
and heterogeneity) between the mother a~d her infant during the 
first years of life. As Stein phrases it: 'Enveloped as he is 
in his mood, he cannot distinguish the "tone" in himself from the 
"tone" of the world' . This may be the feeling analogue of the 
earliest parent-infant object relationship. It implies that a 
greater understanding of mood may be attained by the study of 
early object relationships. 
Stein's metaphor retains some independence from the psychoanalytic 
concept, through its stress on the presentational function of mood. 
Mood presents the world, the self, and the interconnectedness of 
world and self, to the individual through the medium of affect. 
Stein writes: 
Man simultaneously perceives objects and finds himself 
in a mood which presents him with himself and his relation 
to the world as an attunement. For us to have the kind 
of experience we do have of ourselves in a situation, we 
must perceive (or the situation would not appear) and feel 
ourselves in relation to this situation (or we would not 
appear, and there would be no way of speaking of a 
relation between ourselves and the world). I would like 
to call this basic position of man in relation to the 
world "cosmopathy". Man experiences things in the world 
in terms of his momentary mood because it is only through 
a mood that he and his relation to the world appear (p.221). 
Stein draws a distinction that is pertinent to, though divergent 
from, Charlton's position (p.p.58-61). Her view centres on a 
distinction between visual perception and feeling. In her view 
visual perception simply presents a world, while feeling as mood 
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presents a self and its relation to a world. The origin of mood, 
however, is perceptual. She writes: 
It is important not to forget that I perceive this other 
as originating the tone I feel resounding in me, for the 
resonance I experience is a particular variation of my 
attunement to the world which I perceive. In the same 
way, something cannot arouse a resonance in me unless I 
perceive it (p.222). 
Continuing Stein's thought and utilizing the concept of "syntony" 
within an existential paradigm, the following analogy is suggested: 
The world is the emittor and the individual the receiver of the 
"tone", to which he adjusts his "tone", or better, the world emits 
a spectrum of tones, out of which the individual selectively 
perceives one wavelength and adjusts himself to that tone (thus 
both subject and environment are active). Here there is a two 
stage creation of mood, the selection of "tone" and the adjust-
ment. The imperfection of adjustment, the inability to achieve 
a complete sympathetic identity with the world paves the way for 
reflection, symbolization, and a realization of the presentational 
function of mood. 
Summary: the major elements of Stein's view 
1. Mood is an attunement or adjustment between the individual 
and the world. 
2. Mood serves the function of presenting to the individual his 
relationship to the world. 
3. Moods do not have specific objects. 
4. Mood as an experience may be metaphorically said to surround 
and envelop the individual. 
5. The origin of mood is perceptual, but a model for mood should 
be patterned on auditory experience rather than visual 
experience. 
Kockelmans: Mood as Part of a Primordial Praxis 
J.J. Kockelmans (1970) conceives of mood as a fundamental component 
of a "primordial praxis", a root activity of man in which'he is 
"concernfully" involved with the objects and tools of his world. 
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The individual expresses his nature in an active and concernful 
dealing with objects (as potential artefacts) and individuals (as 
co-equal embodied regions of consciousness). This practical 
activity occurs against a background route-void structure of world, 
i.e. world as a collection of concatenating routes (natural, 
social, and psychological) where things devolve and mutually refer 
to each other, in a contingent fashion (the void structure). 
Kockelmans writes: 
The essential relationship between man and world which 
mediately comes to the fore in each concernful dealing 
with this or that concrete thing is contained in an 
original "mood" which is necessarily connected with 
each concrete interpretation of meaning and with each 
understanding characteristic of the 'iprimordial praxis" 
(p.l02). 
This humanistically oriented relational metaphysics sets the stage 
for two prime functions of mood. Kockelmans writes: 
Undoubtedly "mood" communicates to us something about 
our own mode of being in relationship to the other as 
a whole; but it is very difficult to determine why one 
is disposed or "tuned" in a determinate way, and what 
this disposition tells us about ourselves and the 
other. The "original mood" informs man about his 
position in the midst of things in the world. In this 
"insight" different elements are contained which must 
be carefully distinguished. First, in his mood man 
is aware of his own being, of the fact that he is. 
Without wanting it, and without freely having chosen 
it, man is. His being appears to him as a being 
"thrown"; he appears to himself as thrown among things. 
In mood man not only becomes conscious of the fact "that 
he is", but also of the fact that "he has to be", that 
his being has to be realized by himself as a task ..•• 
Mood is an implicit, continuous "judgement" regarding 
man's self-realization. Hence man can be disclosed to 
himself in a more primordial way through "mood" than 
through theoretical reflection. However, if it is 
true that man ek-sists, i.e. is as being-in-the-world, 
then mood must also disclose to him not only his own 
being as "thrown" but also other men and things (p.l03). 
Kockelmans seems to be emphasizing that in dealing with concrete 
things, objects, persons, events, and situations, in the process 
of interpreting them, valuing them, and bestowing meaning upon 
them in a practical context, there is given something mood-like, 
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something original and primary that is co-given with this practical 
activity. It is as if there were a mood-like shadowing of all 
practical activity. However, the existence of such a process or 
state has been implied, but not demonstrated. If criteria are 
not provided, and an empirical demonstration given, then it seems 
superfluous to go even further and suggest that an "original mood" 
contains the essential relationship between man and world. 
Let it be suggested that as a result of his practical activities 
the individual sometimes finds himself in a mood-like state, and 
he is beginning to become aware of what Kockelmans has called 'the 
different elements' of the mood. This is not implausible -
individuals in the midst of their activities do at times come to 
a halt and through an affective provocation begin to reflect, e.g. 
on the nature of themselves and their concerns. What follows 
upon this reflection is crucial for Kockelmans' notion. 
In order to clarify some of the issues, consider the example of a 
small farmer tilling his soil. It is likely that there will exist 
a complex relationship between himself, the soil, and the activity 
of tilling. His livelihood depends on the fertility of the soil, 
on the allocation of particular portions of his total land area to 
particular crops, on his ability to have the tilling and planting 
completed by a particular date, and upon the vagaries of meteor-
ological conditions. Part of the meaning these practical activities 
bear are traditional and historical meanings, e.g. the farmer may 
come from a long line of farmers, he may retain their inculcated 
beliefs and prejudices, he may be proud or dissatisfied as a 
farmer, this particular year may be the anniversary of a devasta-
ting drought, and there are symbolic meanings, e.g. the sexual 
symbolism of tilling. 
Today, as the farmer tills, the various meaning elements coalesce 
and precipitate a particular mood, and the farmer reflects. Will 
he be presented with the fact that he is? That he was "thrown" 
into existence? That it is his task to "realize" himself? 
Perhaps, but equally possibly he may try to shake off his vague 
thoughts and pursue his job to completion. He may simply decide 
he needs a vacation. In this case do we call him inauthentic, or 
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do we question the universal applicability of the existential view? 
If a Heideggerian metaphysician were on the scene to administer the 
"facts" to him, will he recognize them? Let it even be granted 
that he assents to the formulations of his metaphysical mentor, is 
it then necessary to postulate an 'original mood' to account for 
the situation? 
Summary: the major elements of Kockelmans' view 
1. Mood is connected with the practical activities of individuals 
in their environment. 
2. Mood presents to the individual his relationship to the world. 
3. Mood brings the individual's existence, his contingency, and 
his task of self-realization to light. 
1.12 A Critique of Disposition Theories 
Theorizing about mood phenomena has placed a special emphasis on a 
disposition formulation of mood. This has been evident in both 
analyses of mood words and mental concepts in general, e.g. Ryle 
(1949) and experimental studies of mood, e.g. Nowlis (1963; 1965; 
1970). In recent behavioural approaches, e.g. Ryle's 'logical 
behaviourism', and the psychological viewpoints of Nowlis, Cattell, 
and Pribram, a disposition is a tendency toward a behavioural or 
affective response which is determined both by the abilities and 
capacities of the organism and the stimulating conditions of the 
environment. This use of the concept of a disposition is derived 
from physical science where in the case of non-organic, non-sentient 
entities, a disposition is a power or property of that entity. 
Examples would include the solubility of sodium chloride in water, 
the refractive index of water, and the magnetic property of iron. 
When applied to sentient organisms, in particular to individuals, 
a disposition refers to in Ryle's (1949) words: "The person's 
abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and undergo certain 
sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things 
in the ordinary world'' (p.199). Ryle applies the notion of "dis-
position" to mood phenomena in the following way: 
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In saying that someone is in a certain mood we are 
saying something rather general, not that he is all 
the time or frequently doing one unique thing or 
having one unique feeling, but that he is in the 
frame of mind to say, do and feel a wide variety of 
loosely affiliated things (p.95). 
It is important to note what Ryle is denying and what he is 
affirming. Ryle is denying that a mood can be uniquely charac-
terized or identified by a particular feeling or a particular 
behaviour that occurs continuously over, or even frequently in, 
a given span of time; a mood is not a state or process of 
feeling, but rather it is an overarching tendency to feel and 
behave. 
In response to Ryle, what I wish to maintain is that mood may be 
more or less adequately conceptualized as a set of tendencies or 
dispositions, but from the subject's point of view mood is the 
experienced manifestation of that set of tendencies. It may be 
the case that mood is not a continuous affective process, but 
neither is it only a set of tendencies to respond. 
Ryle is affirming that "mood" refers to a tendency or set of 
tendencies ' •.• to say, do and feel a wide variety of loosely 
affiliated things'. What is meant by a "loose affiliation" is 
not made clear. Ryle seems to want to have some connection 
among the different activities, but does not specify what the 
connection is. Nowlis (1963) also has found the problem of 
connection or configuration recalcitrant to theoretical formula-
tion. He writes: 
I find that the application of mood terms to behaviour 
and experience has represented a variety of relatively 
unsuccessful attempts to identify some intriguing yet 
perversely subtle and obscure ways in which behaviour 
seems to be organized (p.48). 
These unsuccessful attempts are all the more embarrassing as the 
notion of configuration is inherent in the concept of disposition 
itself. Consider the definition of "disposition" in The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary: noun. Setting in order,' arrangement, relative 
position of parts. This definition coexists with: bent, temperament, 
-69-
natural tendency, inclination to. It is suggested that the error 
here is in thinking that there must be a connection or configura-
tion, interpreted in any strict way. The connection, to the 
extent that there is one, is in the "vectorial tissue 11 of the 
individual's own experience. It is the organization of the 
individual's attitudes and intentions and his feeling reaction to 
them. 
Nowlis (1965) defines mood as: 'A multidimensional set of 
temporary reversible dispositions'. 
paradigm he offers the following: 
As a general definition and 
Mood is the effect on a person of his own configurations 
of activity. These configurations may be conceptualized 
as fundamental patterns of general functioning and 
orientation, such as level of activation, level of 
control, level of concentration, direction of social 
orientation, and positive (pleasant) or negative (un-
pleasant) general appraisal. The effect of these 
general patterns on the person may be mediated by cues 
associated with them in the life history and involve 
affective, cognitive, motivational and motor responses 
to the cues; such responses may in turn become 
functionally related to the general patterns and may 
modify, maintain or even instigate them (p.353). 
Nowlis' view can be seen to depart from a traditional behavioural 
orientatiop in his emphasis on intraorganism variables. He does, 
however, offer a means for the measurement of these variables and 
he stresses that mood is the effect of these variables, which he 
links with predisposing and eliciting environmental stimuli. His 
emphasis on the hierarchical disposition nature of mood, i.e. mood 
as a middle order disposition situated between temperament and 
emotional reaction, and his implicit negative feedback model, 
perhaps entitle us to classify him as a behaviourist with cognitive 
and cybernetic leanings. 
Logical and experiential difficulties in the disposition 
formulation 
The difficulties in the formulation of mood by the several dis-
position approaches, are of two types: logical and experiential. 
The logical difficulty, logical here being used in a broad epis-
-70-
temological sense, has two aspects: 
1. Ryle (1949) in his attempt to reformulate the concept of mood 
to fit the mould of the concept of disposition has denied 
that mood as a concept refers to states or acts. He writes: 
'Inclinations and moods, including agitations, are not 
occurrences ••.• they are propensities, not acts or states' 
(p.81). Ryle is here considering the words "mood" and 
"propensity" as logical or category words and analyzing them 
in terms of their roles in linguistic expressions. In 
section 4.8 below I will offer linguistic evidence that goes 
contrary to Ryle's position. It will be shown that the word 
mood is employed by subjects to denote states and acts. 
However, he soon leaves this logical realm to make definitive 
statements about the empirical world. 
Thus Hampshire (1950) can say: 
To say of a particular word that it is the name of, 
or designates a mood and that moods are not 
occurrences, amounts to saying (misleading) some-
thing about the kind of evidence or tests of truth 
which are appropriate to any statement in which 
this word occurs (p.25). 
Hampshire's criticism of Ryle is that Ryle is using distinc-
tions based on logic to make decisive distinctions concerning 
the empirical world. For Ryle, logic (his "logic") is 
legislating absolutely for reality. But even if we were to 
let this confusion pass, there are still other difficulties. 
Ryle most of the time, and Nowlis some of the time, tends to 
exhaust the notion of a disposition with its behavioural 
reference. 
It follows that the type of evidence used to verify statements 
which include mood terms is behavioural evidence. Coordinately, 
the type of evidence used to ascribe mood (as a state or dis-
position) to individuals is also behavioural evidence. If 
behavioural evidence is taken as the sole type of evidence 
relevant, then this is an arbitrary oversimplification. It 
omits other kinds of obviously basic evidence. To use 
Hampshire's (1950) example: 
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We usually test a child's concentration by testing 
his performance, but we do not identify the 
performance and the concentration precisely because 
although the first may often (not always or 
necessarily) be properly accepted as sufficient 
evidence for the other, it is not a necessary 
condition in the sense of being in all circumstances 
the only kind of relevant evidence available, either 
to the child himself or to the teacher (p.32). 
It is not unreasonable to assume that there can be multiple 
independent approaches to the verification of mood phenomena; 
because we frequently refer to a person's behaviour in 
deciding what mental state they are in, it does not follow 
that the mental state can be exhaustively identified with 
that behaviour or the result of any other single method of 
verification. It is suggested that "mood" as a comprehensive 
theoretical term refers to an individual in a situation x, 
feeling y, and doing z. The theoretical term can be 
procedurally defined by the of approaches to verification 
that are adopted in the particular situation. 
Reliance on behavioural evidence alone for the verification 
of statements concerning mood, where mood is taken as a dis-
position entity, is inadequate. This approach to the verifi-
cation of statements about mood, if it is coupled with an 
exclusive reliance on behavioural criteria for the identifi-
cation of mood, would set up a programme that is an unfaithful 
reflection of the notion of a disposition itself. A dis-
position can be operating, as a readiness to respond, without 
any specific behavioural manifestations. Consider the case 
where from past experience the environmental conditions under 
which a particular person is likely to become irritable is 
specifiable, i.e. at tl, t2, and t3 under these conditions the 
person has become irritable and has shown irritable behaviour 
bl, b2 and b3, but at t4, under precisely the same environ-
mental conditions, he does not show irritable behaviour. He 
tells us he feels his old irritation, but he has resolved 
'not to let those conditions make him act out of his irritation', 
and .he manifests none of the irritable behaviour he has before 
(he may of course show new irritable behaviour). His report 
of irritation, though there are none of the old behavioural 
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manifestations, is still intelligible. 
Conversely, irritable conditions may (for him) be present and 
he may show irritable behaviour, but he may still not be irri-
tated, i.e. his rapid hand movements, his shouts and general 
agitation indicate (he tells us) that he is trying to attract 
the attention of an old friend who has just passed on the 
street. 
2. The second logical difficulty stems from the disposition view 
that a disposition statement is a statement that summarizes 
what tends to happen, or is liable on the whole to happen, as 
a result of the organism's tendencies, capacities, and environ-
mental conditions. A disposition statement therefore does 
not state what will happen on a particular occasion, i.e. 
disposition statements do not generate determinate predictions. 
As the majority of disposition theorists seek to construct a 
theory within the natural science paradigm, the lack of deter-
minate predictions becomes a major obstacle to the fulfilment 
of their goal. It might be argued that it is open to dis-
position theorists to develop a statistical-inductive model, 
however such a model has not been offered and there are major 
difficulties here as well (Lambert and Brittan, 1970). 
The experiential difficulty 
The experiential difficulty stems from disposition theory's con-
ception of mood as a set of tendencies to say, do, and feel a wide 
variety of loosely affiliated things, where this set of tendencies 
is equated with 'an infinite series of propositions' and the 
experiencing subject with 'the topic of sets of testable hypo-
thetical and semi-hypothetical propositions' (Ryle, 1949, p.46). 
Ryle has a distressing tendency to transform individuals into 
logical and grammatical vectors. His view can be criticized as 
inadequate to account for the unity and self-identity of the 
experiencing subject. This is to say that mood is eminently a 
human phenomena, an experience or set of experiences that the 
individual undergoes and which makes a difference to him. This 
implies a continuity and identity enduring within the texture of 
the individual's experience. The disposition view abrogates this 
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identity and continuity. 
It is a general liability of the disposition approach that it 
tends to: 
1. Take place at such a high level of abstraction that the 
individual's experience is not retrievable from the 
abstractions and 
2. Divides mood up into discrete units of behaviour in such 
a way that the individual's experience cannot be recon-
stituted from this "granular analysis" (Schrag, 1969). 
More often than not the full complexity and articulation of the 
psychological state, e.g. desires, intentions and goals, is lost. 
Theoretically mood may be more or less adequately formulated as 
an organized system of dispositions, but experientially mood is 
the felt manifestation of that disposition system. If the dis-
position approach has explanatory aspirations within a natural 
science paradigm, then it is the failure of the disposition 
approach to: 
1. make explicit the type of explanatory model it is offering, 
e.g. deductive, inductive-statistical, or teleological type 
(Lambert and Brittan, 1970); 
2. make explicit the rules of logical connection between lower 
order, middle order, and higher order postulates and hypo-
theses. Berg (1955) has pointed out that no disposition 
theory has provided logical rules for handling hierarchical 
disposition terms; 
3. make explicit the theory's pertinence to the individual's 
experience 
that constitutes the basic liability of this type of theory. 
Disposition theories are in need of supplementation and completion 
if they are to account for the full range of mood experience in 
the sentient human organism. 
The problematic state of Ryle's example 
Consider Ryle's example of a frivolous mood in light of the fore-
going discussions: 
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A person in a frivolous vein is in the mood to make more 
jokes than usual, to be more tickled than usual by the 
jokes of others, to polish off important matters of 
business without anxious consideration, to put heart and 
soul in childish games and so on indefinitely (Ryle, 1949, 
pp.95-96). 
This seems to be quite a plausible description of an hypothetical 
person's tendencies to behave in a frivolous mood. But it can be 
asked: Does Ryle intend this to be a model for all frivolous 
moods? Does it represent all, most, or just some of one person's 
frivolous moods? Can necessary and sufficient behavioural 
criteria be established, so that we can reliably attribute a 
frivolous mood to this person? Are there situational and/or 
intrapsychic determinants of this set of tendencies toward 
frivolous behaviour? 
It is also important to consider whether cognitive factors may be 
playing a significant role in Ryle's "frivolous mood". 
line of questions would include: 
An out-
1. If there are major situational determinants of the mood, is 
the individual's perception of these determinants mediated 
by his attitude and belief system? 
2. Is the frivolous mood something the individual undergoes in 
a mechanical fashion, or can he play a role in creating, 
augmenting, or inhibiting the mood? 
3. What is the relationship (if any) between choice and the 
manifestation of disposition? 
4. Is it possible for someone to be in a frivolous mood and not 
know it, i.e. is there a necessary reflexivity to moods? 
5. Do goals and intentions play a part in the production and 
maintenance of a frivolous mood? 
6. What (if anything) is in the individual's awareness as he 
behaves frivolously? 
This is not to suggest that it is incumbent upon Ryle to provide 
answers for all these questions, and the author is prepared to 
admit that some of the quest-ions may be poorly framed or involve 
logical mistakes. What is being suggested is, that Ryle may be 
throwing out a good part of the grain with the chaff. It is 
believed that this results from a lack of consideration of the 
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full range of avowals individuals make concerning their mood 
experience. In sum it is suggested that conceptual clarification 
should proceed coordinately with thorough data collection. 
A Critical Examination of Nowlis' Disposition View 
Metatheoretical Critique 
Nowlis maintains that he is establishing a 'general definition' 
of mood and offers the following formulation: 
Hood is the effect on a person of his own configurations 
of activity. These configurations may be conceptualized 
as fundamental patterns of general functioning and 
orientation, such as level of activation, level of 
control, level of concentration, direction of social 
orientation, and positive (pleasant) or negative (un-
pleasant) general appraisal. The effect of these 
general patterns on the person may be mediated by cues 
associated with them in the life history and involves 
affective, cognitive, motivational and motor responses 
to the cues; such responses may in turn become 
functionally related to the general patterns and may 
modify, maintain or even instigate them. Hypotheses 
about the dimensions of mood can be developed from a 
specification of general patterns of functioning and 
orientation. The methods for describing or measuring 
can be based on an understanding of the cues and 
responses functionally related to each general pattern. 
Additional hypotheses about mood dimensions may be 
derived from whatever patterns these cues and responses 
are found to exhibit. (Nowlis, 1965, p.353). 
There are a number of difficulties with Nowlis' general definition. 
To begin with: Is a "general definition" in fact what he is 
offering? Clearly, he is not offering a simple definition, for 
neither is his definition linguistically equivalent to the word 
"mood" nor is it in practice commonly identifiable with the word 
"mood". But this is in order, for Nowlis maintains he is providing 
a general definition. This claim should be examined more closely. 
A definition can be general in several senses: 
1. A definition can be general in that it juxtaposes and inter-
relates the major features of a variety of definitions or 
models. Nowlis (1963) refers to the work of Ryle (1949), 
Skinner (1953), and Jacobson (1957), but he fails to establish 
the major definition elements of each approach, nor are the 
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various analogies and discrepancies established. Instead 
Nowlis sets forth what he believes are the 'five common 
applications of mood'. He sets them out as follows: 
(a) Mood is used in referring to dispositions; 
moreover, these dispositions are temporary 
and reversible, usually lasting minutes, 
hours or days. 
(b) Mood always refers to the whole person or self. 
(c) When the common conceptual scheme assumes that 
dispositions are hierarchical, mood refers to 
higher-order dispositions. 
(d) Mood refers to constancies in behavior and 
experience during the interval to which it is 
applied. 
(e) Mood refers to dispositions which have hetero-
geneous determinants; these determinates may 
be relatively remote and obscure, or they may 
be obvious, like the weather, but relatively 
inaccessible to manipulative control; thus 
mood is used in referring to known and unknown 
constraints on behavior and experience. 
(Nowlis, 1963, p.74). 
From Nowlis' presentation it is unclear whether his common 
applications are referring primarily to the concept of mood 
or to the behaviour and experience which fall under the con-
cept mood. In the main he seems to be dealing with the 
concept "mood". However, the second and fourth applications 
may be more directly empirical. It is doubtful whether each 
of these applications is common to each viewpoint Nowlis cites. 
For example, Jacobson's psychoanalytic view is a psychodynamic 
view stressing the discharge modifications of psychic energy; 
this formulation is incompatible with a disposition formulation. 
It is suggested that the common applications Nowlis lists are 
the emphases of his own disposition view. 
2. A definition may be general in the sense that it establishes 
a common factor or factors by reason of which a collection of 
xs may be said to be y. tihen a set of factors is found 
attempts are made to unify the set at a higher theoretical 
level. This seems to be part of what Nowlis is trying to do 
with his common applications and general definition. The 
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general definition is an attempt to unify the five common 
applications. However, doubt has been cast on his position 
that the applications are common to the viewpoints cited. 
If the applications are not common, then the conditions for 
this type of general definition cannot be met. 
Nowlis may be misguided in his search for common factors. 
All the viewpoints cited are complex and this reduces the 
likelihood of simple common factors being discovered. 
Methodologically, the search for common factors within 
diverse entities has been largely abandoned in favour of 
listing major elements that can be demonstrated to overlap 
and crisscross in various ways (Bambrough, 1960). 
3. A definition may be said to be a general definition in the 
sense that it sets up a paradigm case which can be used as a 
"yardstick" for classifying the phenomena under consideration. 
This is perhaps closest to Nowlis' intentions. He writes: 
It appears that the phenomena to which the layman 
and the scientist refer in using mood terms are 
important but are poorly analysed and classified. 
In so far as references to these phenomena supply 
the.context in which mood terms appear, we should 
begin our explication by reviewing its applications 
in everyday discourse. As Strawson (1959) says, 
these applications may form "a family, the members 
of which may, perhaps, be grouped around a central 
paradigm case and linked with the latter by various 
direct or indirect links of logical connection and 
analogy". Such a procedure is sometimes called 
"meaning analysis", and is •••• the first step in 
the potential transformation of a vernacular term 
to a scientific or technical term (Nowlis, 1963, p.74). 
;;lowlis goes on to suggest: " ••.. if there is a central or 
paradigm case in this family of applications, I would suggest 
it is this: Mood refers to the effect on the self of its 
own configurations of activity" (p.74). It has already been 
pointed out that the range of applications Nowlis considers 
is limited; of necessity this restricts the general validity 
of the paradigm case. Also, Nowlis has not performed the 
important task of linking the paradigm case to his family of 
common applications. For these reasons Nowlis' formulation 
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can only be a recommendation within the framework of a dis-
position viewpoint. 
If Nowlis has not provided a simple definition nor a compre-
hensive general definition, what has he provided? It is 
suggested that he has set forth a loose confederation of 
theoretical statements concerning mood, e.g. mood is the 
effect on an individual of certain configurations of activity, 
and a hypothetical mechanism that provides a functioning model 
for the operation of his theoretical entities. The words 
"configuration" and "pattern" announce the presence of 
theoretical terms and the hypothetical mechanism is a negative 
feedback model. If this is the case, and if Nowlis is 
operating within a natural science framework, then it is 
legitimate to request: 
1. Some demarcation of the theoretical terms and the 
observation terms and some statement of their inter-
relationships if the formulation contains both 
theoretical and observation terms or 
2. If a particular formulation contains only theoretical 
terms, then it is important to know what potentially 
testable empirical statements can be derived from the 
formulation (Carnap, 1966). 
Howeve~, there are good reasons to suggest that neither 
request can be met. Briefly stated: 
1. The major terms within the hypothetical-causal framework 
of Nowlis' formulation, e.g. 'effect' (mood) and 'pattern 
of activities', each possesses both a theoretical and an 
empirical status which is substantially the same for both 
entities. The effect (mood) is specified and measured 
in terms of factors a •••. n (on the Nowlis Mood Adjective 
Check List), and' the cause (the general pattern of 
activities) is also specified in terms of factors a •... n 
(on the MACL). Hence there is no clear demarcation of 
the theoretical and observation terms. Since the type 
of relationship intended by Nowlis is most likely a causal 
one, and since a true causal relationship requires that 
-79-
its terms be independently specified (i.e. for "a" to be 
in causal relationship to "x", "a" must be specified in-
dependently of "x"), a causal hypothesis becomes untenable. 
2. The major terms of Nowlis' theoretical formulation can be 
said to be vague. 
ness in this way: 
Lachenmeyer (1971) has defined vague-
A term is said to be vague when the range of 
object predicates forming a term's referential 
meaning has not been specified: the term's 
connotative meaning is greater than its 
denotative meaning. In extreme cases, a vague 
term may have multiple, equiprobable, specifi-
able object predicates and no specified object 
predicates (p.30). 
To contravene the charge of vagueness with respect to 
Nowlis' formulation, it would be necessary to know if his 
list of mood dimensions forms a closed set and if he has 
identified each of the constituent members of the set. 
If Nowlis' list of dimensions is an open set then it is 
necessary to have rules for the identification of possible 
successful candidates for inclusion in the set. 
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CHAPTER 2 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE OBSERVATIONAL AND EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF MOOD 
Summary 
The structuralist schools of Wundt and Titchener provide the background to modern experi~ 
mental approaches to mood. 
The search for "mental elements" reveals the problems of establishing criteria, the con-
fusion of logical with experiential orders, and the determining role of semantics. 
Early studies (e.g. Koch, 1913; Krueger, 1928) suggest the need for a molar process view 
of mood. Mood processes may be internally complex. Ruckmick (1936) offers mood criteria 
potentially amenable to experimental study. 
1934-1945 Mood as the general feeling tone of the organism. Psycho-social factors 
stressed. The role of physiological variables and the problem of mediation. 
Psychoanalysts provide information on the developmental and psychodynamic 
aspects of mood. 
1945-1959 Mood linked to specific motivational sub-systems. A homeostatic model is 
developed. Experimental research concerned primarily with the effects and 
correlates of mood. Insufficient attention given to the logical shifts that 
should accompany procedural shifts. Self-rating scales widely used to 
measure mood. 
1960-1970 The disposition view of mood becomes prominent. Mood seen as a consequence 
of the interaction between personality and situation. Clinically, the 
fluctuations of mood over extended time periods are studied. Factor 
analytically derived mood adjective check lists used to measure mood. 
Dimensions of the Nowlis MACL replicated. Labelling of affective states 
shown to be a joint function of physiological arousal and cognitive factors. 
1971-1977 The representation of mood by monopolar factors is challenged. Mood as an 
"entity" occurring within a matrix of psychological, psycho-social, and 
physiological factors. Social-developmental and conflict models proposed. 
Evidence for interrelationships between cognitive styles and mood states. 
A systematic contemporary application of phenomenological principles to 
mood study is offered. 
Content Summary 
Introduction 
2.1 The Forerunners: Wundt, Titchener, Koch and Krueger 
2.2 The work of Ruckmick 
2.3 The years 1934-1945 
2.31 The experimental work 
2.32 Discussion of major conceptualizations, techniques, criteria and general 
considerations 
2.4 The years 1945-1959 
2.41 The experimental work 
2.42 Discussion of major conceptualizations, techniques, criteria and general 
considerations 
2.5 The decade 1960-1970 
2.51 The experimental work 
2.52 Discussion of major conceptualizations, techniques and criteria 
2.6 Current research 1971-1977 
2.61 The experimental work 
2.62 Discussion of major conceptualizations, techniques, criteria and general 
considerations 
2.7 A modern application of phenomenological principles to mood study (Mood as a feeling 
structure and meaning vector) 
INTRODUCTION 
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CHAPTER 2 
This chapter reviews the history of the observational and experimental 
investigation of mood. The history 1s divided (somewhat arbitrarily) 
into five time periods. Some of the individual studies are presented 
in rather more detail than is customary for such a review. 
done in order to 
This was 
1. show the clarity or unclarity of their formulations of "mood" 
2. indicate their methodological rigour or lack of it, and 
3. provide depth to balance the range of studies presented. 
The descriptive material presented for each time period is followed by 
an important section that summarizes the period in terms of major con-
ceptualizations of mood, .techniques employed for mood study, criteria 
for the identification of mood, and general considerations. Most of 
the critical appraisals will occur in these sections. 
The general purpose of Chapter 2 is twofold: to give a better under-
standing of "mood" through viewing it in historical perspective and to 
indicate the genealogical roots of the present study. The history of 
mood study has not been one of continuous linear development. Rather, 
I believe, it shows a series of intermittent motions, stops and starts, 
advancements and periods of inactivity, hesitancies and crosscurrents 
of dispute, sudden enthusiasms andemphases dictated by psychological 
fashion. It is a history largely ignored in current mood studies. 
Therefore to the extent that the present is both a culmination of the 
past and a prefiguring of the future, it will merit a clear and careful 
examination. 
Section 2.1 examines the contribution of Wundt, Titchener, Koch and 
Krueger to the legitimization of affect as a central focus of experi-
mental study. It is difficult to faithfully reflect the ethos of this 
period, the particular influx and colligation of innovative forces, the 
intellectual ambience. However, it may be said that there was a sensing 
of the natural vigour and quiddity of affective experience--coupled with 
a firm conviction that self-observation (as introspection) and analysis 
offered a reliable tool and procedure. 
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The concept of "elements" or "constituents of consciousness" was 
formulated in an intransitive and disjunctive way; "atoms" of affective 
experience were· disengaged and separated from their wider context, their 
supportive web. The result was the determination of "crystalline 
granules", each with a specific weight and density; each ordered, 
tagged and determinately named. Within this tradition, Koch was one 
of the first experimenters to realise the necessity for adequate 
criteria in order to make empirical distinctions and classifications. 
The point bears emphasis even today: only with the explicit formulation 
of criteria, an acknowledgement of their limitations and an exposure of 
their logical commitments, can experimental progress be made towards a 
consistent theoretical unification. 
Koch's finding that subjects were unable to distinguish between feelings 
and organic sensations does not, in itself, carry the inference that he 
made, i.e. that non-differentiation is equivalent to identity. In 
contradistinction to this position, I have provided data and linguistic 
considerations which suggest that subjects' primary discriminations can 
be combined with an awareness of different modes of language functioning 
and constancies in affective vocabularies, in order to clarify the 
issues. More immediately pertinent to mood study was Koch's advocation 
of a molar process view of mood. Koch emphasized the internal complexity 
of mood, and the importance of component processes sometimes amplifying, 
sometimes interferring with, and by extension, sometimes opposing or 
cancelling out one another. This is an observational and experimental 
finding that is also upheld clinically. 
Against the general reductive trend, Krueger emphasized the importance 
of the total field of experience. In his view the overriding configu-
ration as a determining pattern exercises control over its constituent 
elements. From my own experience with mood subjects I would add that 
a particular configuration of elements can also have conformational 
variations, i.e. the same elements, the same pattern, but a different 
emphasis or articulation within the field of awareness. 
Section 2.2 presents the work of C.A. Ruckmick. He presented a tri-
dimensional topographic representation to clarify the relations between 
mood, emotion, and feeling. He carefully enumerated the components of 
his mood conception, offering one of the clearest views of mood as a 
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protracted feeling state of moderate intensity. His viewpoint is still 
worthy of attention. For Ruckmick, mood in a sense was (or was like) 
the deterioration state of an emotion--broad, amorphous, and lacking in 
cognitive elements •. My observational work leads me to differ with 
Ruckmick on several points: he suggests that mood is primarily a back-
ground effect, exerts no tyrranical control, has no connative impulse, 
and does not lead to definite action. In my experience this may be 
typical of one sub-class of mood, those airy sinuous moods of neutral 
feeling tone, e.g. detached apathy, but this is only a small segment of 
the mood spectrum. 
Section 2.3 reviews the experimental work of the period 1934-1945. 
Mood as the general feeling tone of the organism, was the most frequent 
conceptualization during this period. Johnson (1937) investigated 
intra-individual patterns of mood, their associated behaviours .and 
characteristic subjective accompaniments. In her sample of female 
university students, those subjects who experienced recurring 
depressions, were found to have approximately a fifteen day interval 
between depressions. However, not all subjects had these depressive 
cycles, and many were largely free of moods. 
From my own qualitative data I would tend to concur with Johnson's 
view on the fifteen day interval for depressive cycles. This interval 
is only approximate--environmental pressures and situations that 
generate fear or insecurity may increase the length and frequency of 
the depressions; they may induce depression in basically non-
depressive subjects, and for this latter type certain negative factors 
in the environment may be periodic. Whatever the reason, a conspicuous 
minority of subjects maintain that over a monthly time span they feel 
enervated and depressed half the time. 
Therapeutically, it is often useful to have the individual keep a 
written daily record of their elevations and depressions of mood, this 
will give some indication of the presence and action of a periodic 
rhythm; the type of social reinforcements that influence mood and if 
possible their mechanism of operation should be formulated. A psycho-
dynamic sketch of the historical patterns of motivation and defence, 
when combined with self-expressive and personality-syntonic activities, 
often opens the way to personal growth. 
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In another contribution Johnson (1934) defined "moodiness" as change-
ability of mood, and measured it by peer ratings. She concluded that 
although moodiness could be a liability in intra-familial situations 
it was not necessarily a detriment to a wider sphere of social relation-
ships. Johnson has couched her conclusion in rather cautious and 
dilatory terms. The present study has found that subjects do find it. 
easier to express a negative mood to members of the family group. 
This may be necessary when the negative mood is stimulated by 
destructive, controlling, and esteem reducing interactions within the 
family; orperhaps, in a self-destructive fashion the individual may 
try to immolate her most intimate relationships. 
The negative mood certainly can be a liability when expressed amongst 
peers. In those cases where it is not a liability, there is usually 
an elated mood of such dynamism and intensity that for the peer group 
it overshadows the more negative phases. Also, an individual who has 
marked elations and depressions, may seek new social relationships 
when in the elated phase, and withdraw from social contact when in the 
depressed or irritable phase, or as indicated she may express the 
negativity towards a few "selected" individuals. Thus her popularity 
and success in social relationships may be contingent upon her main-
taining a wide flexible rotating circle of relatively superficial 
relationships. (See Section 5.1 for a discussion of the positive 
aspects of "changeability of mood".) 
During this period the issue arose of the degree of relationship 
between mood and environmental factors. Young (1937) suggested a 
direct relationship between social stimulation and moods of cheerful-
ness and depression. On the other hand, Johnson (1938) viewed the 
relationship as more indirect, social stimulation being mediated by 
rhythmical biochemical changes and neuromuscular tonus. This question 
of mediation was, is, and probably will remain, a contentious issue. 
Clinical experience has demonstrated to my satisfaction, that for 
~ subjects, mood is the felt manifestation of internal rhythms. 
However, as Schachter and Singer (1962) have shown, the physiological 
activation is interpreted in terms of the cognitions available to the 
individual and the social context. In addition, there are some 
individuals, both sensitive and impressionable, for whom social factors 
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alone appear to be the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
production of moods. There may even be a substantial intermediate 
or mixed type: one subject maintained that she sometimes had 
depressions for no apparent reason, though in general she was 
impressionable and much influenced by social conditions. 
Section 2.4 reviews the experimental work of the period 1945-1959. 
During this period the major conceptualizations were: 
1. Mood as general feeling tone, specifically, as the resultant 
of specific feeling tones linked to motivational factors. 
2. Mood as the affective aspect of psychic equilibrium, specifi-
cally, equilibrium linked with conflict resolution. 
Both of these conceptualizations received empirical support in the 
present study. To mentally pos~ess the value and comprehend the 
limitations of these two viewpoints, we should consider both the 
supporting and the discrepant data. Supporting evidence comes from 
subjects who maintained that their moods were a 'balancing or blending 
of emotion in the psyche', and from those subjects who felt that their 
mood could be a settling down after intense affective stimulation. 
This latter view was occasionally combined with an emphasis on a 
cathartic function, e.g. one subject said: 'A mood is a strong 
emotional feeling which must be experienced by an individual so as to 
allow him/her to let out the appropriate feelings and by so doing, 
feel better afterwards'. 
However, neither the view of mood as the resultant of specific feeling 
tones, nor mood as an aspect of psychic equilibrium, was able to 
account for the full range of data collected in this study. For 
example, in contradistinction to these two positions--mood can be 
experienced as a dynamic monolithic quality and a constraint to 
action, an original unidirectional impetus towards the environment. 
Hence in order to refine and temper our understanding of these two 
conceptualizations, we will consider the greater body of evidence 
that is supportive, and the evidence that eludes accommodation, or 
is incompatible with the two concepts. 
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Supporting Evidence 
(subjects' definition of mood based on their own experience) 
'A mood is a strong feeling or blend of similar emotions •••• ' 
(tends to support conceptuali~ation 1) 
'A mood is something which consists of a number of emotions interacting 
to form this mood.' 
(tends to support conceptualization 1) 
'I feel mood is a visible either consciously or unconsciously demon-
stration of the conflicts, experiences, and emotions the individual has 
recently experienced or is experiencing as a result of an interaction.' 
(tends to support conceptualization 2) 
Non-Supporting Evidence 
(subjects' definition of mood based on their own experience) 
The type of evidence that is not well accommodated by these two con-
ceptualizations are definitions that stress: 
1. the process aspect as opposed to a static balance 
e.g. 'A mood is a passing emotion or set of emotions, that is 
caused by exterior events, or your reaction to these events is 
a mood. It might last quite a long time because you lose your-
self in it, you become submerged. I always think of a mood as 
being sad--even when it is a happy mood the person knows it will 
pass so it is very insecure.' 
2. the homogeneous quality and modulation aspect as opposed to the 
resolution of internal conflict 
e.g. 'A mood is something which envelops my whole life and 
affects everything I do and say. It can be formed by the 
slightest thing--a stranger may smile at me and make me feel 
great, or it may build up for days. I can feel it there, 
waiting but not coming. It is usually quite short--rarely more 
than a day and sometimes only lasting for a minute.' 
3. the heterogeneous or rapidly oscillating quality as opposed to a 
single resultant of specific feeling tones 
e.g. 'A mood is a state of mind that one is in at a particular 
moment. This of course can change rapidly, hence one can be 
depressed one minute and ecstatic the next.' 
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Section 2.5 reviews the experimental work of the period 1960-1970. 
A number of important studies took place during this time period, e.g. 
the-work of Reynolds on mood .and the menstrual cycle; Schachter and 
Singer's work on the interaction of physiological and cognitive 
variables; and the correlations established by Wessman, Ricks and 
Tyl between mood variability and self and ideal-self concepts. Here 
I would like to give selective attention to the second aspect of 
Borgatta's approach to mood--the need for directing attention to the 
experience of mood and its phenomenal aspects. 
Subjects frequently maintain that "mood" unfolds as a process, or a 
changing quality that is process-like in nature. This is to say in 
more formal terms that mood experience fills in segments of phenomenal 
and objective time, is something which can be interrupted, arrested, 
aborted, or completed. It can be divided into phases (with phase-
specific attributes), may establish momentary stabilization points, 
and often has a general direction of change. Admittedly, this may 
be to impose a teleological framework on the data, but it is an 
imposition required by a significant proportion of mood data. 
The process aspect is stressed at this point, not because it is the 
only legitimate perspective, but as a corrective counterpoint and a 
reinstatement--"process" has been largely abandoned for other points 
of view as section 2.5 demonstrates; parenthetically we might add 
that the alternative points of view are (1) mood as disposition, (2) 
mood as steady state, and (3) mood as a more or less random fluctuation 
of affect. Unless we are prepared to accept that in many cases "mood" 
is a concretely experienced process, we will misunderstand, misinter-
pret, and most detrimentally--be unable to communicate with individuals 
undergoing this type of experience. Two examples taken from Session 2, 
the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique, will perhaps 
confirm this point: 
Example 1: 
I feel happy and on the whole carefree •••• In a way I feel sad but I 
think all in all I am happy. A problem is that I seem to now be 
happy and sad both at the same time. I feel most peculiar because 
I feel happyand sad both at the same time and with the same intensity. 
When I started I felt happy but the more I started thinking about 
events in the past the sadder I began to feel, but I still feel happy. 
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In addition to the process aspect, this example also illustrates the 
oscillation in dominance of component elements and the achievement of 
a rather precarious stabilization. 
Example 2: 
I have a feeling of held-in energy--! want to jump and skip, I'm 
looking forward to the day ahead. I have the feelings that I connect 
with my childhood when physical activities were spontaneous. The 
desire to laugh is becoming uncontrollable--enjoyment. I need to 
use some energy. I feel like a star, all of me is open and receptive. 
In the background is a fear that I can't hold on to the joyful mood--
realization of how transitive it is. I feel like a diamond--that's 
not quite right--a diamond is too rigid. But it has energy and 
sparkle, its fire depends on how it's handled. I feel lithe and 
bouncy but now there is something spiky--the joy is ebbing away, now 
I am beginning to feel wistful, quieted and sad. (See section 5.11 
for an explication of the qualitative structure of this mood type.) 
This mood description prescribes a process formulation, and assigns 
energy expending, affect dilating and genetically determined attributes 
to the basic mood state. 
Section 2.6 reviews the experimental study of mood for the period 
1971-1977. It was a time of expanded interest in mood as a topic of 
experimental study, and revealed a more subtle awareness of the 
problems and intricacies of conceptualization, the biases of individual 
methodological techniques, and the fact that mood occurs within a 
matrix of psychological, psycho-social and physiological factors. 
Meddis indicated one way in which the concept of mood and its co-
ordination with experience were affected by assumptions embedded in 
the structure of the "instruments" used to measure mood, and questioned 
the validity of monopolar mood factors. (A discussion of Meddis' 
criticisms is offered in section 3.24.) Wright and McDonald provided 
a synoptic view of several behavioural approaches to depression, 
emphasizing the nature and patterning of reinforcers, reasons for the 
reduction in potency of reinforcers, factors contributing to the 
maintenance of depression, and the role of social skills in depression. 
Reimanis proposed that elation or happiness in university students is 
related to psychosocial development and that developmental crises are 
related to the degree of anomie or social disorganisation. In his view, 
negative mood states are correlated with the unsuccessful resolution of 
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psycho-social conflicts. Gorman and Wessman demonstrated inter-
relationships between individual cognitive styles and mood states. 
They stressed the conjoint operation and interdependence of cognition, 
affect, and behaviour. 
Lauterbach posed the question of whether or not a relationship exists 
between the quality of mood and the amount of conflict (measured as 
cognitive imbalance) present in the area of personal problems. He 
found that several mood factors typically correlated positively with 
conflict, but the correlated factors tended to be different for 
different subjects. This is an issue with respect to which the 
qualitative data obtained on Session 2, the experimenter administered 
Mood Analysis Technique, has bearing. Two pertinent examples will be 
given, the first substantiating Lauterbach's position, and the second 
questioning its general application. 
Example 1: 
I feel happy but worried. It's because I am deciding about my future. 
Being happy about everything, and alive and not tired is what I want. 
The worry is my conflict over deciding what to do on graduation--to 
join a travelling ballet troupe or to seriously consider marriage. 
My mood is like a long stretch of nothingness, with a few sparse 
trees, but quite light and dry. [For the subject no matter which 
choice is made, there will be positive and negative consequences, 
satisfaction and regret, yet the decision must be made in clarity and 
with determination] The conflict has produced a yearning for some-
thing to make me feel happy and contented, a happening that will take 
away the worry. [The subject petitions for the strength of resolution, 
hopes for some guiding sign, desires perhaps to have the onus of 
decision removed by the course of events] This conflict produces 
emotional vacillation--! am like a wave that is constantly changing 
and restless, never still. 
This mood clearly confirms Lauterbach's position, the internal 
differentiation and vacillation of the mood is a reflection of conflict 
--particularly, cognitive imbalance in the area of personal concerns. 
The correlated mood factors are a mixture of agitation, apathy and 
connative impulses. 
Example 2: 
Right now I am in a limbo mood. This 'none' mood is shaping depending 
on my activities. I don't feel anything is influencing me--it's a 
state of 'I am'. It's coming from within me, I feel a waiting inside, 
a sense of expectancy. It hasn't taken final form, everything seems 
tentative, there is a shifting swirling shade to everything. There 
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is a feeling of something missing, the mood is taking shape. but i.~ needs 
a crystallization point to become definite. I know the proper point 
will be found sometime during the day--like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle. 
I feel I must begin to move and go about my business if the mood is to 
develop the way I would like. If I remain still and quiet my dark mood 
may take over. 
This mood appears to have an internal origination; there are no elements 
of conflict, no personal problems in the foreground or background of 
awareness. It is a mood in the process of being constellated, and as 
such it is not amenable to Lauterbach's conceptualization. 
This, and the preceding exercises tn comparative criticism, warrant in 
my opinion an adjuration: each mood viewpoint should specify its con-
stituent concepts, map out their implicit logical commitments, identify 
the range of the mood spectrum being studied, provide criteria for the 
identification of specimens within that range, and indicate how dis-
crepant cases might be accommodated by alternative models. 
I would further add that theoretical nicety must be attuned to the 
clear, confused, or troubled voice with which subjects themselves 
speak--a formally unified and elegant theory is sterile unless it can 
increase our understanding of concrete experience. Experimental mood 
study should begin with a relatively presuppositionless attitude, and 
when later mapping the received data into a given model, the exper 
menter should be aware that subjects' representation of their mood ts 
already a refraction through the medium of language--hence simultaneously, 
it is an expression, an attempt at presentation, a bodying forth and 
a necessary distortion. Such a realization dispels any tendency 
towards experimental egoism, and fosters the desire to search with 
subjects for the most adequate representation of their mood experience. 
Section 2.7 brings together and synthesizes the principles for one 
contemporary phenomenological approach to mood study. The approach 
is designed to make evident the different "moments" of experiencing, 
illuminate the internal detail, the general structure, and the implica-
tions of a given mood experience. Its aim is to clarify mood experience 
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in the sense of rendering that experience transparent to the individual. 
Descriptive data from the mood study is used to illustrate .. the applica-
tion of the principles. To comply with our own adjuration: it is a 
process approach, it has teleological commitments, i.e. views mood as 
moving towards ends established by the individual's intentions, desires, 
and phantasies. It is most applicable in those cases where there is a 
degree of, or potential for, internal movement. The approach is less 
applicable for inert states or statically balanced states (though here 
it may overset the balance), and least applicable for those states in 
which behavioural aspects or action needs predominate (for a justifi-
cation of these statements see subject's comments in the Appendix). 
Discrepant cases can usually be accommodated by a disposition, or a 
simple stimulus-response behavioural model. 
r 
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2.1 The Forerunners: Wundt, Titchener, Koch, and Krueger 
Historically, the experimental study of mood must acknowledge as 
a progenitor, with respect to content if not method and concept-
ualization, the introspective study of emotions, feelings, and 
sensations that developed within the structural schools of Wundt 
and Titchener. The atmosphere in Wundt's early psychological 
laboratory was heavily reductionist; the goal was to exhibit the 
elementary constituents of consciousness. As physics and chemistry 
had established previously, and philosophy was soon to follow, e.g. 
Russell's programmatic 'logical atomism', the search was for the 
building blocks, which in various combinations and permutations, 
would be capable of accounting for the more complex entities of the 
investigator's particular division of reality. 
For psychologists, the particular division of reality was subjective 
experience, the focus: affective experience. Both Wundt and 
Titchener believed it necessary to distinguish between sensation 
and feelings, but they were sharply divided in their determinations 
of the basic nfeeling" elements. Wundt, in an attempt to account 
for the complexity of emotional states, set forth a Tridimensional 
Theory of Feeling based on his own introspections. He maintained 
that the basic feeling elements were: pleasantness/unpleasantness, 
tension/relaxation, and excitement/quiescence. Titchener, on the 
other hand, maintained that introspection revealed only pleasant-
ness/unpleasantness as a feeling element. In Titchener's view all 
feeling elements, in contradistinction to sensations, were difficult 
of access, as introspection tended to dissipate feeling elements. 
M.B. Arnold (1961) writes: 
Both Titchener and Wundt found what they were looking 
for, neither of them I hasten to add, found figments of 
his own imagination. They both reported actual 
experience. But Wundt started from emotional experience, 
which he believed to be a complex of simple heterogeneous 
feeling elements, and tried to isolate the elements. 
Titchener, on the other hand, tried to isolate mental 
elements, starting from the simplest experiences of 
pleasantness/unpleasantness, and paid only scant attention 
to the way in which these elements are composed (p.23). 
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A partial list of Titchener's simple mental elements i~cludes: 
.~4 ·.: 
·feeling hungry, feeling dizzy, feeling comfortable, feeling 
poorly, and feeling first-rate. These would be classified as 
sensations in Titchener's system as only sensations are clearly 
accessible to introspection. These sensations would also be 
subject to Titchener's general law of mental occurrences. As 
Titchener expressed it: "I believe that we are here in presence 
of a general law or uniformity of mental occurrences; that all 
conscious formations show like phenomena of rise and fall, 
increase and decrease in complexity, expansion and reduction" 
(1908, p.34). 
As indicated the above mental elements are to be classified as 
sensations, and they should all possess the characteristic of 
clarity. Also, they should all exhibit patterns of rise and 
fall, increase and decrease in complexity, and expansion and 
reduction. However, even intuitively, it would seem that feeling 
hungry and feeling first-rate are both of a different logical and 
experiential order. If this is the case, then Titchener's 
uniformity law should be supplemented with an indication of how 
disparate entities follow like processes; in the absence of such 
a clarification, the law of uniformity becomes so general that it 
lacks any theoretical or methodological value. 
Alechsieff (1907 - cited in Arnold, 1961) attempted to determine 
the properties common to Wundt's feeling elements, as a means to-
ward distinguishing feelings from sensations. He suggested that 
feeling elements differ from sensations in that the former are non-
localizable, non-objectifiable, independent of specific sense 
organs, dependent upon the prior condition of consciousness for 
their quality, and difficult to describe. 
Koch (1913) decried the lack of criteria for assigning mental ele-
ments to the categories of sensation and feeling. To remedy this 
lack, he assembled eleven criteria that psychological investigators 
had set out as adequate for the empirical distinction between 
sensation and feeling. Koch then instructed his subjects to 
utilize these criteria in reporting on their experience. His major 
conclusion was that although subjects could reliably distinguish 
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between feelings and external sensations (sensations arising from 
'external stimulation), they were unable to distinguish between 
feelings and organic sensations, e.g. ache, pressure, nausea, and 
thirst, sensations which arise from the viscera and visceral systems. 
Koch came to the conclusion that because feelings and organic 
sensations are indistinguishable, they must be identical, and hence 
he defined feeling elements as diffuse organic sensations. 
Arnold (1961) in a reassessment of Koch's data, argues that the 
majority of the criteria advanced do distinguish feelings from 
sensations, and that subjects reporting on their affective experience 
regularly do distinguish feelings and organie sensations. 
I would like to suggest that the problem of whether or not "feelings" 
can be distinguished from "sensations" especially organic sensations, 
is a problem of terminology and conceptualization as much as it is 
one of empirical discrimination. The semantic matrices of the two 
concepts overlap at certain points and diverge widely at others. 
It is suggested that: 
1. The ambiguities in the use of the concept "feeling" stand in the 
way of a clear conceptual separation of "feeling" and "sensation". 
The Concept "Sensation" and the Concept "Feeling" 
The concept of a sensation in most of its subdivisions appears 
to be the clearer concept. Sensation refers to the conscious 
or experienced result of a physical entity or force coming into 
contact with receptor organs that influence areas of the cerebral 
cortex through their respective sensory pathways. The senses 
and organs of sensation are most often given under the headings: 
Distance Senses (visual, auditory), Chemical Senses (taste, 
smell), and Somaesthetic or Body Senses. The latter are divided 
into Cutaneous Sense (pressure or touch, warmth, cold, and pain), 
Kinaesthetic Sense (active motion of the body in space), Vestibular 
Sense (bodily position), and Organic Senses (e.g. ache, organ 
pressure, nausea, hunger and thirst). 
Examining the special senses in terms of the location of their 
-95-
receptors and the accompanying primary sensory qualities yields: 
1. Vision. The specific receptors are the rods and cones 
which form the endings of the optic nerve in the retina. 
The primary sensory qualities are light or colour, and 
shape. 
2. Hearing. The specific receptor is the organ of Corti in 
the inner ear. The primary sensory qualities are tones 
or noise, given in terms of pitch, intensity, and timbre. 
3. Taste. The specifi~ receptors are the taste buds 
arranged mainly on the edges and over the dorsal surface 
of the tongue. The primary sensory qualities are sweet, 
salt, sour, and bitter. 
4. Smell. The specific receptors are the olfactory nerve 
endings located high in the nose. The primary sensory 
qualities are camphoraceous, musky, floral, pepperminty, 
ethereal (ether-like), pungent, and putrid. 
5. Cutaneous. The specific receptors are nerve endings 
located in the skin. The primary sensory qualities are 
warmth, cold, smoothness, hardness, and other sensations 
resulting from pressure on the skin. 
6. Kinaesthesis. The receptors are nerve endings located 
in the muscles, tendons, and joints. The sensory qualities 
are the result of an awareness of position and movement of 
the limbs. 
7. Vestibular. The specific receptors are the semicircular 
canals and the vestibules of the inner ear. The sensory 
qualities are the result of an awareness of starting and 
stopping movements, balance, position, turning, and the 
motion of the body as a whole. 
8. Organic. The organic sensations which arise from within 
the body, e.g. the abdominal cavity, are less clearly 
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delineated and understood. The category organic sensations 
refers to a collection of sensations located in the viscera 
and bodily cavity. 
The presence of specific sense receptors localized within the 
body and giving rise to primary sensory qualities (experienced 
but not so easily described) has resulted in a sensation 
language that functions denotatively to indicate the presence 
of particular sensations. This sensation language is charac-
terized by semantic elements of intensity, location, and primary 
quality, e.g. 'I have an intense throbbing pain in my left 
foot'. This sensation language is less adequate in referring 
to organic sensations which tend to be less clearly localizable 
and experienced as relatively "diffuse", e.g. 'I am aware of 
pressure in my chest cavity'. The parameters of such sensations 
are less clearly demarcated (though none the less real) than 
that of non-organic sensations, e.g. having a twinge in the 
right shoulder. In addition the intensity dimension is less 
applicable in some cases. 
If a subject attempts to describe an organic sensation he is 
confronted by a dearth of vocabulary. Therefore descriptions 
of organic sensations tend to be brief and sometimes meta-
phorical, i.e. a borrowed vocabulary is used. For example, 
'I feel tense inside my body, everything is pulled tight, it's 
like holding your breath'. In other cases the borrowed 
vocabulary may be the vocabulary of feeling words, e.g. 'I feel 
anger in my throat'. When this statement was discussed with 
the subject, it became apparent that her throat felt constricted 
(organic sensation) and she was angry (feeling). 
The concept of "feeling11 is complicated by the fact that as a 
verb, "to feel" can take three kinds of grammatical constructions: 
a direct object, e.g. 'I feel my anger', 'I feel the cold', 
'I feel a twinge' (and in the latter example it is appropriate 
to ask, a twinge of what and where are you feeling it); an 
adjective, e.g. 'I am feeling sick', 'I am feeling despondent', 
'I am feeling at ease'; various types of clauses, e.g. 'I feel 
that you would be wise to reconsider your decision', 'I feel 
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that the time to speak out hasn't yet arrived' (Kenny, 1969). 
Hence the verb "to feel" can take a sensation or a feeling as 
a direct object or as an adjective, i.e. it can be used to 
qualify a state of mind or indicate a sensation in two of its 
grammatical constructions, and in a third can set out a 
conviction or generally posit an attitude. This should make 
us wary of any single type of reference for the noun "feeling". 
We may, of course, restrict the reference of the term to one 
unified meaning for particular purposes. However, in such a 
case the relatively free linguistic pool of "common" speech 
with its variety of meanings will most likely shatter our 
simplification. 
The grammatical affinity of "feeling" for various prepositions, 
conjunctions and conditionals suggests that "feeling" can 
generally stand for any connective or relational experience 
(experience existing in relation to other actual or potential 
experiences). As William James put it: 
We ought to say a feeling of AND, a feeling of IF, 
a feeling of BUT, and a feeling of BY, quite as 
readily as we say a feeling of BLUE or a feeling 
of COLD. Yet we do not: so inveterate has become 
our habit of recognizing the existence of substantive 
parts alone that language almost refuses to lend 
itself to any other use. 
(1905, pp.245-246) 
Parenthetically it should be pointed out that 1 a feeling of 
BLUE' is grammatically and semantically ambiguous because 
visual perceptual vocabulary cannot be translated into feeling 
vocabulary. However, there is a sense in which "to feel" is 
synonymous with "to be aware". 
Perhaps,in the case of sentient human organisms, the most 
straightforward view is to say that "feeling refers to the 
qualitative responsiveness, the dynamic viability of conscious-
ness, and the motivational force in relation to circumstances, 
bodily symptoms (including characteristic sensations), and 
actions both performed and intended. If this is adequate as 
-98-
a minimal formulation, then "feeling" will be superordinate 
with respect to "sensation". Feeling involves sensations but 
cannot be reduced to them. 
2. The language of sensation words and the language of feeling 
words are each composed of special domains of reference and 
have circumscribed modes of employment. Specifically: 
(a) The language of sensation words is a language of bodily 
events, its vocabulary is one of bodily function and 
activity in terms of its own inner operation and its 
activity in relation to the environment. As a language 
it is primarily denotative, functioning to name and 
locate relatively discrete units of bodily experience. 
(b) The language of feeling words is a language of an 
individual's dynamic concern with his own psychological 
states and objects and events in his environment. As a 
language it not only functions to denote experience, but 
also can be manipulated by the individual to give des-
criptions that represent and expressively portray his 
experience. The individual will tend not only to 
describe phenomenal aspects of his experience but also 
to integrate them in terms of "animating aspects" or 
patterns of quality. 
In general the feeling of vocabulary is quite extensive 
and well marked off from sensation vocabulary (the 
vocabulary of quivers, throbs, twitches, and tingles). 
A number of basic feeling vocabularies have been 
recommended. 
Davitz (1969) lists: admiration, affection, amusement, 
anger, anxiety, apathy, awe, boredom, cheerfulness, 
confidence, contempt, contentment, delight, depression, 
determination, disgust, dislike, elation, embarrassment, 
enjoyment, excitement, fear, friendliness, frustration, 
gaiety, gratitude, grief, guilt, happiness, hate, hope, 
impatience, inspiration, irritation, jealousy, love, 
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nervousness, panic, passion, pity, pride, relief, remorse, 
resentment, reverence, sadness, serenity, shame, solemnity, 
and surprise (pp.32-84). 
Schrag (1969) lists: admiration, anger, anxiety, aversion, 
awe, bliss, boredom, comfort, confidence, despair, dis-
comfort, disgust, distrust, fascination, fatigue, fear, 
frighti grief, hope, horror, love, melancholy, pain, 
pleasure, rapture, regret, remorse, repulsion, resentment, 
self-negation, self-worthiness, shame, shock, sorrow, 
spite, sympathy, tremor, trust, and zest (p.92). 
(c) One area of overlap between these two vocabularies 
(sensation vocabulary and feeling vocabulary) is in the 
case of terms predominantly used to refer to general 
bodily condition. 
This is especially noticeable when states of general 
activation, tension, or wellbeing are being described. 
To feel "ill at ease", for example, may be to feel tense, 
uneasy, nervous, and irritable without having localizable 
sensations (I feel "ill at ease" because forthcoming 
events are worrying me, there are anticipated difficulties, 
I am nervous about whether I am adequately preparing for 
them and I am irritable because it is all impingirtg upon 
me bringing resentment and general mental and physical 
imbalance). Thus feeling "ill at ease" may refer to my 
expectations, feelings, general attitude, and general 
bodily feeling. But to feel "ill at ease" may be to feel 
tension in my head, nervousness in my stomach, and to feel 
insecure. Here it refers to localizable sensations and 
feeling. On the other hand, to feel "ill at ease" may 
be simply to feel unhappy and worried. Here the bodily 
reference is relatively minimal. 
Table 1 presents data from the mood study pertinent to 
these issues. It shows subjects' responses to the 
question: 'What bodily sensations are you having?'. 
An examination of the responses shows that subjects do 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
a. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
l~. 
u. 
14. 
15. 
~o. 
l7 .. 
t8. 
t9. 
20. 
21. 
CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJEC!'S' RESPONSES TO TH:E: QUESTION: 'WHAT l:lOOILY .OE!-lSATIONS A.RE YOU HAVING?' ON TH:E: MOOD 
!'.NALYSIS QUESTIONNAIRE ACCORDING TO THE CATEGORIES "SENSATIONS", "AWA.RENESS OF GENERAL BODILY CONDITION", 
AND ''FEELINGS OR THOUGHTS". 
Sensations 
tension in head (0) 
back sweaty 
hot temperature 
bottom on hard surface 
headache (0) 
heart beating (0) 
pain in back 
tension in chest 
tension in throat 
headache 
face flused and hot 
tension in nee.k 
heaviness in head (01 
mouth - smiling 
face & ·'·,cia 1 expressions 
stomach-tlcking sensation 
(exclted buz.z.l 
headache (0) 
eyel~ds dropping 
prickly sensations 
rfrc:n ·.;oollen clothes) 
heart beat 
pulse in left wrist 
~ead feels clear (01 
tem?erature (hot) 
knees (sti.c:ky) 
one l.eq tingling 
•lpper body {1 iqht I (?) 
tension in stomach 
foot itchy 
Awareness of general bodily condition 
general tenseness 
relaxed 
energetic 
general lethargy 
tired all over 
heavy, relaxed feeling 
generally limp sensation 
-.,hole body alive and tingling 
·.,ell-beinq 
Feelings or thoughts 
hair revolting 
mind feels full 
r feel I look brlght and cheery 
(self-evaluatlon, ~ttltude 
toward body) 
I 
I-' 
0 
0 
I 
:J. 
.. 
.... 
:s . 
.:o .. 
-~· 
~ ~­
:o. 
n. 
n. 
J). 
J.l. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
39. 
39. 
~0. 
.a. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48~ 
49. 
50. 
SL. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
lle~s!:'.::-'J<ll :::rdl:lps (0" 
ha.n<J,; 
head ne,avy 
neck st1ff 
breathing COl 
face (hot) 
heart be<lt (Ol 
dull headache (OJ 
"heart beat" in stomach (0) 
hands tinglinq 
top half of body 
feet tired 
eyelids heavy 
eyes sore 
feet (position) 
cneeks burning 
mouth (responsive, ~nsetl 
feet hurt 
numbness in braLn (OJ 
pressure on back ~uscles 
foot tingling 
head 
butterflies in stomach \OJ 
butterflies in stomacn (OJ 
stoma.ch (Ol 
(pressure on from t.1.qnt 
clothes) 
breathinq (OJ 
heart beat (Ol 
pressure on leqs 
leqs ,and arms feel ener'<et.I.C ( ?.l 
eyes 
head he<ivy and dull (OJ 
breath.Lng 
stomach (OJ 
·.oar:nth of sk1.n 
StO!IldCh (()) 
foot go.1.nq to sLeep 
drowsy 
very relaxed 
body feels Light and ener1etic 
general relaxation 
relaxed, comfortable 
overall tiredness 
general peacefulness(?) 
heavy 
general welL-being 
tense in all my actions 
lazy and comfortable 
body active 
body throbbing 
hyperactive 
sleepy 
relaxed 
general heaviness 
feelinq weak 
general well-beinq 
aware of ~y hands ~ecause I 
don't ti:.C:e them 
peacefulness(?) 
~ind whirring 
mind active 
angry feeling in my throat 
l 
,..... 
0 
,..... 
I 
~.,. 
S7. 
:;a. 
59. 
r;o. 
6l. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
6S. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
13. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
aJ. 
84. 
as. 
96. 
87. 
!"\eadache (Ol 
feet. and hdnds fi.dg<!ty 
head~che (0) 
eyes (sparkling) 
stcmach turning (0) 
t~ngl~ng in a~s dnJ feet. 
heart. beat.Lng (0) 
headache (0) 
tension in shoulders 
eyes drooping 
head 
pressure in chest 
especially cardiac area (0) 
dull ache,in back 
warm 
warm 
chest tight {0) 
face frowning 
muscular tension in neck 
and upper back 
head and throat sore 
heart beating {Ol 
head 
breaching tOl 
liqhtness of heart (Ol 
head heavy 
stomach is relaxed (0) 
sensations in fingers 
headache {0) 
difficult breathing (0) 
face 
tension at top of S?ine 
cold 
numb all over 
generally relaxed 
general well-being 
energetic (from antLcipationl 
well-being 
listless (?) 
body relaxed 
relaxed completely 
body feels dull 
relaxed - placid 
tired 
inexcitable 
rhythm and fullness 
healthy well-being 
tense 
relaxed - calm 
feeling of wholeness (?l 
heavy 
listless {?) 
thoughts get mudd.led 
aware of my mind, as if I'm 
living in my thoughts almost 
withdrawn 
alone and lonely 
freedom 
feeling of wholeness (?) 
1-' 
0 
N 
I 
'o\9. 
d<l. 
JO. 
')L 
92. 
?J. 
'H. 
9S. 
96. 
97. 
'39. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
105. 
he,.~r·~ r 1te !Ol 
bubbl<nq in centre of body(O) 
foot ~as qone to sieep 
Skl:"l 
h.ur 
warcth inside (0) 
head L i'}ht 
post·..:ri! relaxed 
pos<tion of back 
:uscle quivers in arms 
head drooping 
headache (0) 
tingling down back 
knee vibrating 
headache (0) 
eyes heavy 
generally relax.::d and hedl.thy 
generally feeling good 
weakness. general slackness 
well-being 
pulsing of life throuqh my body 
shape & body, its moving and working 
relaxed 
relaxed, calmness 
mind active 
no enthusiasm 
lethargy, indifference 
calmness (?) 
I 
,...... 
0 
w 
I 
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make discriminations (without being given any instructions 
to do so) that can be classified according to whether 
(a) they refer to sensations (including organic sensations 
which are designated "o") 
(b) they refer to an awareness of general bodily experience 
or functioning 
(c) they refer to feelings or thoughts. 
Sensation words such as tingling, pulse, numbness, tension, 
and quiver were frequently followed by prepositions that 
indicated a specific bodily location. Sensation words 
that referred to organic sensations were in most cases 
also given an area of bodily location. Words referring 
to general bodily experience or bodily functioning were 
often prefaced by the word "general" (again without 
subjects being given any instructions to do so). Feeling 
words were not assigned a bodily location with the 
exception of one subject who said that she had an angry 
feeling in her throat. As already indicated (p. 96), 
further examination of this response showed that her 
throat was constricted and that she was feeling angry. 
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The semantic overlap between words referring to general 
bodily experience or bodily functioning and words 
referring to feeling can also be seen. For example, 
the words peaceful, listless, calmness, and wholeness, 
without any further information from the subjects can be 
said to refer to a general bodily experience or to a 
feeling. To shed light on this issue and how one would 
go about resolving it, I will consider the response 
"peacefulness". 
Firstly, it should be noted that "peacefulness" is part 
of a family of approximately synonymous words: peaceful, 
calm, tranquil, serene, and placid. The general 
connotation is one of being free from disturbing or 
exciting influences. Further reflection suggests that 
"peacefulness" could be construed in any of three ways: 
{a) Peacefulness as an awareness of harmony of or 
integration in the body's overall functioning 
(peacefulness as awareness of general bodily 
condition). 
(b) Peacefulness as an indication of bodily deactivation 
and repose (repose as absence of tension in 
specific areas of the body), perhaps also associated 
with pleasant thoughts and a lack of exciting and 
disturbing stimuli (peacefulness as involving a 
sensation or set of sensations). 
(c) Peacefulness as a felt reaction to events flowing 
smoothly, to equanimity of mind; or peacefulness 
as not feeling like doing anything in particular 
other than enjoying one's surroundings {peacefulness 
as feeling and motivational condition). 
It should also be pointed out that various hybrids of 
a, b, and c are possible, e.g. a and c. In order to 
reduce the semantic overlap and to refine subjects' 
discriminations, the following questions can be asked: 
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Is the experience localizable as a sensation? Is it 
localizable in a specific area or is it more diffuse, 
e.g. as a dullness, a pressure, a lightness, in a sector, 
region, quadrant, or field of the body, upper vs. lower, 
right vs. left side of the body? Is it more an aware-
ness or indication of how the body is functioning--a 
sense of an overall tension or well being? Is it a felt 
response to how the body is functioning, to external 
events, to thoughts, memories, or anticipations? 
3. A judgement is made that the assigning of experience to the 
categories of feeling or sensation is less important than 
encouraging an individual to describe, portray, and represent 
his experience to himself. From this primary point of 
reference and an awareness of the ambiguities in the concept 
of feeling in conjunction with 
(a) an understanding of the different modes of language 
functioning and 
(b) a familiarity with the sensation and feeling vocabularies. 
Corrective steps such as those outlined above may lead us to a 
resolution of the problem of "feeling" and "sensation" as 
categories of experience. 
Krueger (1928) believed that a more fruitful approach to affective 
phenomena was to study feeling as a reaction to a total experience 
field. Wundt had approached a given feeling experience by con-
sidering the proportionate participation of the different feeling 
elements, e.g. if the affective reaction to a musical chord were 
being studied, the total affective impression would be described 
as consisting of the partial feeling effects of the partial tones 
and intervals that comprised the chord. On the other hand, 
Krueger insisted that the emphasis be placed on the totality of 
the inner experience. In particular, feelings should be considered 
as immediate qualities arising from the total field of momentary 
experience. Furthermore, in Krueger's view, any attempts at an 
explanation of affect were premature until basic descriptions of 
phenomena (in their totality) were available. This would require 
a language that employed new models and metaphors to reflect the 
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functioning of feeling within a total structure, and as a reaction 
to the total structure. 
In Krueger's words (1928): 
In reality, the experience of a normal individual (and 
also all social experience) consists in its main bulk 
of indistinctly bounded, diffused, slightly or not at 
all organized complexes in whose genesis all organs and 
functional systems take part .... Never are the differen-
tiable parts or sides of real experience as isolated 
from one another as the parts of physical substance, 
i.e. its molecules or its atoms. All things which we 
can differentiate there, by comparison, always grip into 
one another and around one another in the greatest ela-
boration. And every time it is, without exception, 
imbedded within a total-whole, by which it is penetrated 
and more or less completely enclosed •.• Feelings are the 
qualities of experiences of this total whole (p.67). 
The influence of Krueger's concept of feeling persists, in basic 
theme and units of analysis chosen, in Arnold's conception of mood 
as the feeling response to general organismic functioning. 
Krueger's emphasis on molar units of analysis was part of the 
programmatic platform of Gestalt Psychology in both its Continental 
and American phases. However, Krueger's view has not endured as 
originally formulated. Gestalt Psychology and its experimental 
precursors sometimes suffered from a low standard of methodological 
rigour and an opaqueness of theoretical formulation. 
Even in Krueger's time, a growing mistrust of introspection as a 
reliable method (Wundt himself near the end of his career adopted 
a comparative social-genetic approach to the study of emotional 
life) coupled with a general disagreement over criteria for the 
identification of mental elements, soon led to a change in emphasis. 
The shift in emphasis was one of content, to emotion rather than 
feeling, emotion being considered a complex feeling but having the 
advantage of being more "palpable" and with direct manifestations 
that were open to public observation (Nafe, 1924). There was 
also a proliferation of new approaches, at first theoretical within 
the methodological context of introspection and then methodological, 
a result of the tension between new theory and an outdated method. 
A bare outline of these approaches would include: 
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1. Emotion as meaning, residing in the individual's approach or 
avoidance of the stimulus (Carr, 1925). 
2. Emotion as a construct resulting from the training and 
systematic biases of the observer (Young, 1927). 
3. Emotion as the result of success or failure in achieving a 
goal (McDougall, 1933). 
4. Emotion as a judgement that something is to be approached or 
avoided, but without a special conscious content (Peters, 
1935). 
5. Emotion as an attitude involving the acceptance or rejection 
of an object as the result of experience of the object (Carr, 
1925). 
One of the earliest references to mood in the experimental literature 
occurs in the study of Koch (1913). 
In this experiment the subject was a trained psychological 
investigator who participated in an experiment to determine the 
feeling elements induced by musical stimuli. Immediately prior to 
the experiment the subject described his mood as a 'strong 
depressive unpleasantness', which had been aroused by the receipt 
.of an annoying letter. In addition, there was resistance to 
participating in the experiment and an anticipation of further 
unpleasantness, as the activity of verbally reporting on feeling 
reactions to musical chords was judged to be not consonant with 
the dominant mood. The subject reported: 
As soon as I sounded the first chord, there was 
immediately the usual aesthetic judgement: this chord 
is beautiful. This judgement aroused a certain pleasant-
ness. But at the same time there was unpleasantness like 
an undercurrent in the affective life. And now there 
began a struggle between the unpleasantness aroused by 
my resistance to this acoustic stimulus, and the pleasant-
ness of the sound. The resistance eventually won out. 
It is not only the aesthetic judgement which aroused 
temporary pleasantness, but also the overwhelming impression 
of the sensory stimulus at the moment of sounding the 
chord; it arouses pleasantness, which at first seems 
to have displaced the unpleasant mood. But immediately 
afterwards I became aware that the unpleasant mood was 
there all the time as an undercurrent. When the chord 
died out, the tone itself displeased me and the two 
causes of unpleasantness combined to an intense depression. 
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(Several repetitions of the chords). The mood gradually 
changed in so far as pleasantness and unpleasantness 
seemed to be present simultaneously while the chords 
sounded, but pleasantness gradually became the stronger 
feeling. There was a noticeable alternation of 
attention between the present content of pleasantness 
and unpleasantness, but not really an alternation of 
feeling: both feelings existed side by side and only 
alternatively increased or decreased in intensity (p.39). 
This mood description implies that a process approach may be in-
dispensable to understanding mood. It suggests that mood as a 
process is internally complex, and many involve competing or 
oscillating component processes. Thus a multidimensional process 
model which achieves a series of stabilization points over time, 
should receive critical attention. 
2.2 The work of Ruckmick 
Ruckmick (1936) considered the alternative of conceptualizing mood 
as a cross between a feeling and an emotion, or as something which 
followed "in the wake" of an emotion. He chose the latter 
alternative and offered the following diagram as a representation 
of some of the distinguishing features of emotion, mood, and 
passion: 
Fig. 1 Ruckmick's representation of Emotion, Mood and Passion 
His caption reads: 
Symbolic representation of typical forms of emotion, 
mood, and passion. The figure should be visualized 
tridimensionally. It is meant to illustrate the 
sudden incidence and gradual submergence of these 
affective processes, even at times in the latter 
event, below the level of experience. The stippling 
(somewhat in perspective) indicates a diminishing 
degree of hedonic tone with passage of time (Ruckmick, 1936, 
p.70). 
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After pointing out that there existed neither a substantial body 
of research literature nor definitive experimental studies con-
cerning mood, he suggested that until such experimental work was 
forthcoming, general uncontrolled observations would have to 
suffice. In his view: 
A mood has only the general affective tone and some 
of the bodily symptoms in common with emotion. Other-
wise it stands in direct contrast to the typical 
emotion as defined. It is not sudden but usually long 
drawn out, lasting sometimes for hours, occasionally 
for days. It has no particular cognitive element. 
We are often at a loss to say toward whom or what it 
is directed. By the same token it does not generally 
seize the whole of consciousness. It stands quietly 
in the corner, as it were, while the conscious parade 
goes on. That it has some effect on the rest of 
consciousness there can be no doubt. Its presence is 
noted; it is a silent junior partner to the mental 
life of the moment. But certainly there is no seizure, 
no tyrannical control, no obvious intrusion. There is 
also generally no conative impulse about it. It does 
not lead itself to any definite action. Biologically 
its function is hard to determine. Positively one 
might state that it is probably more allied to physio-
logical conditions than to direct experience. But 
certainly many moods are occasioned through circum-
stances which have occurred in experience - a series 
of mishaps during the day, a stroke of bad luck in many 
enterprises, a gay evening with many pleasures; all 
such experiences are provocative of moods. But some 
moods are casually ascribed to indigestion, to a bad 
liver, or to getting out of the wrong side of the bed 
in the morning (pp.72-73). 
Ruckmick cites Pillsbury as offering a partly contrasting 
portrayal: 
Mood is a predisposition to an emotion of comparatively 
short duration. It may be due to physical causes. 
Lack of sleep, a fit of indigestion, and many other 
indispositions predispose to unpleasant emotions, while 
good health and rest conduce to pleasant emotions or 
sentiments. Moods, too, develop from earlier emotions. 
A disagreeable emotion .•. leaves a tendency to other 
unpleasant emotions, and this is a mood (p.72). 
Thus the modern disposition view of mood which stresses the hier-
archical organization of disposition terms and the dimensions of 
affectivity can be seen as a descendant of "direct observation" 
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techniques and Wundt's Tridimensional Theory of Feeling. Ruckmick's 
observations are of considerable utility, as they suggest both 
distinctions and criteria that are potentially amenable to experi-
mental investigation. 
The development of the experimental and observational study of mood, 
subsequent to Koch's introspective studies and the observationally 
based views of Ruckmick, has proliferated in multiple directions. 
Unmindful of Ruckmick's suggestions (I am aware of no systematic 
experimental follow-up to Ruckmick's observations and proposals) 
and hampered by the lack of a clear conceptual viewpoint on mood 
and specific demarcations for the phenomena they studied, experi-
mental investigators generally equated mood with simple feeling or 
hedonic tone. This restricted view of mood, as simple feeling or 
the feeling tone pleasantness/unpleasantness, was mitigated to a 
certain extent by the influence of Psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysts 
provided in-depth studies of character structure, often touching on 
phenomena that can be considered as mood phenomena under certain 
conditions, e.g. querulousness, boredom, and loneliness. 
In the review that follows, the type of research conducted under 
the heading of mood will be set out, as well as the techniques 
utilized, prior to Nowlis' seminal work on mood. 
As indicated in the Introduction to this chapter, the procedure 
will be to set out the descriptive material for each time period 
followed by a summary and an appraisal given under the headings: 
major conceptualizations of mood, techniques employed for mood 
study, criteria for the identification of mood, and general con-
siderations. 
-ll2-
2.3 The years 1934-1945 
2.31 The experimental work 
The Nature of Mood 
Johnson (1937), in a two part study, focused on a wide range of 
characteristics and correlates of euphoric and depressed moods. 
Using a sample of female university students, she sought to 
determine: 
1. Intra-individual patterns of euphoria and depression. This 
involved obtaining estimates of daily feeling tone on an 
eleven point scale over periods of sixty-five to ninety 
consecutive days. The author reported: 
For many of our subjects a period of about fifteen 
days between depressions appears to occur more 
often than chance alone would permit. Many subjects 
fail to show changes approximating rhythm in the 
time limits of this study ..•. Our own data are in-
sufficient to establish whether or not rhythm is 
the rule. A more constant feature of the temporal 
patterns is the longer persistence of the euphoric 
as compared with the depressed moods, resulting in 
a noticeable predominance of "m"-shaped graphs .... 
A third feature of the mood graphs is their lack 
of synchronization with one another. Whatever 
factors are responsible for the temporal location 
of rises and falls are largely particular to the 
individual (p.83). 
2. The characteristic behaviours and subjective accompaniments of 
euphoric and depressed moods. This involved participation in 
two ninety minute experimental sessions, one when in a euphoric 
mood, and the other when in a depressed mood. The experimental 
work involved recording spontaneous vocalizations, association 
speed, the emotional tone of associations, regression in thought 
trends, decision speed, judgements of distance, psycho-motor 
performance, perceptual fluctuations with ambiguous figures, 
and sleep reports. The author reported: 
The subjects certainly made more spontaneous and 
unnecessary conversation in euphoric than in 
depressed moods. Depression resulted in a very 
definite regression to childhood events, in thought 
and memory, compared to the amount of this type of 
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association in euphoria. Our subjects found it 
possible to make decisions much more readily when 
in pleasant moods. Apparently the sense of in-
decisiveness and mental futility which often 
accompanies depression is not entirely illusory (p.96). 
Johnson (1938), in the second part of her two part study, analyzed 
the subjective aspects of euphoria and depression. In her view: 
A purely behavioristic approach to the problem of mood 
seems to omit its essential nature, which is the subjective 
awareness of changing affect. In a highly socialized group, 
it seems doubtful if mood is always mirrored in objective 
behavior. Subjective assessment, therefore, seems indis-
pensable for this problem (p.l89). 
In her experiment subjects completed rating scales once when in a 
euphoric mood and once when in a depressed mood, covering a number 
of aspects of feeling tone. The scales covered the variables of: 
1. Physical Energy; 
2. Hental Energy; 
3. Self-confidence and Diffidence; 
4. Social Attitudes towards Others; 
5. Social Self-Feeling; 
6. Vocalization; 
7. Emotional Excitability; and 
8. Decisiveness. 
Johnson reported these results: 
Emotional apathy is usually a component of depression ... 
A number of clinical notations were recorded which are 
pertinent here. Subjects in discussing the nature of 
their depressions, usually said such things as "I feel 
jittery", or "I'm excited as though something bad were 
about to happen". 
It seems a defensible hypothesis that there are here 
involved different types of depression. One is the more 
usual apathetic depression; the other analogous to the 
agitated depressions of psychotics (p.ll5). 
Johnson believed that at the then present state of knowledge, it 
was premature to attempt to postulate a final theory concerning 
the nature of mood; however, in terms of her findings, she 
commented upon the then available theories of mood. Her data tended 
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to conflict with the two major theories, i.e. with Fisher and 
Morrow's inhibition theory and with Hersey's emotional resistance 
theory. 
Young (1937) advanced a succinct formulation of mood as 'a relatively 
persistent affective consciousness, such as cheerfulness, depression, 
anxiety and excitement'. In his view moods could be distinguished 
from simple affective reactions in terms of duration and from 
emotions by the fact that emotions are disruptive while moods are 
not. Also emotion is more intense and of briefer duration than mood. 
Emotions can merge into moods over time when the initial intensity of 
the emotion decreases, although in many cases a sharp dividing line 
cannot be drawn between the two. Young also pointed out that the 
term "mood" is often applied to abnormal affective states such as 
mania and deep depression, but these are to be considered as 
exaggerations of normal human moods. 
Young used the combination of a questionnaire and a rating scale to 
obtain information on laughing and weeping, cheerfulness and 
depression, and the stability and variability of moods. He contributed 
information on the frequency and causes of these feeling states. 
He concluded: 
1. College students rate their prevailing mood as 
cheerful 4.6 times as frequently as depressed. 
2. Moods are reported as stable and cheerful, stable 
and indifferent, stable and depressed, as alter-
nating wholly on the side of cheerfulness, or 
wholly on the side of depression or across the 
region of indifference from cheerfulness to 
depression. A cheerful mood may be punctured by 
a brief period of depression, or a depressed mood 
by a period of cheerfulness (p.332). 
Mood and Hypnosis 
Fisher (1934) employed hypnosis for the induction of post-hypnotic 
mood states in. a non-pathological population. His technique had the 
potential advantage of facilitating observations of the effects of 
particular moods on a wide variety of activities. However, Fisher 
restricted his investigations to the differential effects of elation 
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and despondency on the activity of card sorting. A control condition 
was included and pulse rate across the various conditions was 
monitored. These results were obtained: (1) Speed in card sorting 
increases in an elated mood. (2) Speed in card sorting decreases in 
a despondent mood. (3) In card sorting more errors tend to be made 
in both an elated and in a despondent mood than in a normal mood. 
(4) Pulse rate changes with changes in mood. 
Levine, Grassi and Gerson (1943) used hypnosis to study variations 
in Rorschach protocols produced under the induced moods of elation, 
depression, apprehension, sexual concern, and hypochondria. A normal 
control condition was also employed. Pronounced variations were 
noted in the protocols under the various induced moods. The 
investigators found that the peculiarities of the individual protocols 
were consistent with the peculiarities cited in the literature for 
the different affective states. 
Leuba and Lucas (1945) employed hypnotic techniques to induce three 
different "attitudes", i.e. happiness, criticalness, and anxiety. 
When in each of the three moods subjects were asked to describe a 
series of six photographs in order to determine the influence of mood 
on perception and description. The descriptions were rated by a 
panel of three judges who concluded that the descriptions were signi-
ficantly affected by the induced moods. 
Mood Measurement and Affective Methodology 
Kendrew (1935) experimentally aroused mood in young children in an 
attempt to measure the temporal duration or persistence of moods. 
The effect of the aroused mood, in this case "disappointment", was 
observed on the subsequent activity of the children. 
In 9 out of twenty cases disappointment experimentally 
aroused (by preventing the child from playing with a 
toy which he had just been allowed to choose) appeared 
to produce persistent effects of a diminishing order of 
magnitude; and in 3 cases there was no noticeable effect. 
In several cases a persisting conative activity showed 
itself in general behavior, but the emotional disturbance 
had a greater effect on the natural rate of working. 
Two children delayed the effect of disturbance by a 
determined effort (p.l8). 
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It should be pointed out that the labelling of the affective 
experience as disappointment is arbitrary. The experimental 
manipulation could just as easily produce a state of anger, guilt 
or boredom. 
Gemelli (1945), although concerning himself with basic concepts 
used in research on emotional states, provided a useful method-
ological review of the techniques for analysis of emotional states. 
He outlined his own approach, the functional method, which stresses 
both behavioural observation and introspection within the framework 
of a model that links biological and instinctual components to their 
action expressions. Attention was also given to the developmental 
phases of emotional states. 
Mood and Personality 
Johnson (1934) investigated the effect of mood on personality traits 
as measured by the Bernreuter Personality Inventory. For the purposes 
of the experiment, mood was conceptualized as 'generalized affective 
tone' (Johnson, 1934, p.521). Two measurements of mood were employed, 
self-report of mood state coupled with a rating on a 5 point scale 
(from low spirits to high spirits) and a one-hundred item word 
association test to which the subject responded "pleasant" or 
"unpleasant". It was predicted that a depressed mood would increase 
the scores for neurotic tendency and introversion, and would decrease 
the scores for self-sufficiency and dominance. The results obtained 
by the author were only significant for the dimension dominance, and 
were in the direction predicted. With regard to the association 
test, the author predicted that the number of "unpleasant" responses 
would be greater when the subject was in a depressed mood than when 
the subject was in an elated mood. This was supported in eleven out 
of the fifteen subjects, but for the other 4 subjects the results 
were reversed. 
Noting the absence of any objective tool for the measurement of 
affective tone, Johnson commented: 'If mood be thought of in terms 
of generalized affective tone the most desirable criterion would 
probably be an association test of rather wide scope and chosen on 
a basis of sensitivity to mood changes' (p.521). Johnson questioned 
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the validity of a single self-rating measure. She proposed a 
double criterion of a self-rating plus the direction of an 
association test score as the only alternative. 
Mood and Visual Perception 
Hevner (1935) sought to determine the affective values of colours 
and lines. Four basic designs involving different variations of 
line, e.g. circles, angles, squares, and waves were presented in 
either a blue or a red version to groups of undergraduate psycho-
logy students. The students were required to indicate from a list 
of affective words those words that they believed to be appropriate 
to the design. The conclusions reached were: (1) Red is happy 
and exciting. Blue is serene, sad and dignified. (2) Curves are 
serene, graceful and tender-sentimental. Angles are robust, 
vigorous, and somewhat more dignified. 
Mood and Social Psychology 
Johnson (1940) investigated the social effects of "moodiness", 
defined as changeability of mood, in a college sorority. Thirty 
students ranked each other on cheerfulness, changeability of mood, 
tenseness, and likeability. There were no significant correlations 
between moodiness and popularity. The author concluded that 
although moodiness might be a liability in intra-familial relation-
ships, it was not necessarily detrimental to a wider sphere of 
social relationships. 
Mood and Industrial Psychology 
Weston (1944) outlined some relationships between industrial 
illumination, mood, and worker efficiency. 
Psychoanalytical Studies 
Sachs (1939) analyzed pessimism in Shakespeare's "Measure for 
Measure" relating it to the hypothesized pessimism of Shakespeare 
himself. 
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Kielholz (1938) investigated the phenomenon of querulousness based 
on an analysis of one of his patients, correlating his findings 
with the wider literature. He gave attention to querulousness as 
manifested in the psychopathological states of paranoia, senile 
dementia, alcoholism, traumatic states, and psychopathic behaviour. 
Zilboorg (1938) argued for a relationship between loneliness and 
narcissism. 
Miscellaneous Studies 
Leibl (1935) suggested that a correlation exists between mood and 
handwriting. He used graphological rules for interpreting hand-
writing to support the distinction between transitory moods and 
constitutional affective dispositions. 
Barmack (1939) and Berman (1939) waged a dispute on the nature of 
boredom. Berman interpreted Barmack's definition of boredom as 
equivalent to satiation, and maintained that physiological and 
motivational descriptions by themselves were inadequate to account 
for the phenomenon. Barmack maintained that the disagreement was 
not over the actual operational facts but concerned deductions 
drawn from those facts and the level of description preferred for 
the interpretation (Barmack, 1939, p.472). Barmack upheld a more 
psychological and a less physiological approach, maintaining that 
a criterion of satiation should involve a subjective report, non-
resumption of activity, characteristic variability in performance 
and cognitive factors such as daydreaming (Barmack, 1939, p.298). 
}1cCann (1940) investigated nostalgia considering its symptomatology, 
personality differences between susceptible and non-susceptible 
individuals, etiology, prevention, and methods for its modification. 
McCann concluded that nostalgia shows a wide variety of symptoms, 
which have the common feature of being 'emergency emotional reactions'. 
Significant personality patterns for "nostalgic" individuals were 
revealed by the Bernreuter Personality Inventory. 
Petersen and Reese (1940) related moods in both normals and 
psychotics to the variables: change in weather, sexual cyr.le, 
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physical and mental activity, diet, infection, and general 
emotional situation. The authors concluded that the effects of 
weather were most significant, being relatively prolonged and 
inescapable in their effect. It was suggested that for the 
psychotic sample weather functions to bring into relief latent 
hereditary, dispositional, and constitutional tendencies. 
The influence of weather on mood states is a factor that has 
received little attention in the mood literature, and deserves 
systematic study. Several subjects reported to the investigator 
that it was a major determinant of their moods, e.g. one subject 
reported that on grey, hazy days, she was much more likely to 
feel lethargic. 
-120-
The Years 1934-1945 
2.32 Discussion of major conceptualizations, techniques, criteria, and 
general considerations. 
Major conceptualizations 
The most frequent conceptualization of mood during this period was 
as the general feeling tone of the organism, either as a result of 
internal processes, e.g. Johnson (1938), or the impingement of the 
social environment, e.g. Young (1937). Other views were also 
current though less widespread. 
Leuba and Lucas (1945) equated mood with "attitude", though 
presumably they were not suggesting that all attitudes are moods. 
Kendrew (1935) conceived of mood as the perseveration of emotional 
disturbance, and most generally as a persisting psychological 
reaction or process. Johnson (1940) equated "moodiness" with 
changeability of mood. In these years there was some awareness of 
the trait-state distinction with respect to mood, e.g. Young (1937), 
but this was not general currency. Psychoanalysts provided valuable 
information on the developmental and psychodynamic aspects of mood, 
but they were conceptually isolated from the more academic approaches. 
Attempts were made.to reduce phenomena that could be considered as 
moods, e.g. boredom, to a reference network of objectively corre-
lated concepts, e.g. Barmack's conceptualization of boredom in terms 
of 'satiation', but the results were polemical (Barmack, 1939; 
Berman, 1939). 
Major techniques for the induction and study of mood 
In this period a variety of techniques were used for the study and 
induction of mood. The most popular measure was the bi-polar 
rating scale. It was used alone, in combination with a questionnaire, 
e.g. Young (1937), in combination with experimental sessions 
utilizing tests, behavioural, and cognitive measures, e.g. Johnson 
(1937), and in combination with verbal reports, e.g. Johnson (1938). 
Johnson (1937) used an eleven point rating scale for the mood 
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dimension euphoria-depression, applied daily for periods of from 
sixty to ninety days. The daily variations were graphed for 
individual subjects to reveal individual patterns. An "average 
mood" graph, i.e. the daily average ratings for a group of 
individuals was determined. It was hypothesized that individual 
physiological variation would cancel out to reveal the effect of 
generalized environmental factors, e.g. temperature, and humidity. 
Johnson (1938) employed a series of self-rating scales to tap the 
subjective aspects of mood, emphasizing the indispensibility of 
such probes for an understanding of mood. Young (1937) employed 
a questionnaire and a rating scale in a test-retest manner, and 
independently used a daily mood questionnaire for a 3~ week period. 
Kendrew (1935) obtained a baseline time for children to thread 
sixty-six beads. Each child was tested three times on separate 
days. Before the third test the child was disturbed, i.e. 
prevented from playing with a toy he had previously selected for 
play. His subsequent performance on the bead threading task was 
observed and recorded. 
Fisher (1934) used post-hypnotic suggestion for the induction of 
mood states, and Leuba and Lucas (1945) induced mood in subjects 
while under hypnosis. However, the use of hypnosis as a technique 
for the induction of mood has a number of theoretical and practical 
difficulties. One difficulty is the generalizability of the 
results, the percentage of the general population that can be 
hypnotized is small and this capacity may be the result of specific 
personality variables or configurations of personality variables. 
Also, it is not clear whether a hypnotically induced mood is equivalent 
to a mood produced by internal or external factors. 
Johnson (1940), investigating the social consequents of moodiness 
and the degree of relationship between self and other ratings of 
moodiness, had sorority members rank each other for traits bearing 
on aspects of mood. Thirty subjects ranked each other on cheerful-
ness and gaiety, changeableness of mood, highstrungness and tension, 
and personal likeability. 
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Criteria 
The majority of authors were operating with a conceptualization of 
mood as "general feeling tone", and adopted the position that an 
individual is always in one mood or another. Hence, they saw no 
need to apply criteria for the differentiation of mood from other 
affective phenomena. In their view, an individual might or might 
not be in a particular mood, e.g. depression, but if he were not 
depressed, then some other mood (general feeling tone) would be 
operating. 
This can be expressed by saying that there was little distinction 
between general criteria for mood (that the person is in a mood), 
the identification of a particular mood (that he is in a mood of a 
particular type), and the measurement of correlates of a particular 
mood. Essentially verbal report and rating scales were used to 
identify, measure and validate the presence and description of a 
particular mood. The confounding of aspects in this approach is 
apparent. Whitely (1973) has distinguished between two senses of 
criteria: (1) the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
correct application of a descriptive term, and (2) the evidence or 
clues which may be relied upon to assure us that the term is being 
correctly applied. This type of distinction was not made in the 
experimental literature. 
If Johnson's view that subjective aspects of mood are basic and that 
mood states have cognitive and behavioural consequents which can be 
used as signs of a particular mood is accepted, then Whitely's 
distinction becomes in principle applicable. Given that general 
criteria for mood were met (as suggested in section 1.10), then 
for a particular mood the subject's verbal report and self-rating 
could serve as criteria of identification in {~itely's first sense 
(as a sufficient condition) and such things as patterns on an 
association test, reaction time, etc. could be considered as criteria 
or signs in \~itely's second sense. The mood strictly speaking is 
not measured, just the cognitive and behavioural correlates. As 
Johnson pointed out, there are no objective measures for mood 
itself. 
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Theoretically, Young (1937) suggested general criteria for mood, 
i.e. criteria that tell us someone is in a mood, though not what 
sort of a mood. He suggested: 
Moods may be distinguished from simple affective reactions 
in terms of duration •... Just what degree of persistence is 
necessary for an affective experience to be classified as 
a mood has not been determined by psychologists. 
Moods can be distinguished from emotions in at least two 
respects. First, an emotion is a disruptive activity or 
perhaps the consciousness of a subject during behavioural 
disorganization, whereas a mood is relatively free from 
disruption. Second, the typical emotion is more intense 
than the mood and of briefer duration (p.311). 
General Considerations 
Johnson (1938) put forth the view that: 
..•.• mood is largely dependent upon neuromuscular tonus, 
the degree of which is due to the volume of afferent 
excitation from the proprioceptors, which in turn is due 
to biochemical changes. These biochemical changes occur 
in somewhat rhythmic fashion with the gradual building up 
of chemical balances and subsequent change in qualitative 
effects (p.l97). 
Accordingly she put forth the view that the relationship between 
mood and environmental factors was not as direct as many authors 
had suggested. In her view emotional responses generated by the 
environment are superimposed upon mood, largely conditioned by 
mood, and of relatively little influence upon mood unless of 
sufficient intensity to have major physiological effects. Johnson 
suggested that there is a strong tendency to rationalise moods, to 
pin them on to environmental occurrences, i.e. incidents are 
selectively interpreted to form causes in tune with current mood. 
A different view with a greater emphasis on environmental conditions 
was put forth by Young (1937): 
In the study upon moods one of the outstanding results is 
that moods of cheerfulness and depression are dependent 
primarily upon meaningful events within the social environ-
ment. From this fact it may be inferred that the situations 
and events which change one's moods bring into function the 
complex processes of the cerebrum (p.318). 
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Thus early in the history of mood study a tendency to emphasize 
one type of variable to the relative exclusion of other types of 
obviously relevant variables, was established. This selective 
orientation, although not amounting to an either/or type of logic, 
became nevertheless an impediment to any general theory or holistic 
approach to mood phenomena. 
In terms of specific findings, Johnson (1937) found periodicity 
in depression for some subjects but none for other subjects. It 
should be pointed out that if biochemical factors were the only 
variables involved in the production of mood, then a more constant 
pattern for individual subjects would be expected. 
My own observations tend to confirm Johnson's findings on the 
issue of periodicity. Some subjects reported definite mood states 
but no regular sequence or recurrence. Other subjects reported 
a pattern of recurrence usually in phase with the menstrual cycle. 
Still other subjects reported mood systems, i.e. a pattern of 
both recurrence and sequence. For example, one subject reported 
a system of six basic moods which in her opinion recurred in a 
definite sequence: 
1. a state of magical happiness 
2. a state of lethargy and disorientation 
3. an excitable, impulsive state characterized by strong sexual 
feelings 
4. a state of tender and affectionate feelings 
5. a state of calmness and confidence, and 
6. a state of frustration and self-critical depression. 
Another subject also reported a system of six basic moods that 
unfolded in a definite sequence: 
1. a state of happiness 
2. a state of feeling deflated and confused 
3. a depressed state 
4. a state of fragile and vulnerable feelings 
5. a state of detachment and generally dull feeling, and 
6. a nervous and tense state. 
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2.4 The Years 1945-1959 
2.41 The experimental work 
Mood and Verbal Associative Responses 
Bousfield (1950), in his investigation of the relationship between 
mood and the production of verbal associative responses, defined 
mood in this way: 
Mood is a generic term denoting general feeling tone which 
is a resultant of the specific feeling tones associated 
with the specific motivational systems operating at any 
one time. Mood is generally present in the living individual 
since some phase of motivation is never completely absent 
(p.67). 
Bousfield's general hypothesis was: there is a facilitation of 
responses having affective values corresponding to the quality of 
the mood. Following from this general hypothesis, Bousfield 
hypothesized: 
1. l.Jith pleasant mood there is a facilitation of verbal associative 
responses having pleasant affective value. 
2. With unpleasant mood there is a facilitation of verbal 
associative responses having unpleasant affective value. 
The procedure for testing these hypotheses involved obtaining 
self-ratings of mood on an eleven point rating scale whose extremes 
were: 'feel as badly as possible' and 'feel as good as possible'. 
After this rating, subjects were requested to list as many pleasant 
objects, activities and situations as they were able (pleasantly 
toned associates); as many unpleasant objects, activities, and 
situations as they were able (unpleasantly toned associates); and 
to make as many words as they were able from the letters ONDTERH 
(neutrally toned associates). 
It was found that subjects' self-ratings of mood were predominantly 
positive (75.15% positive, 4.33% neutral, and 20.52% negative). 
The interpre~ed data tended to support both initial hypotheses, but 
the first hypothesis, viz. with pleasant mood there is a facilita-
tion of verbal associative responses having pleasant affective 
value, was more conclusively established. Bousfield considered 
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three possibilities that could account for the greater support for 
the first hypothesis: 
1. The operation of a mechanism of repression or isolation in 
connection with unpleasantly toned associates. 
2. As high mood subjects were found to have higher energy levels, 
they could conceivably expend this energy more evenly over the 
three associative conditions. 
3. Since the assumption was made that in Western culture the 
majority of basic needs are satisfied, it was suggested that 
when motivational frustration is strong enough to produce an 
unpleasant mood, it is likely that only a small number of 
motives are being frustrated, so that in an unpleasant mood 
more unpleasantly toned associates would be produced, but not 
an appreciably greater number than in a pleasant mood. 
Although this latter piece of reasoning is not very conclusive, 
Bousfield tentatively chose both possibilities 2 and 3 above as 
adequate to account for his results. 
Mood and Homeostasis 
Machover and Schwartz (1952) set forth mood as the affective aspect 
of equilibrating mechanisms. They write: 
From the point of view of homeostasis, mood may be 
regarded as the affective aspect of the psychic 
equilibrium which follows the overcoming of conflict 
or the management of a displacing excitation. A given 
affective state or mood, thus linked with the resolution 
of a preceding displacement or conflict, might then be 
expected to deal with ensuing stimulations in a manner 
consistent with its conservation. In other words, mood, 
signalling or itself constituting a state of dynamic 
equilibrium, should seek its own persistence. It should 
create a predisposition toward the selective modification 
of response as its own persistence and the nature of the 
stimulus, now confirmatory, now antithetical require (p.S9). 
It was the author 1 s general hypothesis that mood functions as a 
defender of the psychological status quo after conflict resolution 
and that it controls the associative process in order to maintain 
itself. In particular contrast responses (considered more abstract) 
and adjective-noun responses (considered more concrete) would be 
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determined by both the hedonic tone of the stimulus word and the 
prevailing mood of the subject. 
The author reasoned: If mood is essentially serving a homeostatic 
function, then the associative response of a depressed subject to a 
negatively toned stimulus word should be a concrete adjective-noun 
response as a negatively toned stimulus word would be consistent 
with and supportive of the depressed mood. 
On the other hand, to a positively toned stimulus word, a depressed 
subject should give a more abstract contrast response, as the 
feeling tone would be contrary, i.e. threatening to the equilibrium 
established by the prevailins mood. It was also hypothesized that 
a depressed subject responding to a negatively toned stimulus word 
should have less incentive to respond as the stimulus word would 
not be disruptive to the mood equilibrium, and hence he would show 
a longer reaction time relative to a positively toned stimulus word. 
The authors used the Depression Scale·of the MMPI as their independent 
measure of depression and administered it along with a word list of 
thirty positively toned adjectives and thirty negatively toned 
adjectives to a sample of thirty-one normal subjects. Fr~m the 
data three presumptive indices of depression were determined: a 
reaction time depression index, a contrast response depression 
index, and an adjective-noun depression index. It was predicted 
that since both the MMPI Depression Scale scores and the association 
test indices tvere presumed to increase with affective depression, 
the correlation between them should be positive. Although the MHPI 
was admitted to be a highly fallible criterion for current depression 
and the hedonic variability for a siven stimulus word was large, the 
authors appeared to be confident in reporting: 
Correlations between MMPI depression and association test 
depression were: for contrast responses 0,40 (p = 0,02), 
for adjective-noun responses 0,33 (p = 0,05), for reaction 
time 0,45 (p = 0,01). 
It is concluded that the prevailing mood of the respondent 
operates homeostatically, exercising a selective influence 
on associative abstraction and reaction time, depending on 
the mood implication of the stimulus. Abstract associations 
(contrast responses) are facilitated when the stimulus word 
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threatens the respondent's prevailing mood, while concrete 
associations (adjective-noun responses) are facilitated 
when the stimulus word corroborates the mood. Reaction 
time is decreased when the stimulus word threatens the pre-
vailing mood, and lengthened when the stimulus corroborates 
mood. In general, the associative process is in some 
measure subordinated to the end of conserving the prevailing 
mood of the subject (p.66). 
\~odin (1956), working in the vein of Machover and Schwartz, used 
a general concept of homeostasis to test hypotheses concerning the 
operation of homeostasis through perception, memory, memory trace, 
word associations, and associative reaction. In each case pre-
vailing mood operating homeostatically was suggested as a major 
determinant of response. 
Conceptual and Methodological Studies 
Elmgren (1950) suggested that affective phenomena might profitably 
be classified and conceptualized through a modification and 
expansion of the Wundtian tridimensional theory. He maintained 
that it was possible by means of psychophysiological, constitutional, 
and factor analytic studies to determine the basic components of 
affective experience. No component, however, was to be accepted 
unless it was confirmed by experimental study. Elmgren set forth 
a list of components for which there was at least some experimental 
evidence. These included: 
1. sensitivity or susceptibility and vividness 
2. excitation or tension 
3. lability-stability 
4. intensity 
5. integration, the greater or lesser closure of the structure of 
a sentiment (p.l46). 
Strunz (1954) reviewed the theoretical problems of disposition 
concepts within psychology. He drew attention to problems in 
distinguishing between formal and actualizing dispositions, i.e. 
higher-order and lower-order dispositions. He demonstrated the 
need for critical analyses of disposition concepts and indicated 
the hazards of their uncritical acceptance. 
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Psychoanalytical Studies 
Rapaport (1953) reviewed and synthesized what might be called the 
developmental moments of Freud's thinking on the theory of affect. 
He stressed a regulatory and adaptational view of affect within 
the framework of ego psychology. 
Jacobson (1954) surveyed the views of Freud and other psycho-
analytical writers on the theory of affect. She suggested that 
the following factors were of primary importance for a psycho-
analytic theory: the reality principle, instinctual maturation, 
and the maturation of the ego. 
Psychiatric and Forensic Studies 
Branfman (1954) investigated the dynamics of sentimentality. 
Utilizing the approach of Edmund Bergler, he demonstrated a 5 layer 
dynamic stratification. 
Schulte (1954) indicated that severe depressive mood states 
accompanied by a severe loss of self-esteem were capable of 
provoking criminal or illegal actions, in those personalities that 
were predisposed. He suggested that the mood state of such 
individuals be taken into account in determining the responsibility 
of such persons for their criminal acts. 
Mood and Visual Perception 
Wexner (1954) investigated the degree to which colours (hues) and 
mood tones are associated. Her general hypothesis was: there 
is a positive relation between certain colours and certain mood 
tones. She pointed out two shortcomings in the previous 
literature. First, in word lists used to measure mood, groups of 
words that were hypothesized to measure a dimension of mood often 
lacked reasonable synonymity. Hence one subject might primarily 
be responding to one word of the group and another subject might 
be responding to a different word of the group. Second, the 
forced method of fitting mood words to a colour circle where there 
was a total reliance on the experimenter's view as to what colours 
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went with what words, was questioned. 
Wexner chose twelve words as a measure of mood, i.e. the words -
exciting, secure, distressed, tender, protective, despondent, calm, 
dignified, cheerful, defiant, powerful and sensuous. Then a list 
of 164 adjectives was culled from the literature, from synonyms of 
these words as well as the original twelve. Four judges were 
requested to choose words from the list of adjectives which they 
felt meant the same as the mood tone words. The mood tone words 
were listed together with their synonyms as unanimously chosen by 
the four judges. The final groups of mood tone words were: 
exciting, stimulating; secure, comfortable; distressed, disturbed, 
upset; tender, soothing; protective, defending; despondent, 
dejected, unhappy, melancholy; calm, peaceful, serene; dignified, 
stately; cheerful, jovial, joyful; defiant, contrary, hostile; 
and powerful, strong, masterful. 
Wexner found that for each mood tone certain colours were chosen 
to go with that mood tone significantly more often than the 
remaining colours. In general the investigation tended to support 
the colour-mood studies as recorded in the literature. No significant 
differences were found in colour-mood association between male and 
female. Wexner considered the relevance of cultural, biological 
and learning factors to these findings. 
Miscellaneous Studies 
Delay (1946) considered mood to be a fundamental affective quality 
• 
that gives to each state of mind an agreeable or disagreeable tone. 
Delay set forth the view that mood was a basic substratum in an 
individual's affective life. From clinical observation, the results 
of brain surgery, and animal experimentation, he concluded that the 
centre for the regulation of mood is in the base of the brain 
particularly the diencephalon. Delay stressed that mood was the 
basis of all affective life and served through a balance of 
inhibition~ and facilitations to prevent either excess or deficiency 
of affective tone. 
Mark (1947) used an idiographic approach to reveal the structure of 
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neurotically determined moods. Mark's main point was that an un-
covering of the individual's unique motivations was necessary for 
a favourable change of mood and a successful modification of the 
mood system. 
Moon (1954) studied the scope of mood responses in intermediate 
grade pupils. 
Bloch (1954), in a contribution that might be considered a fore-
runner of the influential Schacter and Singer study of 1962, 
summarized the anatomical and physiological studies concerning 
the locus of emotional responses. His own conclusion was that 
physiological intensities of affective states could be distinguished 
but not unique feeling qualities. 
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The Years 1945-1959. 
2.42 Discussion of major conceptualizations, techniques, criteria, and 
general considerations 
Major conceptualizations 
New emphases began to emerge in the literature of 1945-1959, e.g. 
1. For Bousfield (1950) mood was still equivalent to general 
feeling tone, but now it was the resultant (implying a 
vectorial approach) of a network of specific feeling tones 
grounded in operative aspects of the individual's motivational 
system. 
2. For Machover and Schwartz (1952) operating with a broad tele-
ological point of view, the concept of homeostasis was 
essential to an understanding of mood. In their view mood 
is the affective aspect of psychic equilibrium following the 
resolution of conflict or excitement. Mood then functions 
through the selective modification of responses to maintain 
equilibrium. 
Thus there was a general emphasis on the relationship between mood 
and motivational factors, corresponding to the general interest in 
motivation, drive and reinforcement which was prevalent in psychology 
in the 1950's; and an emphasis on the adaptive and regulating 
function of mood. Closer scrutiny of Machover and Schwartz's 
view indicates that in fact they were very close to propounding a 
feedback model. Such a model later became manifest in Nowlis' 
conceptualization (see section 1.11). 
Major techniques for the study of mood 
Strictly speaking this p~riod was dominated by a study of the 
effects and correlates of mood, the relationship between mood and 
associative response being the preferred area of study. The usual 
technique was to employ mood self-rating scales, a listing of 
associative responses and then to compare associative responses 
produced under different ratings of mood. The ratings most fre-
quently chosen for study were high mood and low mood. 
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Machover and Schwartz (1952), in a more complex approach, took into 
account the feeling tone of the stimulus word, positive and negative 
toned stimulus words distributed randomly on a word list, affective 
state, depression scale of the MMPI, and the nature of the associative 
response in relation to the prevailing affective state. 
Wexner (1954), pointing out methodological faults in the previous 
literature, stressed the need for synonymity between words 
comprising a given dimension of mood check lists for valid statistical 
results. 
The idiographic, dynamic, and genetic approaches of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis resulted in a number of clinical contributions during 
this period. 
Criteria 
Bousfield (1950) acknowledging that the status of mood as a topic 
in psychology was vague, suggested that mood should occupy a 
position intermediate between affection and emotion. 
sought to map out some of the pertinent distinctions: 
Bousfield 
Emotion is a term best applied to relatively strong 
motivational states identified on the basis of their 
having pronounced physiological concomitants. The 
somewhat equivalent terms affection, feeling tone, 
and hedonic tone, denote a phenomenological attribute 
of motivation generally described in terms of pleasant-
ness and unpleasantness. Some aspects of the relation-
ship between motivation and feeling tone are obvious. 
In general, frustration is associated with unpleasant-
ness and satiation with pleasantness (p.67). 
These formulations were not systematized to the point where actual 
criteria for the presence or absence of a mood state in awareness 
were advanced and applied. Instead it was suggested: 'Mood is 
generally present in the living individual since some phase of 
motivation is never completely absent' (Bousfield, 1950, p.67). 
There was no attempt to stratify the concept of mood into higher-
order theoretical terms and lower-order observation terms. 
Machover and Schwartz (1952) directed attention to psychoanalytical 
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theorizing concerning mood. From their viewpoint, it might be 
suggested that mood criteria be linked to the experience of intra-
psychic conflict or the conditions producing intra-psychic conflict, 
but this was not attempted. Hence it might be said that their 
theory was not adequately linked to their procedure, as no attempt 
was made to induce conflict or to ensure that the prevailing 
affective state was the result of a preceding conflict. 
General Considerations 
The experimental literature of this period demonstrated a movement 
away from the study of mood as a phenomenal state toward the study 
of the behavioural correlates of mood. However, there seemed to 
be a lack of awareness of the logical shifts that must accompany 
such a procedural shift, e.g. a correlational study should be able 
to independently define and measure those variables to be correlated. 
And as Bousfield pointed out, the status of mood as a concept was 
vague and lacking in specific criteria; he was also aware that the 
correlations between feeling tone and behaviour were tenuous at 
best. It is suggested that because the concept was so vague there 
could be no specific criteria and the correlations could only be 
tenuous. 
An initial corrective step could be one which focused on the 
subjective aspects of mood, with a view to developing a theory and 
criteria that would be applicable to the individual's experience. 
This is not to affirm that the study of behaviour associated with 
a phenomenal state is an empty enterprise, far from it, for such 
behaviour may serve as partial criteria for the identification of 
the phenomenal state. The point to be stressed is that subjective 
aspects and behavioural aspects must be studied together before 
there can be an adequate formulation of mood. 
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2.5 The Decade 1960-1970 
2.51 The experimental work 
Mood in Normal and Pathological Subjects 
Wessman, Ricks and Tyl (1960) investigated mood fluctuations in a 
sample of college women without discernible pathology, over a 
seven week period. The authors' guiding proposition was that the 
difference between normal and pathological moods is one of degree 
rather than type. For their sample the authors considered: 
(a) self and ideal-self representations reported by subjects in 
relatively elated and relatively depressed moods; 
(b) the direction of punitive responses and the persistence of 
effort revealed by a projective frustration test taken during 
elation and depression, and 
(c) the average level, the frequency, and the intensity of mood 
fluctuations reported daily over a period of six weeks. 
From their results the authors concluded: 
The significant intra-individual changes in depression 
(relative to elation) were: lower correlation of self 
and ideal, more unfavourable self concept, increased 
extrapunitive responses; and reduced need-persistive 
responses. Individual records of mood fluctuation 
were markedly irregular and showed no clear periodicity 
•.. Relative interindividual standings on the parameters 
of mood fluctuations showed the following significant 
correlations: intensity of mood swings inversely 
related to relative stability of the self concept; and 
average mood (or general hedonic level) inversely 
related to correspondence of self and ideal. The last 
finding, which was contrary to prediction, led to an 
examination of the contents and discrepancies between 
self and ideal descriptions in elation and depression 
for the relatively more and the relatively less happy 
girls (pp.l25-126). 
Borgatta (1961) urged experimenters to undertake empirical studies 
of conce~ts and variables that were relevant to the study of 
personality, but which transcended a narrow trait approach. 
Borgatta considered 'mood' just such a variable. Traditionally, 
he believes, mood has been treated as a nuisance variable, a 
variable that is capricious in its effects and which tends to 
detract from the generalizing power of any particular study. 
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Borgatta suggested that attention be turned to this evasive entity 
in order to determine its influence and manner of operation. 
Borgatta writes: 
It [mood] raises many theoretical questions, however, 
that will influence future research. For example, 
should attention concentrate on the situations and 
sequences of situations that lead to particular moods, 
or should it concentrate on the moods themselves? The 
question is compounded since moods must be viewed as 
consequences of the interaction of the personality of 
the individual and the situation; any analysis that 
is undertaken is necessarily complex and at least 
partially circular. One important strategy, thus, 
may be to concentrate ori the development of measures 
of any given type before dealing with the question of 
the interrelationship of different types of measures 
(pp.lOS-106). 
Borgatta sought: 
1. to replicate an early forty word adjective check list devised 
by Nowlis and his associates to determine salient mood 
factors and parameters; 
2. to correlate mood scores on these factors with change in mood 
scores and 
3. to correlate change in mood scores (the difference between 
pre- and post-mood adjective check list administrations) with 
personality data, e.g. scores on the Guilford-Zimmerman· 
Temperament Survey, the Thurstone Temperament Schedule, the 
Edwards Personal Preference Survey, and the Cattell Sixteen 
Personality Factor Questionnaire. 
Borgatta's procedure: 
A short mood adjective check list was administered pre- and post-
personality testing to one-hundred-and-eighty male university_ 
students. The mood adjective check list data was factor analyzed 
separately pre- and post-testing by the Complete Centroid Method 
with Quartimax rotation~ Orthogonally rotated factors were deter-
mined. In addition, for a sample of ninety-eight males and thirty-
five females, mood scores pre- and post-were interrelated. 
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Borgatta's results: 
1. For the male data, six of the Nowlis factors were confirmed, 
i.e. those factors which Nowlis called Depression, Social 
Affection, Deactivation, Concentration, Aggression, and 
Anxiety. Nowlis factors not confirmed were those of 
Pleasantness, which was indistinguishable from Social 
Affection, and Egotism, the loadings on which were considered 
to be too small to warrant its inclusion as a major factor. 
2. For the male data, the author tentatively accepted a signi-
ficant correlation (for both pre- and post-tests) between the 
mood factor Lonely and the mood factors of Defiant and 
Startled. This was established at the .05 level of signi-
ficance. The mood factor Tired was correlated positively with 
Thoughtful and negatively correlated with Lonely, Defiant and 
Startled. The mood factor Warmhearted was independent in the 
male matrix. 
3. The female data relative to the male data, for the similarity 
between pre- and post-test factor structures, there seemed to 
be less of a parallel between the factor structure of the pre 
and post data. In the pre data (again relative to the male 
data) there was no relationship between the mood factor Tired 
and the mood factors Lonely, Defiant and Startled. This also 
held for the post data. The post data generally revealed 
smaller statistical relationships, though it was isomorphic 
to the male data. 
Some specific variations were noted. The author stated: 
In summary, examination of the pre- and post-test scores 
revealed some systematic dependencies. At the same time, 
it was seen that the scores tended to be consistent from 
pre- to post-testing. While the scores were built on the 
basis of experience with male data, the female data tended 
to show similar structure with several specific variations 
(p.ll2). 
Borgatta summed the mood scores pre- and post-testing (Tl + T2) 
for each individual on each mood factor, for the largely dis-
junctive categories male/female. This score yielded an indication 
of the stable way the individual perceived his own feelings. A 
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second score, a change in mood score (Tl- T2), the algebraic 
difference between pre- and post-test scores was established to 
indicate the influence of two-and-a-half hours of strenuous 
personality testing on mood state. 
1. For the male data, the interrelationship of mood and change in 
mood scores indicated that scoring high on Thoughtful was 
correlated with an increase in the Thoughtful score. The other 
salient relationships were between being high on the mood 
factor of Startled and an increase in the mood factor of Lonely; 
being high on the factor of Thoughtful and showing an increase 
in the factor of Tired, and being high on the factor of Tired 
and showing an increase on the factor Defiant. 
2. For the male data, the interrelationship of the change in mood 
scores revealed that the highest correlation was between changes 
in the mood factors of Defiant and Startled. Also significant 
were changes between Warmhearted and Tired, and between Thought-
ful and Defiant. 
3. For the female data, the interrelationship of mood and change 
in mood scores parallel that of the male data, but at a lower 
level. For the females being high in the mood factor Startled 
was correlated with an increase in the mood factor of Startled. 
4. For the female data, the interrelationship of the change in mood 
scores again paralleled the male data. 
Mood scores and change in mood scores were correlated with the 
different measures provided by the personality tests. The author 
also presented data which consisted of self-ratings on behavioural 
characteristics and peer rankings obtained after a discussion 
session. It is not possible to present all the correlations for 
all the mood factors. However, the correlations for the mood factor 
Tired are set out: 
1. For the male data, there were no significant correlations 
between the mood factor Tired and the personality subtests. 
2. For the female data, there were several substantial negative 
correlations, e.g. between the mood factor Tired and the traits 
of Extroversion and Emotional Stability on the 16PF. Positive 
correlations were noted between the mood factor of Tired and 
~ -.. 
the personality dimensions of Succourance (Edwards) and 
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Bohemian (Cattell). 
Borgatta's results have been presented in detail to indicate (a) 
the Nowlis Mood Factors that were replicated (Depression, Social 
Affection, Deactivation, Concentration, Aggression and Anxiety), 
(b) the relative stability of the mood scores over time, and (c) 
the potential correspondence between mood scores and personality 
variables. 
McNair and Lorr (1964), guided by the intent to develop a method 
for the identification and assessment of mood states in a male 
psychiatric outpatient population, sought to determine: 
(a) the presence of a set of hypothesized mood factors; 
(b) a replication of these factors, and 
(c) the sensitivity of these factors to various treatments, e.g. 
chemotherapy, short~term psychotherapy, and a placebo treat-
ment. 
The hypothesized mood factors based on clinical observation and a 
review of previous studies were: Anxiety, Tension, Anger, 
Depression, Vigour, and Fatigue. The authors' theoretical frame-
work was based on Nowlis' view of mood as an intervening variable. 
The authors state: 
Mood is regarded as a concept with the status of an inter-
vening variable. It is conceptualized as an organismic 
state definable in terms of the antecedent inducing 
operations and the correlated behavioral consequences. 
Physiological distinctions between moods are not assumed. 
Among the antecedent conditions inducing mood or mood 
change are withholding reinforcement, environmental 
deprivation, emotional stimulation, and intraorganic events 
such as illness. Among the behavioral correlates of mood 
shifts are changes in frequency and intensity of many acts 
and verbal responses. It is these differences among the 
antecedent conditions, together with differences among 
consequent behaviors, that define different mood states. 
Mood states and emotional states are viewed as overlapping 
categories. Mood states are likely to be more persistent 
and to involve less intense physiological arousal (p.621). 
The authors further subscribe to the view that: 
What subjects report when they describe mood changes is 
probably a joint function of knowledge of the inducing 
conditions, cues from the physiological activation level, 
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and feedback from the behavioral consequents ...• 
Verbal responses are behavioral consequents of mood change 
which offer readily available indices of mood variation. 
Adjectives, in particular, are among the most frequent 
verbal responses to mood. Our approach to identifying 
mood states and assessing their intensity is to present 
adjectives to subjects and elicit their reports of the 
extent to which the adjectives describe their typical 
mood (p.621). 
The authors reported positive results for their three areas of 
endeavour. In addition the relationship of their study to other 
factor analytic studies of mood dimensions, e.g. the work of Nowlis 
and Green, Borgatta, and the Clyde t1ood Scale, was established. 
Laxer (1964) investigated the correlations between self-rating, 
mood level, and intropunitive aggression and extrapunitive 
aggression in normals and neurotic depressives. Interaction 
effects between mood level and blame assignment were established 
for the abnormal subjects, e.g. the psychiatric patients with very 
low mood levels were found to show very low self-rating only if 
they blamed themselves for their failures; those who tended to 
blame others when they were unhappy did not show a devalued self 
concept. 
The author concluded that in the case of normals there were corre-
lations between mood level, blame, depression, and self-rating. 
In the case of abnormals there is an interaction effect between 
mood level and blame. Two sets of criteria for neurotic depression 
were established: low self-rating and a combination of low mood 
with high self-blame. 
Hoffman and Peterson (1960) sought to assess the emotional structure 
of personality disorders on the basis of observer ratings and to 
compare observer ratings with self-descriptions of mood. 
The subjects were 80 male and 15 female psychiatric inpatients that 
had received the diagnosis of personality disorder by a psychiatrist 
and a psychologist. The subjects were rated on a 52 item check list 
of mood related adjectives by ward personnel who were in daily contact 
with the subjects. The personnel were instructed to rate each subject 
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as perceived at the time of rating. All subjects received three 
independent ratings from different individuals. In addition self-
ratings were obtained from all but 11 of the subjects. 
Factor analysis of the observer ratings yielded 10 factors: 
Friendliness-Hostility, Guilt, Fatigue, Depression, Confusion, 
Tension-Anxiety, Activity, Efficiency and two other unlabelled 
factors. Mean self-ratings were compared with mean observer 
ratings, eight items showing a significant mean difference. The 
majority of differences between observer and self-ratings occurred 
for items of the factor Friendliness-Hostility. The authors' 
findings supported the idea that patients classified as personality 
disorder are perceived as highly efficient and lacking in guilt, 
confusion, and fatigue. It was found that these subjects have 
moderate amounts of anxiety and depression. Contrary to expectation, 
they are also seen as being friendly and lacking in hostility. 
Behavioural Correlates of Mood 
Dittman (1962) investigated the relationship between mood and body 
movements in the interview situation. Body movements in three 
prescribed areas were studied across five different moods of one 
patient. It was found that frequency of movements reliably 
differentiated the different moods and that the patterns of move-
ment differed across body areas for each mood. Dittman writes: 
During this patient's angry mood, for example, there are 
many head and leg movements, but few hand movements, while 
during the depressed mood, there are few movements of the 
hands and head, but many leg movements (p.480). 
Although Dittman only used one subject, his study is important in 
that he established behavioural correlates of different mood states. 
Mood and Cognitive Processes 
Hoffer (1962) studied the relationship between mood and time 
perception in depressed and schizophrenic patients. The author 
recommended a more general use of simple tests of time perception 
for diagnosis, screening and categorizing the mentally ill. It was 
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suggested that changes in the perception of time could be used as 
indicators of progress during and after treatment, as well as 
predictors of relapse. 
Affective States, Physiological Arousal and Cognition 
Schachter and Singer (1962) sought to determine whether unique and 
reliable differences in physiological arousal could be established 
for different affective states. After a review of the pertinent 
literature the authors came to the conclusion: 'Recent work might 
be taken to indicate that such differences are at best rather subtle 
and that the variety of emotion, mood, and feeling states are by no 
means matched by an equal variety of visceral patterns' (p.380). 
Following up suggestions by Ruckmick (1936), Hunt, Cole and Reis 
(1958), and Schachter himself (1959) that cognitive factors may be 
crucial determinants for the labelling of affective states, 
Schachter reasoned: 
Granted a general pattern of sympathetic excitation as 
characteristic of emotional states, granted that there 
may be some differences in pattern from state to state, 
it is suggested that one labels, interprets, and 
identifies this stirred-up state in terms of the 
characteristics of the precipitating situation and one's 
apperceptive mass. This suggests, then, that an emotional 
state may be considered a function of a state of physio-
logical arousal and of a cognition appropriate to this 
state of arousal. The cognition, in a sense, exerts a 
steering function. Cognitions arising from the immediate 
situation as interpreted by past experience provide the 
framework within which one understands and labels his 
feelings. It is the cognition which determines whether 
the state of physiological arousal will be labelled as 
"anger", "joy", "fear", or whatever (p.380). 
Following from these considerations, Schachter and Singer put forth 
three basic propositions: 
1. Given a state of physiological arousal for which the 
individual has no immediate explanation, he will label 
this state and describe his feelings in terms of the 
cognitions available to him. To the extent that 
cognitive factors are potent determiners of emotional 
states, it could be anticipated that precisely the same 
state of physiological arousal could be labelled "joy" 
or "fury" or "jealousy" or any of a great diversity of 
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emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspects of 
the situation. 
2. Given a state of physiological arousal for which an 
individual has a completely appropriate explanation 
(e.g. "I feel this way because I have just received 
an injection of adrenalin") no evaluative needs will 
arise and the individual is unlikely to label his 
feelings in terms of the alternative cognitions available. 
3. Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual 
will react emotionally or describe his feelings as 
emotions only to the extent that he experiences a state 
of physiological arousal (pp.381-382). 
The authors then attempted to manipulate by means of the subject's 
cognitions, the labelling and interpretation of the subject's own 
feeling state. This was done under the conditions of receiving 
an injection of either epinephrine or a placebo saline solution 
and then either being informed of the physiological effects, being 
uninformed, or being misinformed. Under each of these conditions 
subjects were submitted to social stimulation designed to induce 
euphoria, or to induce anger. Subjects were observed through a 
two-way mirror and were required to give a self report of mood and 
physical condition for their treatment. The authors found: 
1. Following an injection of epinephrine, those subjects who were 
not given an explanation for the physical symptoms produced by 
the drug, labelled their feeling state in terms of the cognitions 
produced in response to the experimenters' manipulation (social 
stimulation designed to induce either euphoria or anger). 
Hence the role of cognitive factors and the act of interpreta-
tion of physiological arousal were suggested as fundamental 
components in the labelling of affective states. 
2. Following an injection of epinephrine, those subjects who were 
given an adequate explanation for the physical symptoms produced 
by the drug, generally did not label their feeling state in terms 
of the experimenters' manipulation. 
Hence adequate reasons established an anticipatory set which was 
completed when the physiological effects of the drug corresponded 
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to the subjects' expectations. In this case the cognitive 
factors produced by environmental manipulation had relatively 
little effect. 
3. The evidence for the proposition that under constant cognitive 
circumstances an individual will react emotionally only to the 
extent that he experiences physiological arousal was consistent 
but considered to be tentative due to experimental artifacts. 
The authors were able to provide substantial evidence that the 
labelling of affective states is a joint function of physiological 
arousal and cognitive factors. Their study is important not only 
because it established the importance of cognitive factors. Its 
importance also lies in the demonstration of the interrelationship 
of cognitive and physiological factors. 
Mood and Human Factors 
Heimstra, Ellingstad and De Koch (1967) investigated mood as a 
determining variable on driver performance under simulated 
conditions. The authors' purpose was to establish relationships 
between operator mood and performance, and to investigate sex 
differences for the effect of mood on performance. Special attention 
was given to the mood factors of Aggression, Anxiety, Concentration, 
and Fatigue, as these were considered to have a direct connection 
with driver performance. Mood was measured by the Nowlis Mood 
Adjective Check List and performance was measured in terms of 
vigilance, reaction time, tracking performance and speed maintenance. 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were computed between 
the performance and mood measures for 350 subjects (175 male and 
175 female). No single performance measure was significantly 
related to the mood factors, either collectively or by a male/female 
division of the data. Correlations among performance measures were 
low for both males and females. The patterning of the mood factors 
was different for females as compared with males, the females 
exhibiting a "positive set" not present for the males. 
Subjects scoring high (the top quartile) on Anxiety, Aggression, and 
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Concentration were compared with subjects scoring low (the bottom 
quartile) on those factors. It was ~ound that subjects in the 
high mood quartiles were inferior in performance to those scoring 
low in the low mood quartiles. Considering only performance 
measures the authors found: 
.... that the performance of the males was generally 
superior to that of the females on the various tasks. 
On the meter vigilance task females missed siBnifi-
cantly more signals than males; women's reaction 
time was significantly lower than men's and they 
showed significantly more tracking error than the men. 
On the speed maintenance tasks, females tended to 
rarely exceed the maximum speed prescribed but would 
frequently drop below the minimum. Males, on the 
other hand, were likely to show speed maintenance 
errors in either direction (p.734). 
The authors concluded: 
It appears that the findings of the present investiBation 
support the hypothesis that the mood of an operator is, 
at least to a limited degree, related to his performance 
on several types of psychomotor tasks. The relationships 
between the mood factors and performance measures, however, 
are far from clear. Correlations among these variables 
were low and on the basis of this analysis one could say 
that S's mood apparently does not relate to any large 
extent to his performance on the tasks required in the 
present study. On the other hand, when Ss were selected 
on the basis of high or low mood factor scores and their 
performances on the various tasks involved in the operation 
of the device were compared, either high or low scores on 
certain mood factors might determine performance (p.734). 
The authors considered the lack of clear cut relationships in terms 
of the validity of the mood measure, the sensitivity of the performance 
measures and the possible distortion introduced by the simulated 
conditions. The exclusion of measures of risk taking and decision 
variables and their possible relationship to driver mood, were 
considered as further limitations. 
Mood, Self-Image and Self-Report 
Mosher (1968) constructed forced-choice and true-false measures 
applicable to females which provided scores for three aspects of 
guilt. The aspects measured were: Sex-Guilt, Hostility-Guilt and 
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Morality-Conscience. A multitrait-multimethod matrix (Campbell and 
Fiske, 1959) and a factor analysis were applied to the responses of 
63 females to the three aspects of guilt. The measures were found 
to be relatively free of social desirability response bias. Evidence 
for convergent and discriminant validity was presented. 
Guilt was conceptualized as a personality disposition, which is 
manifested in situations where temptation to violate moral standards 
is present. Mosher writes: 
Guilt, conceptualized as a disposition, becomes relevant 
in situations where temptation to violate moral standards 
is present. Females who score higher on these guilt 
measures are expected to inhibit the expression of 
aggressive or sexual behaviors when faced with temptations. 
If transgressions occur nevertheless, then females who 
score higher on these measures of the personality dis-
position of guilt are expected to experience the feeling 
of guilt, or to confess, or to punish themselves, or to 
make restitution. The present inventories do not directly 
measure guilt as a feeling or state of the person at the 
moment, rather they are offered as measures of the dis-
position to respond under certain circumstances with a 
class of behaviors which may be described as guilt (p.695). 
Kornreich, Straka and Kane (1968) in a study of self-image disparity 
as measured by the Q sort, supported Levy's (1956) finding that self-
image disparity scores are in part a function of a general tendency 
to perceive differences between the real and the ideal self. Citing 
Laxer's 1964 study, the authors concluded that the self-image dis-
parity score should perhaps be abandoned in favour of measures of 
mood and classification of types of defence mechanism. 
Mood Induction and Alteration 
Velten (1968) sought to induce the moods of elation and depression 
in volunteer university enrolled females by means of having them 
read, both silently and aloud, series of specially designed mood 
related statements. Velten employed five treatment groups. One 
group read and concentrated upon 60 self-referrin8 statements 
designed to induce elation; the second group read 60 statements 
designed to induce depression; the third group read 60 statements 
which were neither self-referring nor mood relevant. There were 
two control groups designed to produce simulated states of elation 
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and depression. 
Pre-treatment mood level was determined by measures of decision time 
and perceptual ambiguity. The effects of the treatments upon mood 
were identified by seven "critical measures" which were: writing 
speed, distance approximation, decision time, perceptual ambiguity, 
word association, the multiple affect adjective check list and 
spontaneous verbalizations. 
The results of the experiment indicated that the elation and 
depression treatments differed significantly from each other on 
five of the seven criterial measures. On all measures, except 
distance approximation, the neutral treatment group yielded means 
that fell between those of the elation and depression treatment 
groups. On two of the seven measures, the elation and elation 
simulation groups differed significantly, the same held for the 
depression and depression simulation groups. For the simulated 
mood groups, means were closer to the means of the opposite mood 
treatment than for the treatments for which they were designed to 
provide controls. 
The author concluded that his approach had consequences for both 
research and therapy. In his words: 
The present method appears to have potential for the 
experimental induction and study of elation, depression, 
and perhaps for other moods such as fear or sexual arousal. 
If appropriate lists of statements could be developed for 
the induction of these and other moods, the controlled 
laboratory investigation of mood might be greatly facili-
tated. The generally positive results of this experiment 
suggest the possible value of lists of mood or other 
statements in psychotherapy. The T and the patient would 
develop appropriate statement lists after exploration of 
the patient's problems. This procedure would be somewhat 
analogous to the development of anxiety hierarchies in 
systematic desensitization. The patient would be instructed 
to practice appropriate lists at or near to the times he 
becomes aware of undesirable moods and behavior (p.481). 
Shatin (1968) sought to effect mood change through the step-wise 
vectoring of musical selections. Musical selections chosen on the 
basis of clinical and aesthetic judgement were put together to 
represent change along the following affective poles: Sad to Gay, 
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Restless to Serene, Bored to Active, and Active to Majestic. The 
author's hypothesis was: 
That the mood response of normal subjects to music can 
be altered or vectored along an affective continuum 
between two contrasting antipodes of emotion (mood). 
Beginning at one polar mood or musical experience we 
can, through properly selected music, move (or vector) 
the affective state "up" (or "down") by step-wise 
stages into its antipolar or contrasted mood reaction 
(p.82). 
Ratings were made by 74 male college students, who rated their mood 
response to each of the four sets of musical stimuli. The author 
reported the following: 
Chi square tests were conducted for each of the four 
continua and in every instance they demonstrated a 
significant association between the stimulus music 
continuum and the cognate mood response of the subjects 
(p = .001) in each and every case). The mood vectoring 
of the music selections did cause the subjective mood 
response of normal college men (N=76) to vary pari 
passu with the mood changes which that music purpose-
fully sought to induce (p.83). 
Mood and the Menstrual Cycle 
Reynolds (1969) studied variations of mood and recall in the 
menstrual cycle. The author monitored mood in 87 women suffering 
from difficult or painful menstruation. Their moods were monitored 
over an 8 week period. It was found that mood was significantly 
lower both immediately before and during menstruation. In addition 
recent events were evaluated more favourably by these women, at 
this time, when ,compared with ratings of recent events made at 
other times. 
In terms of the present study, subjects frequently reported 
alterations in mood prior to the onset of menstruation. Depression 
and/or tension were reported by some subjects but not by all 
subjects. Those subjects who did report depression or tension did 
not necessarily report the continuation of these feelings during 
menstruation. 
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Mood and ESP 
Carpenter (1969) used the Nowlis MACL to measure mood in subjects 
undergoing precognition runs with ESP symbols. Earlier findings 
that there was a significant difference between the predicted large 
variance for a combined group of sessions and the small run score 
variance which was predicted for a group of moderate negative or 
extreme positive sessions, was reconfirmed. 
Psychiatric Studies 
Delgado (1960) investigated the psychopathology of depressive 
states. He found the general characteristic of depressive states 
to be the experience of grief combined with a negative disposition 
to the world, the self, and the body. Certain depressive states 
were believed to be autonomous and immune from mitigation or 
aggravation by circumstances and were distinguished by slowness 
of onset and evolution. No evidence was found for so-called 
"existential depressions". 
Stolorow (1969) investigated the mood of anxiety and postulated 
three levels of the experience that were fundamental. These levels, 
arranged from the more basic to the less basic were: the impinge-
ment of a dreaded intrapsychic impulse, the presence of a dis-
harmonious interpersonal relationship, and basic faults and con-
tingencies inherent in the life situation itself. The role of 
the individual's sense of self and various defensive processes 
were stressed. The author suggested that psychotherapy should aim 
at the clarification and working through of intrapsychic conflicts, 
developing interpersonal security, and strengthening the individual 
in his endeavour to perceive meanings and values in his life 
situation. 
Psychoanalytic Studies 
(1960) suggested that depression is the result of the ego's 
response to a basic threat or a disaster deemed to be imminent. 
A predisposition to depression is established when early ego 
identifications are inadequate or faulty. 
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Jacobson (1961) studied the mood states of adolescents. The mood 
swings of early adolescence were seen to be a function of ties to 
oedipal love objects and the incomplete development of several ego 
processes. 
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The decade 1960-1970 
2.52 Discussion of major conceptualizations, techniques and criteria 
Major Conceptualizations 
During this period the equation of mood with either 'general 
feeling tone' (e.g. Wessman, Ricks and Tyl, 1960) or 'current 
degree of happiness or unhappiness' (e.g. Laxer, 1964) was still 
prominent. Other studies equated mood with emotion, e.g. Shatin 
(1970), but an increased conceptual sophistication was beginning 
to emerge, e.g. Borgatta (1961); McNair and Lorr (1964). 
As Borgatta pointed out, there are two broad approaches to the 
refinement of the concept of mood within an empirical framework, 
i.e. attention can.be directed to the situations and sequences of 
situations that produce mood states and attention can be directed 
to the moods themselves, to the experience of mood. The situation 
or sequence of situations approach must face the difficulty that 
there may be no necessary one-to-one correspondence between 
situation and mood, particularly if mood is a cumulative effect, 
the result of a sequence of situations. Some authors would 
maintain that contemporary situational factors are relatively 
unimportant in the production of mood. Psychoanalysts, for 
example, tend to stress the operation of various intraphysic factors 
as the major determinants. If mood is conceptualized as the 
resultant of general organismic functioning, then the search 
for a direct connexion between mood and situation would seem to 
be futile. 
In terms of the present study with mood subjects, it was found 
that situational factors do play a major role in the production 
labelling and interpretation of many moods. However, the notion 
of a direct connection between mood and environmental factors 
has not been particularly helpful in understanding mood phenomena. 
Nowlis' approach which classifies situational and environmental 
factors in terms of predisposing variables, variables that pre-
cipitate mood, and variables that help to maintain mood, is 
useful. 
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The second approach, directing attention to the experience of mood 
to its phenomenal aspects, requires a description of the salient 
aspects of mood from the first person viewpoint. This is an 
essential part of the study of mood. However, for this approach 
to be legitimate, it must be correlated with other approaches, e.g. 
the situational and behavioural approaches. As mood is a human 
phenomena, something the individual undergoes and is frequently 
aware of, I would like to suggest that any conceptual formulation 
of mood must be linked in a demonstrable way to just this type of 
data. There are, however, difficulties associated with this, one 
of which is the problem of language. It must be shown that the 
subject uses language in a reliable way in his reports and that 
there are connections between the way he uses language and the 
way others use similar and related concepts. 
Borgatta is aware that a hard and fast distinction based on the two 
approaches cannot be maintained. He writes: 
The question is compounded since moods must be viewed 
as consequences of the interaction of the personality 
of the individual and the situation; any analysis 
that is undertaken is necessarily complex and at least 
partially circular (p.lOS). 
Borgatta suggested that an important strategy might be to concen-
trate on the development of mood measures of a particular type, 
rather than developing and trying to co-ordinate several methods, 
or attempting to isolate and resolve the theoretical issues. One 
difficulty here is the assumption that there is something empirical 
which corresponds to the concept of mood. The measurement approach 
has the liability of tending to assume that mood is something 
empirical and whatever it is that the measurement technique 
quantifies is by definition the assumed existent "mood". It is 
for this reason that the measurement approach must be coupled with 
criteria that can reliably identify whatever a particular theory 
or approach takes to be "mood". 
McNair and Lorr (1964) do more than merely acknowledge the 
possibility that mood is a theoretical construct, they postulate 
it. The authors suggest that mood has the status of an intervening 
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variable and should be defined in terms of 'antecedent inducing 
operations and correlated behavioral consequents'. Verbal 
responses are s~en as an aspect of the mood itself, rather than 
a consequent of the mood state. 
Techniques 
During this decade factor analysis became a major statistical 
technique for the study of mood. Its employment can be roughly 
divided into two related approaches: 
1. The factor analysis of subjects' avowals of mood, i.e. the 
determination and replication of significant dimensions of 
mood adjective check lists. This is represented by the work 
of McNair and Lorr (1964) and the work of Borgatta (1961). 
2. The determination of significant dimensions of observer des-
criptions of mood. This is represented by the work of 
Hofmann and Peterson (1960). 
The McNair and Lorr study was particularly useful as it established 
factors common and unique to the reports of Nowlis and Green (1957), 
Borgatta (1961), and Clyde (1960). 
It should be stressed that the value of a particular factor analysis 
depends ultimately on the measures that are being analyzed. 
Hundleby et ~1 (1965) have discussed a number of the technical 
problems involved, and Brody (1972) has set forth general criticisms 
of the factor analytic approach. 
Wessman, Ricks and Tyl (1960) further refined the rating scale 
approach to the study of mood. They developed a scale for the 
mood dimension Elation-Depression which was composed of ten phrases 
ranging from extreme depression, through neutral feelings, to 
extreme elatio~. The scale was: 
1. Complete elation, rapturous joy, and soaring ecstasy. 
2. Very elated and in very high spirits; tremendous delight 
and buoyancy. 
3. Elated and in high spirits. 
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4. Feeling very good and cheerful. 
5. Feeling pretty good, "OK". 
6. Feeling a little bit low, just so-so. 
7. Spirits low and somewhat "blue". 
8. Depressed and feeling low. Definitely "blue". 
9. Tremendously depressed. Feeling terrible, really miserable, 
"just awful". 
10. Utter depression and gloom. Completely down. All is black 
and leaden. Wish it were all over. 
Their scale was significant in that it attempted to have: 
(1) approximately equal subjective gradations between phrases, 
and (2) the ends of the scale so extreme that very few subjects 
would experience them, but the full range of possible feeling 
would be covered. 
A number of other significant techniques and approaches were 
adopted for the study of mood during this decade. A selective 
list would include: 
1. The correlation of mood scores obtained from a mood adjective 
check list with personality variables (Borgatta, 1961). 
2. The correlation of mood scores with change in mood scores 
(Borgatta, 1961). 
3. The correlation of observer ratings of mood with self-
descriptions of mood (Hoffman and Peterson, 1960). 
4. The measurement of mood, e.g. guilt, by self-report 
inventories (Mosher, 1968). 
5. The induction of mood by musical stimuli (Shatin, 1968). 
6. The induction of mood by specially designed word lists 
(Velten, 1968). 
7. The correlation of mood scores with task performance 
(Heimstra, Ellingstad and De Koch, 1967). 
Criteria 
During this period the majority of studies assumed that the 
individual is always in one mood or another and hence little 
attention was paid to establishing general criteria of mood. 
McNair and Lorr (1964) with their concept of mood as an inter-
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vening variable rooted in antecedent conditions and subsequent 
behaviours, were in a position to set forth criteria for specific 
moods, but this was not attempted. The authors did tentatively 
distinguish between mood and emotion on the basis that moods tend 
to be more persistent and involve less intense physiological 
arousal than emotions. 
Physiological criteria for specific moods were ruled out. The 
authors assumed that verbal responses, if not criteria, were at 
least indices of mood variation. 
Laxer (1964) utilized individual self-ratings as mood criteria. 
He adopted the view that mood is the feeling response to general 
organismic functioning. For Laxer objective criteria are 
possible in terms of events that enhance or interfere with 
organismic functioning. However, no criteria were set out. 
It would be in line with Laxer's point of view to suggest an 
ideal programme where objective criteria, events that enhance or 
interfere with organismic functioning, and subjective criteria 
including individual self-rating, are taken together. 
Hoffman and Peterson (1960) compared observer ratings of in-
patient mood on a series of mood scales (more objective criteria) 
with the in-patient's own self-rating on the same scales (more 
subjective criteria). The authors found a number of significant 
differences between self-ratings and observer ratings of the 
same individual. This indicates the insufficiency of any single 
approach when several approaches are equally relevant and the 
difficulty of co-ordinating several independent criteria. 
Mosher (1968) gave behavioural referents that could be inter-
preted as a series of partial criteria for an hypothesized mood 
of guilt. They included: resistance to temptation and the 
inhibition and suppression of hostile and sexual behaviours; or 
following the commission of a prohibited act, self-punishment, 
reports of painful feelings of self-remorse, self-criticism, 
self-blame, confession, expiatory and restitutional behaviour. 
Using Whiteley's model of criteria, it is not clear which would be 
criteria in the sense of necessary and sufficient conditions and 
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which would be criteria in the sense of evidence or clues that 
the term 'guilt 1 was being correctly applied. 
Velten (1968) employed decision time and perceptual ambiguity as 
pre-treatment measures of mood level. Seven criteria! measures 
were taken as measures of mood in order to assess the effects of 
the experimental treatments. These seven criteria! measures 
included the two pre-treatment measures. As only two measures 
were comparable pre- and post-testing, the measure of change in 
mood level was less adequate than it could have been. 
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2.6 Current Research (1971-1977) 
2.61 The experimental work 
Mood in normal and pathological subjects 
Constantini, Davis, Braun and Iervolino (1973) investigated the 
personality and mood correlates of major life style changes, e.g. 
personal, family, social, occupational, and residential changes, 
in male and female university students. The measures employed 
were: The Schedule of Recent Experience, The Psychological 
Screening Inventory, and The Profile of Mood States. Results 
obtained from The Profile of Mood States indicated: 
.... an association between reports of having experienced 
high levels of life change and reports of having recently 
experienced high levels of tension, depression, anger, 
fatigue, confusion and total mood disturbance. The 
format of The Profile of Mood States asks S to indicate 
how he has been feeling ''within the past week, including 
today". Thus, the correlations are specifically between 
magnitudes of life changes reported to have taken place 
in different periods of the past, and the moods reported 
to have been experienced within the week prior to the 
data collection (p.ll46). 
Lauterbach (1975) sought to establish whether or not a relation-
ship exists between the quality of mood and the amount of con-
flict (measured as cognitive imbalance) present in the area of 
personal problems. In question form this becomes: Are there 
one or more mood factors, e.g. Depression, Confusion, Anxiety, 
which correlate with conflict present in personal problems? 
A single case research approach was adopted, focusing for each 
subject on a neutral set of attitudes and beliefs and a conflict 
set of attitudes and beliefs. It was acknowledged that the 
assessment process could itself decrease conflict and this was 
the rationale for including a neutral set of attitudes and beliefs. 
The measurement device for mood was the McNair and Lorr mood 
scale. The five subjects were in-patients in a mental hospital. 
They demonstrated three common characteristics: high intelligence, 
feelings of depression, and the ability to speak about their 
problems. Two of the five subjects were discharged after only 
three or four testings and the results were determined from the 
remaining three subjects. 
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It was found that degree of conflict correlated positively with 
mood. Several mood factors correlated positively with conflict, 
but the correlated factors tended to be different for different 
subjects. The overall portion of conflict was most consistently 
correlated with the mood factors of fatigue, tension and 
depression. The author suggested: 
Conflicts caused by what a person identifies with and 
sees as part of himself may be more disturbing (i.e. 
depressing, confusing, etc.) than conflicts caused by 
his likings and dislikings (p.58). 
Mood Measurement and Methodology 
Meddis (1972) argued on the basis of statistical evidence that 
the commonly reported existence of several monopolar mood factors 
was the result of peculiarities in the structure of the mood 
scales themselves. The author constructed an "improved" scale 
and the application of this scale resulted in a small number of 
bipolar mood factors. 
While not criticizing the use of rating scales based on factor 
analytic studies, the author did criticize the Nowlis MACL on two 
counts: 
1. The Nowlis scoring categories are (a) definitely feel x; 
(b) feel slightly x; (c) cannot decide whether or not I 
feel x; and (d) definitely do not feel x. These responses 
are assigned numerical values of 3, 2, 1 and 0 respectively. 
Meddis asks if it can be said with confidence that "cannot 
decide whether or not I feel x" is midway between "feel 
slightly x" and "definitely do not feel x"? Meddis 
believes that "cannot decide whether or not I feel x" should 
be counted as missing data rather than as a mid-point reply,' 
hence the status of the scale as an ordinal scale is 
questioned. 
2. The author points out that the scale is not symmetrical, 
i.e. there are two opportunities for acceptance (a and b) 
and only one opportunity for rejection (d). For this reason 
increases on a mood factor score, e.g. moving from (b) to (a) 
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on the mood factor Happy cannot be paralleled by a decrease 
1n the mood factor Sad, because there is no second measure 
for decrease. This suggests that negative correlations 
between such factors as Happy and Sad will be absent. 
Meddis devised a mood rating scale that provided an equal number 
of acceptance and rejection possibilities and it revealed bipolar 
factors. He concluded that the asymmetrical scales suppressed 
negative correlations, and hence masked the presence of bipolar 
factors. 
Meddis writes: 
The results strongly suggest that the rating scales 
may have influenced the results obtained by the 
pioneers of MACL research. They do not, of course, 
undermine the general approach. By bringing the 
early results more in line with commonsense, they 
increase our confidence that the tests are measuring 
what we think they are measuring. It is easier to 
accept a small number of largely bipolar mood factors 
and easier to make clinical sense of a patient's 
factor scores along such mood dimensions. 
Larger sample sizes will be needed to identify the 
factors with more precision. It is possible that 
some factors such as aggressiveness could be either 
monopolar (aggressive v. not aggressive) or bipolar 
(aggressive v. friendly). Decisions on such issues 
are required before MACLs can take their place as 
powerful research and clinical rating procedures (p.l84). 
A discussion of Meddis' criticisms 1s g1ven 1n Chapter 3, 
section 3.24. 
Ryman, Biersner, and La Rocco (1974) presented the factor analytic 
derivation, reliability, and validity of a 40 item mood check list 
called The Mood Questionnaire. 
The Mood Questionnaire was administered to 1,140 U.S. Navy 
recruits at the start, at the middle of the first week, at the 
middle of the fifth week, and at the middle of the seventh week, 
of a 7 week basic training course. The dropout rate from 
beginning to end was 26%. An important aspect of the study was 
the determination of predictive and construct validities. At the 
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present time, the majority of mood measures have indices of con-
current validity only. 
Factor analysis of the data indicated the presence of six signi-
ficant factors: a Happiness factor, an Activity factor, a 
Depression factor, an Anger factor, a Fear factor, and a Fatigue 
factor. Test-retest correlations for the different scales were 
low. The authors suggested that these low correlations might be 
due to the transitory nature of the phenomena under study. 
Construct validity was provided by a comparison of mood variation 
for those recruits who underwent group counselling sessions 
designed to ease tensions and solve problems, against those 
recruits who did not have such counselling. Anger was signifi-
cantly decreased and happiness was significantly increased for 
the recruits who received counselling. The authors also reported 
additional construct validity for the Activity Scale of their 
measure which correlated with thyroid blood measures. 
Concurrent validity was provided for several scales of The Mood 
Questionnaire when compared with the State-Trait Anxiety Index 
scales administered to sailors experiencing repeated noise of 
high level. State-anxiety was significantly related to The Mood 
Questionnaire Fear Scale during five of six periods of high level 
noise. This significant correlation was confirmed on a sample 
of one-hundred women who completed both the State-Trait Anxiety 
Scale and The Mood Questionnaire. 
Predictive validity was obtained for the Happiness and Activity 
Scales, they correlated significantly with success in passing a 
6 week strenuous physical training course. The scales were more 
highly related to success in training than several other measures, 
includin~ attitudes, perceived health, a life-crisis questionnaire, 
and demographic information. It was also shown that the pre-
flight administered Fear Scale was negatively correlated with 
pilots' landing performance after combat missions. The authors 
concluded: 
These results demonstrate that these scales have 
moderate to high validities in a number of situations 
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and moderately high Spearman-Brown inter-item 
reliabilities. The questionnaire is simple to 
administer, easily scored, and has been well 
received because of its brevity. Moderate inter-
correlations between the scales indicate that the 
constructs represented by these scales are probably 
not independent ••.• The item content of The Mood 
Questionnaire is similar to that of other forms, 
and it also has comparable reliabilities. The Mood 
Questionnaire has substantial predictive and con-
struct validities and is not limited solely to the 
concurrent validities found for so many other mood 
questionnaires (pp.483-484). 
Mood and Behavioural Psychology 
Wright and McDonald (1974) reviewed the several behavioural 
approaches to the treatment of depression. They set out the 
major theoretical and pragmatic issues in the behavioural 
approach which generally conceptualizes depression in terms of 
an extinction paradigm. These issues are: 
1. The nature and patterning of reinforcers in depression. 
2. Reasons for the reduction in potency of reinforcers. 
3. Factors contributing to the maintenance of depression. 
4. The role of social skills in depression. 
The authors classified the different behavioural therapeutic 
techniques used in the treatment of reactive depressions under 
these headings: 
1. The exaggeration and prolongation of normal reaction to loss. 
Here the different therapeutic techniques most often employed 
are systematic positive reinforcement for simple tasks, de-
conditioning or counter-conditioning, behavioural deprivation, 
imagery techniques, and time projection. 
2. Reactive depression associated with severe anxiety. The 
major techniques in this type of situation most often 
employed are systematic desensitization and assertive training. 
3. Failure to control interpersonal situations. 
Behavioural studies have shown that one of the primary causes 
of depression is the individual's failure to control or be 
effective in interpersonal situations. Several techniques 
have been used effectively in this type of situation. They 
are positive reinforcement, punishment, and counter-conditioning 
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techniques. 
The authors suggest that behavioural rating scales can be corre-
lated with self-reports and therapists' clinical impressions. 
These behavioural rating scales can be used as a longitudinal 
record to assess behavioural changes during depression and can 
serve as measures for the achievement of target behaviours. They 
suggested that several variables were worthy of consideration, 
e.g. therapist characteristics and the length, number, and fre-
quency of therapeutic sessions. In the authors' assessment: 
More replication and cross-study comparisons are needed, 
but this cannot take place at an adequate level of 
sophistication until depressive behaviors are objectively 
defined and identified and the variables mentioned above 
are explicated. The use of statistical tests of signi-
ficance have yet to emerge in the behavioral studies of 
depression, although such procedures are possible given 
pre- and post-assessment data from individuals or groups. 
When the number of Ss is too small to permit statistical 
analysis, results must be regarded as highly tentative 
and in need of more rigorous demonstration (p.l340). 
Strongman, Wookex and Remington (1971) sought to understand 
elation as an aspect of emotional behaviour following the laws of 
classical conditioning, but leading to immediate respondent 
changes in behaviour. In their view elation is emotional 
behaviour intimately connected with instrumental behaviours. 
Thus patterns of both instrumental and Pavlovian responding are 
involved in the phenomenon of elation. 
elation in this way: 
The authors defined 
The concept of elation is defined as a non-instrumental 
change in the vigour of responding brought about by an 
upward shift in conditions of reward. It is seen that 
this reward change could be contingent or non-contingent 
on behaviour; it could be signalled or unsignalled; 
and the changed reward could be the same or different in 
quantity and/or quality from that which went before (p.481). 
The authors reviewed the behaviourally oriented research on elation 
under these categories: 
1. Reward that is response contingent, signalled, and the same 
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in quantity and/or quality. 
2. Reward that is response contingent, signalled, and different. 
3. Reward that is response contingent, unsignalled, and the 
same. 
4. Reward that is response contingent, unsignalled and 
different. 
5. Reward that is non-contingent, signalled, and the same. 
6. Reward that is non-contingent, signalled, and different. 
7. Reward that is non-:contingen t, unsignalled, and the same. 
8. Reward that is non-contingent, unsignalled, and different. 
The authors concluded: 
As regards the effects of the various experimental 
procedures that we have gathered together under the 
heading of elation, all the sources of evidence add 
up to equivocation. An upward shift in reward does 
have immediate emotional effects on ongoing instru-
mental behaviour and some paradigms have been developed 
for studying its conditioned effects. However, there 
does not seem to be any consistency in these behaviour 
changes; sometimes there is an enhancement or facili-
tation of responding, sometimes there is an impairment 
or suppression. So, although the procedures under 
discussion have a common root in reward increase, 
their effects are dissimilar ••. The term elation could 
be restricted to procedures and not effects. It would 
be clearly inappropriate to tie it to effects and not 
procedures .•. it may be preferable not to use the term 
to cover a large number of procedures, but rather to 
concentrate on clarifying the effects of the individual 
procedures themselves (p.490). 
Lewinsohn and Graf (1973), in a behaviourally oriented research 
programme that investigated several aspects of depression, 
attempted to establish an association between mood and engaging 
in pleasant activities as a function of age, sex, and diagnostic 
group. Lewinsohn had determined: 
Specifically, a fairly substantial, and statistically 
significant, association between mood level and the 
number of pleasant activities engaged in was demon-
strated: and a significantly larger number of activities 
were found to be associated with mood for depressed and 
for non-depressed psychiatric patients than for normal 
control subjects. In addition 24 specific activities 
and events were identified which were associated with 
mood for more than 10% of the sample (p.261). 
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The authors sought to replicate these findings with a more 
heterogeneous sample. They were concerned to answer the 
following questions: 
Does the relationship between mood and the level of pleasant 
activity vary as a function of age? 
What specific activities are associated with mood? 
What is the nature of these activities? 
The authors hypothesized that it was those activities which brought 
social reinforcement that were most closely associated with mood. 
With respect to this issue, in terms of the evidence provided by 
their study, the authors concluded: 
Activities which were found to be associated with mood 
for a substantial proportion of the subjects fell into 
three categories: activities involving positive social 
interactions, incompatible affects and ego-supportive 
activities (p.267). 
Mood and Social Psychology 
Reimanis (1974) explored the relationships between mood, conflict 
resolution (in terms of Erikson's stages of psychosocial develop-
ment), and social disorganization or anomie. It was the author's 
hypothesis that anomie and negative mood states are positively 
correlated with the unsuccessful resolution of psychosocial con-
flicts. The corollary of this hypothesis maintains that opposite 
relationships obtain for the successful resolution of psychosocial 
conflicts. 
The author randomly selected 100 domiciled members of the U.S. 
Veterans Administration. These subjects were male veterans who 
because of old age or chronic disability were unable to maintain 
themselves in the outside community. In the second stage of the 
study, 86 female and 55 male college students culled from intro-
ductory psychology classes were used. Scales for measuring anomie 
and success in resolving stage specific psychosocial problems were 
constructed. Mood was measured by an adapted form of the Nowlis 
Mood Adjective Check List. Correlations were computed between 
the anomie scale and factors representing psychosocial development, 
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and between psychosocial development and the specific mood factors 
of elation and depression. The author concluded: 
The present study, which was based on three tests 
involving verbal reports of attitude, behavior, 
feelings and mood, thus supported the hypothesis 
that success in resolving psychosocial develop-
mental crises is related to anomie or social dis-
organization. The study offered further support· 
to the findings by Constantinople (1969) that 
elation or happiness in college students is related 
to psychosocial development. A very consistent and 
predictable mood-psychosocial-development relation-
ship was also present for the relatively aged VA 
domiciliary males (pp.356-357). 
Mood and Cognitive Psychology 
Gorman and Wessman (1974) investigated the interrelationships 
between individual cognitive styles and mood states. They found 
that field dependence and/or impulsivity, field independence, 
temporal orientation, sensation-seeking, conceptual differentiation 
and category width, language facility, locus of control, defensive-
ness, and rigidity were interrelated with mood level, mood vari-
ability, and mood differentiation. These mood measures were 
obtained from The Wessman and Ricks Personal Feeling Scales. 
The authors employed a number of statistical techniques to: 
(1) factor analyse the cognitive style measures and (2) to analyse 
the relationships between the cognitive styles and mood characteris-
tics. The authors concluded: 
This study found a large number of relationships between 
cognitive style measures and mood characteristics. The 
two strongest sets of findings were: (1) the association 
of sensation-seeking with higher "peak" and "average" 
mood levels; and (2) the inverse relationship of field 
independence with day-to-day variability in "average'' 
moods ••. In the authors' opinion, cognition and affect 
are intimately intertwined and merged in most behavior, 
Many recent theorists have emphasized their conjoint 
operation and interdependence. The enormous complexity 
and variability of human subjective experience develops 
in an organism gifted and burdened with open and highly 
differentiated conceptual and emotional capacities. 
Investigation of the nature and characteristics of mood 
is one way to study these features (pp.24-25). 
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Mood and the Menstrual Cycle 
May (1976) employing a sample of 30 women of good health, with a 
mean age of 22 years, examined the relation between mood changes 
and the menstrual cycle. It was found overall that mood change 
was not significantly related to either the physical symptoms of 
menstruation, nor to the degree of physiological stress experienced. 
When the menstrual cycle was divided into three phases--premenstrual, 
menstrual, and midcycle, 50% of all subjects reported their most 
depressed moods during the premenstrual phase, 40% reported their 
most depressed moods during the menstrual phase, and 10% had their 
lowest moods during the midcycle phase. 
Baron (1976) as a subsidiary part of a study concerning the effects 
produced by the menstrual cycle on manifest content and affect in 
dream reports, hypothesized that daily mood ratings would be less 
pleasant in the premenstrual phase than in the pre-ovulatory phase. 
This hypothesis was confirmed at a level of statistical significance. 
She was also able to show a carry over effect from dream affect to 
waking affective state; co-ordinately dreams with unpleasant 
affect were most likely to follow days on which moods were rated 
as predominantly unpleasant. 
Schilling (1977) used a sample of 25 female college students and 
23 male students, to investigate the relationship.s between mood, 
mood determinants and the perception of affective stimuli. No 
differences were found in women's mood levels across the different 
phases of the menstrual cycle. Schilling discussed the inconsis-
tency of her finding with other studies on the menstruum; she 
suggested that subjects' expectancies with regard to their menstrual 
cycle were often determined by the researcher's expressed interest 
in menstrually related mood changes and/or symptoms of menstrual 
discomfort. 
Mood and Sleep Research 
Roth, Kramer, and Lutz (1976a; 1976b) conducted a series of 
experiments to determine the effects of sleep deprivation on mood, 
and the differences in pre-sleep and waking mood. In the first 
study 11 male subjects with an age range of 20-22 years completed 
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the Clyde Mood Scale each morning after three different sleep 
conditions: normal sleep, deprivation, and recovery. The 
statistical analysis of variance showed no main effect due to 
sleep condition; however, the analysis indicated that the mood 
subscales were measuring different aspects of mood. When the 
interaction of the mood subscales was taken into account, there 
was a significant effect for the sleep deprivation condition. 
Sleep deprivation significantly influenced the mood components 
"friendly", "aggressive", and "sleepy". The subjects consistently 
showed higher aggression scores following sleep deprivation than 
following baseline or recovery sleep. The authors concluded 
that even a single night of sleep deprivation has major effects 
on morning mood. 
In the second series of studies, analyses were performed on a 
sample of four 20 year old, two 50 year old and two 70 year old 
males who slept for 15-20 nights in a monitored sleep laboratory. 
Mood was measured by the Clyde Mood Scale before retiring and on 
arising each morning. Statistical attention focused on comparing 
the differences between night moods and morning moods; consistent 
changes in terms of average intensity level and variability of 
mood were found between night and morning; however, this effect 
was not shown equally by all the mood dimensions. The study was 
replicated on a second sample of eleven 20-25 year old male 
subjects, the primary results being similar. The authors speculated 
that the differences in mood were more likely due to night time 
sleep activity as the consistent change in mood was always between 
night and morning. 
Miscellaneous Studies 
Weingartner, Miller and Murphy (1977) considered the effect of mood 
state on the retrieval of self-generated free associations, 1n a 
sample of eight psychiatric patients with affective disorders. 
The authors established that the recall of associations was most 
complete and efficient in stable moods, or periods of mania, as 
opposed to other moods. The possibility of mood specific acts of 
encoding, storage, and retrieval was considered by the authors. 
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Harris (1977) conducted three studies to determine whether altruism 
(acts of helping others) was commonly perceived as leading to a 
"good" mood, and if in fact it does so. In the first study 
subjects were asked which of a ser1es of altruistic behaviours 
would affect their mood. Five out of six commonly considered 
altruistic behaviours were judged as effective for raising 
individual mood, the sixth--giving money to a panhandler was 
judged as being instrumental in lowering mood. Two field experi-
ments established that giving directions to a stranger had no 
effect on mood, and helping an individual search for an important 
"lost" paper, significantly elevated mood. The author concluded 
that some, but not all altruistic behaviours were capable of 
producing positive moods. 
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Current Research 1971-1977 
2.62 Discussion of major conceptualizations, techniques, criteria, 
and general considerations. 
Major Conceptualizations 
Examination of the literature of this period leads to the identi-
fication of both conservative and progressive trends in the 
conceptualization of mood. Constantini et al (1973) and Gorman 
and Wessman (1974) assumed that the individual is always in some 
mood or another. Other authors, e.g. Lewinsohn and Graf (1973) 
suggested that particular moods were dependent on certain types 
of activity involving social reinforcement. A number of issues 
relevant to the conceptualization of mood emerged in the different 
studies and these will now be considered. 
Constantini et al (1973) used the McNair, Lorr, and Droppleman 
Profile of Mood States which provides scores on the monopolar 
dimensions of Tension-Anxiety, Depression-Dejection, Anger-
Hostility, Vigour-Activity, Fatigue-Inertia, Confusion-Bewilder-
ment, and a score for total mood disturbance. It is not clear 
whether Constantini assumed that his mood measure was identifying 
dimensions of the overall mood state at the time of testing, or 
whether he was identifying particular moods at the time of testing. 
There are differences between these two assumptions and the 
differences affect the validity of the measure, e.g. fatieue or 
inertia could be a component or accompaniment of many different 
mood states or it could be a monolithic state of fatigue. 
Meddis (1972) performed the useful service of demonstrating what 
can be the result of concentrating on mood measures without 
providing a critical conceptual explication of the background 
concepts. In particular, the concept of mood and its co-
ordination with experience were affected by assumptions embedded 
in the structure of the measuring instrument itself. 
Lauterbach (1975) implicitly adopted a higher-order disposition 
view of mood. He writes: 
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Correlations were not limited to 'tension'; it 
seems possible that the aspect of mood that corre-
lates highest with conflict (or the mood factors 
that do not correlate at all) are characteristic 
of the subject's personality (p.52). 
On the other hand, mood can only be a phenomenal state if one is 
to speak of the quality of mood. Lauterbach writes: 'This paper 
does not attempt to investigate the causal relationships between 
the quality of mood on the one hand and the nature of one's 
problems on the other, •••. ' (p.49). Lauterbach either fails to 
co-ordinate mood as a higher-order disposition and mood as a 
phenomenal state, or is inconsistent in his usage of the term 
"mood". 
Lauterbach seems to assume that "mood11 and "attitude'' are 
independent. He sought to determine mood factors that correlate 
with conflict, where conflict was concep~ualized in terms of a 
cognitive imbalance of beliefs and attitudes. The lack of in-
dependence of the concept of mood from the concept of attitude 
is discussed below (section 5. 9 ) . 
Ryman et al (1974) used a questionnaire that purported to measure 
mood and emotion. It is not clear whether the authors had the 
intention of conceptually and empirically distinguishing the two, 
or whether they were positing that their questionnaire measured 
both mood and emotion. 
Wright and HcDonald (1974) illustrated the diversity of view-
points over conceptualizing specific moods generally and specific 
moods within a particular paradigm. They write: 
The phenomenon of "depression" has been described in 
categories from subjective feelings to overt behaviors 
and yet has been grossly neglected in definition and 
experimentation. Part of the confusion stems from the 
ambiguity of the term "depression" which has be~n used 
to refer to a vast array of conditions, symptoms, 
diseases, and underlying "elements" (p.l335). 
The authors offered an extinction hypothesis as paradigmatic for 
the behavioural view of depression and noted the different 
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emphases of several researchers. They indicated that conceptual 
clarification would be aided by a multifaceted behavioural approach. 
Such an approach would provide verification for self-reports and 
clinical impressions plus a longitudinal record to assess 
behavioural changes during depression. 
Techniques 
In the period 1971-1977 the selection of studies has revealed a 
continuing interest in the employment of factor analysis and 
rating scales often applied over extended periods of time, for 
the study of mood. The work of Ryman et al (1974) represented 
a commendable emphasis on the establishment of multiple validity 
indices for mood questionnaires. Meddis' statistical scrutiny 
of one type of mood adjective check list (the Nowlis MACL) was a 
positive step in the direction of correcting and refining 
specific measurement techniques. 
A variety of correlational studies have suggested significant 
connections between mood and a series of complex variables. The 
work of Reimanis (1974) and Lewinsohn and Graf (1973) is of 
particular interest as it establishes the importance of a psycho-
social approach to the study of mood. This psychosocial emphasis 
has been largely neglected since the early studies of Johnston 
(1937; 1938). 
A selective list of the approaches and techniques of this period 
would have to include: 
1. The factor analytic development of a symmetrical bipolar mood 
scale (Meddis, 1972). 
2. The development of a reliable mood questionnaire with reported 
predictive, construct, and concurrent validity (Ryman et al, 
1974). 
3. The correlation of mood factors with personality variables 
and the magnitude of experienced life changes (Constantini 
et al, 1973). 
4. The correlation of mood factors and cognitive variables 
(Gorman and Wessman, 1974). 
5. The correlation of mood with stages of psychosocial development 
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and social disorganization (Reimanis, 1974). 
6. The correlation of mood with conflict in beliefs and 
attitudes concerning the self (Lauterbach, 1975). 
7. The correlation of mood with pleasant activities (Lewinsohn 
and Graf, 1973). 
Criteria 
None of the studies reviewed adequately distinguished between the 
affective sub-categories of mood, feeling, and emotion. Little 
explicit distinction was made between mood as a disposition and 
mood as a phenomenal state. Generally, it was assumed that mood 
is the affective accompaniment of the indiviqual's activities, 
cognitive and/or behavioural. It is easy to see that this is a 
tempting experimental assumption, it guarantees that there will 
always be an affect present to measure, and the affect will always 
be what is sought, mood. 
Meddis (1972) drew attention to the fact that assumptions built 
into the structure of our measuring instrument influence our 
conceptualization of the phenomenon that is measured, and by 
implication the criteria also. It should be added that our 
assumptions and requirements concerning the employment of a 
measuring device also have influence on the conceptualization of 
the phenomenon under study. 
It may be that the identification of affective factors by adjective 
check lists, which investigators have termed mood factors (but this 
is precisely the contentious issue) can be interpreted as dimensions 
of affect which can be correlated with individual reports of mood 
meeting general and specific criteria. The presence or absence of 
various combinations of affective dimensions could then function 
as evidence for specific moods. At the present state of research, 
however, this has not been achieved due to the lack of an adequate 
concept of mood. 
In other words, I am suggesting that first there must be an adequate 
conceptualization of mood; secondly there must be a consensus on 
what the criteria for specific moods will be, i.e. what behavioural 
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Interesting questions are raised by considering what force the 
word "in" carries with respect to the expression "One is always 
~n a mood of some sort". It is not a preposition of location 
but rather one of condition. This would seem to imply that one 
is "in" a mood ~n the same logical way that one can be "in" 
difficulty, "in" the Navy, or "in" motion. I will endeavour to 
show that this is incorrect. For mood discourse ''in" functions 
as a preposition of special condition and as a preposition of 
retrospective comment. 
Subjects tend to say 'I feel depressed', 'I am depressed', or 'I 
was depressed', less often 'I am in a depression', but more often 
'I was in a depression'. I would suggest that one reason subjects 
relatively infrequently say 'I am in a depression' is because it 
has a connotation of separation between the speaker and the experience 
of depression. Such a separation is foreign to the way in which 
many subjects claim they experience mood. Their claim is closer 
to one that means for the time the mood ~s operating they are 
their experience. This may require the understanding that for 
the phrase "to be ~n a mood", "in" is a special kind of conditional 
preposition. One is not "in" a mood in quite the same way that 
one is "in" difficulty, for under normal circumstances one is not 
the difficulty one is having, i.e. one has difficulties; however, 
one not only "has" or experiences moods--but perhaps momentarily 
is the experience. The reason one tends to say 'I was ~n a 
depression', with approximately the same frequency as 'I felt 
depressed' or 'I was depressed' is because the time separation 
of the past tense reinforces the grammatical separation that the 
preposition "in" usually implies, i.e. the expression becomes a 
suitable form for retrospective comment. 
The overall conclusion that I am working towards is that the 
expression "One is always in a mood of some sort" as a theory-free 
express~on ~s a very general summary statement, like saying "One 
is always aware of something of some sort", or "One is always in 
a bodily state of some sort", which is to say that the expression 
ranges rather freely over a nearly limitless set of data. Also, 
as a theory-free expression it tends to equate mood with any type 
of affective experience. As a theory-bound expression it carries 
the assumptions and biases of its theoretical underpinnings. 
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2.7 A Modern Application of Phenomenological Principles to Mood Study 
(Mood as a Feeling Structure and a Meaning Vector) 
In this section I propose to synthesize the essentials of one 
contemporary phenomenological approach to mood study. In line 
with Gendlin (1967) the emphasis for a phenomenological approach 
should be on the structure of the individual's experience and the 
facilitating conditions inducing change within this experience. 
This is to say a procedure is sought that will make evident, 
illuminate, and clarify mood in its essential meanings for a 
subject; make evident in the sense of differentiating as a con-
crete moment of experiencing and establishing the parameters of 
that experience as it exists for the subject; illuminate in the 
sense of making apparent the details, the general structure, and 
the implications of a given mood experience for the subject; and 
clarify in the sense of rendering the mood experience relatively 
transparent to the subject and to those others who seek to under-
stand it. 
This approach should be sufficiently general to encompass the 
diversity of mood experience, yet should be specific enough to 
permit its implementation through sequential stages. Only these 
features will make it pertinent, in a systematic way, to the mood 
data it seeks to explicate. This approach should also preserve 
the integrity of the individual's experience while at the same 
time put sufficient "stress" on the experience so that it points 
to the limit of its possibilities, or undergoes an "unfolding" 
into a series of different but related experiences. 
To achieve this purpose I have extracted a number of principles 
from the literature of both classical and contemporary phenomen-
ology. They are the principles that guided the collection of the 
descriptive data this study offers. Hence their enumeration sets 
the stage for the descriptive data offered in Chapter 4. These 
principles will now be set out followed by some expository and 
critical remarks relevant to each principle. Some descriptive 
data from the mood study will be used as illustrations. 
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1. The suspension of the "natural attitude" 
At most times, an individual is engaged in a range of 
activities. He is perhaps most frequently engaged in and 
busied with specifics, e.g. drawing up and signing a 
business contract, arranging meetings, discussing the 
organisational aspects of a· new and developing project, 
collecting information on different investment prospects. 
The fact that these activities are taking place and con-
stitute a solid nucleus of meaning for the individual never 
becomes radically problematic. To be sure, in times of 
stress or when much hangs in the balance there may be times 
of doubt, not a vertiginous doubt, but a doubt of acumen, 
efficacy, and perhaps -- propriety. It is not usually a 
doubt that leads to a search for the basic meaning or 
essential aspects of a phenomenon as it appears to the 
experiencing individual. It is not a doubt that seeks to 
lay bare the value matrix that underwrites such activities 
or makes them desirable. 
It is also unlikely that inquiries would be made as to how 
such mundane activities would affect the sensory modalities, 
or how individually or conjointly cognitive, emotive, and 
volitional states and processes would shape the overall 
situation. It is possible that the effects of signing that 
contract might be envisioned, e.g. an increase in material 
wealth, but most likely it'would be conceived of as a by-
product of the general "busiedness" with that contract. 
It is this straightforward involvement in and uncritical 
acceptance of a substantive reality, the commitment to a 
fixed utility and meaning structure, and the unidirectional 
impetus of mental activity toward a static independent 
reality, that Husserl (1931) terms the "natural attitude". 
·Husserl does not attempt to deny the natural attitude and 
its correlate the "fact-world", nor to dissolve it in a 
Cartesian programme of systematic doubt, but rather he 
exhorts us to adopt a standpoint whereby we stand back from 
our customary non-reflective involvement with the fact-world 
-178-
and transform our attitude towards it. The possibility of 
such a basic change in attitude is given in those experiences 
where I am not synchronized with the fact-world, e.g. in 
moments of delusion, hallucination, and phantasy. 
In summary, it can be said that the preliminary step in a 
method based on phenomenological principles is the acknow-
ledgement of the fact-world as standing over against the 
conscious activity of the individual. This fact-world 
should be acknowledged as the independent limit of the 
individual's system of attitudes and beliefs. The 
individual non-refl~ctively considers his attitude and 
belief system consonant with the fact-world. The possibility 
of a fundamental change in the individual's relation to the 
fact-world is given in those experiences where he is not 
synchronized with the fact-world, e.g. in delusion, 
hallucination, and phantasy. 
2. The actualisation of the possibilities inherent in the 
suspension of the natural attitude by means of phenomen-
ological reflection 
There is a difference between phenomenological reflection 
and "merely thinking about oneself". The differences alfe 
brought out by R. Schmitt (1959). He writes: 
Take a child who has been punished for disobedience. 
He will retreat to his room in anger, turning over 
and over in his mind how he has been wronged, and 
how unjustly he has been dealt with. This child 
thinks, and he thinks about "his own mind" and "the 
ideas therein11 , about his loneliness and unhappiness, 
and how no one loves him. But, so far, he does not 
reflect. He does not ask himself whether his punish-
ment may not, perhaps, be partly justified, whether 
it is really true that he is being punished mer2ly 
out of sheer malice and ill ill on his parent's part. 
Caught up in his own anger and misery the child has 
not been able to "stand back" and survey the situation 
calmly and with some detachment. In his anger he 
loses his nsense of proportion" and his "proper 
perspective". Reflection, on the other hand, 
involves just this critical detachment. Once the 
child begins to reflect, after the first violent 
emotion is spent, he will, to be sure, still think 
about himself, his own suffering, and the sins of 
others against him. He will instead, think about 
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himself in relation to the other people involved. 
He will review the events, try to see them from 
his parents' point of view, how his behaviour may 
have embarrassed or hurt them. Thus taking "the 
other's point of view11 will, at the same time, 
lead the child to think ab~ut himself in a 
different light (pp.62-63). 
In general I might add, the failure to understand the signi-
ficance of situations or individuals is most often due to 
insufficient information, insufficient thought, an excess of 
passion and egoism, an inability to empathically enter a 
person's field of reference, a degree of inherent obtuseness 
in language and communication processes, or combinations of 
all these elements. 
From Schmitt's model the properties that distinguish the 
reflective attitude from "merely thinkingabout oneself" may 
be said to be: 
(a) The establishment of a critical distance and detachment. 
(b) The suspension of the welter of emotion and rigid 
belief surrounding a given phenomenon. 
(c) The "taking the other's point of view" and establishing 
a wider context. 
(d) Making a trial thematization of factors or aspects that 
were initially unnoticed or considered irrelevant. 
(e) The thematization of one's sensitivity in a situation 
and contribution to that situation. 
The first and second properties make it possible to adopt a 
receptive and reasonably objective standpoint with respect 
to what actually occurred in a given situation. The third 
through fifth properties permit a preliminary display of 
the meaning of a phenomenon for a subject, through their 
inter-correlation. As an empirical supplement to Schmitt's 
views, consider the following introspective mood (so 
designated by the subject) explored in the context of the 
mood study, the subject reported: 
I frequently have this mood, it's the same feeling 
but it takes many forms. I question everything. I 
think about my feelings and thoughts -- sometimes 
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about a specific problem. If something is worrying 
me I try to pull it to pieces, try to work it out, 
it's usually when I feel dissatisfied, tired, 
depressed, or bored. It is an intense feeling, it 
can last minutes, days, even weeks. When I'm in 
this mood I have the same thoughts over and over 
again -- because I can't get any further, it seems 
to be all there is, it's like a record player that 
gets stuck. I describe to myself -- look at her 
doing this and that, in a nasty critical way. I' 
ask myself -- are you a machine? I become bitter 
and sarcastic about everything I do. But I don't 
think I'm useless or no good, but rather I criticize 
what I'm doing and thinking in an ironic sort of way. 
At first inspection this mood would not seem to qualify as a 
mood that adopts the standpoint of phenomenological 
reflection, i.e. it doesn't exhibit all the properties of 
the reflective attitude. For example, instead of establishing 
a distance of neutrality and detachment, the subject seems 
to have precipitated a portion of her awareness as a self-
critical ironic attitude; instead of a suspension of the 
welter of emotion and belief surrounding the phenomenon, 
the subject is besieged by a collection of arresting 
affective and cognitive elements -- e.g. depression, bore-
dom, bitterness, dissatisfaction, and sarcasm. 
There also seems to be an absence of properties (d) and (e), 
i.e. trial thematizations of factors or aspects that were 
initially unnoticed and thematization of one's sensitivity 
in the situation and contribution to the situation. However, 
I would like to suggest that this mood represents an 
important advance over previous moods of the same type and 
represents a developmental stage on the way to a fully 
reflective attitude. The subject was asked when this mood 
first began, she replied: 
It began at about twelve or thirteen and it used 
to be worse then. It occurred when I became 
depressed, upset, or angry. I used to introspect 
about my relations with people -- it was about 
just everything. I used to be in it more, to 
wallow in it. It was too egocentric to sit and 
think about yourself for hours, you lose perspective 
and don't get as far as you think you are going 
to get. I think I used it as a way of shutting 
out other people. 
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It is suggested that at this prior stage the mood was paradig-
matic of a non-reflective thinking about oneself. At presentt 
however, the mood is quite different. Its essential feature 
is an overall awareness that includes but is not dominated by 
self-awareness. It was suggested to the subject that if the 
mood were expressed and made "substantial" through a metaphor, 
the mood would be like a crystal globe of awareness and self-
awareness -- but not flawless. There would be milky streaks 
of self-compassion and self-criticism. The subject responded: 
"Yes, I like the metaphor and it [the mood] is the way you 
would talk to someone to say -- how futile, how silly, but 
talking to help not to bring down". 
The following points are made to support the contention that 
the subject's present mood represents an intermediate stage 
with the potential for becoming a mood of full reflection: 
(a) The personification of the critical distance as a self-
critical agency in response to frustrating situations 
has developed into a more impartial agency, and is 
evoked by a wider variety of situations than previously. 
This agency is now capable of providing a helpful 
monitoring and directing function for the subject. It 
is hoped that the increased generality of the mood and 
the helpful control it provides will lead to a further 
development, i.e. a translucent objectivity that is 
"on call"·whenever needed. 
(b) Although the suspension of the welter of emotion is not 
complete, there is an increased emphasis on the cognitive 
aspects of the mood. The subject sees herself (when in 
this mood) as someone who desires self-understanding and 
an understanding of her environment, a person who asks 
"why" questions. 
(c) The adoption of alternate points of view and taking a 
wider context is still deficient. This is at least 
partially a function of the subject's own independence, 
need for self-sufficiency, and preferred isolation. 
Recently the subject has become more aware of her need 
for other people (as indicated, in the past this mood 
(d) 
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was used to shut out other people). It is suggested that 
this realization will promote an increase in adopting 
alternative points of view. 
The subject has begun to make trial thematizations of the 
aspects of a situation that were initially unnoticed or 
considered irrelevant. For example, in a receptive and 
non-compulsive way when performing an action, she may ask 
herself -- why am I doing it in this particular way? She 
will also thematize such ordinarily irrelevant occurrences 
as the sound of running water, asking herself -- what does 
water sound like when it is running? 
(e) The thematization of one's special sensitivity in a 
situation and contribution to that situation is a higher 
order reflective attitude that has not been fully achieved 
by the subject. This is a goal for the future. 
Phenomenological Reflection as Method 
Dorian Cairns (1940) in his classical statement of phenomen-
ological method and in his recent formulation (1972) sets forth 
phenomenological reflection: 
The Husserlian phenomenologist, imitating Husserl's 
terminology, applies the name "reflection" to any 
awareness of something as one's own mental process 
or as a determination thereof .•.•. As I look about, 
I see physical things; their shapes, colors, etc., 
and usually occupy myself - cognitively, aesthetically, 
practically - with physical things only as having 
certain thing determinations, not as things believed 
in, seen, liked, etc. Sometimes, however, one does 
pay attention to things as believed, as things given, 
as liked - in brief, as intended to in-one's aware-
ness of them. And this paying of attention to the 
usually ignored status of things as intended to is 
contrasted terminologically as "reflection" with 
one's usual "straightforward" paying attention only 
to things (p.36). 
Does phenomenological reflection in the above mentioned sense 
have application to a study of mood phenomena? Has it been 
provided for in the five properties of the reflective attitude 
(see above p. 179) The answers suggested are yes it does have 
an application as one constituent of a broader dynamic phenomen-
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ological approach. Its existence has been intimated and must 
now be made explicit. Phenomenological reflection can be seen 
as a development of property (e) of the reflective attitudet i.e. 
the subject's contribution to the appearance of a given phenomenon. 
Phenomenological reflection makes explicit the mode of awareness 
that intends a given phenomenon, e.g. a person may report that 
they are looking at a tree. We would then seek to determine: 
Is it a tree desired as a provider of shade? A specific tree, 
the old oak in front of the family house, that is nostalgically 
being recalled? A tree that is disliked for its unaesthetic 
form? A tree valued as necessary for ecological balance? A 
tree cherished as a home for nesting birds? A tree assessed as 
increasing property value through its fruit-bearing capacity? 
A tree revered as symbolic of the strength and vitality of 
nature? A tree detested as the hangman's tree? A tree that I 
plan to plant for posterity and imagine as giving pleasure to 
future generations? 
Indeed, the mode of awareness may not be unitary, but rather, 
complex -- involving a number of interrelated modes of awareness. 
The untangling of such a skein is one of the major functions of 
phenomenological reflection. Theoretically it is an endeavour 
without a terminus, because in addition to the phenomenon 
apprehended at t1, there is a history of previous apprehensions 
each with its own motivational and attitudinal context, which 
may or may not enter into the apprehension at t1. In addition 
the apprehension at t1 is an actualised element in a field of 
possibilities both present and future. Furthermore, taking the 
most general perspective, for any finite system (S), observed 
or apprehended by a subject (A): S changes, A changes, and the 
relationship (R) between S and A changes; hence any fact or 
value (P) established for the composite system at t1, may be 
unstable for further values of t. 
This need not lead to despondency however, for the initial focus 
of interest is always: What is there for the subject right now? 
What is his contribution to the phenomenon as experienced right 
now? What possibilities for meaning are being presented and 
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which possibilities are being left out and why? The data itself 
then dictates the direction of further probing. 
In summary, we have decided to consider phenomenological 
reflection as a way of developing property (e) of the reflective 
attitude. Thus expanded, the application of the reflective 
attitude to a person who was looking at a tree, would proceed as 
follows: 
1. In order to examine phenomenologically the experience of an 
individual perceiving a tree, we would first take up a 
critical distance, poised as it were with him, to determine 
in a critical way the essential structure and meaning of 
his field of perceptions, as they establish meaning for him. 
2. There would be a suspension of emotions and beliefs con-
cerning trees as a general class, as well as the particular 
tree; bearing in mind that a complete suspension is an 
ideal that can only be approximated. 
3. There would be an attempt to "take the other's point of 
view", in this case it would involve the empathetic adoption 
of a range of positions or stances toward the particular 
tree being perceived. 
4. There would be trial thematizations of factors or aspects of 
the individual's perception that were initially unnoticed or 
considered irrelevant, as well as the thematization of more 
central factors. 
5. The individual's special sensitivity in and to the particular 
situation is considered. Phenomenological reflection is 
used to determine the subject's contribution to the tree as 
object of various cognitive acts and processes. Steps 3, 4 
and 5 are co-ordinated and interrelated. Finally, the 
original experience as recorded is brought in for a "match" 
with the determinations of each stage. 
3. Phenomenological Abstraction and Thematization 
Phenomenological abstraction is a "digging" and a "lifting out", 
or to use another metaphor: when a young plant or tree is trans-
planted, it is lifted out of the earth -- separated from its 
place.of origin, but not carelessly wrenched out. The roots must 
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be protected, it is good if some of the native soil adheres, 
so that a portion of the original nurturing environment is 
preserved. So too does the phenomenologist show care in 
abstracting from his own experience or when assisting another 
person to do the same. He. takes care in maintaining the con-
text of any abstracted portion of experience, realizing its 
importance as a source of "nourishment" to the abstracted 
portion. 
At this point the phenomenologist has two choices. He may 
consider the abstracted portion of experience as functionally 
related to its context and explore the interrelations, or he 
may take note of the context and then carefully set it aside, 
choosing to explore the abstracted portion of experience in-
dependent of its original context. To illustrate, consider 
the following statement of mood from a subject in the mood 
study: 
I feel in a state of suspended or pent-up emotion 
of some kind which does not however make me feel 
.tense, rather, relaxed -- receptive and very aware. 
I feel rather amused generally, as if something 
funny could easily happen. I feel as if it's 
important that I notice everything going on around 
me, as if it's significant. 
This report of a feeling state (an abstracted portion of 
experience) can be attended to in light of its immediate 
intrasubjective penumbra (what is on the edge of the subject's 
awareness) without considering the greater environmental con-
text, e.g. a general bodily lethargy with tension in the chest 
and thorax, feelings of being unwanted and unloved, feelings 
of being an object of affection for specific people, a general 
lack of motivation and striving, a desire for solitude and 
gentle physical contact with loved ones, and a growing 
realization qf a need for other people. The experience can 
also be attended to in light of its environmental context, 
e.g. a lack of attention from an individual the subject is 
interested in, the receipt of letters from her family, looking 
forward to the purchase of a special book in the near future. 
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The historical precedent for phenomenological abstraction has 
been pointed out by Zaner and Ihde (1972). They write: 
In many places, Kant mentions that he is "abstractively 
isolating" or "dissecting out" distinguishable but 
inseparable components of human experience and know-
ledge. So doing, he believes he has detected or made 
explicit what is all along implicit in human life. 
This "making explicit" (formal explication) becomes, 
in Husserl's hands, a major component of what he 
designates a1:1 11phenomenological description". The 
basic aim of the latter is precisely to ferret out 
the taken for granted, the hidden, the latent, the 
obscure, the recondite -- as regards every region of 
human engagement (p.l8), 
Phenomenological thematization has two senses and applications. 
In the first sense thematization is the direction of attention. 
onto some unit of experiencing, so that an abstraction can be 
made from the manifold of experience, i.e. it "carves out" a 
content for the reflective attitude. Thematization in the 
second sense is the inference of a general statement from the 
concrete detail of a given phenomenon. This general statement 
suggests an activity tqat is related to the subject, i.e. some-
thing which she would like to do, or something which she would 
not like to do, something which she feels attracted to or 
perhaps repelled by, an activity that is a reflection of some 
aspect of her self-identity. The application of "thematization" 
takes pl~ce within the reflective attitude and the act of 
phenomenological reflection. 
Consider thematization at work with the following image 
produced by a subject in the mood study. The subject was in 
a mood that she described as unresponsive and tired. She added 
that she was feeling drowsy and tired, yet to a certain degree 
she also felt quiet and kindly. In the process of expressing 
and exploring this mood, she produced this image: 
There's a peach on the ground, an old one, squashed 
and open under a peach tree. No grass -- a rocky 
ground, the skin is all pushed to one side and 
crumpled, the stones are sticking to it. There are 
a couple of others, but this one is more squashed, 
as if trodden upon -- there's a bee buzzing around 
it. Nobody will look at it or touch it again, 
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actually there are a number of peach pips lying 
around from previous years. There is a certain 
similarity to everything, the peach seems to 
dissolve into its surroundings. The ground is 
very dry and flecks of dust are sticking to the 
peach, it's fairly dark, not a bright day. There 
are dark red bits of colour on the peach, the 
rest is an anaemic white. Its texture seems to 
stand out, I am gazing at the texture in an 
observing sort of attitude. 
\fuat general statements can be made as to the activities 
implicit in this image and their relevance to the subject? 
What self-identities or self-evaluations can be inferred from 
this image? Inertia and passivity seem to be a part of the 
subject's mood as well as of this image. If we turn our 
attention to the peach (the first sense of thematization) and 
search for an activity (the second sense), we could infer a 
languishing that reaches a fulness and a ripeness in time. 
The peach lies amongst other peaches, and the pips of previous 
years -- discarded and indistinguishable from its surroundings; 
the buzzing bee attests to its ripeness, and reflects its 
exposure in a squashed and open state. Dust and stones adhere 
to the peach, they seem to add to its weight and inertia -- a 
patina of dry inertia. It appears stuck in time, incapable of 
any resurgence of life or energy. 
are still worthy of interest. 
Yet its colour and texture 
Considering the image from the second aspect of thematization, 
we ask: How is the subject related to this image that she has 
produced? Do the activities and processes of this image, e.g. 
the languishing in time, have relevance to her? Are the 
feeling states expressed in the image, e.g. isolation and 
vulnerability reflections of her own feeling state? Does she 
evaluate herself as we have evaluated the peach -- something 
squashed and given over to its destiny but still worthy of 
interest? These are the types of questions that a thematiza-
tion of the above image would suggest. 
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Meaning and Phenomenological Method 
The meaning of a phenomenon, e.g. of a mood phenomenon for a 
subject, can be approached from a number of different levels: 
1. At the most immediate and concrete level, the meaning of a 
mood is the psychological situation it presents to the subject, 
i.e. the subject's awareness of affective, cognitive, and 
behavioural tendencies elicited in response to environmental 
and/or intrapsychic situations. Under this heading consider 
the following description of a depressed mood obtained from a 
subject in the mood study: 
This mood makes me feel like hibernating. I want 
to be alone in surroundings I know and just sit and 
think, and listen to music. The only part of my body 
I am aware of in this mood is my stomach and the area 
of my rib cage because I feel hollow there and sort ' 
of hurting. 
In this mood I feel all alone and completely cut off 
from other people. The feeling is a horrible one 
and yet funnily enough I could not bear to go among 
people. So, quite paradoxically, I want to heighten 
the feeling of being alone and yet want to end the 
alone feeling. Most intensely I feel this cut-off 
feeling, divorced entirely from people whom I love 
and whom I know love me. I can feel this self-pity 
in me. I know I wallow when depressed and I don't 
seem able to make a strong enough effort to lift 
myself out of it. If this mood transformed me into 
a material object, I'd be a weeping willow- bent and 
bowed over, not strong and upright like, say a pine. 
A body that would suit my mood would be that of a 
sad clown, with a big red nose, but sorrowful deep 
eyes with painted tears on his face - all alone. 
I think an important question to ask about my mood, 
is what the person's reaction is to other people. 
I know when I'm feeling depressed, I'm very aware 
of other people nearby and they seem either to be 
happy and so totally insensitive to your mood or you 
can recognise other isolate, solitary people and 
imagine that they are depressed. 
At the immediate and concrete level, the meaning of this mood 
is the subject's aloneness, her hurt and hollow feeling and 
her desire to withdraw and be nourished with affection. These 
concrete meanings are given within the mood description itself. 
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2. At the next level, the level of the reflective attitude, the 
meaning of the mood is found in the description of those 
structures and their interrelationships that are revealed by 
the reflective attitude, e.g. the subject's self-pity structure 
and its interrelationship with feelings of inadequacy 
engendered by the insensitivities of university competition. 
3. At the most general and comprehensive level, the meaning of a 
mood phenomenon is a constructed meaning framed out of the 
synthesis of felt, willed and noetic (cognitive) meanings. 
Here felt meaning refers ~o a special way of being aware 
through feeling -- feeling becomes the locus for meaning and 
points to a future while retaining a past; willed meaning 
refers to the meaning resulting from the anticipation and 
striving toward a future that has been imaginatively postulated; 
and noetic meaning refers to the identification of goals, 
inner constraints, plans, strategies, and general features. 
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CHAPTER 3 METHOD 
Summary 
Subjects were all volunteer female university students between the ages of 16 and 32. 
Mean agt was 19 .• 12 years, with a standard deviation of 2,67 years. 
105. 
Sample size was 
Three personality measures, the Cattell Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire, the 
Edwards Personal Preference Schedule, and the Gough Adjective Check List, were used as 
part of an experimental treatment and to determine personality variables that signifi-
cantly distinguish "moody" from "non-moody" individuals. 
A Mood Analysis Questionnaire was developed and its overall effect on mood as well as 
moods classified as positive, neutral, and negative, was determined. The Mood Analysis 
Questionnaire was also designed to elicit basic information on mood. 
The Nowlis Mood Adjective Check List was used to assess mood change across four 
different treatments. Treatment 1 (N=l05) measured mood change resulting from the 
completion of personality tests; Treatment 2 (N=l05) measured mood change resulting 
from an experimenter administration of the Mood Analysis Questionnaire; Treatment 3 
(N=l05) measured mood change resulting from engaging in quiet activities; Treatment 4 
(N=l05} measured mood change resulting from a self-administration of the Mood Analysis 
Questionnaire; subjects also defined mood in terms of their own experience, and used 
the word "mood" in four grauunatical sentences. 
An additional session was given to 43 subjects in order to discuss their mood states. 
Fifteen of these subjects volunteered for further intensive study of their moods. 
Descriptions were obtained of basic recurring mood states. 
The statistical procedure involved both univariate and multivariate techniques of analysis. 
Content Smmnary 
3.1 Subjects 
3.11 Sampling 
3.2 Techniques of Assessment 
3.21 The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF) 
3.22 The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) 
3.23 The Gough Adjective Check List 
3.24 The Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
3.25 The Mood Analysis Questionnaire 
3.3 Procedure 
3.31 Experimental Procedure 
3.32 Experimental Design 
(ACL) 
List 
3.33 Rationale for Statistical Procedure 
3.34 Statistical Techniques 
(MACL) 
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3.1 Subjects 
The subjects were 105 volunteer female university students enrolled 
at the University of Cape Town. They were all English-speaking and 
between the ages of 16 and 32. Mean age was 19,12 with a standard 
deviation of 2,67 years. (See Appendix A, Table A2 for the age 
distribution). 
They were in the main living in university residence and many were 
living away from home for the first time. A variety of university 
faculties were represented including Arts, Science, Social Science 
and Fine Arts - Drama, Music and Ballet. 
3.11 Sampling 
The experimenter obtained perm1ss1on from the Lady Warden of 
the female residence to address the students and ask for 
volunteers. The majority of subjects were obtained in this 
manner. Some were referred by their friends. The subjects 
received no remuneration for their participation. (A summary 
of the petition addressed to the students is found 1n 
Appendix A, Tabulation A1). 
3.2 Techniques of Assessment 
3.21 The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire 
Description: 
The Cattell Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire is a non-
projective personality test which was developed for both 
research purposes and practical applications. It yields a 
measurement of the total personality in terms of 16 personality 
* factor scales . Form A 1961-62 edition was used. It consists 
of 187 items concerning the subject's interests and preferences. 
The Sixteen Primary Factors are presented in this way: 
Low Score Direction 
Reserved, Detached, Critical, Cool 
Less Intelligent, Concrete-thinking 
Factor A 
vs 
Factor B 
High Score Direction 
Outgoing, Warmhearted, Easy-going, 
Participating 
More Intelligent, Abstract-thinking, 
Bright 
* Note: See Appendix C, Tabulation C1 for a description of the 16PF scales. 
Affected by Feelings, Emotionally 
less Stable 
Humble, Mild, Accommodating, 
Conforming, 
Sober, Prudent, Serious, Taciturn 
Expedient, Evades Rules, Feels Few 
Obligations 
Shy, Restrained, Diffident, Timid 
Tough-minded, Self-reliant, 
Realistic, No-nonsense 
Trusting, Adaptable, Free of 
jealousy 
Practical, Careful, Conventional 
Regulated by External Realities, 
Proper 
Forthright, Natural, Artless, 
Sentimental 
Placid, Self-assured, Confident 
Serene 
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Factor C 
vs Emotionally stable, Faces Reality, 
Calm 
Factor E 
vs Assertive, Independent, Aggressive, 
Stubborn 
Factor F 
vs Happy-go-lucky, Impulsively Lively, 
Gay, Enthusiastic 
Factor G 
vs Conscientious, Persevering, Staid, 
Rule-bound 
Factor H 
vs Venturesome, Socially-bold, 
Uninhibited, Spontaneous 
Factor I 
vs Tender-minded, Dependent, Over-
protected, Sensitive 
Factor L 
vs Suspicious, Self-opinionated, Hard 
to fool 
Factor M 
VS Imaginative, Wrapped up in Inner 
Urgencies, Careless of Practical 
Matters, Bohemian 
Factor N 
VS Shrewd, Calculating, \.;rorldly, 
Penetrating 
Factor 0 
VS Apprehensive, Worrying, Depressive, 
Troubled 
Factor Q1 
Conservative, Respecting Established vs Experimenting, Critical, Liberal, 
Ideas, Tolerant of Traditional Analytical, Free-thinking 
Difficulties 
Group-dependent, A "Joiner" and 
Sound Follower 
Undisciplined Self-conflict, 
Careless of Protocol, Follows 
own Urges 
Relaxed, Tranquil, Torpid, 
Unfrustrated 
Factor Q2 
vs Self-sufficient, Prefers Own 
Decisions, Resourceful 
Factor Q3 
vs Controlled, Socially-precise, 
Following Self-image 
Factor Q4 
VS Tense, Frustrated, Driven, Over-
wrought , 
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Reliability and Validity: 
Cattell expresses the reliability of the sixteen personality 
factors as "dependability coefficients" for each scale. For 
Form A the test-retest coefficients range from 0,61 for 
Factor N (Forthright vs Shrewd) to 0,83 for Factor H (Shy vs 
Venturesome). The homogeneity of individual scales, the 
correlations among scale items, are kept at moderate values 
to give breadth to the factors. 
Construct Validity, the extent to which the test items are 
good measures of the personality factors, is approximately 
+0,85 (Cattell, 1961, p.8). 
Concrete Validity, the correlation with criteria external to 
the test, is not computed. This is because, 1n Cattell's 
view, a multi-purpose test like the 16PF can be related to 
a large number of different criteria and therefore the con-
crete validity cannot be 1meaningfully calculated (Cattell, 
1961, p.9). However, concrete relations to a variety of 
situations and variables are presented. 
Criticisms: 
Norms for the 16PF are given for the general population and 
for college students, according to sex. Lorr (1964) suggests 
more specific norms are needed, social class and occupation 
being the two important factors that have been neglected. 
Levonian (1961) found a low internal correlation on factor 
items suggesting substantial within-factor heterogeneity. 
Becker (1960) has questioned the independence of the 16 
factor scales. His study found clear evidence for only eight 
independent factors. Lorr (1964) maintains that the 16PF 
is the best factor based personality inventory available, 
but is primarily a research and not a clinical instrument. 
In his view, more specific facts concerning the construct 
validity of individual factors are needed. 
In conclusion, the 16PF was a suitable test for the descriptive 
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purposes of this study from t~o perspectives: it provides 
a comprehensive representation of basic personality traits, 
and Form A is recommended by Cattell for use with young 
adults (Cattell, 1961). The reliability of individual 
factors is adequate for exploratory research purposes. (No 
clinical judgements were made on the basis of the 16PF 
scores.) The construct validity of +0,85 is also acceptable 
for research purposes; however the criticisms of Levonian 
(1961), Becker (1960) and Lorr (1964) militate against an 
uncritical acceptance of the test. The general validity 
of the 16PF is reflected in its progressive development 
and the elimination of factors not confirmed on three 
successive factor analyses. 
3.22 The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule 
Description: 
The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) is a 
personality measure designed for both research and counselling 
purposes. It yields scores for 15 personality variables based 
on Murray's 1938 manifest need system. The EPPS is a 
convenient measure of normal personality variables. The 
15 needs measured are: Achievement, Deference, Order, 
Exhibition, Autonomy, Affiliation, Intraception, Succourance, 
Dominance, Abasement, Nurturance, Change, Endurance, Hetero-
* sexuality, and Aggression. It is the most comprehensive 
inventory designed to assess such needs (Anastasi, 1968, 
p.452). 
The schedule contains 210 pairs of statements in which items 
from each of th~ 15 scales are paired with items from the 
other 14. For each paLr of statements the individual must 
choose the statement most characteristic of himself. This 
is an ipsative forced-choice design. It means that the 
score for each need represents not an absolute value, but a 
value in relation to the other 14 needs. Hence two individuals 
* Note: See Appendix C, Tabulation D1 for a description of the EPPS scales. 
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may have the same ipsative score for a particular need, but 
the absolute strength of the need may differ. 
Reliability and Validity: 
Split-half reliability coefficients, or internal consistency 
coefficients, for the 15 scales range from 0,60 (Deference) 
to 0,87 (Heterosexuality). Test-retest reliability co-
efficients, or stability coefficients, range from 0,74 
(Achievement) to 0,88 (Abasement). 
Edwards sets out two approaches to determining the validity 
of his personality measure. The first approach assumes a 
"pure criterion measure" with which test scales can be 
correlated. Edwards suggests that pragmatically such pure 
measures are an idealization of the standard measures that 
are available. Evidence for the validity of the EPPS is 
obtained by comparing ratings and scores on the EPPS with 
other self-ratings and peer ratings. A degree of correlation 
has been found but the evidence is not conclusive. 
The second approach involves compar~sons between EPPS scores 
and scores on other personality inventories. Correlations 
have been measured between the EPPS, the Guilford-Martin 
Personnel Inventory, and the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. 
A number of correlations were established at the ,05 level 
(Edwards, 1959, p.22). In addition, "social desirability", 
as a factor influencing EPPS scores, has been eliminated. 
Criticisms: 
Anastasi (1968, pp.453-454) criticizes the EPPS on the 
procedure of converting ipsative scores to normative scores. 
This conversion produces an element of uncertainty in the 
interpretation of EPPS scores. A consistently ipsative or 
normative procedure would have been preferable. The validity 
studies become inconclusive because the majority failed to 
take the ipsative nature of the scores into account. 
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Statistically, ipsative scores tend to yield negative mean 
intercorrelations for individual scales and the mean 
correlation of all scales with independent variables 
approaches zero. She suggests that: 
Although the EPPS has many promising features, 
it is in need of: (a) revision to eliminate 
certain technical weaknesses, particularly with 
regard to item form and score interpretations; 
and (b) properly conducted validation studies 
utilizing techniques of score pattern analysis 
appropriate to ipsative scores (p.454). 
In conclusion, the EPPS was a suitable test for the purposes 
of this study in that it portrays the relative strength of 
intra-individual needs. It will provide a hierarchical 
ordering of need components in the individual's internal 
constellation of tendencies, constraints and impulsions 
toward behaviour. The reliability coefficients, particu-
larly test-retest or stability coefficients are adequate 
for research purposes (No clinical judgements were made on 
the basis of the EPPS scores). The presence of statistically 
significant correlations between the EPPS and other 
personality measures, and the elimination of "social 
desirability", provide some encouragement for confidence 
in the test's overall validity. 
Nevertheless this confidence must be tempered by considerable 
caution, owing to the idiosyncratic conversion of ipsative 
scores to normative scores in the test construction. The 
particular employment of the EPPS in this study, to indicate 
personality variables that may distinguish "moody" from 
"non-moody" subjects, is perhaps less influenced by this 
anomaly than would other uses, as it seeks to compare the 
relative strength of-scale scores for two different groups. 
3.23 The Gough Adjective Check List 
Description: 
The Gough Adjective Check List (ACL) is a non-projective 
personality measure consisting of 300 adjectives commonly 
used to describe attributes of a person. The individual is 
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required to mark all adjectives he considers to be self-
descriptive. It is primarily used as a research measure 
of the individual's self-perceptions and self-concept. 
The ACL is composed of 24 scales which may be divided 
into 3 categories: 
1. response set scales - the total number of words marked, 
number of favourable adjectives marked and number of 
unfavourable adjectives marked; 
2. observation and clinical evaluation scales - Defensive-
ness, Self-confidence, Self-control, Lability, Personal 
adjustment and Counselling readiness; 
3. need scales - Achievement, Dominance, Endurance, Order, 
Intraception, Nurturance, Affiliation, Heterosexuality, 
Exhibition, Autonomy, Agg;ession, Change, Succourance, 
Abasement and Deference. 
(Anastasi, 1968, p.533) 
The need scales of the ACL correspond to the need scales of 
the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule and were not 
included in this study. The scales used were: Defensive-
ness, Ratio of favourable to unfavourable adjectives, Self-
confidence, Self-control, Lability, Personal adjustment and 
Counselling readiness. {See Appendix C, Tabulation E1 for 
a description of the ACL scales utilized). 
Reliability and Validity: 
The ACL reliability can be considered from two perspectives: 
the test-retest reliability of the individual words; and 
the reliability of the individual scales. The mean test-
retest reliability for individual words is +0,54 with a 
' 
standard deviation of 0,19 (Gough and Heilbrun, 1965, p.l2). 
Gough suggests that the reason this reliability is not high 
is because the self-image derived from ACL responses may be 
less stable than that derived from self-report inventories 
using items and questions. Furthermore, overall test 
reliability may be a function of the individual response 
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reliabilities of individuals taking the test. Reliability 
of response may itself be a unique psychological variable 
and not just a statistical property. Gough concludes: 
With subjects of cheerful, informal and energetic 
character the ACL tends to be quite reliable in a 
test-retest situation; with subjects who are 
awkward, prejudiced, etc., in disposition, the 
ACL self-reports will show more variations. · 
(Gough and Heilbrun, 1965, p.l3) 
Gough reports that most of the scales possess adequate 
reliability. The range of phi coefficients was 0,54 
(Succourance) to 0,85 (Nurturance) taken over a 10 week 
period. The scale Self-confidence has especially high 
stability over a 10 week, a 6 month and a 5! year testing, 
while Succourance and Lability are rather low when taken 
over the same time periods. Thus Succourance and Lability 
require particular caution in their interpretation. 
Gough points out (op.cit., p.l4) that determining the 
validity for the set of scales of a multivariate personality 
instrument such as the ACL is a cumulative task. It 
requires the co-ordination of a wide variety of data. 
In addition validity is dependent upon not only the test's 
correlations with independent measures, but also by the 
insight of the test administrator - his sensitivity to 
patterns and configurations of data. This is particularly 
important with respect to the clinical scales. 
Heilbrun (1958) demonstrated correlations between ACL need 
scales and their counterparts on the Edwards Personal 
Preference Schedule. Ten of the 15 coefficients computed 
were significant at the ,01 level. MacKinnon (1963) found 
correlations between indices of "creativity" and the ACL. 
High scorers on creativity also scored high on the scales 
Lability, Exhibitionism, Autonomy and Aggression. Low 
scorers on creativity also scored low on the scales 
Defensiveness, Self-control, Endurance, Orderliness, 
Intraception, Nurturance, Abasement and Deference. 
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In general the correlation of the ACL with measures of 
intellectual ability and cognitive functioning has not 
been high, e.g. coefficients of correlation with the 
Terman Concept Mastery Test ranged from -0,26 to +0,29. 
However, correlations with other personality tests, e.g. 
the California Psychological Inventory are relatively 
higher, coefficients of correlation ranging from -0,45 
to +0,60. 
Criticisms: 
The Manual regards the ACL scales as being primarily 
experimental. Therefore, considerable further information 
is required to establish the reliability and validity of 
its clinical applications. Although the ACL has been 
widely used and has an application to an extensive range 
of situations (Anastasi, 1968, pp.533, 542) its stability 
as a measure remains low and ACL results must be inter-
preted with caution. 
In conclusion, the evidence points to an overall low 
reliability and uncertain validity for the ACL scales 
(again, no clinical judgements were made on the basis of 
the ACL scores). However, it should be recalled that the 
ACL is a measure of the components of self-concept, a 
subjective variable that under any circumstances is diffi-
cult to gauge. For this reason we are prepared to accept 
lower levels of reliability and validity than would be 
required for more objectively defined variables. The 
study sought to determine dimensions of personality and 
self-concept that might statistically distinguish "moody" 
from "non-moody" subjects; with this goal in mind the 
ACL was employed cautiously and with circumspection. The 
best way (combining predictive caution with tentative 
descriptive optimism) to view the ACL variables that 
distinguished "moody" from "non-moody" subjects will be 
from a perspective that discounts the possibility of 
precision measurement but does suggest parameters for 
future investigation and validation. 
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3.24 The Nowlis Mood Adjective Check List (MACL) 
'Description: 
The Nowlis MACL is a' 33 item check list of adjectives 
* designed to measure mood change • Subjects are instructed 
to indicate for each adjective to what extent it applies 
to their present feelings. For example, the subjects must 
decide for the word "fearful" whether at the moment of 
testing they definitely feel fearful, feel slightly fearful, 
cannot decide whether or not they feel fearful, or 
definitely do not feel fearful. 
Nowlis and his associates have grouped the adjectives 
together by factor analytic techniques into twelve 
dimensions of mood. These dimensions are: Aggression, 
Anxiety, Surgency, Elation, Concentration, Fatigue, Social 
Affection, Sadness, Scepticism, Egotism, Vigour, and 
Deactivation. The difference between pre-treatment and 
post-treatment scores on the 12 mood dimensions measures 
mood change due to the particular treatment. 
Nowlis (1965) acknowledges that a tendency to judge mood 
words as applicable to one's own psychological state is 
only one index of mood. However, it has been found to be 
a stable and straightforwardly obtained measure, and one 
that is based upon an overt theoretical conception of mood. 
Development: 
Theoretical background: 
Nowlis (op.cit.) has advanced a general definition of mood 
based on the psychological literature and applications of 
the term "moody" in everyday speech. He writes: 
"Mood is the effect on a person of his own con-
figurations of activity (~owlis, 1961). These 
* Note: See Appendix B, Tabulation Bz for the Nowlis MACL. 
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configurations may be conceptualized as fundamental 
patterns of general functioning and orientation 
such as level of activation, level of control, 
level of concentration, direction of social orienta-
tion, and positive (pleasant) or negative (unpleasant) 
general appraisal. The effect of these general 
patterns on the person may be mediated by cues 
associated with them in the life history and involves 
affective, cognitive, motivational, and motor 
responses to the cues; such responses may in turn 
become functionally related to the general patterns 
and may modify, maintain, or even instigate them" (p.353). 
Empirical background: 
Nowlis and Green (1964) found 130 potential mood words in 
everyday speech that provided broad definitions for their 
mood dimensions, or these configurations of general 
functioning and orientation: level of activation, level 
of control, positive vs. negative social orientation, and 
pleasantness vs. unpleasantness. A check list consisting 
of the 130 words was administered to approximately 450 
university men before and after six experimental sessions 
designed to induce different moods. The experimental 
findings were grouped into five sets of data and factor 
analysed. Thirty-four of the 130 words were eliminated 
after an examination of response distributions, reliabilities, 
order effects, and patterns of correlation with other 
variables. Ten factors were then obtained by the Thurstone 
centroid method. Most of the apparent common variance 
was accounted for by 9 factors and each factor was rotated 
to an oblique solution by the Pinzka-Saunders method. 
Nowlis then sought to find whether similar mood factors 
emerged from data obtained when subjects were in different 
moods. From the original five sets of data he compared 
each set of 9 rotated factors with the other four sets 
of data. He found: 
An axis in all five sets for four factors: Aggression, 
Anxiety, Surgency, and Concentration. 
An axis in four sets for four other factors: Fatigue, 
Social Affection, Sadness, and Scepticism. 
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An axis 1n three sets for one factor: Egotism. 
An.axis in two sets for two factors: Elation and 
Deactivation. 
One unique axis was tentatively identified as a twelfth 
factor: Vigour. 
After examination of the 12 groups of matched axes the 
following items were selected as representative of the 
12 mood factors. The first three items after the des-
criptive name became the items on the short form of the 
MACL. 
A, Aggression (5 axes): 
B, Anxiety (5 axes): 
c, Surgency (5 axes): 
D, Elation (2 axes): 
E, Concentration (5 axes): 
F, Fatigue (4 axes): 
G, Social Affection 
(4 axes): 
H, Sadness (4 axes): 
I, Scepticism (4 axes): 
J, Egotism (3 axes): 
K, Vigour (1 axis): 
N, Nonchalance(2 axes): 
Scoring the Nowlis MACL: 
defiant, rebellious, angry, 
grouchy, annoyed, fed-up. 
clutched UE, fearful, jitterl· 
carefree, Elayful, witty, 
lively, talkative. 
elated, overjoled, Eleased, 
refreshed. 
enga~ed in thou~ht, intent, 
concentrating, attentive, 
earnest, serious, contemplative, 
introspective. 
tired, sluggish, drowsy, dull. 
affectionate, kindly, warm-
hearted, forgiving. 
regretful, sad, sorry. 
'dubious, sceptical, suspicious. 
egotistic, self-centered, 
boastful, aloof. 
active, energetic, vigorous. 
leisurely, nonchalant. The 
short form of the MACL substitutes 
Deactivation for Factor N. It 
comprises the words: at rest, 
quiet, calm. 
The scoring of the Nowlis MACL can yield three types of 
score: a magnitude of change score for each of the 12 
mood dimensions; a set of ,component change scores, 1.e. 
the number of components increased, decreased, new, dis-
appeared, and total change in components for each of the 
12 mood dimensions; and an absolute magnitude of change 
score, i.e. the sum of the change scores on each of the 
12 mood dimensions irrespective of sign. 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
Factor 3 
Factor 3 
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Thus the magnitude of change scores measure discrete 
change on each of the 12 mood dimensions for a particular 
treatment; the set of component change scores for each 
of the 12 mood dimensions measures internal change on the 
12 mood dimensions for a particular treatment; and the 
absolute magnitude of change score measures global or 
overall change across the 12 mood dimensions for a 
particular treatment. 
This can be illustrated by examining an hypothetical 
score sheet. For reference purposes i~ is recalled that 
the Nowlis response categories and their numerical values 
are: 
l. definitely feel "x" = 3 
2. feel slightly "x" = 2 
3. cannot decide whether I feel "x" = 1 
4. definitely do not fee 1 "x" = 0. 
The hypothetical score sheet: 
Pre- Post- Magnitude Components testing testing of change 
Aggression 
1) defiant 0 0 number of c increased = 
2) rebellious 0 2 +2 number of c decreased = 
3) angry 2 2 number of c disappeared 
number of c new = 1 
Total = 1 
Anxiety 
1) clutched up 1 1 number of c increased = 
2) fearful 1 2 0 number of c decreased = 
3) jittery 1 0 number of c disappeared 
number of c new = 0 
Total = 2 
Surgency 
1) carefree 0 1 number of c increased = 
2) playful 2 2 -1 number of c decreased = 
3) witty 2 0 number of c disappeared 
number of c new = 1 
Total = 2 
Elation 
1) elated 1 2 number of c increased = 
2) overjoyed 2 1 0 number of c decreased = 
3) pleased 3 3 number of c disappeared 
number of c new= 0 
Total = 2 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
= 1 
0 
0 
= 1 
1 
1 
0 
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It might be argued that the categories of component change 
are not independent, e.g. components increased and new 
components are not categorically different both being a 
type of magnitude increase, and therefore there are only 
grounds for 3 categories - components increased, components 
decreased, and total change. However the 4 categories of 
component change were used because it was desirable to have 
the distinction between a component merely increasing and 
a component appearing for the first time as the result of 
a particular treatment. Statistically, the lack of 
categorical independence was accepted, and appropriate 
univariate techniques were used to analyse the component 
categories. 
Examining the hypothetical score sheet: 
In the case of Factor 1 Aggression, the magnitude of change 
score, the difference between pre- and post-testing, is +2. 
Looking at the components responsible for this change, it 
can be seen that there is a new component - "rebellious" 
appeared. 
In the case of Factor 2 Anxiety, although the magnitude of 
change score is 0, there is internal change in the factor 
components, i.e. the compone-nt "fearful" increased in 
intensity and the component "jittery" disappeared. 
In the case of Factor 3 Surgency, the magnitude of change 
score, the difference between pre- and post-testing, is -1. 
Looking at the components responsible for this ch~nge, it 
can be seen that there is one new component "carefree" and 
the component "witty" has disappeared. 
In the case of Factor 4 Elation, although the magnitude of 
change score is 0, there is internal change in the factor 
components, i.e. the component "elated" increased in 
intensity and the component "overjoyed" decreased in intensity. 
The absolute magnitude of change would be the sum of the 
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magnitude of change on each factor irrespective of sign. 
Current status: 
(studies supporting the MACL derivation; corroborating 
the MACL as a measure of mood change; and providing inter-
national equivalents) 
Five other factor analytic studies, Borgatta (1961), Thayer 
(1963), McNair and Lorr (1964), Clyde (1960) and Reimanis 
(1964) were made of lists of words derived wholly or 1n 
part from the Nowlis MACL. Six mood factors tended to 
recur in all these studies. They were: Aggression, 
Anxiety, Concentration, Fatigue, Social Affection, and 
Surgency. There was sufficient evidence to postulate 
another 6 factors analogous to the MACL factors. 
The Nowlis MACL has been used as an effective measure of 
mood change in a number of contemporary studies. These 
include: Schilling, 1977; Blatt, Quinlan and D'Aflitti, 
1972; Sommer, 1972; Sato, Murai and Kinebuchi, 1970; 
Mosher and Greenberg, 1969; and Heimstra, Ellingstad and 
De Koch, 1967. 
The Nowlis MACL has also stimulated the development of 
several international equivalents, e.g. Hecheltjen and 
Merlesdorf, 1973 (German); and Malolinova and Hampejsova, 
1973 (Czech). 
Reliability and Validity: 
It should be emphasized that the Nowlis MACL was designed, 
and refined over an eight year period, as a measure of 
mood change. Its reliability as a measure of mood change 
is dependent on the reliability of its scores as a measure 
of mood at any particular time. An important limiting 
factor on this reliability is that mood, by one definition, 
may fluctuate over short intervals of time. Accordingly, 
it is conceivable that mood change may occur during the 
time interval required to complete the Nowlis MACL. This 
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could be a result of factors independent of the MACL or 
the act of completing the MACL itself. In other words, 
the reliability of the MACL is limited by the very , 
phenomenon it purports to investigate and may itself 
induce mood change. 
Estimates of reliability have nevertheless been obtained . 
. Borgatta (1961) found test-retest reliabilities of from 
0,40 (Fatigue) to 0,71 (Social Affection). Nowlis and 
Green (1964) found within test reliabilities for individual 
words to range from 0,52 to 0,80. Green (1964) found 
test-retest reliabilities to range from 0,50 to 0,75. 
McNair and Lorr (1964) found that mood words taken from 
the Nowlis MACL to have estim~tes of internal consistency 
ranging from 0,80 to 0,91. 
The validity of the Nowlis MACL has been strengthened by 
the elimination of "social desirability" as a contributing 
variable (Green, 1964). Correlations with the known effects 
of several drugs has been established by Wendt and Cameron 
(1961), and Wendt, Cameron and Specht (1964). Speisman, 
Lazarus, Mordkoff and Davison (1964) have shown statistically 
significant correlations between the Nowlis MACL and the 
California Personality Inventory and 4 scales based on the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. 
Criticisms: 
Meddis (1972) has argued on the basis of statistical 
evidence that the commonly reported existence of several 
monopolar mood factors is the result of peculiarities in 
the structure of the mood scales themselves. While not 
criticizing the use of mood rating scales based on factor 
analytic studies, i.e. the general approach, he did criticize 
the Nowlis MACL on two counts: 
1. The Nowlis scoring categories are: (a) "definitely 
feel 'x' "; (b) "feel slightly 'x' "; (c) "cannot 
decide whether or not I feel 'x' "; and (d) "definitely 
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do not feel 'x' ". These responses are assigned 
numerical values of 3, 2, 1 and 0 respectively. 
Meddis asks if it can be said with confidence that 
"cannot decide whether or not I feel x" is midway 
between "feel slightly x" and "definitely do not feel 
x"? Meddis believes that "cannot decide whether or 
not I feel x" should be counted as missing data rather 
than as a mid-point reply, hence the status of the 
scale as an ordinal scale is questioned. 
2. Meddis point~ out that the scale is not symmetrical, 
i.e. there are two opportunities for acceptance (a 
and b) and only one opportunity for rejection (d). 
For this reason increases on a mood factor score, 
e.g. moving from (b) to (a) on the factor component 
"happy" cannot be paralleled by a decrease on the 
factor component "sad", because there is no second 
category for decrease. This suggests that negative 
correlations between the mood factors containing the 
components happy and sad will be absent. 
Meddis (1972) writes: 
The results strongly suggest that the rating scales 
may have influenced the results obtained by the 
pioneers of MACL research. They do not, of course, 
undermine the general approach. By bringing the 
early results more in line with commonsense, they 
increase our confidence that the tests are measuring 
what we think they are measuring. It is easier to 
accept a small number of largely bipolar mood factors 
and easier to make clinical sense of a patient's 
factor scores along such mood dimensions. 
Larger sample sizes will be needed to identify the 
factors with more precision. It is possible that 
some factors such as aggressiveness could be either 
monopolar (aggressive v. not aggressive) or bipolar 
(aggressive v. friendly). Decisions on such issues 
are required before MACLs can take their place as 
powerful research and clinical rating procedures (p.l84). 
Certainly the.development of reliable and valid mood rating 
scales with equal opportunities for acceptance and rejection 
of items, is desirable. Meddis' two statistical criticisms 
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are cogent and his study should be replicated. However, 
the qualitative analysis of over 200 mood analyses has 
suggested a greater congruence of monopolar mood dimensions 
with subjects' reported experience. Subjects' mood state 
is often a complex state of affairs, several contradictory 
feelings may predominate, or fluctuate in their ascendency. 
To expect largely bipolar mood factors and to argue that 
they are more in line with commonsense, is merely to 
introduce a counter bias. 
In conclusion, the MACL is a factor analytically derived 
measure of mood change with known (estimated) reliability 
and validity. The assessment of the adequacy of this 
reliability and validity for research purposes must take 
several facts into account. Firstly, as a factor analytic 
measure it has the deficiencies inherent in many factor 
analytic approaches, i.e. oblique rotation (lack of full 
independence of factors), a degree of circularity in the 
definition of dimensions, and an exclusively nomothetic 
theoretical base (Brody, 1972). 
Secondly, mood by one definition is that which fluctuates 
over short periods of time. This introduces an important 
limiting factor, what might be termed an analogue of the 
Heisenberg principle of uncertainty, into the domain of 
mood. This is to say that the measuring instrument itself 
may interact significantly with the phenomenon under study. 
Two options seem to follow--either the empirical study of 
mood requires a serious curtailment, perhaps even abandon-
ment, or an acknowledgement is made that (1) our measuring 
instrument may necessarily influence the object of study 
(by one definition of mood) and (2) the intrinsic nature 
of mood may militate against any precise measurement. An 
abandonment of the empirical study of mood is not recommended 
at this exploratory stage of the construct. The measurement 
or even the description of any affective state will influence 
that state to a certain degree. Prudence lies in acknow-
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ledging the presence of a limitation and assessing its 
extent. 
The limitation may not be as great as it first seemed. 
If one of the things an individual is disposed to do when 
in a particular mood, is to advow, admit, declare, or 
generally manifest the particular mood through verbal 
declarations, then the MACL can serve as a prompt for 
such responses (Nowlis, 1965). Hence the MACL will also 
influence mood in that it elicits response tendencies 
already present 'in the mood. It manifests, or permits 
a manifestation of the latent constituent elements and 
parameters of individual moods. 
If the Nowlis scale is not an ordinal scale as Meddis 
(1972) implies, then quite simply the Nowlis scores are 
not amenable to parametric·statistics. However, equal 
and continuous gradations of subjective estimates are 
always difficult to achieve--until Meddis' refinements 
can be established to be both empirically useful and 
valid, the MACL will undoubtedly continue to be used as 
an approximation of a valid ordinal rating scale for 
indicating mood change. Meddis is correct in saying 
that there is an asymmetry to the scales, but it is a 
defect not an abrogation. In terms of the present study 
it could theoretically result in a greater number of 
increase scores. However, even if present, this would 
be a constant across all the treatments and hence its 
effect would be minimized or as a constant may possibly 
be factored out. Bearing these deficiencies in mind, 
and the unpalatable alternative of making mood an experi-
mental pariah in advance of experimental investigation, 
the MACL was deemed not to be perfect, but developmentally 
adequate in terms of the available measures for mood change. 
3.25 The Mood Analysis Questionnaire 
Description: 
.... 
The Mood Analysis Questionnaire" is an inventory of questions 
* Note: See Appendix B, Tabulation B1 for the Mood Analysis Questionnaire. 
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and probes designed: (1) to obtain basic information con-
cern1ng mood and (2) to induce mood change. This dynamic 
process orientated research tool can be employed to explore, 
unfold, and make apparent the different aspects and levels 
of mood. Its structure and deployment requires the 
individual to pescribe, analyse, and express their mood 
state. The Mood Analysis Questionnaire is based on the 
experimental work of Gendlin and Olsen (1967), and the 
theoretical orientation of Schrag (1969), Ellenberger (1958) 
and Spiegelberg (1971). It should be stressed that the Mood 
Analysis Questionnaire is an exploratory research instrument 
and technique which may, or may not, have clinical utility. 
This study investigates the effect of the Mood Analysis 
Questionnaire on mood dimensions, and different types of 
mood, but does not seek to establish clinical validity. 
Format: 
After an initial categorization of their mood and an 
unstructured description, subjects proceed to answer a 
series of questions that are grouped determinately under 
ten headings: 
1. Environmental correlates 
(major and minor life events that may be contributing 
to the mood; subjects are asked to indicate the 
connection they perceive between these events and their 
mood) 
2. Cognitive mode analysis 
(a determination of the major cognitive processes 
operating in the mood) 
3. Categorical analysis 
(the subjects' experience of the dimensions of Space, 
Time, Materiality, and Causality in the mood) 
4. The psychological phenomenological reduction 
(the subject's suspension or bracketing of 
and value judgements concerning the mood; 
an assessment of their attitude toward the 
5. The psychological eidetic reduction 
beliefs about 
followed by 
mood) 
(subject's own determination of the essential aspects of 
the mood and background determinants) 
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6. The psychological intentional analysis 
(the subject's general orientation, directedness, and 
striving towards various objects) 
7. The psychological constitutional analysis 
(the subject's view 
or ideal completion 
logical structures, 
the mood produces; 
ment of the mood) 
8. The ego analysis 
as to what the pragmatic, logical 
of the mood would be; what psycho-
e.g. attitudes, beliefs, convictions, 
the stability and expected develop-
(the subject's perception of their degree of integration 
in the mood; their expression of an embodiment of the 
mood; whether or not the mood has a "message" for the 
subject) 
9. The psychological body analysis 
(the subject's bodily activity, bodily intentionality, 
and the action tendencies of the body in the mood) 
10. Final description of the mood 
(subjects are asked to describe the mood as they 
experience it at the moment) 
Subjects are then asked to give comments on the mood analysis 
session. It is emphasized that negative comments are 
especially helpful. 
Additional information: 
1. Subjects are asked to record in terms of their own 
experience, a definition of mood. 
2. Subjects are asked to use the word "mood" in four 
different grammatical sentences. They are asked to 
record sentences they could imagine themselves saying 
to a friend. 
3. Subjects are asked if they have had feelings like 
) 
those described in the mood analysis in the past. 
If so, under what sort of circumstances. 
4. Subjects are asked if they think they are a "moody 
person". If so, to please explain. 
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3.3 Procedure 
3.31 Experimental procedure 
All subjects were tested at the Rosebank Child Guidance 
Clinic. Testing conditions at the clinic were good. 
Illumination and ventilation were adequate, and the noise 
level was satisfactory. Subjects were tested in small 
groups ranging from 5 to 12 individuals. The fluctuation 
in group size was due to subjects' practical and tutorial 
commitments. Meetings were arranged weekly following the 
same progression: Session 1, Session 2, Session 3, 
Session 4, and Session 5. 
Volunteers were contacted telephonically prior to Session 1 
and a brief outline of the 4 experimental sessions was 
given. 
On Session 1 the Nowlis· MACL was provided and the instructions 
read aloud to the subjects. Subjects were then given the 
16PF and the instructions were also read aloud. Upon 
completion of the 16PF, the Gough ACL was provided and the 
instructions again read aloud. When the Gough ACL was 
completed, the Nowlis MACL was re-administered. Subjects 
were given the Edwards EPPS to complete in their free time. 
They were instructed not to confer with each other on it 
and to return all the test materials the following week. 
Session 1 was ·designed to obtain personality data for the 
subjects and to measure the amount and type of mood change 
resulting from completing personality tests. This was 
measured by the change on the 12 mood dimensions of the 
Nowlis MACL. 
On Session 2 subjects were told that in this session they 
would complete the Mood Analysis Questionnaire. The Kowlis 
MACL was distributed and completed. The instructions on 
the Mood Analysis Questionnaire were read aloud to the 
subjects. Subjects were asked to categorize their mood 1n 
one or two words and to give it an intensity rating on a 
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7-point scale. The questions of the Mood Analysis Question-
naire were then read aloud to the subjects. At the end of 
the Mood Analysis Questionnaire another categorization of 
mood was taken and an intensity rating. The Nowlis MACL 
was then re-administered. 
Session 2 was designed to measure the amount and type of mood 
change resulting from the experimenter's administration of 
the Mood Analysis Questionnaire. In addition the effect of 
the Mood Analysis Questionnaire on different categories of 
mood can be determined. This was measured by the change on 
the 12 mood dimensions of the Nowlis MACL. 
On Session 3 subjects engaged in quiet activities. They 
either brought university work or read magazines. The 
Nowlis MACL was administered at the beginning and at the 
end of the session. 
Session 3 was designed to measure the amount and type of mood 
change resulting from engaging in quiet activities. This was 
measured by the change on the 12 mood dimensions of the Nowlis 
MACL. 
On Session 4 subjects were told that they would complete the 
Mood. Analysis Questionnaire but this time the questions would 
not be read to them and interaction between subjects and 
experimenter would be kept to a minimum. The Nowlis MACL 
was administered and the subjects worked on the Mood Analysis 
Questionnaire. ~b~ Nowlis MACL was then re-administered. 
Session 4 was designed to determine the experimenter effect 
on Session 2, i.e. the fact that the questions were read 
aloud by the experimenter on Session 2. 
On Session 5 subjects came in individually for feedback and 
discussion. They discussed their mood analyses, and were 
asked to categorize the 4 grammatical sentences using the 
word "mood" according to categories based on the work of 
Strawson (1966) and Perkins (1966). Subjects were randomly 
• 
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chosen to be asked to participate 1n a sixth session for 
more detailed discussion of their moods. Forty-three 
subjects participated in this undertaking. 
Further intensive sess1ons were g1ven to 15 subjects who 
were found to have definite recurring mood states. Basic 
descriptions of these moods were recorded by the subjects 
while undergoing these moods. Major qualitative dimensions 
of mood were determined through formal questions and 
discussion. 
3.32 Design 
One hundred and five subjects underwent four experimental 
sessions designed to determine the effect of the Mood 
Analysis Questionnaire, under an experimenter administered 
condition and ~ self-administered condition, on mood. A 
fifth session was arranged for feedback and discussion. 
Forty-three subjects participated in further discussions 
of their mood states. Additional sessions were arranged 
with 15 subjects for more detailed study of basic recurring 
moods. 
SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE BASIC RESL\RCH DES!Gt\ 
Session 3 4 5 
Treatment Nmdis MACL Now lis MACL Now lis HACL Now 1 is n;cL Feedb::~c:L 
pre and posl pre and post pre and post pre and post and 
personality experimenter quiet sel f-adminis- discussi,." 
testing administered activities tration of 
Mood Analysis ~load Analvsis 
Questionnaire Questionnaire 
N 105 105 105 105 105 
3.33 Rationale for Statistical Procedure 
The data obtained from the experimental sess1ons was suit-
able for analysis by statistical techniques based on a 
comparison of group means. 
3.331 Identifying personality variables or patterns of 
personality variables that distinguish "moody" 
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from "non-moody" subjects. 
The Hotelling T2 test was performed on the 16PF, 
the EPPS, and the Gough ACL. Since each personality 
test was a set of scores, not a single or global 
score, a multivariate statistical technique was 
required. As two group means were to be compared 
(moody vs. non-moody), the Hotelling T2 was indicated 
(Morrison, 1967). Simultaneous confidence intervals 
were used to interpret the results, Student t-tests 
were also required. 
3.332 To show that the Mood Analysis Questionnaire is 
effective in changing dimensions of mood, the evidence 
is built up in a stepwise fashion. 
A. Comparing the effectiveness of the Mood Analysis 
Questionnaire in changing dimensions of mood with 
the other experimental sessions. 
1. A one-way analysis of variance with repeated 
measures was applied to the absolute magnitude 
of change, i.e. ~he sum of the change scores 
on the 12 Nowlis mood factors irrespective of 
sign, in order to compare overall mean change 
on the four experimental sessions. A one-way 
analysis of variance was used as there were 
four groups to be compared on a single measure. 
It was a repeated measures design as the subjects 
were the same across the four treatments. 
2. A one-way multivariate analysis of variance 
with repeated measures (U-statistic, Morrison, 
1967, p.l79) was applied to the mean magnitude 
of change scores on the 12 Nowlis mood factors 
across the four sessions. A multivariate 
technique was needed to compare the group means 
because the Nowlis MACL is made up of 12 factors 
and not a single score. Hence the MANOVA was 
used. This is also a repeated measures design. 
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A multivariate analys of variance was chosen 
over a 2-way analysis of variance because it 
was desirable to compare the four sessions on 
the 12 Nowlis mood factors simultaneously. 
3. A one-way analysis of variance with repeated 
measures was applied to the component change 
scores for each of the 12 Nowlis mood factors 
across the four experimental sessions. The 
component change scores for each factor con-
sist of components increased, components 
decreased, new components, components dis-
appeared, and total change in components. 
Since the component scores are not independent 
a multivariate technique was not used. A uni-
variate technique was used on each category 
separately. As there were four groups to be 
compared the one-way analysis of variance was 
used. 
B. Investigating the effect of the Mood Analys 
Questionnaire on the different mood groups, ~.e. 
positive, neutral and negative moods, of Session 2. 
1. A one-way analysis of variance was applied to 
the mean absolute magnitude of change scores 
on the 12 Nowlis mood factors across the three 
mood groups. A one-way analysis of variance 
was used as there were three different mood 
groups to be compared on a single measure. 
However, in this case it was not a repeated 
measures design. 
3.333 Establishing whether the four experimental sessions 
were effecting moody and non-moody subjects differently. 
The Hotelling T2 test was applied to the mean magnitude 
of change on the 12 Nowlis mood factors for each of the 
four sessions in order to compare moody and non-moody 
subjects. A multivariate statistical technique to 
compare group means was indicated. Since there were 
-217-
two groups to be compared, the Hotelling T2 test was 
used. 
3.334 Investigating the frequency of different elements ~n 
student definitions of mood. 
The definitions were categorized and frequency counts 
determined. This form of data is suitable for a x2 
Test of Homogeneity. This tests whether the different 
definitions have the same frequency, i.e. are homo-
geneous or not. 
3.335 Investigating the frequency of different categories 
of use of the word mood in grammatical sentences. 
This form of data was also suitable for the x2 Test 
of Homogeneity. 
3.34 Statistical techniques 
Retelling's T2 Statistic 
Suppose two independent random samples of observations on 
some multidimensional variable have been obtained under 
different experimental conditions. We assume that the 
variables have a multivariate normal distribution with the 
same, though unknown, covariance matrix L of full rank p, 
and desire to test the null hypothesis 
H0 : 1.11 = 1.12 
that the population means are identical, as opposed to the 
alternate hypothesis 
H1: lll 1.12 
of different means. 
By application of the likelihood-ratio principles the 
statistic for testing the hypothesis is 
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where N1 and N2 are respective sample sizes, x1 and x2 are 
respective sample means and S is the pooled sample estimate 
of the common covariance matrix. This T2 statistic can be 
converted to an F statistic which is approximately F-
distributed with p and N1+N2-p-1 degrees of freedom. The 
simultaneous confidence intervals may then be defined for 
linear combinations of the mean differences. 
Student t-test between two sample means 
To test the hypothesis that the means from 2 populations 
are the same against the alternative hypothesis that they 
are different the sample test statistic 
1s employed. Here n1 and n2 are respective sample sizes, 
x1 and x2 are respective univariate sample means and s1 
and s2 are respective sample variances. This statistic 
has a Student t-distribution with n1+n2-2 degrees of freedom 
provided the underlying distribution is normal. 
One-way analysis of variance with repeated measures 
To test the hypothesis that treatment effects on a uni-
variate score are the same against an alternative hypothesis 
that they are different, the model y .. 
1J 
is assumed. Here the e .. are normally 
1] 
distributed. 
We calculate the total sums of .squares 
SSTOT = t (yij - y )2 
and the treatment sums of squares 
SSTREAT L (y.j - y )2 ... 
= l-1 +oc.i +b.+ e .. 
J 1] 
and independently 
/ 
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geneous against the hypothesis that they are different the 
sample test statistic 
(0. - E.) 2 
1 1 
1 E. 
1 
1s used. Here the 0. are the observed frequencies of each 
1 
category and the E. are the expected frequencies under the 
1 
hypothesis of homogeneity. This statistic is approximately 
x2-distributed with k-1 degrees of freedom, where k is the 
number of categories. 
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CHAPTER 4 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
Sullllllary 
"Noody" subjects are distinguished from "non-moody" subjects in terms of personality 
variables revealed by standard tests. Different criteria of "moodiness" are signifi<.:antly 
correlated with different sets of personality variables. 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), is shown to 
have a determinate and specifiable effect on moods: it influences mood in a global 
fashion, influences mood in ways different from the other experiment:! sessions, may 
influence mood irrespective of whether or not the individual is a "moody" person, and 
in particular influences negative moods in predominantly positive ways. 
Subjects' comments indicate that the MAT operates to change mood and increase awareness. 
The concept "mood" is outlined and limited with respect to its basic parameters; a 
substantial empirical base for the concept is provided. Primary elements for the con-
cept are "mood" as: "a state of mind .or feeling", "pervasive", "having a causal ef feet", 
"the result of both internal and external factors", and "an attitude". 
A functional analysis of language acts shows that the word "mood" is employed in 
sentences to perform social-judgemental actions and to report feeling qualities and 
systematic influences. 
Qualitative data is presented showing: the range of mood experience, major qualitative 
dimensions, causal factors, alterations in self and environment perception, and the 
types of social relationships facilitated by different categories of mood. 
Content Summary 
Introduction 
4.1 Personality variables that significantly distinguish "moody" from "non-moody" 
subjects 
4.2 Absolute magnitude of mcod change (global mood change) across the four experi-
mental sessions 
4.3 Analysis of mood change on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors across the tour experimental 
sessions 
4.31 Magnitude of change scores across the four experimental sessions 
4.32 Component change scores across the four experimental sessions 
4.4 The effect of the four experimental sessions on "moody" vs. "non-moody" subjects 
4.5 The effect of Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), 
on moods classified as positive, neutral and negative 
4.6 Analysis of subjects' comments upon completion of Session 2 
4. 7 Significant elements of subjects' definition of "mood" 
4.8 Significant language acts of sentences using the word "mood" 
4.9 Qualitative data 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 4 presents the collection of experimental and qualitative data, 
and represents a preliminary attempt at resolving a number of general 
and specific questions concerning "mood" and mood experience. The 
experimental questions considered can be grouped under four headings: 
Personality Variables that distinguish "Moody" from "Non-Moody" 
individuals, The Influence of the Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) on Mood, 
Psycho-linguistic Data Pertinent to the Concept Mood, and Qualitative 
Data Presenting the Basic Features and Attributes of Mood. 
1. Personality Variables that distinguish "Moody" from "Non-Moody" 
individuals 
Can standard personality tests provide a set of variables that 
distinguish "moody" from "non-moody" subjects? Do different 
criteria of "moodiness" corresponding to different conceptions 
of "moody" establish identical or dissimilar patterns of variables? 
Are some variables constant regardless of the criterion of "moody"? 
2. The Influence of the Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) on Mood 
Does the Mood Analysis Technique have a greater global effect on 
mood than the other experimental sessions? Is the Mood Analysis 
Technique influencing particular dimensions of mood differently 
from the other experimental sessions, i.e. is its influence 
selective? Is the Mood Analysis Technique influencing "moody11 
individuals differently from "non-moody" individuals? What is 
the effect of the Mood Analysis Technique on different categories 
of mood, i.e. positive, neutral, and negative moods? What are 
the subjects' own appraisals of the Mood Analysis Technique? 
3. Psycho-linguistic Data Pertinent to the Concept 11Mood" 
Can subjects' definition of "mood 11 in terms of their own 
experience contribute to our understanding of what mood is and 
how it functions? What is the range of psycho-linguistic actions 
that mood sentences perform? What significance does this have for 
an adequate conceptualization of "mood"? Is "mood" primarily a 
state or process concept? Can it be assimilated to an organiza-
tional concept for patterns of behaviour? Does it operate 
exclusively to make social-evaluative attributions? 
4. Qualitative Data Presenting the Basic Features and Attributes of 
Mood 
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What is the range of mood experience? What kinds of mood do 
subjects typically have? How do subjects formulate the qualita-
tive structure, the causes and reasons for their experience? Is 
there a wider matrix of contributing factors? When moods are 
grouped into positive, neutral, and negative categories, are 
there common features across these categories? How do subjects 
perceive themselves and their environment when in specific moods? 
What aspects of self-concept may be said to be operating? 
Section 4.1 presents personality variables from the 16PF, EPPS, and ACL 
that distinguish "moody" from "non-moody" subjects at a level of 
statistical significance. Two criteria were used to identify "moody" 
subjects: a self-opinion criterion (corresponding to "moody" in the 
sense of having protracted feeling s·tates of moderate intensity and/or 
having a susceptibility to spells of irritability and bad temper) and 
a statistical criterion of high and low mean variability (corresponding 
to "moody" in the sense of relative changeability of feeling). Each 
criterion yielded statistically significant results. Furthermore, there 
were variables unique to each criterion and a core set of ten personality 
variables common to both criteria. 
This data leads us to conclude that: 
(a) "moody" subjects can be distinguished from "non-moody" subjects 
in terms of personality variables on standard tests; the 
implication here is that there may be a significant personality 
pattern associated with the different types of "moody" individual, 
and the needs, values, actions, and modes of responding for 
"moody" subjects may be different from their "non-moody" counter-
parts. (See section 5.1 for personality sketches of the two 
- types of "moody" individual); 
(b) the fact that there are personality variables unique to the two 
different criteria of moodiness implies conceptually--that the 
associated concepts of "moodiness" have a degree of independence, 
and empirically--that the unique variables enclose different 
segments of personality dispositions; thus this finding supports 
to some degree the conceptual and empirical separation of 
different types of moodiness; 
(c) nevertheless, the existence of a core set of variables common to 
both criteria implies conceptually--that the two associated con-
cepts of moodiness may span a more fundamental conception, and 
empirically--there may be a more basic entity, pattern, or 
factor, "beneath" the revealed variables, though from the data 
available we are not able to make the integration which would 
identify this underlying factor. 
Overview of Sections 4.2 - 4.5 
Section 4.2 establishes the first link in the chain of argumentation 
for the case that the Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) has a determinate 
and specifiable effect on moods. The evidence is not absolutely con-
clusive, but it is believed to be sufficiently persuasive to suggest 
that the MAT does have a major global influence (section 4.2), 
influences mood in ways different from the other experimental sessions 
(section 4.3), may influence mood irrespective of whether or not the 
individual is a "moody" person (section 4.4), and in particular has a 
positive effect on moods classified as "negative" (section 4.5). 
Section 4.2 investigates the absolute magnitude of mood change (global 
change on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors) across the four experimental 
sessions. We might expect that Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), would have a relatively high 
absolute magnitude of change score owing to its design as a probe and 
facilitator of mood change. This expectation is fulfilled experi-
mentally, at a level of statistical significance, However, we cannot 
say that the absolute magnitude of change for Session 2 is greater 
than the absolute magnitude of change for Session 1, the personality 
testing session. (See section 5.2 for: a discussion of this finding 
in terms of the similarity cif cognitive processes instituted by the 
two se~sions, and an explanation for the relatively low score of 
Session 4, the self-administered MAT, in terms of experimental procedure). 
Thus the first link in the chain of argumentation is firm but not 
entirely invulnerable. The absolute magnitude of change scores are 
summary scores, implying no reference per se to modulations in specific 
mood factors. The detailed signification of these scores can emerge 
only with an examination of the magnitude and component change scores. 
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Section 4.3 presents the analysis of mood change on the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors across the four experimental sess~ons. Mood change is indicated 
by magnitude of change scores and component change scores on the Nowlis 
Mood Factors. The magnitude of change scores will establish the effect 
of Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), 
~n terms of discrete change, i.e. mean increase or mean decrease on 
particular mood dimensions (across all moods), in comparison with the 
three other experimental sessions. The component change scores will 
indicate the internal change on the Nowlis Mood Factors, i.e. factor 
components that increase, decrease, disappear, are new, and total change, 
not detected by the magnitude of change scores. 
The analysis of section 4.31 (magnitude of change scores) shows that 
there is an overall difference in group means across the four experi-
mental sessions, at the 0,01 level of significance. Examining the 
individual Nowlis Mood Factors, those factors statistically distinguishing 
the four experimental sessions were: Aggression, Surgency, Social 
Affection, Sadness, Egotism and Scepticism. Focusing on Session 2, 
the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), it was 
found: Session 2 increased the mood dimensions Aggression, Social 
Affection, Sadness and Egotism; and showed a lesser decrease in 
Surgency and Scepticism. 
These results can be explained in terms of the design and format of the 
MAT (see section 3.25 for the design), its ability to locate present 
feeling in terms of past feeling, the latent and shadow aspects of 
present feeling, and the projection of future feeling--all aspects 
being made immanent through the search for expressive metaphors. 
(See section 5.3 for a discussion of these issues, and an explication 
~n terms of the salient effects of each experimental session, a comparison 
of effects across sessions, and a consideration of the experimental 
effects in terms of "energy" mood factors_, "emotion" and "cognitive" 
mood factors). 
Section 4.32 provides an analysis of the component change scores 
(factor elements that increase, decrease, disappear, newly appear, 
and total change in components) on the Nowlis Mood Factors. The analysis 
is attuned to both significant component changes for factors that showed 
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significant magnitude of change scores, and significant component changes 
for factors that did not show significant magnitude of change scores. A 
component change analysis is essential because a 1ack of magnitude change 
may be the result of an internal condition where different factor 
components balance or cancel out one another, i.e. a lack of magnitude 
change for a mood factor does not exclude internal factor change. 
The Nowlis Mood Factors Aggression, Anxiety, Surgency, Fatigue, Vigour, 
Social Affection, Sadness, Egotism, Deactivation and Scepticism (see 
Tables 41 and 42) each showed statistically significant component change 
scores. Focusing on Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), the~ salient component change scores relative to the 
other experimental sessions occurred on these factors: Aggression (Session 
2 had the ability to generate new components), Anxiety (Session 2 had the 
ability both to generate new components and make components disappear--
it was the most active experimental session in terms of this dimension), 
Social Affection (Session 2 had the ability to generate more new components 
than any of the other experimental sessions), and Sadness (Session 2 
showed more total change and more new components). 
In general the patterns of effect for Session 2 were parallel to Session 
4, the self-administered MAT, and both sessions tended to be dissimilar 
to Session 1, the per.sonality testing session, and Session 3, the quiet 
activities session. 
The results suggest that Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood 
Analysis Technique (MAT), has the ability to generate more new components 
over several mood~dimensions (with the exception of the mood factor 
Deactivation), and provide substantial support for the argument that 
Session 2 is functioning to bring new feeling elements into awareness 
and to reveal potentials for feeling. (See section 5.3 for the relevant 
comparisons, the areas of qualification, and a detailed discussion of 
the analysis). 
Thus the analyses of section 4.3 forge the second link in the chain of 
argumentation. The Mood Analysis Technique has been shown: to 
influence mood (as measured by magnitude of change scores and component 
change scores) in ways different from the other experimental sessions, 
and to function to bring new elements of affect into awareness. 
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Section 4.4 examines the effect of the four experimental sessions on 
"moody" vs. "non-moody" subjects. It had been expected that Session 2, 
the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), might 
influence "moody" individuals. (so designated by the self-opinion 
criterion and the statistical criterion) to a greater extent than "non-
moody" individuals. The experimental results indicate that this was 
not the case. An alternate possibility is that the Mood Analysis 
Technique is influencing mood irrespective of whether or not the subject 
can be classified as "moody"; since the Mood Analysis Technique has 
been shown to influence mood, and from examining subjects' comments 
upon completion of Session 2 (see section 4.6) this appears a reasonable 
explanation. However in moderation to any extreme elevation in confi-
dence this conclusion suggests, it should be noted that there were no 
statistical differences between "moody" and "non-moody" subjects on 
any of the other experimental sessions. If we wish to include this 
finding as a fast link in our argumentation, we must also aver that 
its nature may be somewhat tenuous and speculative. 
Section 4.5 carries out a new more detailed examination of the effects 
of Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), on different qualitative categories of mood. It has been shown 
that Session 2 has a major global effect across all moods, that it 
influences mood 1n ways divergent from the other experimental sessions, 
and that it may influence mood independently of whether or not the 
subject is a "moody" person. Now we wish to know whether Session 2, 
the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), has a 
differential effect on moods classified as positive, neutral and 
negative. Confidence in the clinical utility of the MAT will be 
enhanced if it can be shown to influence negative moods in predominantly 
positive ways. 
Subjects' descriptive classification of their mood state enabled each 
mood to be assigned to either a positive, neutral, or negative mood 
category (see section 4.5 for the rationale for this procedure). A 
one-way analysis of variance comparing the absolute magnitude of change 
scores for the three qualitative categories was significant at the 0,01 
level. It was found that Group 3 (negative moods) had a greater mean 
absolute magnitude of change than Group 2 (neutral moods); this suggests 
that Session 2 was globally influencing negative moods to a greater 
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extent than more neutral moods. It appears that the negative moods are 
amenable to change and less resistant to change than the neutral moods. 
(The mean absolute magnitude of change scores for positive moods was 
intermediately high but not significantly high with respect to the 
neutral moods, nor was it significantly low with respect to the negative 
moods.) The next step 1s to establish that the greater global effect 
represents an improvement 1n the negative moods. This can be achieved 
by examining the individual Nowlis Mood Factors, and subjects' indication 
of qualitative or intensity changes upon completion of Session 2. 
Statistical analysis of the individual Nowlis Mood Factors shows that 
the factors Anxiety, Surgency, and Elation are all significant across 
the three mood groups (positive, neutral and negative moods). 
Scrutinizing the inter-group comparisons (section 4.5, Table 54), it 
can be seen that Group 3 (negative moods) show a decrease in Anxiety; 
and increases for the mood dimensions Surgency and Elation. In each 
case these results can be interpreted as an improvement in the negative 
moods. 
The qualitative data for the three mood groups establishes that overall 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), 
either improves their quality of negative moods (N=34) or reduces their 
intensity. Apparent contradictions are Frustrated moods (N=3), and 
Sceptical moods (N=l). 
(See section 4.5 for the analysis of neutral and positive moods, and 
section 5.7 for a thorough analysis of mood improvements, stabilizations 
and deteriorations--here it is established that the three Frustrated 
moods and one Sceptical mood which appeared to deteriorate nevertheless 
resulted in increased insight for the subjects.) 
Thus the final link in the sequentially articulated argument that 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), 
has a determinate and specifiable effect on mood is set in place. 
Section 4.6 presents the analysis of subjects' comments given upon the 
completion of Session 2. Subjects were asked to give their considered 
opinion as to whether the MAT changed or did not change their mood, 
whether they liked or did not like the imagination questions, whether 
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they had suggestions for improvement in the MAT's format. They were told 
that negative comments would be especially helpful for revising the Mood 
Analysis Technique. This encouragement to give negative comments and 
criticisms was emphasized in order to overcome any natural reluctance 
' 
on the subjects' part to criticize, and to avoid acquiescence responses. 
The statistical analysis of responses revealed that the response cate-
gories "Changed Moods" and "Increased Awareness" had particularly high 
frequencies, and the response categories "Didn't like Ima~ination 
Questions" and "Frustrating-Irritating" had particularly low frequencies. 
These results suggest that the MAT had the ability to influence mood, 
and did so in such a way that subjects' self-awareness, and understanding 
of the generative conditions, the source and trend of the mood, was 
enhanced. Some subjects felt that the MAT was too long and repetitious, 
but this was a minority opinion. It is interesting to note that a small 
number of subjects felt that mood was basically subjective and undefinable, 
beyond verbal formulation or expression. 
Section 4.7 presents an analysis of subjects' definition of mood in terms 
of their own experience. Chapters 1 and 2 have criticized theoretical 
viewpoints on mood that do not specify their data base, or provide in-
ad,equate correspondence rules for linking higher-order propositions with 
lower-order empirical data. Section 4.7 is a partial corrective measure 
for this disconcerting and insupportable state of affairs. The concept 
"mood" has a wide range of reference, and the specification of those 
situations in which it is legitimate to employ the term are far from 
clear. The data of this section may be useful in outlining and limiting 
the concept of "mood" by establishing basic mood parameters in terms of 
subjects' own concretely felt experience. 
Response categories with particularly high frequencies were: 
Mood as a state of mind or feeling 
Mood characterized as pervasive 
Mood as having a causal effect 
Mood as the result of both internal and external factors 
Mood as an attitude. 
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It is suggested that the data and analysis of this section provides an 
empirical base that any theoretical view should be able to accommodate. 
(See section 5.9 for an explication of the mean1ng of these definition 
elements, considerations apposite to their value for understanding mood, 
and some assessments of how they would be accounted for by the view-
points outlined in section 1.10). 
Section 4.8 exam1nes the language acts (psycho-linguistic actions) 
performed by sentences using the word "mood". This approach is primarily 
a functional analysis that locates the import of "mood" in terms of 
contextualized psycho-linguistic actions. For example, the analysis of 
subjects' sentences using the word mood shows that mood sentences can 
be used to: report feeling qualities, characterize systematic aspects 
of mood experience, provide a vehicle for the natural expression of 
mood, evaluate other people in a social way, recognize discomfiture 
about one's own experience, request information, and many other actions 
(see section 4.8 Table 60). 
It is emphasized that language acts or psycho-linguistic actions never 
comprise isolated functions, but occur as an integral part of different 
ways of feeling, thinking, and acting. The analysis is not so much a 
matter of content interpretation, as it is seeing how in particular 
circumstances a particular mood sentence could come to be employed--
a cognisance of relevant circumstances, intentions and behaviours. It 
is to consider both what is being affirmed in providing a particular 
mood sentence, and an extrapolation to what is being said by a particular 
mood sentence. To understand these extended language acts is to determine 
function, action, context, and personal intentions. 
The subjects were asked to use the word "mood" in four different 
grammatical sentences. They were asked to generate sentences they could 
imagine themselves saying to a friend. The subjects were acquainted 
with categories of language acts adapted from the work of Wittgenstein 
(1972), Strawson (1970), and Austin (1963), and asked to make determinations 
for their sentences. The data obtained is used as part of the continuing 
effort to determine the parameters of what can meaningfully be said about 
"mood" both as a concept and an experience. Specifically the data is 
used to confirm or disconfirm two theses: 
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1. that mood is not any sort of experience or process, and 
2. that linguistic expressions referring to moods are not necessarily 
functioning to inform of psychological facts and that these 
expressions presuppose various social and institutional concepts. 
In addition we wish to consider how this data in its interpreted form 
might contribute to the configuration of a comprehensive concept or 
model for mood. 
(See section 5.10 for the interpretation and discussion.) 
Section 4.9 presents qualitative data obtained from the intensive study 
volunteers who recorded descriptions of their basic recurring mood 
states. Having determined which were the basic moods for a particular 
subject, the subject was then asked to write down a description of the 
mood the next time it occurred. Each subject was encouraged to describe 
the mood in any way she saw fit, as long as it was a portrayal of the 
affective state that was meaningful to her. Subjects met with the 
experimenter on a weekly basis to discuss their mood descriptions. 
During these sessions they were asked a series of questions designed 
to determine the causal factors and reasons for the mood, the aspects 
of personal identity operating in the mood, the role of personal goals 
and self-concept, the type and quality of interpersonal relations 
fostered by the mood, the modulations 1n self and environment perception 
intrinsic to the mood, and the degree to which the subject herself 
played an active and decisive role in producing the mood. 
For the purposes of presentation the moods are divided into three cate-
gories: positive, neutral and negative moods, and subjects' descriptions 
are arranged together, sequentially, under different content areas 
corresponding to the questions asked. 
(See section 5.11 for a structural analysis and a composite representa-
tion of the positive, neutral and negative moods.) 
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4.1 Personality Variables that significantly distinguish "Moody" from 
"Non-Moody" subjects 
Description 
The study used two different criteria of moodiness, a self-
opinion criterion and a statistical criterion. The self-opinion 
criterion was provided by the subject's response to the question 
'Do you think you are a moody person?' on the Mood Analysis 
Questionnaire. This question was qualified by instructions to 
the subjects that "moody" was to be understood in either or both 
of two senses, i.e. having a susceptibility to spells of irri-
tability and bad temper and/or having protracted feeling states 
of moderate intensity. 
It could be argued that this criterion, involving as it does a 
process of self-reflection concerning one's affective states and 
behavioural tendencies, is not independent of the process whereby 
personality dimensions are determined, i.e. checking answers on 
the personality tests. In this view the criterion is not pure, 
it is not a sign independent of that which it purports to 
indicate. 
In reply, it is suggested that the processes are similar but not 
identical. With the personality tests subjects are told to 
indicate their immediate response, to choose without deep 
reflection which of the choices offered by the test is most 
typical of themselves. On the Mood Analysis Questionnaire 
subjects are encouraged to give thought to the question and their 
responses. Nevertheless from a purist point of view this 
criterion is partially defective. 
The score of mean variability was used as the second criterion of 
moodiness. It was computed by taking the mean absolute magnitude 
of change across the four experimental sessions for each subject. 
The absolute magnitude of change is the sum of the change scores 
for each of the twelve Nowlis Mood Factors irrespective of sign. 
Those subjects with a high mean variability, i.e. one standard 
deviation above the mean were designated "moody". Those subjects 
with a low mean variability, i.e. one standard deviation below the 
mean were designated as "non-moody". (This cut-off point was 
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established after an inspection of the data).* The statistical 
criterion of high and low mean variability may be said to be an 
indicator of the general degree of fluctuation in feeling. 
* Mean = 15,48; S.D. = 5,07 
One S.D. above = 20,55 
One S.D .. below = 10,42 
Statistical Note 
The Hotelling T2 test was used in order to compare two group means 
on a set of scores. When the Hotelling T2 statistic is signifi-
cant, the two groups "moody" and "non-moody" differ on the 
personality factors simultaneously. To find out which particular 
factors are contributing to this significance, simultaneous 
confidence intervals are calculated. 
A test of significance for any factor can be achieved by comparing 
the Student t-test value squared (t2 ) with the critical Hotelling 
T2 value, or the t-value with Tcrit· 
Where: 
= 
N1 + N2 -p-1 
F . * cr1.t ' 
When this was done for the personality factors none were found to 
differ significantly at the ,05 level of significance. However, 
since the calculated Hotelling T2 statistic was significant, there 
exists at least one contrast of factors which would be significant. 
As this would be difficult to interpret, Student t-tests were 
calculated on each factor separately to give an indication as to 
which factors differ. 
* Note: 
p number of factors 
N1 = sample size for "non-moody" 
N2 = sample size for "moody" 
F . is a table value for a critical F with relevant degrees 
cr1.t 
of freedom. 
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Summary of Findings 
1. The self-opinion criterion 
At the ,01 level of significance "moody" subjects were 
distinguished from "non-moody" subjects in the following 
ways: 
On the 16 PF -
scored higher on the dimension Trusting vs. Suspicious 
On the EPPS -
scored lower on the dimension Deference 
On the ACL -
scored lower on the Ratio of favourable to unfavourable 
adjectives checked (saw themselves in a less favourable 
light) 
At the ,05 level of significance "moody" subjects were 
distinguished from "non-moody" subjects in the following 
ways: 
On the 16 PF -
scored higher on the dimensions Placid vs. Apprehensive, 
and Relaxed vs. Tense; scored lower on the dimension 
Affected by Feelings vs. Emotionally Stable 
On the EPPS -
scored higher on the dimensions Exhibition, Autonomy and 
Heterosexuality; 
and Nurturance 
On the ACL -
scored lower on the dimensions Affiliation 
scored higher on the dimension Counselling Readiness; 
scored lower on the dimensions Defensiveness and Personal 
Adjustment 
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2. The criterion of high and low mean variability 
At the ,01 level of significance "moody" subjects were 
distinguished from "non-moody" subjects in the following 
ways: 
On the 16 PF -
scored higher on the dimensions Humble vs. Assertive, and 
Trusting vs. Suspicious 
On the EPPS -
scored higher on the dimension Exhibition; scored lower on 
the dimension Deference 
On the ACL -
scored higher on the dimension Counselling Readiness; 
scored lower on the dimensions Defensiveness, Ratio of 
favourable to unfavourable adjectives (saw themselves in a 
less favourable light), Self-Control and Personal Adjustment. 
At the ,05 level of significance "moody" subjects were 
distinguished from "non-moody" subjects in the following 
ways: 
On the 16 PF -
scored higher on the dimensions Sober vs. Happy-go-lucky, 
Relaxed vs. Tense; scored lower on the dimension 
Undisciplined Self Conflict vs. Controlled 
On the EPPS -
scored higher on the dimension Heterosexuality; 
lower on the dimension Nurturance 
On the ACL -
scored 
showed no difference at the ,05 level of significance. 
Hypotheses 
4.1.1.1 
4.1.1.2 
Results 
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Null Hypothesis H : 
0 
It is hypothesized that the two different criteria of 
moodiness (the self-opinion criterion and the criterion 
of high and low variability) will not yield different 
patterns of significant personality variables. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1: 
It is hypothesized that the two different criteria of 
moodiness (the self-opinion criterion and the criterion 
of high and low variability) will yield different 
patterns of significant personality variables. 
1. The self-opinion criterion (the MAT criterion) 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 are presented showing the significant 
personality factors distinguishing "moody" from "non-moody" 
subjects, for subjects designated "moody" on the MAT 
criterion. 
Table 5 is a summary table of Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
Examining the first criterion of moodiness, the self-
opinion criterion (MAT criterion), Table 5 shows that moody 
subjects were distinguished from non-moody subjects at the 
,01 level of significance on these dimensions: 
On the 16 PF -
scored higher on the dimension Trusting vs. Suspicious 
On the EPPS -
scored lower on the dimension Deference 
On the ACL -
scored lower on the dimension Ratio of favourable to 
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TABLE 3 HOTELLING T2 TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE ON THE EDWARDS BETWEEN 
MOODY AND NON-MOODY DESIGNATED ON THE HA.T CRITERION 
Hotelling T2 df 
36,89 15 89 
Note 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule 
1. Achievement 
2. Deference 
3. Order 
4. Exhibition 
5. Autonomy 
6. Affiliation 
7. Intraception 
8. Succorance 
9. Dominance 
10. Abasement 
11. Nurturance 
12. Change 
13. Endurance 
14. Heterosexuality 
15. Aggression 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Non-Moody 
M STD 
54,77 28,32 
49,20 27,75 
46,07 29,92 
36,67 25,70 
60,13 24,80 
59,77 25,72 
62,57 27,34 
65,17 25,86 
34,37 26,74 
45,83 26,97 
69,13 19,71 
61,70 29,82 
47,70 27,55 
46,10 26,19 
53,00 22,98 
Sample size for non-moody is 30 throughout. 
Sample size for moody is 75 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 103 throughout. 
F-Value 
2,13* 
M 
59,24 
31,85 
36,29 
49,47 
71,48 
44,79 
52,80 
60,29 
36,09 
4 7. 7 6 
57' 01 
63,51 
46,09 
59,88 
60,40 
Moody 
STD 
28,06 
23,70 
28,56 
27,78 
24,96 
27,24 
26,53 
27,80 
27,54 
29,13 
27,36 
26,78 
26,97 
24,67 
28,50 
T2 
T crit 
crit 
t 
-0,74 
3,22** 
1,56 
-2,18* 
-2, 11* 
2,59* 
1,69 
0,83 
-0,29 
-0,31 
2. 21'* 
-0,30 
0,27 
-2,54* 
-1,27 
= 31,88 
5,65 
0,05 
TABLE 4 HOTELLING T2 TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE ON THE GOUGH ACL BETWEEN MOODY AND 
NON-MOODY DESIGNATED ON THE MAT CRITERION 
Hotelling T2 
11,48 
Selected Variables from The Gough Adjective Checklist 
df 
7 
97 
F-Value 
1,55 
Non-Moody 
1. Defensiveness 
2. Ratio of Fav. to Unfav. Adj. 
3. Self-confidence 
4. Self-control 
5. Lability 
6. Personal Adjustment 
7. Counselling Readiness 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0, 01. 
Sample size for non-moody is 30 throughout. 
Sample size for moody is 75 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 103 throughout. 
M STD 
42, 2) 11,73 
10,72 13,83 
48,67 9.40 
45,13 12,67 
52,93 11,67 
45,03 10,04 
54,53 8,36 
Moody 
M STD 
37,19 10,98 
5,10 6,92 
46,56 11,11 
40,67 10,53 
51,08 11,92 
39,87 10,52 
59,77 11,70 
I 
N 
w 
\0 
I 
t 
2,09* 
2. 77**-
0,92 
1,85 
0, 72 
2,30* 
-2,23* 
TABLE 5 
Test 
Cattell 
16 PF 
Cough 
t\CL 
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SUMHARY TABLE SHOWING PERSONALITY FACTORS WHICH DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY 
BETWEEN MOODY AND NON-MOODY ON THE :tAT CRITERIO~ 
Factor 
Factor C (Affected by Feelings 
·;s. Emotionally Stable) 
Factor L (Trusting vs. Suspicious) 
Factor 0 (Placid vs. Apprehensive) 
Factor Q4 (Relaxed vs. Tense) 
Deference 
Exhibition 
Autonomy 
Affiliation 
Nurturance 
Heterosexuality 
Defensiveness 
Ratio of Fav. to Unfav. Adj. 
Personal Adjustment 
Counselling Readiness 
Direction of Score 
Moody subjects score low 
(Affected by Feeling~ 
Moody subjects score high 
(Suspicious) 
Noody subjects score high 
(Apprehensive) 
Moody subjects score high 
(Tense) 
Moody subjects score low 
(less Deference) 
Hoody subjects score high 
(more Exhibition) 
Hoody subjects score high 
(more Autonomy) 
Moody subjects score low 
(less Affiliation) 
Moody subjects score low 
(less Nurturance) 
Moody subjects score high 
(more Heterosexuality) 
Moody subjects score low 
(less Defensiveness) 
Moody subjects score low 
(Moody subjects see them-
selves in a less favour-
able light) 
Moody subjects score low 
(less Personal Adjust-
ment) 
Moody subjects score high 
(more potential for 
counselling) 
Signifi-
cance 
Level 
p <0,05. 
P <IJ,Ol. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,01. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,01. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
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unfavourable adjectives (saw themselves in a less favourable 
light) 
At the ,OS level of significance: 
On the 16 PF -
scored higher on the dimensions Placid vs. Apprehensive, and 
Relaxed vs. Tense; scored lower on the dimension Affected 
by Feelings vs. Emotionally Stable 
On the EPPS -
scored higher on the dimensions Exhibition, Autonomy and 
Heterosexuality; 
and Nurturance 
On the ACL -
scored lower on the dimensions Affiliation 
scored higher on the dimension Counselling Readiness; 
scored lower on the dimensions Defensiveness and Personal 
Adjustment. 
2. The criterion of high and low mean variability 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 are presented showing the significant 
personality factors distinguishing "moody" from "non-moody" 
subjects, for subjects designated "moody" on the high and 
low mean variability criterion. 
Table 9 is a summary table of Tables 6, 7 and 8. 
Examining the second criterion of moodiness, the high and 
low mean variability criterion, Table 9 shows that moody 
subjects were distinguished from non-moody subjects at the 
,01 level of significance on these dimensions: 
On the 16 PF -
scored higher on the dimensions Humble vs. Assertive, and 
Trusting vs. Suspicious 
TABLE 6 HOTELLING T2 TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE ON THE CATTELL 16 PF BETWEEN MOODY AND NON-MOODY 
DESIGNATED IN TER.'1S OF HIGH AND LOW 11EAN VA"ZIABILITY CRITERION 
Hotelling T2 df F-Value 
96,14 16 3,19 ** 17 
Note 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
The Cattell 16 PF 
Non-Moody 
M STD 
1. Factor A (Reserved vs. Outgoing) 
2. Factor B (Less Intelligent vs. More Intelligent) 
3. Factor C (Affected by Feelings vs. Emotionally Stable 
5,32 
6' 24 
5,59 
5,00 
5,24 
4,41 
4,65 
5,65 
5,29 
6, 71 
5,47 
5,82 
o,71 
6,53 
5,65 
5,47 
2,06 
1,60 
2,55 
2,09 
1,61 
1,73 
1,80 
2,09 
1,45 
2,05 
2,07 
2,5n 
1,40 
1,97 
2,18 
2' 7 2 
4. Factor E (Humble vs. Assertive) 
5. Factor F (Sober vs. Happy-go-lucky) 
6. Factor G (Expedient vs. Conscientious) 
7. Factor H (Shy vs. Venturesome) 
8. Factor l (Tough-minded vs. Tender-minded) 
9. Factor L (Trusting vs. Suspicious) 
10. Factor M (Practical vs. Imaginative) 
11. Factor N (Forthright vs. Shrewd) 
12. Factor 0 (Placid vs. Apprehensive) 
13. Factor Ql (Conservative vs. Experimenting) 
14. Factor l)2 (Group-dependent vs. Self-sufficient) 
15. Factor Q3 (Undisciplined Self-conflict vs. Controlled) 
16. Factor Q4 (Relaxed vs. Tense) 
)~ p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Sample size for non-moody is 17 throughout. 
Sample size for moody is 17 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 12 throughout. 
Moody 
M STD 
5, 71 2,11 
5,65 2,42 
4,29 1,93 
7,53 1,97 
6,35 1,54 
3,94 2,30 
6,00 2,12 
6,59 :2,15 
7,53 1,59 
5,88 1,65 
4,59 2,27 
7,12 2. 12 
7 ,4 7 2. :.!4 
5,88 2,00 
4,12 l, 90 
7,53 1,59 
-------
T 
crit 
T 
crit 
t 
-0,49 
0,84 
1,67 
-3,63** 
-2,07* 
0,67 
-2,00 
-1,29 
-4' 29 1'* 
1,29 
1' 19 
-l,ol 
-1,19 
0,95 
2,18* 
-2,70''' 
~ 72,:39 
= 8,'il 
0,05 
I 
N 
""' N I 
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TABLE 7 HOTELLING T2 TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE ON THE EDWARDS 
BETWEEN MOODY AND NON-MOODY DESIGNATED IN TERMS OF 
HIGH AND LOW MEAN VARIABILITY CRITERION 
Hotelling T2 
44,32 
df 
15 
18 
The Edwards Personal Preference Schedule 
1. Achievement 
2. Deference 
3. Order 
4. Exhibition 
5. Autonomy 
6. Affiliation 
7. Intraception 
8. Succorance 
9. Dominance 
10. Abasement 
11. Nurturance 
12. Change 
13. Endurance 
14. Heterosexuality 
15. Aggression 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Non-Moody 
M STD 
51,29 24,50 
51,88 27,82 
43,94 28,63 
34,59 20,75 
56,82 22,52 
54,24 30,28 
62,47 21,23 
57,18 27,96 
38,18 27,49 
47,12 31,26 
62,35 23,05 
59,71 30,01 
56,76 29,19 
45,94 26,57 
56,06 25,57 
Sample size for non-moody is 17 throughout. 
Sample size for moody is 17 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 32 throughout. 
F-Value 
1,66 
Moody 
M STD 
59,65 29,83 
23,41 21,83 
41,18 29,47 
58,65 25,63 
68,82 30,38 
47,12 29,53 
55,76 26,31 
59,41 26,60 
41,00 29,11 
46,29 27,40 
43,29 27,59 
63,71 33,21 
54,29 27,63 
64,76 27,27 
68,06 24,85 
t 
-0,89 
3,32** 
0,28 
-3,01** 
-1,31 
0,69 
0,82 
-0,24 
-0,29 
0,08 
2,19* 
-0,37 
0,25 
-2,04* 
-1,39 
TABLE 8 HOTELLING T2 TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE ON THE GOUGH ACL BETWEEN MOODY AND NON-MOODY 
DESIGNATED IN TERMS OF HIGH AND LOW MEAN VARIABILITY CRITERION 
Retelling T2 df 
34,51 7 26 
Note 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0, 01. 
Selected Variables from The Gough Adjective Checklist 
Non-Moody 
1. Defensiveness 
2. Ratio of Fav. to Unfav. Adj. 
3. Self-confidence 
4. Self-control 
5. Lability 
6. Personal Adjustment 
7. Counselling Readiness 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0, 01. 
Sample size for non-moody is 17 throughout. 
Sample size for moody is 17 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 32 throughout. 
M STD 
47,00 9,68 
12,55 13,53 
50,29 12,31 
47,88 11,23 
52,94 11,17 
49,18 8,85 
54,29 8,10 
F-Value 
4,01** 
Moody 
M STD t 
33,35 12,22 3,61** 
3,47 4,57 2,62 
47,88 11,30 0,60 
34,59 9,91 3,66** 
50,47 12,75 0,60 
35,47 9,43 4,37** 
63,18 10,28 -2,80** 
T2 = 33,92 
T c:it 
= 5,82 
cr1t 
0,05 
I 
N 
~ 
~ 
I 
TABLE 8 HOTELLING T2 TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE ON THE GOUGH ACL BETWEEN MOODY AND NON-MOODY 
DESIGNATED IN TERMS OF HIGH AND LOW MEAN VARIABILITY CRITERION 
Hote11ing T2 df 
34,51 7 26 
Note 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Selected Variables from The Gough Adjective Checklist 
Non-Moody 
1. Defensiveness 
2. Ratio of Fav. to Unfav. Adj. 
3. Self-confidence 
4. Self-control 
5. Lability 
6. Personal Adjustment 
7. Counselling Readiness 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0, 01. 
Sample size for non-moody is 17 throughout. 
Sample size for moody is 17 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 32 throughout. 
M STD 
47,00 9,68 
12,55 13,53 
50,29 12,31 
47,88 11,23 
52,94 11,17 
49,18 8,85 
54,29 8,10 
F-Value 
4,01** 
Moody 
M STD t 
33,35 12,22 3,61** 
3,47 4,57 2,62 
47,88 11,30 0,60 
34,59 9,91 3,66** 
50,47 12,75 0,60 
35,47 9,43 4,37** 
63,18 10,28 -2,80** 
T2 . = 33,92 
T c:l.t 
= 5,82 
cr1.t 
= 0,05 
I 
N 
.p.. 
.p.. 
I 
. TABLE 9 
Cattell 
16 PF 
Edwards 
EPPS 
Gough 
ACL 
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SU~~~RY TABLE SHOWING PERSONALITY FACTORS WHICH DIFFER SlUNIFlCANTLY 
BETWEEN MOODY AND NON-MOODY IN TERMS OF HIGH AND LOW ME.t\N VARIABILiTY 
CRITERION 
Factor 
Factor E (Humble vs. Assertive) 
Factor F (Sober vs. Happy-go-lucky) 
Factor L (Trusting vs. Suspicious) 
Factor Q3 (Undisciplined Self-
conflict vs. Controlled) 
Factor Q4 (Relaxed vs. Tense) 
Deference 
Exhibition 
Nurturance 
Heterosexuality 
Defensiveness 
Ratio of Fav. to Unfav. Adj. 
Self -control 
Personal Adjustment 
Counselling Readiness 
Direction of Score 
Hoody subjects score high 
(Assertive) 
Moody subjects score high 
(Happy-go-lucky) 
Hoody subjects score high 
(Suspicious) 
Moody subjects score low 
(Undisciplined sel~ 
conflict) 
Moody subjects score high 
(Tense) 
Hoody subjects score low 
(less Deference) 
Moody subjects score high 
(more Exhibition) 
Moody subjects score low 
(less Nurturance) ---
Moody subjects score high 
(more Heterosexuality) 
Moody subjects score low 
(less Defensivenessr-
Hoody subjects score low 
(Moody subjects see them-
selves in a less favour-
able light) 
Hoody subjects score low 
(less Self-control_)_ 
Moody subjects score low 
(less Personal Adj~­
ment) 
Moody subjects score high 
(more potential for 
counsel! ing) 
Signif i-
cance 
Level 
p <0,01. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,01. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,01. 
p <0,01. 
p <0,05. 
p <0,05. 
p ·0,01. 
p <0,01. 
p <0,01 
p <0, 01. 
p <0,01. 
\ 
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On the EPPS -
scored higher on the dimension Exhibition; scored lower on 
the dimension Deference 
On the ACL -
scored higher on the dimension Counselling Readiness; 
scored lower on the dimensions Defensiveness, Ratio of 
favourable to unfavourable adjectives (saw themselves in a 
less favourable light), Self-Control and Personal Adjustment 
At the ,05 level of significance: 
On the 16PF -
scored higher on the dimension Sober vs. Happy-go-lucky, 
and Relaxed vs. Tense; scored lower on the dimension 
Undisciplined Self-Conflict vs. Controlled 
On the EPPS -
scored higher on the dimension Heterosexuality; scored 
lower on the dimension Nurturance 
On the ACL -
showed no differences at the ,05 level of significance 
Table 10 is an overall summary table that shows significant 
personality variables common and unique to the two criteria 
of moodiness. 
Examining Table 10 (the following page), it can be seen that 
scores for personality variables unique to the self-opinion 
criterion (MAT criterion) are: 
On the 16PF -
lower on Affected by Feelings vs. Emotionally Stable; 
higher on Placid vs. Apprehensive 
On the EPPS -
higher on Autonomy; lower on Affiliation 
TABLE 10 
Test 
16 PF 
EPPS 
ACL 
Ui PF 
EPPS 
.\CL 
NDte: 
;, r ·.o,os. 
,,,~ p -·o. 01. 
SUMHARY TABLE SHOWING SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITY VARIABLES COMMON AND UNIQUE TO THE THO CRITERIA OF MOODINESS 
~h\T Criterion (self-opinion) 
Factors Common 
scored high on Trusting vs. Suspicious ** 
scored high on Relaxed vs. Tense * 
scored higher on Exhibition * 
scored lower on Deference ** 
scored lower on Nurturance * 
scored higher on Heterosexuality * 
scored lower on Defensiveness ,., 
scored lower on the Ratio of Favourable 
to Unfavourable Adjectives (saw themselves 
in a less favourable light) ** 
scored lower on Personal Adjustment * 
scored higher on Counselling Readiness '~ 
Factors Unique 
scored lower on Affected by Feelings vs. 
Emotionally Stable ** 
scored higher on Placid vs. Apprehensive * 
scored hl~hcr on Autonomy * 
scored lower on Affiliation* 
-~ -- -- ---·- -·· 
High and Low Mean Variability Criterion 
scored high on Trusting vs. Suspicious ** 
scored high on Relaxed vs. Tense * 
scored higher on Exhibition** 
scored lower on Deference ** 
scored lower on Nurturance * 
scored higher on Heterosexuality * 
scored lower on Defensiveness ** 
scored lower on the Ratio of Favourable 
to Unfavourable Adjectives (saw themselves 
in a less favourable light) ** 
scored lower on Personal Adjustment ** 
scored higher on Counselling Readiness ** 
scored higher on Humble vs. Assertive to~ 
scored higher on Sober vs. Happy-go-lucky * 
scored lower on Undisciplined Self-Conflict vs. 
Controlled * 
scored low<~r on S<'tf-Control '~'* 
I 
N 
.!:--
...... 
I 
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On the ACL -
no personality variables unique. 
For the high and low mean variability criterion, scores for 
personality variables unique are: 
On the 16 PF -
higher on Humble vs. Assertive; higher on Sober vs. Happy-
go-lucky; lower on Undisciplined Self-Conflict vs. 
Controlled 
On the EPPS -
no personality variables unique 
On the ACL -
lower on Self-Control. 
Scores on personality variables common to both the self-
opinion criterion and the high and low mean variability 
criterion are: 
On the 16 PF -
higher on Trusting vs. Suspicious; higher on Relaxed vs. 
Tense 
On the EPPS -
higher on Exhibition; higher on Heterosexuality; lower on 
Deference; lower on Nurturance 
On the ACL -
lower on the Ratio of favourable to unfavourable adjectives 
(saw themselves in a less favourable light); lower on 
Defensiveness; lower on Personal Adjustment; higher on 
Counselling Readiness. 
Acceptance or Rejection of Hypotheses 
These results, Tables 2-10, show that the two different criteria 
of moodiness each establishes a different pattern of significant 
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personality variables (although there are common variables). 
Hence the Null Hypothesis (4.1.1.1) that the different criteria 
of moodiness will not yield· different patterns of significant 
personality variables, is rejected. 
It has been shown that "moody" subjects can be distinguished 
from "non-moody" subjects in terms of personality variables 
revealed by standard tests and that different criteria of 
moodiness are significantly correlated with different sets of 
personality variables. Hence the experimental data is 
consonant with the experimental hypothesis. 
\ 
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SECTIONS 4.2 - 4.5 
In the sections that follow evidence is accumulated for the case that 
the Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) has a determinate and specifiable 
effect on moods. The evidence is not absolutely conclusive, but it is 
believed to be sufficiently persuasive to suggest that the MAT does 
globally influence mood (section 4.2), that it influences mood in ways 
different from the other experimental sessions (section 4.3), and that 
in particular it has a positive effect on moods classified as "negative" 
(section 4.5). 
4.2 Absolute Magnitude of Mood Change across the Four Experimental 
Sessions 
Description 
This section examines the mean absolute magnitude of change scores, 
i.e.' the total amount of change on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors 
irrespective of sign (increase or decrease of magnitude) for each 
of the four experimental sessions. It may be the case that 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT) designed both as a probe to elicit basic information con-
cerning subjects' mood and as a modifier of negative moods, will 
have a greater effect on all types of mood across all the twelve 
Nowlis Mood Dimensions; or its effect may be more specific, i.e. 
a modification of specific mood dimensions for specific moods. 
At this point in the analysis it will be suggested that the effect 
of Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique, 
may be a global effect. This global effect is formulated in terms 
of four hypotheses given below. 
Summary of Findings 
1. There is an overall difference in absolute magnitude of change 
between the four experimental group means at the 0,01 level of 
significance (Table 11). 
2. Across the four experimental sessions (N=l05), Session 2, the 
experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) has a 
greater mean absolute magnitude of change than Session 3 or 4. 
This is established at the 0,01 level of significance. How-
ever, Session 2 is not statistically distinguishable from 
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Session 1, the personality testing session (Table 12). 
Hypotheses 
4.2.1.1 Null Hypothesis H : 
0 
4.2.1.2 
4.2.1.3 
4.2.1.4 
4.2.1.5 
It is hypothesized that the mean absolute magnitude of 
change score for Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) will not differ from 
the mean absolute magnitude of change score for Session 1, 
the personality testing session. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 : 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will have 
a different mean absolute magnitude of change score 
than Session 1, the personality testing session. 
Null Hypothesis H : 
0 
It is hypothesized that the mean absolute magnitude of 
change score for Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) will not differ from 
the mean absolute magnitude of change score for Session 3, 
the quiet activities session. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 : 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will have a 
different mean absolute magnitude of change score than 
Session 3, the quiet activities session. 
Null Hypothesis H : 
0 
It is hypothesized that the mean absolute magnitude of 
change score for Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not differ 
from the mean absolute magnitude of change score for 
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Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique. 
4.2.1.6 Alternative Hypothesis H1: 
Results 
t It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will have a 
different mean absolute magnitude of change score than 
Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique. 
Table 11 presents the mean absolute magnitude of change scores 
for each of the four experimental sessions and the one-way analysis 
of variance with repeated measures. The F-statistic was found to 
be significant at the 0,01 level of significance. 
Table 12 presents the pair-wise differences. 
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TABLE 11 ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH REPEATED 
MEASURES ON MEAN ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE 
SCORES COMPARING THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data) 
TABLE 12 
Table of Means 
Treatment Group 1 2 3 
Mean 17,93 17,06 13,86 
Analysis of Variance 
Source df s.s M.S 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
3 1771,61 
416 28349,27 
590,54 
68,15 
Note: 
* p<0,05. 
** p<O,Ol. 
SUMMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT PAIR-WISE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEAN ABSOLUTE 
MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE SCORES ON THE FOUR 
EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
Direction 
1 > 3 
1 > 4 
2 > 3 
2 > 4 
Note: 
* p<0,05. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
df are 208 throughout. 
t-Value 
-3,71** 
-4,35** 
-2,75** 
-3,37** 
4 
13,09 
F-Value 
8,67** 
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Table 11 has shown 'that there is a statistically significant 
difference in mean absolute magnitude of change scores across 
the four experimental sessions. 
Table 12 has shown that Session 1, the personality testing 
sesston, and Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood 
Analysis Technique (MAT), have a greater mean absolute magnitude 
of change scores than Session 3, the quiet activities session 
and Session 4, the self-administered MAT. 
Acceptance or Rejection of Hypotheses 
Across the four experimental sessions: 
Hypothesis 4.2.1.1 that the mean absolute magnitude of change 
score for Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), will not differ from the mean absolute magnitude 
of change score for Session 1, the personality testing session, 
is accepted. 
Hypothesis 4.2.1.2 that the mean absolute magnitude of change 
score for Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), will not differ from the mean absolute magnitude 
of change score for Session 3, the quiet activities session, is 
rejected. 
The experimental results indicate that Session 2 had a greater 
mean absolute magnitude of change score than Session 3. 
Hypothesis 4.2.1.5 that the mean absolute magnitude of change 
score for Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), will not differ from the mean absolute magnitude 
of change score for Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis 
Technique, is rejected. 
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The experimental results indicate that Session 2 had a greater 
mean absolute magnitude of change score than Session 4. 
The experimental results have shown that Session 2 has a global 
effect on mood greater than two of the other three experimental 
sessions. 
In summary: In terms of global effect on mood, Session 2, the 
experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) is dis-
tinguished from Sessions 3 and 4 by its greater global effect. 
However, Session 2 cannot be s.tatistically distinguished from 
Session 1. Since Sessio~ 2 and Session 1 both showed a high 
absolute magnitude of change score relative to the other sessions, 
each of the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors will be examined individually 
to determine more precisely the nature of the effect of Sessions 
1 and 2. In addition, attention will be given to Session 4 in 
comparison with Session 2, to indicate the effect of a self-
administration of the MAT. 
4.3 Analysis of Mood Change on the Twelve Nowlis Mood Factors across 
the Four Experimental Sessions 
Description 
In this section both the magnitude of change scores (section 4.31) 
and the component change scores (section 4.32) on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors will be considered (see Appendix D and E for data). 
This will indicate the effect of Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) in terms of mean increase 
or mean decrease on particular mood dimensions (the Nowlis Mood 
Factors) in comparison with the three other experimental sessions. 
It does not, however, indicate the effect of Session 2 on different 
types of mood. This will be considered in section 4.5. 
Summary of Findings 
(a) Magnitude of Change Scores 
1. There is an overall difference in group ~eans across the 
four experimental sessions at the O,Ol·level of signifi-
cance (Table 13). 
2. The individual Nowlis Mood Factors were tested for signi-
ficance by calculating the 95% simultaneous confidence 
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intervals (see Table 14). None of these factors were 
found to be different. However, since the MANOVA was 
significant, there exists at least one contrast of 
factors which is significant. As this would be difficult 
to interpret, one-way anovas were computed for each factor 
to give an indication of which factors are contributing to 
this overall difference (Tables 15 and 16). 
3. Across the four experimental sessions, where N=l05, the 
Nowlis Mood Factors statistically distinguishing the 
experimental sessions were: 
Aggression, Surgency, Social Affection, Sadness, Egotism 
and Scepticism (Table 15). 
4. Focusing on Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood 
Analysis Technique (MAT), in summary it was found: 
Session 2 increased the mood dimensions Aggression, Social 
Affection, Sadness and Egotism; and showed a lesser 
decrease in Surgency and Scepticism. 
5. Focusing on Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis 
Technique, in summary it was found: Session 4 increased 
the mood dimensions Aggression, Sadness, Egotism and 
Scepticism; and showed a lesser decrease in Surgency and 
Social Affection. 
(b) Component Change Scores (Results appear in Tables 17-40) 
1. For Factor 1 (Aggression) Sessions 2 and 4 resulted in 
significantly more new components than Session 3. 
Session 2 was also significantly higher in number of new 
components than Session 1. Hence Session 2 in particular 
had the ability to generate new components. 
2. For Factor 2 (Anxiety) Session 2 was found to be the most 
active experimental session in terms of influencing this 
mood dimension. It had the ability both to generate new 
components and to make components disappear. 
3. For Factor 3 (Surgency) Session 2 was not significantly 
distinguished from Sessions 3 and 4. However, when 
compared with Session 1, it showed a greater number of 
new components and fewer components disappeared. 
Session 4 also showed fewer components disappeared than 
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Session 1. 
4. For Factor 4 (Elation) no variables were significant. 
5. For Factor 5 (Concentrating) no variables were significant. 
6. For Factor 6 (Fatigue) Session 4 showed significantly less 
total change than the other experimental sessions. 
7. For Factor 7 (Vigour) Session 2 showed more components 
decreased than on Session 1. 
8. For Factor 8 (Social Affection) Session 2 had the ability 
to generate more new component·s than any of the other 
experimental sessions. In addition Session 2 showed more 
total change than Sessions 3 and 4. Session 4 showed 
less total change than Session 1. 
In general, Session 2 was the most influential session 
in affecting Social Affection. It did so by generating 
more new components. 
9. For Factor 9 (Sadness) Session 2 showed more total change 
in components than Sessions 3 and 4. Session 2 showed 
more new components than Session 1. Session 1 was signi-
ficant in that it showed more components disappeared than 
any of the other experimental sessions. 
In general, Session 2 was the most influential session 
in affecting the mood dimension Sadness. Its influence 
can be related both to increasing components and to 
bringing new components into existence. Session 4 was 
relatively ineffectual in influencing this mood dimension. 
10. For Factor 10 (Egotism) Sessions 2 and 4 were both 
different from Session 1 in terms of generating more new 
components and showing fewer components disappeared. 
Session 2 showed more new components than Session 3. 
Session 4 showed both fewer components disappeared and 
more new components than Session 3. 
In general, Sessions 2 and 4 increased Egotism by 
generating new components. In particular Session 4 is 
unusual in that it both showed fewer components dis-
appeared as well as generating new components. 
11. For Factor 11 (Deactivation) Session 4 showed less total 
change than any of the other experimental sessions. 
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I 
Examining the other variables: Session 4 showed fewer 
components decreased than any of the other experimental 
sessions. Both Session 2 and Session 1 showed more 
components disappeared than Sessions 3 and 4. 
In general, Session 4 showed less overall effect on this 
factor than the other experimental sessions; it showed 
fewer components decreased than any of the other experi-
mental sessions, and fewer components disappeared than 
Sessions 1 and 2. This can perhaps be viewed as a 
stabilization effect of Session 4 on the initial level 
of Deactivation. 
12. For Factor 12 (Scepticism) Session 2 showed more total 
change than Session 3, but less total change than Session 
1. Session 4 also showed less total change than Session 1. 
Examining the other variables: Session 3 showed fewer 
components decreased than any of the other experimental 
sessions. Both Sessions 2 and 4 showed fewer components 
disappeared than Session 1. In addition Session 4 showed 
fewer components disappeared than Session 2. 
In general, Sessions 2 and 4 showed less overall effect 
on this factor than Session 1. However Session 2 did show 
more total change than Session 3. Sessions 2 and 4 showed 
more components decreased than Session 3. Session 2 showed 
more components disappeared than Session 4, but fewer 
components disappeared than Session 1. 
Hypotheses 
4.3.1.1 Null Hypothesis H : 
0 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not 
differ from Session 4,the self-administered Mood Analysis 
Technique, in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check List, 
MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
4.3.1.2 
4.3.1.3 
4.3.1.4 
4.3.1.5 
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! 
Alternative Hypothesis H1: 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will be 
different from Session 4, the self-administered Mood 
Analysis Technique, in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
Null Hypothesis H : 
0 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not 
differ from Session 1, the personality testing session, 
and Session 3, the quiet activities session, in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1: 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will be 
different from Session 1, the personality testing session, 
and Session 3, the quiet activities session,in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
~1ood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
Null Hypothesis H : 
0 
It is hypothesized that Session 4, the self-administered 
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Mood Analysis Technique, will not differ from Session l, 
the personality testing session, and Session 3, the quiet 
activities session, in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
4.3.1.6 Alternative Hypothesis H1: 
Results 
It is hypothesized that Session 4, the self-administered 
Mood Analysis Technique, will be different from Session 1, 
the personality testing session, and Session 3, the quiet 
activities session, in terms of 
(a) the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowl 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check 
List, MACL, and 
(b) the number of mood components increased, decreased, 
disappeared, new and total change in mood components. 
4.31 Magnitude of Change Scores 
Table 13 presents the calculated U-statistic (see section 
3.332, and Morrison 1967, p.l79) for the one-way multivariate 
analysis of variance with repeated measures which compare 
the four experimental sessions on the mean magnitude of 
change scores on the twelve Nowlis factors simultaneously. 
The appropriate F-statistic, calculated from the U-statistic, 
was found to be significant at the 0,01 level. 
TABLE 13 
Factor 1 
(Aggression) 
2 
(Anxiety) 
3 
(Surgency) 
4 
(Elation) 
5 
(Concentrating) 
6 
(Fatigue) 
7 
(Vigour) 
8 
(Social Affection) 
9 
(Sadness) 
10 
(Egotism) 
11 
(Deactivation) 
12 
(Scepticism) 
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ONE-WAY ~IDLTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH REPEATED 
MEASURES CO~~ARING THE FOUR SESSIONS ON THE MAGNITUDE OF 
CHANGE SCORES ON THE 12 NOWLIS FACTORS SI~LTANEOUSLY 
(See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data) 
Table of Heans 
Session Overall 
1 2 3 4 He an 
-0,39 0,01 -0,64 0,03 -0,25 
-0,55 -0,15 -0,49 -0,02 -0,30 
-0,97 -0,08 -0,18 -0,39 -0,40 
-0,50 -0,08 -0,23 -0,34 -0,29 
0, 39 0,33 0,10 0,57 0,34 
0,30 -0,01 0, 70 0,26 0,31 
-0,70 -0,28 -0,84 -0,36 -0,54 
-0,91 0,06 -0,18 -0,29 -0,33 
-0,60 0,16 -0,09 0,11 -0,10 
-0,34 0,17 -0,26 0,21 -0,05 
-0,18 -0,10 0,35 0,36 0,11 
-1,01 -0,31 -0,29 0,09 -0,38 
Analysis of Variance 
U-Statistic df Approximate F-Statistic df 
0, 77 12 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** p<O,(H. 
3 
416 
3,00** 36 
1197,35 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
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Table 13 has shown that the four experimental sessions are different overall in 
terms of the mean magnitude of change scores on the twelve Nowlis factors 
simultaneously, at the 0,01 level of significance. 
The F-statistic calculated in the MANOVA, for the magnitude of change scores on 
the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors simultaneously across the four experimental sessions 
was statistically significant. This indicates that the four experimental sessions 
differ on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors simultaneously. The individual Nowlis 
Factors can now be tested for significance by calculating the 95% simultaneous 
confidence intervals, where width of the confidence interval ~ 
J 1 ~~X~ e .• 11 (_!_ N. 
J 
Note: X~ 1s the critical value of X taken from the Heck charts. 
eii SSE taken from the appropriate Anova table 
(Appendix D, Table K). 
N. is the number of observations in the jth group. 
J 
The following table summarizes the common components and the width of the confi-
dence intervals for each factor calculated from the critical x0 ,05 taken from 
Heck charts (Morrison, 1967, p.314). In this procedure, if a difference between 
any two group means (here means for the experimental sessions) on a factor is 
smaller than the width of the confidence interval, then the two groups do not 
differ on this factor. If a difference between two group means on a factor is 
greater than the width of the confidence interval, then the two groups differ on 
this factor. 
Table 14 presents the.common components and simultaneous confidence intervals 
for the twelve Nowlis Hood Factors across the four experimental sessions. 
TABLE 14 
Factor 
1. Aggression 
2. Anxiety 
3, Surgency 
4. Elation 
5. Concentrating 
6. Fatigue 
7. Vigour 
COMMON COMPONENTS AND SI~lliLTANEOUS CONFIDENCE INTERVALS.FOR. 
THE TWELVE NO\.JLIS MOOD FACTORS ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL 
SESSIONS 
yeii =issE 
35,48 
35,12 
42,65 
45,23 
46,59 
49,53 
48,49 
Interval width (0,0393 .1~) v ll 
8. Social Affection 42,22 
1,39 
1,38 
1,68 
1,78 
1,83 
1,95 
1 '91 
1,66 
1,29 
0,97 
1,97 
1,31 
9. Sadness 32,78 
10. Egotism 24,74 
11. Deactivation 50,03 
12. Scepticism 33,43 
0: 0,05 
x0,05; s,m,n x0,05; 3,4,201~ 0,075 
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From Table 14 it can be seen that none of the factors 
were found to be significantly different. However, since 
the MANOVA was significant, there is at least one 
contrast of factors which is significant. As this would 
be difficult to interpret, one-way anovas were computed 
for each factor to give an indication of which factors 
were contributing to the overall difference. This is 
detailed in Table 15. 
Table 15 presents the means of magnitude of change scores 
on the twelve Nowlis Mood Factors and the F-values from 
the one-way analysis of variance, across the four 
experimental sessions. 
TABLE 15 
Factor 
1 
(Aggression) 
2 
(Anxiety) 
3 
(Surgency) 
4 
(Elation) 
5 
(Concentrating) 
6 
(Fatigue) 
7 
(Vigour) 
8 
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MEANS OF MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE SCORES ACROSS THE FOUR 
SESSIONS ON THE 12 NOWLIS FACTORS AND F-VALUES FROM 
THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON MAGNITUDE OF 
CHANGE FOR EACH FACTOR 
(See Appendix D, Tables G-K, for data and Anova 
Tables)' 
Session Overall 
1 2 3 4 Mean F-Value 
-0,39 0,01 -0,64 0,03 -0,25 3,65* 
-0,55 -0,15 -0,49 -0,02 -0,30 2,35 
-0,97 -0,08 -0,18 -0,39 -0,40 3,847~* 
:..o,50 -0,08 -0,23 -0,34 -0,29 0,67 
0,39 0,33 0,10 0,57 0,34 0,78 
0,30 -0,01 0,70 0,26 0,31 1,55 
-0,70 -0,28 -0,84 -0,36 -0,54 1,33 
(Social Affection) -0,91 0,06 -0,18 -0,29 -0,33 4,21** 
9 
-0,60 0,16 -0,09 0,11 -0,10 4,94** (Sadness) 
10 
-0,34 0,17 -0,26 0,21 -0,05 5,83** (Egotism) 
11 
-0,18 -0,10 0,35 0,36 0,11 1,45 (Deactivation) 
12 
-1,01 -0,31 -0,29 0,09 -0,38 8,16** (Scepticism) 
Note: 
* p<0,05. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Sample si~e is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 3 and 416. 
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Table 15 has shown that statistically significant 
differences exist on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors in 
terms of mean magnitude of change across the four 
experimental sessions. Factors significant at the 
0,01 level are: Surgency, Social Affection, Sadness, 
Egotism and Scepticism. The factor Aggression is 
significant at the 0,05 level of significance. 
Table 16 is the summary table presenting the s1gn1-
ficant inter-session comparisons for each significant 
Nowlis Mood Factor, as derived from the analysis of 
variance. 
(See Appendix D, Table K, for the analysis of variance). 
TABLE 16 
Factor 
1 
(Aggression) 
3 
(Surgency) 
8 
(Social 
Affection) 
9 
(Sadness) 
10 
(Egotism) 
12 
(Scepticism) 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is 105 
Degrees of freedom 
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SU~~y TABLE SHOWING SIGNIFICANT MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE SCORE 
CO~~ARISONS ACROSS THE FOUR SESSIONS ON THE 12 NOWLIS FACTORS 
(See Appendix D, Table K, for the analysis of variance tables) 
F-Value Direction t-Value 
3,65* Session 2 shows an increase and -2,66** 
Session 3 shows a decrease 
Session 3 shows a decrease and 2,99** 
Session 4 shows an increase 
3,84** Session 1 shows a greater decrease 3,05** 
than Session 2 
Session 1 shows a greater decrease 2,71** 
than Session 3 
Session 1 shows a greater decrease 2,15* 
than Session 4 
4,21** Session 2 shows an increase and 3,18** 
Session 1 shows a decrease 
Session 1 shows a greater decrease 2. 7 3** 
than Session 3 
Session 1 shows a greater decrease 2,28* 
than Session 4 
4,94** Session 2 shows an increase and 3,34** 
Session 1 shows a decrease 
Session 1 shows a greater decrease 2,68** 
than Session 3 
Ses:;ion 4 shmvs an increase and 3,21** 
Session 1 shows a decrease 
5,83** Session 2 shows an j_ncrease and 2,90** 
Session 1 shows a decrease 
Session 2 shows an increase and -2,43* 
Session 3 shows a decrease 
Session 3 shows a decrease and 2,97** 
Session 4 shows an increase 
Session 4 shows an increase and 3,49** 
Session 1 shows a decrease 
8,16** Session 1 shows a greater decrease 2,61** 
than Session 2 
Session 1 shows a greater decrease 3,18** 
than Session 3 
Session 1 shows a decrease and 4,35** 
Session 4 shows an increase 
Session 4 shows an increase and 2,11* 
Session 3 shows a decrease 
throughout. 
are 208. 
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Table 16 has presented the summary of the significant inter-session 
differences on the significant Nowlis Mood Factors, in terms of change 
on magnitude scores. Focusing on Sessions 2 and 4 it can be seen tha~: 
In particular Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique 
Session 3 
Session 1 
Session 1 
(MAT), was 
(p<O,Ol); 
(p<O,Ol); 
(p<O,Ol); 
found to increase Aggression when compared with 
to show a lesser decrease on Surgency than 
to increase Social Affection when compared with 
to increase Sadness when compared with Session 1 
(p<O,Ol); to increase Egotism when compared with Sessions 1 (p<O,Ol); 
and 3 (p<O,OS); and showed a lesser decrease in Scepticism when 
compared with Session 1 (p<O,Ol). 
In summary, Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique, was found to increase the mood dimensions Aggression, 
Social Affection, Sadness and Egotism; and to show a lesser decrease 
in Surgency and Scepticism. 
In particular Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), was found: to show an increase in Aggression when compared 
with Session 3 (p<O,Ol); to show a lesser decrease inSurgency when 
compared with Session 1 (p<O,OS); to show a lesser decrease in 
Social Affection than Session 1 (p<O,OS); to show an increase in 
Sadness when compared with Session 1 (p<O,Ol); to show an increase 
in Egotism when compared with Sessions 1 (p<O,Ol) and 3 (p<O,Ol); 
and to show an increase in Scepticism when compared with Sessions 1 
(p<O,Ol) and 3 (p<O,OS). 
In summary, Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique, 
was found to increase the mood dimensions Aggression, Sadness, Egotism 
and Scepticism; and to show a lesser decrease in the mood dimensions 
Surgency and Social Affection. 
Hence although Session 2 cannot be distinguished from Session 1 in 
terms of absolute magnitude of mood change, an examination of the 
individual Nowlis Mood Factors establishes that Session 2 (relative 
to Session 1) shows an increase in the mood factors Social Affection, 
Sadness and Egotism; and a lesser decrease in the mood factors , 
Surgency and Scepticism. 
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4.32 Component Changes 
In this section the component changes on the twelve Nowlis 
Mood Factors across the four experimental sessions are 
presented. It is important to examine the component changes 
because there can be no change in magnitude, i.e. zero 
magnitude change on a factor and this can be due to one 
component appearing for the first time and a different 
component disappearing; ~n this case there is internal 
change on the factor but no magnitude change. Similarly, 
an increase in one component can be offset by a decrease 
~n another component of the same factor. This type of 
change can be detected only by examining factor components. 
The fact that there can be significant differences in 
component changes between experimental sessions, which 
do not result in significant magnitude of change scores, 
~s shown in Table 18 below. This table shows that 
Session 2 is different from Session 1 on the factor 
Aggression, in terms of Session 2 showing more new 
components, but this does not result ~n a significant 
difference in magnitude change. The reason for this can 
be seen by examining Table 17, i.e. Session 1 on average 
shows more components decreased and'more components dis-
appeared than Session 2. 
Tables 17-40 present the means of component changes and 
the summary tables of significant component changes and 
significant inter-session comparisons across the four 
experimental sessions (see Appendix E, Tables L and M 
for data and analysis of variance tables). 
For Factor 1 (Aggression) Tables 17 and 18 present the 
means of component changes across the four experimental 
sessions and the summary of significant changes iri 
components across the four experimental sessions, as 
derived from the analysis of variance (see Appendix E, 
Table ,M, for details of the analysis). 
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TABLE 17 
FACTOR 1 (AGGRESSION) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendi.x E, Table M for details of the analysis) 
Session 
Number of Components Increased 
Number of Components Decreased 
Number of Components Disappeared 
Number of New Components 
Total Change 
Note: 
'" p<O,O). 
><1< 'p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is 105 thcoughout. 
0,04 
0,10 
0,39 
0,13 
0,66 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 18 
2 3 
O,OT 0,01 
0,06 0,12 
0,31 0,31 
0,31 0,07 
o, 74 0,51 
FACTOR 1 (AGGRESSION) 
4 Overall Mean 
0,07 0,05 
0,09 0,09 
0,20 0,30 
0,19 0,17 
0,54 0,61 
SU~lliARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMPONENTS 
j\CROSS THE FOUR EXPERU!ENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant 
Variables 
Number of New · 
Components 
F-Value 
4,58** 
Comparison of 
2 is different 
2 is different 
Sessions 
from 1 
from 3 
4 is different from 3 
Note: 
·*p<O,OS. 
'"'< p<ll,Ol. 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
Direction 
More new components 
on session 2 
Hare new components 
on session 2 
More ne·w components 
on session 4 
r'-Value 
1,17 
0,69 
1,57 
4,58** 
1,58 
t-Value 
2,23* 
-3,49** 
2,26* 
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For Factor 1 (Aggression) Table 17 has shown that the 
variable number of new components was significant at 
the 0,01 level. 
For the variable number of new components: 
Sessions 2 and 4 were high on average and Sessions 1 
and 3 were low on average. 
Table 18 has shown that for the variable number of new 
components: 
Sessions 2 and 4 are higher than Session 3 (p<O,Ol; 
p<0,05 respectively). Session 2 is higher than Session 1 
(p<0,05). 
Summary 
In general, Sessions 2 and 4 brought about significant 
increases on the mood dimension Aggression and this was 
achieved by the generation of new components. Session 2 
in particular had the ability to generate new components. 
For Factor 1 (Aggression) Sessions 2 and 4 resulted in 
significantly more new components than Session 3. 
Session 2 was also significantly higher in number of new 
components than Session 1. Hence Session 2 in particular 
had the ability to generate new components. 
For Factor 2 (Anxiety) Tables 19 and 20 present the means 
of com~onent changes across the four experimental sessions 
and the summary of significant changes in components 
across the four experimental sessions, as derived from the 
analysis of variance (See Appendix E, Table M, for details 
of the analysis). 
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TABLE 19 
FACTOR 2 (ANXIETY) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF Cm!PONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
(S<:e Appendix E, Table 
Session 
Number of Components Increased 
Number of Components Decreased 
Number of Components Disappeared 
Number of New Components 
Total Change 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
*i' p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is lOS throughout. 
H, for 
1 
0,06 
0,14 
0,47 
0,15 
0,83 
Degree~ of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 20 
d<:tails 
2 
0,11 
0,11 
0,44 
0,31 
0,97 
FACTOR 2 (ANXIETY) 
of the analysis) 
3 4 Overall He an 
0,03 0,10 0,07 
0,11 0,13 0,13 
0,34 0,19 0,36 
0,11 0,24 0,21 
0,60 0,66 0,76 
SUNHARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COHPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIHENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant F-Value Comparison of Sessions 
Variables 
Number of 
Components 
Disappeared 
Number of 
New 
Components 
Total Change 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** p<O ,Ol. 
3,68* 2 
4 
2 
3,50* 
2 
2 
3,51* 
2 
Sample size is lOS throughout. 
is different 
is different 
is different 
is different 
is different 
is different 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
from 4 
from 1 
from 1 
from 3 
from 3 
from 4 
Direction 
' 
Hore components dis-
appeared on session 
More components dis-
appeared on session 
More new components 
on session 2 
Hore new components 
on session 2 
Hore total change on 
session 2 
More total change on 
session 2 
2 
1 
F-Value 
0,27 
0,94 
3,68* 
3,50* 
3,51* 
t-Value 
-2,93** 
-3,22** 
2. 34* 
-2,86** 
-2,94** 
-2,38* 
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For Factor 2 (Anxiety) Table 19 has shown that the variable 
number of components disappeared, new and total change 1n 
components were all significant at the ,05 level. 
For the variable number of components disappeared: 
Sessions 1 and 2 were high on average and Sessions 3 and 4 
were low on average. 
For the variable number of new components: 
Sessions 2 and 4 were high on average and Sessions 1 and 3 
were low on average. 
For the variable total change in components: 
Sessions 1 and 2 were high on average and Sessions 3 and 4 
were low on average. 
Table 20 has shown that for the variable number of components 
disappeared: 
Session 2 1S significantly higher than Session 
Session 1 is significantly higher than Session 
For the variable number of new components: 
Session 2 is significantly higher 
(p<O,OS; p<O,Ol respectively). 
For the variable total change: 
than Sessions 
4 (p<O,Ol); 
4 (p<O,Ol). 
1 and 3 
Session 2 is significantly higher than Sessions 3 and 4 
(p<O,Ol; p<O,OS respectively). 
Summary 
In general, Session 2 showed more total internal change 
than Sessions 3 and 4; more new components than Sessions 
1 and 3; and more components disappeared than on Session 4. 
Session 2 was the most active experimental session in terms 
of affecting the mood dimension Anxiety. It had the ability 
both to generate new components and to make components dis-
appear. 
For Factor 3 (Surgency) Tables 21 and 22 present the means 
of component changes across the four experimental sessions 
and the summary of significant changes in components across 
the four experimental sessions, as derived from the analysis· 
of variance (see Appendix E, Table M, for details of the analysis). 
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TABLE 21 
FACTOR 3 (SURGENCY) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERUIENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table M. for details of the analysis) 
Session 1 2 3 4 Overall Mean 
Number of Components Increased 0,16 0,20 0,11 0,18 0,16 
Number of Components Decreased 0,20 0,17 0,19 0,17 0,18 
Number of Components Disappeared 0, 72 0,43 0,35 0,48 0,50 
Number of New Components 0,11 0,35 0,27 0,23 0,24 
Total Change 1,20 1,15 0,91 1,06 1,08 
Note: 
* p<0,05. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Deg!ees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 22 
FACTOR 3 (SURGENCY) 
SUHHARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COHPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant 
Variables F-VaJ.ue 
4,46** 
Comparison of 
2 is different 
3 is different 
Sessions Direction 
from 1 More components dis-
appeared on session 
from 1 More components dis-
1 Number of 
Components 
Disappeared appeared on session 1 
Number of 
New 
,Components 
Note: 
* p<0,05. 
** p<O,Ol. 
4 
2 
3,34* 
3 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
is different 
is different 
is different 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
from 1 More components dis-
appeared on session 1 
from 1 More new components 
on session 2 
from 1 Hore new components 
on session 3 
F-Value 
0,88 
0,09 
4,46** 
3,34* 
1,69 
t-Value 
-2,58* 
-3,42** 
-2,10* 
3,05** 
2,14* 
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For Factor 3 (Surgency) Table 21 has shown that the variable 
number of components disappeared and number of new components 
were significant at .the ,01 and ,OS levels respectively. 
For the variable number of components disappeared: 
Session 1 was high on average and Sessions 2, 3 and 4 were 
low on average. 
For the variable number of new components: 
Sessions 2 and 3 were high on average and Sessions 1 and 4 
were low on average. 
Table 22 has shown that for the variable number of components 
disappeared: Sessions 2, 3 and 4 are significantly lower 
than Session 1 (p<O,OS; p<O,Ol; p<O,OS respectively). 
For the variable number of new components: 
Sessions 2 and 3 are significantly higher than Session 1 
(p<O,Ol; p<O,OS respectively). 
Summary 
In general, Session 2 showed both fewer components dis-
appeared and more new components than Session 1, and in 
this respect Session 2 had an effect similar to Session 3. 
In terms of internal change Session 2 appeared to stabilize 
or slightly increase Surgency. 
For Factor 4 (Elation) Tables 23 and 24 present the means 
of component changes across the four experimental sessions 
and the summary of significant changes in components across 
the four experimental sessions, as derived from the analysis 
of variance (see Appendix E, Table M, for details of the 
analysis). 
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TABLE 23 
FACTOR 4 (ELATION) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table M, for details of the analysis) 
Session 1 2 3 4 Overall Hean 
Number of Components 
Increased 0.18 0,21 0,17 0,11 0,17 
Number of Components 
Decreased 0,21 0,18 0,26 0,18 0,21 
Number of Components 
Disappeared 0,52 0,36 0,37 0,36 0,40 
Number of New 
Components 0,30 0,31 0,29 0,22 0,28 
Total Change 1, 21 1,07 1,09 0,88 1,06 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 24 
FACTOR 4 (ELATION) 
SUMMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COHPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant 
Variables 
No variable 
significant 
F-Va1ue Comparison of Sessions Direction 
F-Value 
0,82 
0,58 
1. l8 
0,48 
2,04 
t-Value 
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For Factor 4 (Elation) Table 23 has shown that there are 
no significant component variables across the four 
experimental sessions. 
For Factor 5 (Concentrating) Tables 25 and 26 present 
the means of component changes across the four experi-
mental sessions and the summary of significant changes 
in components across the four experimental sessions, as 
derived from the.analysis of variance (See Appendix E, 
Table M, for details of the analysis). 
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TABLE 25 
FACTOR 5 (CONCENTRATING) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table M, for details of the analysis) 
Session 
Number of Components 
Increased 
Number of Components 
Decreased 
Number of Components 
Disappeared 
Number of New 
Components 
Total Change 
1 
0,60 
0,29 
0,30 
0,33 
1,51 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
2 
0,47 
0,27 
0,36 
0,39 
1,49 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 26 
3 
0,27 
0,34 
0,37 
1,35 
FACTOR 5 (CONCENTRATING) 
4 
0,35 
0,20 
0,24 
0,46 
1,25 
I 
Overall 
Nean 
0,45 
0,25 
0,31 
0,39 
1,40 
SUMMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant 
Variables 
No variable 
significant 
F-Value Comparison of Sessions Direction 
F-Value 
2,26 
0,47 
0,84 
0,62 
1,65 
t-Value 
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For Factor 5 (Concentrating) Table 25 has shown that 
there are no significant component variables across the 
four experimental sessions. 
For Factor 6 (Fatigue) Tables 27 and 28 present the 
means of component changes across the four experimental 
sessions and the summary of significant changes in 
components across the four experimental sessions, as 
derived from the analysis of variance (See Appendix E, 
Table M, for details of the analysis). 
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TABLE 27 
FACTOR 6 (FATIGUE) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table M, for details of the analysis) 
Session 1 2 3 4 Overall Means 
Number of Components Increased 0.26 0,15 0,24 0,11 
Number of Components Decreased 0,21 0,17 0,14 0,11 
Number of Components Disappeared 0,40 0,42 0,24 0,23 
Number of New Components 0,57 o;43 0,61 0,38 
Total Change 1,44 1,17 1,23 0,84 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** p<O,lll. 
Sample size is lOS throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 23 
FACTOR 6 (FATIGUE) 
SUHHARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERUIENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant 
Variables 
Total Change 
F-Value 
6,06** 
Comparison of 
2 is different 
4 is different 
Sessions Direction 
from 4 More total 
on session 
from 1 More total 
on session 
0,19 
0,16 
0,32 
0, so 
1,17 
change 
2 
change 
1 
F-Value 
1,86 
0,91 
2,30 
1,94 
6,06** 
t-Value 
-2,S2* 
-4,39** 
4 is different from 3 More total change -2, 76** 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is lOS throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
on session 3 
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For Factor 6 (Fatigue) Table 27 has shown that the 
variable total change was significant at the 0,01 level. 
For the variable total change: 
Sessions 1 and 3 were high on average and Session 4 was 
low on average. 
Table 28 has shown that for the variable total change: 
Sessions 1, 2 and 3 were significantly higher than 
Session 4 (p<O,OS; p<O,Ol; p<O,Ol respectively). 
Summary 
For Factor 6 (Fatigue) Session 4 showed significantly 
less total change than the other experimental sessions. 
For Factor 7 (Vigour) Tables 29 and 30 present the 
means of component changes across the four experimental 
sessions and the summary of significant changes in 
components across the four experimental sessions, as 
derived from the analysis of variance (See Appendix E, 
Table M, for details of the analysis). 
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TABLE 29 
FACTOR 7 (VIGOUR) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERUIENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table M, for details of the analysis) 
Session 1 2 3 4 Overall 
Number of Components Increased 0,19 0,19 0,12 0,14 0,16 
Number of Components Decreased 0,10 0,30 0,27 0,15 0,21 
Number of Components Disappeared 0,68 0,47 0,50 0,47 0,53 
Number of New Components 0,28 0,33 0,18 0,27 0, 26 
Total Change 1,25 1,30 1,09 1,03 1,16 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Sample 9ize is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 30 
FACTOR 7 (VIGOUR) 
SUMMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIHENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant 
Variables 
Number of 
~omponents 
Decreased 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** o<O,Ol. 
F-Value Comparison of Sessions 
2 is different from 1 
3,45* 
3 is different from 1 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
Direction 
More components 
decreased on 
session 2 
More components 
decreased on 
session 3 
Mean F-Value 
0,64 
3,45* 
1,52 
1,18 
1,57 
t-Value 
2,57* 
2,60* 
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For Factor 7 (Vigour) Table 29 has shown that the 
variable number of components decreased was significant 
at the 0,05 level. 
For the variable number of components decreased Sessions 
2 and 3 were high on average and Sessions 1 and 4 were 
low on average. 
Table 30 has shown that for the variable number of 
components decreased Sessions 2 and 3 were significantly 
higher than Session 1 (p<0,05 in both cases). 
Summary 
For Factor 7 (Vigour) Session 2 showed more components 
decreased than on Session 1. 
For Factor 8 (Social Affection) Tables 31 and 32 present 
the means of component changes across the four experi-
mental sessions and the summary of significant changes 
in components across the four experimental sessions, as 
derived from the analysis of variance (See Appendix E, 
Table M, for details of the analysis)~ 
, o-f 
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TABLE 31 
FACTOR 8 (SOCIAL AFFECTION) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERU1ENTAL SESSIONS 
, (See Appendix E, Table M, for detailH of the analysis) 
Session 1 2 3 4 Overall Means 
Number of Components Increased 0,23 0,30 0,25 0,23 0,25 
Number of Components Decreased 0,31 0,23 0,26 0,23 0,26 
Number of Components Disappeared 0,55 0,41 0,36. 0,30 0,41 
Number of New Components 0,14 0,42 0,20 0,17 0,23 
Total Change 1,24 1,36 1,07 0,93 1,15 
Note: 
1{ p<O,OS. 
*'' p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedbm are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 32 
FACTOR 8 (SOCIAL AFFECTION) 
SUNtlARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN CmlPONENTS 
ACROSS TilE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant 
Variables 
Number of 
New 
Components 
Total Change 
Note: 
* p<0,05. 
'"' p<O ,01. 
F-Value 
5,41** 
3,89** 
Comparison of 
2 is different 
2 is different 
2 is different 
2 is different 
2 is different 
4 is different 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
Sessions Direction 
from 1 More new components 
on session 2 
from 3 More new components 
on session 2 
from 4 More new components 
on session 2 
from 3 More total change 
on session 2 
from 4 More total change 
on session 2 
from 1 More total change 
on session 1 
F-Value 
0,44 
0,53 
2,21 
5,41** 
3,89** 
t-Value 
3,26** 
-2,49* 
-2,82** 
-2,12* 
-3,01** 
-2,34* 
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For Factor 8 (Social Affection) Table 31 has shown that the 
variable number of new components and total change were each 
significant at the 0,01 level. 
For the variable number of new components: Session 2 was 
high on average and Sessions 1, 3 and 4 were low on average. 
For the variable tota~ change: Sessions 1 and 2 were high 
on average and Sessions 3 and 4 were low on average. 
Table 32 has shown that for the variable number of new 
components Session 2 is significantly higher than Sessions 
1, 3 and 4 (p<O,Ol; p<O,OS; p<O,Ol respectively). 
For the variable total change: Session 2 is significantly 
higher than Sessions 3 and 4 (p<O,OS; p<O,Ol respectively). 
Session 1 is significantly higher than Session 4 (p<O,OS). 
For Factor 8 (Social Affection) Session 2 had the ability 
to generate more new components than any of the other 
experimental sessions. In addition Session 2 showed more 
total change than Sessions 3 and 4. Session 4 showed less 
total change than Session 1. 
Summary 
In general, Session 2 was the most influential sess1on 1n 
affecting Social Affection. It did so by generating more 
new components. 
For Factor 9 (Sadness) Tables 33 and 34 present the means 
of component changes across the four experimental sessions 
and the summary of significant changes in components 
across the four experimental sessions, as derived_from the 
analysis of variance (see Appendix E, Tabl~ M, for details 
of the analysis). 
I 
-285-
TABLE 33 
FACTOR 9 (SADNESS) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIHENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table M, for details of the analysis) 
Session 1 2 3 4 Overall Mean 
Number of Components Increased 0,06 0,17 0,02 0,10 0,76 
Number of Components Decreased 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,06 0,90 
Number of Components Di.sappeared 0,50 0,30 0,22 0,21 0,51 
Number of New Components 0,14 0,35 0,19 0,26 0,62 
Total Change 0, 76 0,90 0,51 0,62 0,70 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** p<O,lH. 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 34 
FACTOR 9 (SADNESS) 
SUNMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COHPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERUIENTI\L SESSIONS 
Significant F-Value Comparison of Sessions Direction Variables 
Number of 2 is different from 1 More components 
Components 3,89** increased on session 
Increas.ed 2 is different from 3 More components 
increased on session 
2 is different from 1 More components dis-
Number of appeared on session 1 
Components 4,88** 3 is different from 1 More components dis-
Disappeared appeared on session 1 
4 is different from 1 More components dis-
appeared on session 1 
Number of 
New 2,67* 2 is different from 1 More new components 
Components on session 2 
2 is different from 3 More total .change on 
session 2 
Total Change 3,64* 2 is different from 4 More tota'l change on 
session 2 
3 is different from 1 More total change on 
session 1 
Note: 
* p<O ,05. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
2 
2 
F-Value 
3,89** 
0,21 
4,88** 
2,67* 
3,64* 
t-Value 
2,23* 
-3,19** 
-2,09* 
-3,15** 
-3,30** 
2,72** 
-3,01** 
-2,20* 
-2,03* 
-286~ 
For Factor 9 (Sadness) Table 33 has shown that the variable 
number of components increased and number of components 
disappeared were significant at the 0,01 level of signifi-
cance across the four experimental sessions. The variable 
number of new components and total change were significant 
at the 0,05 level of significance across the four experi-
mental sessions. 
Table 34 has shown that for number of components increased: 
Session 2 was high on average and Sessions 1 and 3 were low 
on average. 
For number of components disappeared: Sessions 2, 3 and 4 
were low on average and Session 1 was high on average. 
For number of new components: Session 2 was high on average 
and Session 1 was low on average. 
For total change: Session 2 was high on average and 
Sessions 3 and 4 were low on average; Session 1 was high 
on average in comparison with Session 3. 
For Factor 9 (Sadness) Session 2 showed more total change 
in components than Sessions 3 and 4. Session 2 showed more 
new components than Session 1. Session 1 was significant 
in that it showed more components disappeared than any of 
the other experimental sessions. 
Summary 
In general, Session 2 was the most influential session in 
affecting the mood dimension Sadness. Its influence can be 
related both to increasing components and to bringing new 
components into existence. Session 4 was relatively in-
effectual in influencing this mood dimension. 
For Factor 10 (Egotism) Tables 35 and 36,present the means 
of component changes across the four experimental sessions 
and the summary of significant changes in components across 
the four experimental sessions, as derived from the analysis 
of variance (See Appendix E, Table M, for details of the· analysis). 
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TABLE 35 
FACTOR 10 (EGOTISM) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERU!ENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table M, for details of the analysis) 
Session 1 2 3 4 Overall Heans 
Number of Components Increased 0,07 0,10 0,03 0,07 0,06 
Number of Components Decreased 0,04 0,07 0,02 0,03 0,04 
Number of Components Disappeared 0,39 0,20 0,27 0,12 0,25 
Number of New Components 0,07 0,26 0,10 0,23 0,16 
Total Change 0,56 0,62 0,40 0,45 0,51 
NotP: 
* p<0,05. 
*f< p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 36 
FACTOR 10 (EGOTISH) 
SUM}~RY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIHENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant F-Value Comparison of Sessions Direction Variables 
2 is different from 1 More components dis-
Number of appeared on session l 
Components 4,37** 4 is different from 1 More components dis-
Disappeared appeared on session l 
4 is different from 3 More components dis-
appeared on session 3 
2 is different from 1 More new components 
on session 2 
Number of 2 is different from 3 More new components 
New 4,68** on session 2 
Components 4 is different from 1 More new components 
on session 4 
4 is different from 3 Hore new components 
on session 4 
Note: 
* p<0,05. 
** 
p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is lOS throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
F-Value 
0,93 
0,96 
4,37** 
4,68** 
1,73 
t-lfalue 
-2,35* 
-3,47** 
-2,00* 
2,92** 
-2,37* 
2,94** 
2,27* 
-288-
For Factor 10 (Egotism) Table 35 has shown that the variable 
number of components disappeared and number of new c~mponents 
were significant at the 0,01 level of significance across the 
four experimental sessions. 
Table 36 has shown that for number of components dis-
appeared: Sessions 2 and 4 were low on average and Session 1 
was high on average; Session 4 was low on average when com-
pared with Session 3. 
For number of new components: Sessions 2 and 4 were high 
on average and Sessions 1 and 3 were low on average. 
For Factor 10 (Egotism) Sessions 2 and 4 were both different 
from Session 1 in terms of generating more new components 
and showing fewer components disappeared. Session 2 showed 
, 
more new components than Session 3. Session 4 showed both 
fewer components disappeared and more new components than 
Session 3. 
Summary 
In general, Sessions 2 and 4 increased Egotism by generating 
new components. In particular, Session 4 may be considered 
to have stabilized Egotism through maintaining existing 
components (fewer components disappeared), as well as 
generating more new components. 
For Factor 11 (Deactivation) Tables 37 and 38 present the 
means of component changes across the four experimental 
sessions and the summary of significant changes in 
components across the four experimental sessions, as 
derived from the analysis of variance (See Appendix E, 
Table M, for details of the analysis). 
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TABLE 37 
FACTOR 11 (DEACTIVATION) 
TABLE OF NEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERUIENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table M, for details of the analysis) 
Session l 2 3 4 Overall Hean 
Number of Components Increased 0,42 0,34 0,33 0,24 0,34 
Number of Compcnents Decreased 0,46 0,41 0,37 0,19 0,36 
Nuniber of Compc•nents Disappeared 0,40 0,46 0,17 0,20 0,31 
Number of New Components 0,35 0,38 0,47 0,37 0,39 
Total Change 1,62 1,59 1,34 1,01 1,39 
Note: 
* J1<1) ,0). 
'''* p<O ,01. 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 38 
FACTOR 11 (DEACTIVATION) 
SUNMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMPONENTS 
ACROSS THE FOUR EXPER UIENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant F-Value Comparison of Sessions Direction Variables 
2 is different from 4 More components 
Number of decreased on session 
Components 2,82* 4 is different from 1 More components 
Decreased decreased on session 
4 is different from 3 More components 
decreased on session 
2 is different from 3 More components dis-
appeared on session 2 
Number of 2 is different from 4 More components dis-
Components 5,02** appeared on session 2 
Disappeared 4 is different from 1 More components dis-
appeared on session 1 
3 is different from 1 Hare components dis-
appeared on session 1 
2 is different from 4 More total change on 
session 2 
4 is different from 1 ~lore total change on 
Total 8,75** session 1 Change 4 is different from 3 Hore total change on 
session 3 
3 is different from 1 More total change on 
session 1 
Note: 
Sample size is 105 throughout. 
i< p<0,05. Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
** p<O,Ol. 
2 
1 
3 
F-Value 
1,28 
2,82* 
5,02** 
0,52 
8,75** 
t-Value 
-2,37* 
-2,84** 
-2,10* 
-3,10** 
-2' 79** 
-2,28* 
-2,60** 
-4,25** 
-4,55** 
-2;59* 
-2,07* 
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For Factor 11 (Deactivation) Table 37 has shown that the 
variable number of components disappeared and total change 
were signif~cant at the 0,01 level of significance. The 
variable number of components decreased was significant at 
the 0,05 level of significance. 
Table 38 has shown that for number of components decreased: 
Session 4 is low on average and Sessions 1 and 3 are high . 
on average; Session 2 is high on average when compared 
with Session 4. 
For number of components disappeared: Session 2 is high on 
average and Sessions 3 and 4 are ,low on average; Sessions 
3 and 4 are low on average and Session 1 is high on average. 
For total change: Session 4 is low on average and Sessions 
1 and 3 are high on average .. 
For Factor 11 (Deactivation) Session 4 showed less total 
change than any of the other experimental sessions. 
Examining the other variables: Session 4 showed fewer 
components decreased than any of the othe·r experimental 
sessions. Both Session 2 and Session 1 showed more 
components disappeared than Sessions 3 and 4. 
Sunnnary 
In general, Session 4 showed less overall effect on this 
factor than the other experimental sessions; it showed 
fewer components decreased than any of the other experi-
mental sessions, and fewer components disappeared than 
Sessions 1 and 2. This can perhaps be viewed as a 
stabilization of the initial level of Deactivation. 
Fo~ Factor 12 (Scepticism) Tables 39 and 40 present the 
means of component changes across the four experimental 
sessions and the summary of significant changes in com-
ponents across the four experimental sessions, as derived 
from the analysis of variance (See Appendix E, Table M, 
for details of the analysis). 
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TABLE 39 
FACTOR 12 (SCEPTICISM) 
TABLE OF MEANS OF COMPONENT CHANGES ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
(See Appendix E, Table H, for details of the analysis) 
Session 1 2 3 4 Overall Neans 
Number of Components Increased 
Number of Components Decreased 
Number of Components Disappeared 
Number of New Components 
Total Change 
Note: 
=" n<O,OS. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Sample size is lOS throughout. 
0,12 
0,17 
0,74 
0,17 
1,21 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
TABLE 40 
0,08 
0,11 
0,39 
0,22 
0,80 
FACTOR 12. (SCEPTICISM) 
0,04 0,11 o;o9 
0,01 0,10 0,10 
0,32 0,20 0,41 
0,09 0,24 0,18 
0,46 0,65 0,78 
SUHHARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN COMPONENTS 
ACROSS TilE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 
Significant F-Value Comparison of Sessions Direction Variables 
2 is different from 3 More components 
Number of decreased on session 
Components 3,81* 4 is different from 3 Nore components 
Decreased decreased on session 
3 is different from 1 More components 
decreased on session 
2 is different from 1 More components dis-
appeared on session 1 
Number of 2 is different from 4 More components dis-
Components 13,86** appeared on session 2 
Disappeared .4 is different from 1 More components dis-
appeared on session 1 
3 is different from 1 More components dis-
appeared on session l 
2 is different from 1 More total change on 
session 1 
Total 2 is different from 3 Hore total change on 
Change l3 'S?** session 2 4 is different from 1 More total change on 
session 'l 
3 is different from 1 Hore total change on 
session 1 
Note: 
* 
p<O ,05. 
*'}~ p<O ,01. 
Sample size is lOS throughout. 
Degrees of freedom are 208 throughout. 
2 
4 
1 
F-Value 
i 
1,31 
3,81* 
13,86** 
2' 34 
13,52** 
t-Value 
-3,21** 
2,39* 
,..3,20** 
-3,49** 
-2,49* 
-S,89** 
-4,23** 
-3,14**· 
-3,06** 
-4,22** 
-6,3S** 
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For Factor 12 (Scepticism) Table 39 has shown that the 
I 
variable number of components disappeared and total change 
are significant at the 0,01 level of significance across 
th~ four experimental sessions. The variable number of 
components decreased is significant at the 0,05 level of 
significance across the four experimental sessions. 
Table 40 has shown that for number of components decreased: 
Sessions 1, 2 and 4 are high on average and Session 3 is 
low on average. 
For number of components disappeared: Sessions 2 and 4 
are low on average and Session 1 is high on average; 
Session 2 is high on average when compared with Session 
Session 1 is high on average when compared with Session 
4. , 
3. 
For total change: Sessions 2 and 4 are low on average and 
Session 1 is high on average; Sessions 1 and 2 are high 
on average and Session 3 is low on average. 
For Factor 12 (Scepticism) Session 2 showed more total 
change than Session 3, but less total change than Session 1. 
Session 4 also showed less total change than Session 1. 
Examining the other variables: Session 3 showed fewer 
components decreased than any of the other experimental 
sessions. Both Sessions 2 and 4 showed fewer components 
disappeared than Session 1. In addition Session 4 showed 
fewer components disappeared than Session 2. 
Summary 
In general, both Sessions 2 and 4 showed less of an ability 
to decrease components (relative to Session 3) or to make 
components disappear (relative to Session 1). For 
Sessions 2 and 4, this may again suggest a stabilization 
of the initial levels of Scepticism. 
' 
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Table 41 is a summary table which juxtaposes the magnitude 
of change scores and component change scores which were 
significantly different on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors 
across the four experimental sessions (see Appendices D 
and E, Tables G-M, for data and analysis of variance 
tables). 
Table 42 presents a summary of significant component 
changes on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors that did not show 
significant magnitude of change scores (see Appendices 
D and E, Tables G-M, for data and analysis of variance 
tables). 
TABLE 41 
factor 
1 
Agr,ression 
3 
Surgency 
8 
Social 
Affection 
9 
Sadness 
SU~!HARY Or SIGNIFICANT NAGNITUDF: OF CHANGE SCORES AND cmtPONENT C!IANCES ON THE TI.JELVE NO\.fLIS ~!OOD FACTORS ACROSS THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL 
SESSIONS (See Appendices D and E, Tables G-H, for data and anal~si~ of variance tables) 
f'-Value 
3,651< 
3,84'H 
4 '211"' 
4 '94tn< 
~lagnitude of Change Scores Change in Components 
Direction t-Value :mt F-Value Comparisnn of Sessions Variable · Direct ion 
------
Session 2 shows an increase 
and Session 3 shows a decrease -2,66** 
Session J shows a decrease and 
Session 4 shows an increase 
Session l shows ;1 greater 
decrease than Session 2 
Session 1 shows a greater 
decrease than Session 3 
Session 1 shows a greater 
decrease than Session 4 
Session 2 shows an Increase 
and Session 1 shows a decrease 
Session l shows a greater 
decrease than Session 3 
Session l shows a greater 
decrease than Session 4 
2,99** 
3,05** 
2, ll** 
2. 15* 
"). 18** 
2,73** 
2,23* 
Numher of N<>w 
Compon<!nts 4,5H** 
2 isdifferent from 
2 is different from J 
4 is different from J 
---------------------·-----
:--l••mher of 
Components 
Disappeared 
::-lumber of :-lew 
Components 
::-lumher of ~cw 
Components 
Tntal Change 
~tlmber of 
Compon11nts 
Lnc re:1sed 
4~46** 
3, V•* 
s,:.t•'* 
),(!9** 
J • ;l') ,.,., 
2 is different from 
] is different from 1 
4 is different from l 
2 is different from 
] is different from 
2 is different from 
2 is different from J 
2 is different from 4 
2 is different from 3 
2 is different from 4 
4 is different from 1 
2 is different from 
2 is different from 3 
More new components on Session 2 
More new components on Session 2 
More new components on Session 4 
~ore components disappeared on 
Session 1 
~lore components disappeared on 
Session 1 
~ore components disappeared on 
Session 1 
More new components on Session 2 
More new components on Session 3 
More new components on Session 2 
More new components on Session 2 
More new components on Session 2 
More total change on Session 2 
More total change on Session 2 
More total change on Session 
More components increased on 
Session 2 
More components increased on 
s~ssion 2 
t-Val.ue 
2, 2 ] 1' 
-·),49'''* 
2. 26 1< 
-2,58* 
] '42~"* 
-2, LO* 
3 ,05''* 
2 ,14i< 
:3,26*"• 
-2 ,49''' 
-2,82** 
-2,12* 
- "3. () t ** 
-:?. 34'' 
2,23* 
-:J ,19•'''' 
----------·- -------- -·---------····----------·------· 
--------·- ---
Session 2 shows an itw rease 
and Session l shows a decrease 
Session l shows a grc•ater 
de('rease than Sessi.on "l 
Session !~ s!H)W~ an i.n1: rt•ase 
and Sei;s ion l shows a decrl'HSe 
], 'l4•'* 
2. 6i>'''" 
"l, 21 ** 
:-lt!ITibC r 0 i' 
Comp<mcnt s 
I) i sappl·ared 
:-IHmh.:•r nf N<"W 
c,)mponcn t s 
Tutal Chan~e 
~ , XH ~<c~~: 
2,67* 
l, 6!,"' 
2 is dlffL·I·ent t'rom 
"] is different from 
4 is diffL•rt·nt from 
More components di:<appcarcd on 
Session l 
More components disappenred on 
Sessi<)n I 
'lore components disappeared on 
Session 1 
---------·----------------· 
,; is different from I 
2 is different from 
2 is difft'rent from 4 
3 is different from 
More new components on Session 2 
More total change on Session 2 
~lore total change on Spssion 2 
More total change on Sesslon 
-2,09* 
3,15*'' 
-3,")01<* 
2,7"!,•1* 
-3,01** 
-2,20* 
-2,03* 
I 
N 
\.0 
+:--
1 
TABLE 41 (continued) 
10 
Egotism 
12 
Scepticism 
Note: 
* p . ·0,05. 
** p ~ 0,01. 
5 '8 3•'•1• 
8, 16•'''' 
Session 2 shows an increase 
and Session 1 shows a decrease 
Sess i.on 2 shows an increase 
and Session 3 shows a decrease 
Session 3 shows a decrease and 
Session 4 shows an increase 
Session 4 shows an increase 
and Session l shows a decrease 
Session l shows .a greater 
decrease than Session 2 
Session l shows a greater 
decrease than Session 3 
Session 1 shows a decrease and 
Session 4 shows an increase 
Session 4 shows an increase 
and Session 3 shows a decrease 
2 
~umber of 
2,90** Components 4,'37** 4 
D i.sa ppea reel 
-2,43* 4 
2 '97'"' 
~umber of 2 3,49** 4' 681n> 2 New 4 Components 4 
2 
Clumber of 
Components '3,81* 4 
Decreased 
1 
2,61•"' 
') 
-
3, 18*'' 
'lumber of 2 
4' 35*'' Components lJ,86** 
Disappeared 4 
2. ll* 
3 
2 
') 
Total Ch:1nge tJ,52*'' 4 
3 
is difEerent from l More components disappeared on 
Session 1 
-2,35* 
is different from 1 More components disappeared on 
Session 1 
-"3,47** 
is different from 3 ~ore components disappeared on 
Session 3 
-2,00* 
is different from l More new components on Session 2 2,92''* 
is clifEeren~ from 3 More new components on Session 2 
-2,37* 
is different from l More new components on Session 4 2. 94*•'• 
is d if Eerent from ] More new components on Session 4 2 '27•' 
is different from 3 More components decreased on 
Session 2 
-J. 21''* 
is cl if ferent from 3 More components decreased on 
Session 4 2,39* 
is different from l More components decreased on I N Session 1 
-3,20** ~ 
\.J1 
I is different from l More components disappeared on 
Session 1 
-3 ,49*'' 
is cl Lfferent from 4 More components disappeared on 
Session 2 
-2,49* 
is cl if fercnt from l More components disappeared on 
Session l 
-5,39•'* 
is cli_fferent from l More components disappeared on 
Session l 
-4,2]** 
is cl ifferent from 1 ~[ore total change on Session l -3, l4•b' 
is different from 3 ~[ore total change on Session 2 
-'3,06** 
is different from l ~[ore total change on Session l 
-4. 22** 
is cl if ferent from l :lore total change on Session l 
-6' 35'''' 
__; 
TABLE 42 SUMMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT CO~fPONENT CHANGES ON THE NOWL IS HOOD FACTORS 
THAT DID NOT SHO\.J SIGNIFICANT ~l.';GNITUDE OF CHANGE SCORES 
(See Appendices D and E, Tables G-H, for dnta and analysis of variance tables) 
Factor Significant Variable F-Value Comparison of Sessions Direction t-Value 
Number of Components Disappeared 3,68* 2 is different from 4 Hare components disappeared on Session 2 -2,93** 4 is different from 1 More components disappeared on Session 1 
-3,22** 
2 Number of New Components 3,50* 2 i.s different from 1 More new components on Session 2 2,34 Anxiety 2 is different from 3 Hare new components on Session 2 -2,86** 
Total Change 3,51* 2 is different from 3 Hare total change on Session 2 -2,94** 2 is different from 4 Hare total change on Session 2 -2,38* 
2 is different from 4 More total change on Session 2 
-2,52* I 6 Total Change 6,06* 4 is different from 1 More total change on Session 1 -4,39** N Fatigue \.0 4 is different from 3 More total change on Session 3 
-2,76** 0"1 
I 
7 Number of Components Decreased 3,45* 2 is different from 1 More components decreased on Session 2 2,57* Vigour 3 is different from 1 More components decreased on Session 3 2,60* 
2 is different from 4 Nore components decreased on Session 2 -2,37* 
Number of Components Decreased 2,82* 4 is different from 1 Hare components decreased on Session 1 -2,84** 
4 is different from 3 Hare components decreased on Session 3 -2,10* 
2 is different from 3 More components disappeared on Session 2 -3,10** 11 2 is different from 4 Hare components disappeared on Session 2 
-2,79** Deactivation Number of Components Disappeared 5,02** 4 is different from 1 Hare components disappeared on Session 1 -2,28* 
3 is different from 1 More components disappeared on Session 1 
-2,60** 
2 is different from 4 More total change on Session 2 
-4,25** 
8,75** 4 is different from 1 More total change on Session 1 -4,55** Total Change 4 is dffferent from 3 More total change on Session 3 -2,59* 
3 is different from 1 More total change on Session 1 -2,07* 
Note: 
* p < 0,05. 
** p < 0,01. 
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Tables 41 and 42 have presented the summaries of magnitude 
of change scores and component change scores on the 12 
Nowlis Mood Factors across the four experimental sessions. 
Table 41 presented the significant magnitude of change 
scores and the associated significant component change 
scores. 
Table 42 presented the significant component change scores 
on the Nowlis Mood Factors that did not show significant 
magnitude of change scores. This is attributed to different 
component changes compensating, cancelling or balancing 
each other. The specific pattern for each factor can be 
seen by examining the tables of means for the component 
changes. 
From Tables 41 and 42 it is now possible to compare the 
different experimental sessions by considering the 
magnitude of change scores and the component change scores 
together. 
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Acceptance ot Rejection·of Hypotheses and Results of the 
Comparison of Magnitude of Change Scores and Component Change 
Scores across the Four Experimental Sessions 
1. Comparison of Session 2 with Session 4 
(a) Magnitude of change scores 
Tables 41 and 42 above show that Session 2, the 
experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), 
when compared with Session 4, the self-administered 
Mood Analysis Technique, showed no statistical difference. 
Hypothesis 4.3.l.l(a) that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (HAT), \.Jill not 
differ from Session 4, the self-administered Mood 
Analysis Technique, ln terms of the magnitude of change 
scores on the twelve Nowlis Mood Factors, is accepted. 
(b) Component change scores 
Tables 41 and 42 above indicate: 
Components Increased 
No variable statistically significant. 
Componen~s Decreased 
For the factor Deactivation, Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), showed more 
components decreased than on Session 4, the self-
administered Mood Analysis Technique, on this factor 
(p<O,OS). 
Components Disappeared 
For the factors Anxiety, Deactivation and Scepticism, 
Session 2 showed more components disappeared than on 
Session 4, on these factors (p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol, p<O,OS 
respectively). 
New Components 
For the factor Social Affection, Session 2 showed more 
new components than on Session 4, on this factor (p<O·,Ol). 
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Total Change 
For the factors Anxiety, Fatigue, Social Affection and 
Sadness, Session 2 showed more total change than on 
Session 4, on these factors (p<O,OS, p<O,OS, p<O,Ol, 
p<O,OS respectively). 
Hypothesis 4.3.l.l(b) that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not 
differ from Session 4, the self-administered Mood 
Analysis Technique, 1n terms of mood components: 
increased, decreased, disappeared, new and total change 
in mood components, on the twelve Nmvlis Mood Factors 
across the four experimental sessions, is rejected. 
The experimental evidence is consonant with v1ew1ng 
Session 2 as influencing magnitude of change scores 
in a way different from Session 4. 
(c) Summary of the effect of Session 2 compared with Session 
4 on the 12 Nmvlis Mood Factors in terms of component 
changes. 
Anxiety 
Session 2 showed more components disappeared than on 
Session 4 (p<O;Ol). 
Session 2 showed more total change than on Session 4 
.(p<0,05). 
Fatigue 
Session 2 showed more total change than on Session 4 
(p<O,OS). 
Social Affection 
Session 2 showed more new components than on Session 4 
(p<O,Ol). 
Session 2 showed more total change than on Session 4 
(p<O ,01). 
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Sadness 
Session 2 shot-red more total change than on Session 4 
(p<:O,OS). 
Deactivation 
Session 2 showed more components decreased than on 
Session 4 (p<O,OS). 
Session 2 showed more components disappeared than on 
Session 4 (p<O,Ol). 
Session 2 showed more total change than on Session 4 
(p<O ,01). 
Scepticism 
Session 2 showed more components disappeared than on 
Session 4 (p<O,OS). 
2. Comparison of Session 2 with Sessions 1 and 3 
(a) Magnitude of change scores 
Tables 41 and 42 above show that the factors Social 
Affection, Sadness and Egotism increased on Session 2, 
and on Session 1, the personality testing session, 
these factors showed a decrease (p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol 
respectively). 
The factors Aggression and Egotism increased on Session 
2, while Session 3, the quiet activit s session, 
showed a decrease on these factors (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS 
respectively). 
The factors Surgency and Scepticism decreased on Session 
2, but decreased to a greater extent on Session 1, the 
personality testing sess1on (p<O,.Ol, p<~O,Ol respectively). 
Hypothesis 4.3.1.3(a) that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not 
diff~r from Session 1, the personality testing session, 
and Session 3, the quiet activities session, in terms of 
the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis Mood, 
F~ctors, is rejected. 
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The experimental evidence is consonant with viewing 
Session 2 as influencing magnitude of change scores 
in a way different from Sessions 1 and 3. 
(b) Component change scores 
Tables 41 and ~42 above indicate: 
Components Increased 
For the factor Sadness, Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (~~T), showed more 
components increased than on Session 1, the personality 
testing session, and than on Session 3, the quiet 
activities session, for this factor (p<O,OS, p<O,Ol 
respectively). 
Components Decreased 
For the factor Vigour, Session 2 showed more components 
decreased than on Session 1, for this factor (p<O,OS). 
For the factor Scepticism, Session 2 showed more 
components decreased than on Session 3, for this factor 
(p<O,Ol). 
Components Disappeared 
For the factors Surgency, Sadness, Egotism and Scepticism, 
Session 2 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
Session 1, for these factors (p<O,OS, p<O,OS, p<O,OS, 
p<O,Ol respectively). 
For the factor Deactivation, Session 2 showed more 
components disappeared than on Session 3, for this 
factor (p<O,Ol). 
New Components 
For each of the factors Aggression, Anxiety, Social 
Affection and Egotism, Session 2 showed more new 
components than on either Session 1 or Session 3 (with 
respect to Session 1: p<O,OS, p<O,OS, p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol 
respectively; with respect to Session 3: p<O,Ol, ' 
p<O,Ol, p<O,OS, p<O,OS respectively). 
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For the factors Surgency and Sadness, Session 2 showed 
more new components than on Session 1, on these factors 
(p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol respectively). 
Total Change 
For the factors Anxiety, Social Affection and Sadness, 
Session 2 showed more total change than on Session 3, 
on these factors (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS, p<O,Ol respectively). 
Hypothesis 4.3.1.3(b) that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (~~T), will not 
differ from Session 1, the personality testing session, 
and Session 3, the quiet activities session, in terms 
of mood c~mponents: increased, decreased, disappeared, 
new and total change in mood components, on tlw 12 
Nowlis Mood Fa.ctors, is rejected. 
The experimental evidence is consonant with viewing 
Session 2 as influencing mood components in a way 
different from Sessions 1 and 3. 
(c) Summary of the effect of Session 2 compared with 
Sessions 1 and 3 on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors in terms 
of component changes. 
Aggression 
Session 2 showed more new components than on Sessions 
1 and 3 (p<O,OS, p<O,Ol respectively). 
Anxiety 
Session 2 showed more new components than on Sessions 1 
and 3 (p<O,OS, p<O,Ol respectively). 
Session 2 showed more total change than on Session 3 
(p 0,01). 
Surgency 
Session 2 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
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Session 1 (p<O,OS). 
Vigour 
Session.2 showed more components decreased than on 
Session 1 (p<O,OS). 
Social Affection 
Session 2 showed more new components than on Sessions 
1 and 3 (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS respectively). 
Session 2 showed more total change than on Session 3 
(p<O,OS). 
Sadness 
Session 2 showed more components increased than on 
Sessions 1 and 3 (p<O,OS, p<O,Ol respectively). 
Session 2 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
Session 1 (p<O,OS). 
Session 2 showed more new components than on Session 1 
(p<O,Ol). 
Session 2 showed more total change than on Session 3 
(p<O, 05). 
Egotism 
Session 2 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
Session 1 (p<O,OS). 
Session 2 showed more new components than on Sessions 1 
and 3 (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS respectively). 
Deactivation 
Session 2 showed more components disappeared than on 
Session 3 (p<O,Ol). 
Scepticism 
Session 2 showed more components decreased than on 
Session 3 (p<O,Ol). 
Session 2 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
Session 1 (p<O,Ol). 
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3. Comparison of Session 4 with Sessions 1 and 3. 
(a) Magnitude of change scores 
Tables 41 and 42 above show that the factors Scepticism, 
Sadness and Egotism showed an increase on Session 4, the 
self-administered Mood Analysis Technique, and Session 1, 
the personality testing session, showed a decrease on 
these factors (p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol respectively). 
The factors Surgency and Social Affection showed a 
decrease on Session 4, but decreased to a greater extent 
on Session 1, on these factors (p<O,OS, p<O,OS respect-
ively). 
The factors Aggression, Egotism and Scepticism showed an 
1ncrease on Session 4, and Session 3 showed a decrease 
on these factors (p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol, p<0,05 rftspectively). 
Hypothesis 4.3.1.5(a) that Session 4, the self-administered 
Mood Analysis Technique, will not differ from Session 1, 
the personality testing session, and Session 3, the 
quiet activit s session, in terms of the magnitude of 
change scores on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors, is rejected. 
The experimental evidence is consonant with viewing 
Session 4 as influencing magnitude of change scores 1n 
a way different from Sessions 1 and 3. 
(b) Component change scores 
Tables 41 and 42 above indicate: 
Components Increased 
No variable significant. 
Components Decreased 
For the factor Deactivation, Session 4, the self-
administered Mood Analysis Technique, showed fewer 
components decreased than on either Session 1, the 
personality testing session, or Session 3, the quiet 
activities session (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS). 
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For the factor Scepticism, Session 4 showed more 
components decreased than on Session 3, on this factor 
(p <0,05). 
Components Disappeared 
For the factors Surgency, Sadness, Egotism, Deactivation 
and Scepticism, Session 4 showed fewer components dis-
appeared than on Session 1, on these factors (p<0,05, 
p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol, p<0,05, p<O,Ol respectively). 
For the factor Egotism, Session 4 also shm..:red fewer 
components disappeared than on Session 3, on this factor 
(p<O ,05). 
For the factor Anxiety, Session 4 showed fe,..:rer components 
disappeared than on Session 1, on this factor (p<O,Ol). 
New Components 
For the factor Aggression, Session 4 showed more new 
components than on Session 3, on this factor (p<0,05). 
For the factor Egotism, Session 4 showed more new 
components than on either Session 1 or Session 3, on 
this factor (p<O,Ol, p<0,05 respectively). 
Total Change 
For the factors Social Affection and Scepticism, Session 
4 showed less total change than on Session 1, for these 
factors (p<0,05, p<O,Ol respectively). 
For the factor Fatigue, Session 4 showed less total 
change than on either Session 1 or Session 3 (p<O,Ol 1n 
both cases). 
For the factor Deactivation, Session 4 showed less total 
change than on Session 3, on this factor (p<0,05). 
Hypothesis 4.3.1.5(b) that Session 4, the self-administered 
Mood Analysis Technique, will not differ from Session 1, 
the personality testing session, and Session 3, the quiet 
activities session, in terms of mood components: 
increased, decreased, disappeared, new and total change 
in mood components, on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors, i,s 
rejected. 
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The experimental evidence is consonant with viewing 
Session 4 as influencing mood components in a way 
different from Sessions 1 and 3. 
(c) Summary of the effect of Session 4 compared with 
Sessions 1 and 3 on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors in 
terms of component changes. 
Aggression 
Session 4 showed more new components than on Session 3 
(p<O,OS). 
Anxiety 
Session 4 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
Session 1 (p<O,Ol). 
Surgency 
Session 4 showed fetver components disappeared than on 
Session 1 (p<O,OS). 
Fatigue 
Session 4 showed less total change than on Sessions 1 
and 3 (p<O,Ol, p<O,Ol respectively). 
Social Affection 
Session 4 showed less total change than on Session 1 
(p<O,OS). 
Sadness 
Session 4 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
Session 1 (p<O,Ol). 
Egotism 
Session 4 shmved fewer components disappeared than on 
Sessions 1 and 3 (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS respectively). 
Session 4 showed more new components than on Sessions 1 
and 3 (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS respectively). 
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Deactivation 
Session 4 showed fewer components decreased than on 
Sessions 1 and 3 (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS respectively). 
Session 4 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
Session 1 (p<O,OS). 
Session 4 showed less total change than on Sessions 1 
and 3 (p<O,Ol, p<O,OS respectively). 
Scepticism 
Session 4 shm..red more components decreased than on 
Session 3 (p<O,OS). 
Session 4 showed fewer components disappeared than on 
Session 1 (p<O,Ol). 
Session 4 showed less total change than on Session 1 
(p<O ,01). 
Although no hypotheses concern1ng the relationships 
between Sessions 1 and 3 are formulated, in the interests 
of a complete analysis these comparisons are given: 
4. Comparison of Session 1 with Session 3 
(a) Hagnitude of change scores 
Tables 41 and 42 above show that for the factors 
Surgency, Social Affection, Sadness and Scepticism, 
Session 1 showed a greater decrease than Session 3, 
on these factors (p<O,Ol for each factor). 
(b) Component change scores 
Tables 41 and 42 above indicate: 
Components Increased 
No variable statistically significant. 
Components Decreased 
For the factor Vigour, Session 3, the quiet activities 
session, shmved more components decreased than on 
Session 1, the personality testing session, on this 
factor (p<0,05). 
For the factor Scepticism, Session 1 showed more components 
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decreased than on Session 3, on this factor (p<O,Ol). 
Components Disappeared 
For the factors Surgency, Sadness, Deactivation and 
Scepticism, Session 1 showed more components disappeared 
than on Session 3~ on these factors (p<O,Ol for each 
factor). 
New Components 
For the factor Surgency, Session 3 showed more new 
components than on Session 1, on this factor (p<O,OS). 
Total Change 
For the factors Sadness, Deactivation and Scepticism, 
Session 1 showed more total change than on Session 3, 
on these factors (p<0,05, p<0,05, p<O,Ol respectively). 
(c) Summary of the effect of Session 1 compared with Session 
3 on the 12 Now1is Mood Factors in terms of component 
changes. 
Surgency 
Session 1 showed more components disappeared than on 
Session 3 (p<O,Ol). 
Session 3 showed more new components than on Session 1 
(p<O,OS). 
Vigour 
Session 3 showed more components decreased than on 
Session 1 {p<O,OS). 
Sadness 
Session 1 showed more components disappeared than on 
Session 3 {p<0,01). 
Session 1 showed more total change than on Session 3 
I 
{p<O,OS). 
Deactivation 
Session 1 showed more components disappeared than on 
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Session 3 (p<0,01). 
Session 1 showed more total change than on Session 3 
(p<O,Ol). 
Scepticism 
Session 1 showed more components decreased than on 
Session 3 (p<O,Ol). 
Session 1 showed more components disappeared than on 
Session 3 (p<0,01). 
Session 1 showed more total change t~an on Session 3 
(p<O,Ol). 
An Examination for Consistency of the Significant Magnitude of 
Change Scores and the Significant Component Change Scores 
It is now possible to examine the significant magnitude of change' 
scores and the significant component change scores for consistency. 
It should be the case that the significant inter-session magnitude 
of change differences on the 12 Nowlis Mood Dimensions are meaning-
fully associated with the significant change in components. 
Relating the Significant Magnitude of Chauge Scores on the Twelve 
Nowlis Mood Factors to the Significant Change in Components 
Factor 1 (Aggression) 
1. Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), shows an increase on this factor, and 
Session 3, the quiet activities session, shows a decrease on 
this factor. 
This is associated with Session 2 showing more new components 
than Session 3 (p<O,Ol). 
2. Session 3, the quiet activities session, shows a decrease on 
this factor, and Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis 
Technique, shows an increase on this factor. 
-This is associated with Session 4 showing more new components 
than Session 3 (p<0,05). 
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Factor 3 (Surgency) 
1. Session 1, the personality testing session, shows a greater 
decrease on this factor than Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), on this factor. 
This is associated with Session 1 showing more components 
disappeared than Session 2 (p<O,OS), and Session 2 showing 
more new components than Session 1 on this factor (p<O,Ol) . 
.. 
2. Session 1 shows a greater decrease on this factor than on 
Session 3, the quiet activities session. 
This is associated with Session 1 showing more components 
disappeared than on Session 3 (p<O,Ol), and Session 3 
showing more new components than Session 1 on this factor 
(p<O,OS). 
3. Session 1 shows a greater decrease on this factor than 
Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique. 
This is associated with Session 1 showing more components 
disappeared than on Session 4 (p<O,OS). 
Factor 8 (Social Affection) 
1. Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), shows an increase on this factor, and 
Session 1, the personality testing session, shows a decrease. 
This is associated with Session 2 showing more new components 
than Session 1 (p<O,Ol). 
2. Session 1 shows a greater decrease on this factor than 
Session 3, the quiet activities session. 
Referring to Table 32 it can be seen that all the component 
changes follow the indicated direction. Although individually 
no component changes are significant, it is most likely that 
they are operating in combination to produce the significant 
magnitude change. 
3. Session 1 shows a greater decrease on this factor than 
Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique., 
This is associated with Session 1 showing more total change 
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than Session 4 (p<0,05) and an examination of Table 32~ 
employing the same reasoning as above, can account for the 
observed result. 
Factor 9 (Sadness) 
1. Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), shows an increase on this factor, and 
Session 1, the personality testing session, shows a decrease. 
This is associated with Session 2 showing more components 
increased (p<0,05), fewer components disappeared (p<O,OS), 
and more new components (p<O,Ol) than Session 1. 
2. Session 1 shows a greater decrease on this factor than 
Session 3, the quiet activities session. 
This is associated with Session 1 showing more components 
disappeared (p<O,Ol) and more total change (p<O,OS) than 
Session 3. 
3. Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique, 
shows an increase on this factor, and Session 1 shows a 
decrease. 
This is associated with Session 4 showing fewer components 
disappeared (p<O,Ol) than Session 1. 
Factor 10 (Egotism) 
1. Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), shm..rs an increase on this factor, and 
Session 1, the personality testing session, shows a decrease. 
This is associated with Session 2 showing fewer components 
disappeared (p<O,OS) and more new components (p<O,Ol) than 
Session 1. 
2. Session 2 shows an increase on this factor and Session 3, 
the quiet activities session, shows a decrease. 
This is associated with Session 2 showing more new 
components (p<O,OS) than Session 3. 
3. Session 4, the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique, 
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shows an increase on this factor, and Session 3 shows a 
decrease. 
This is associated with Session 4 showing fewer components 
disappeared (p<O,OS) and more new components (p<O,OS) than 
Session 3. 
4. Session 4 shows an increase on this factor, and Session 1 
shows a decrease. 
This is associated with Session 4 showing fewer components 
disappeared (p<O,Ol) and more new components (p<O,Ol) than 
Session L 
Factor 12 (Scepticism) 
1. Session 1, the personality testing session, shows a greater 
decrease on this factor than Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (t-fAT). 
This is associated with Session 1 showing more components 
disappeared (p<O,Ol) and more total change (p<O,Ol) than 
Session 2. 
2. Session 1 shows a greater decrease on this factor than 
Session 3, the quiet activities session. 
This is associated with Session 1 showing more components 
decreased (p<O,Ol), more components disappeared (p<O,Ol) and 
more toal change (p<O,Ol) than Session 3. 
3. Session 1 shows a decrease on this factor and Session 4, the 
self-administered Mood Analysis Technique, shows an increase. 
This is associated with Session 1 showing more components 
disappeared (p<O,Ol) and more total change (p<O,Ol) than 
Session 4. 
4. Session 4 shows an increase on this factor and Session 3 shows 
a decrease. 
This is associated with Session 4 showing more components 
decreased (p<O,OS) than on Session 3. This apparently anomalous 
result can be explained by examining Table 39. Although 
Session 4 showed more components decreased than Session 3, 
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Table -39 shows that Session 3 showed fewer components increased, 
more components disappeared and fewer new components than 
Session 4. 
This section has shown that the significant magnitude of change 
scores and the significant change in component scores are consistent. 
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4.4 The Effect of the Four Experimental Sessions on "Moody" vs. "Non-
Moody" Subjects 
Description 
In this section the effect of the four experimental sessions on 
moody subjects in comparison with non-moody subjects, in terms of 
the mean magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors, 
is examined. The subjects were divided into two different groups 
nmoody" and "non-moody", according to two different criteria of 
moodiness, i.e. the MAT criterion (self-opinion criterion) and the 
high and low mean variability criterion (statistical criterion); 
then the effect of each experimental session on the "moody" and 
"non-moody" groups in terms of the mean magnitude of·change scores 
on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors was determined. 
Summary of Findings 
None of the Retelling T2 tests were found to be significant. 
Hypotheses 
4.4.1.1 
4.4.1.2 
Results 
Null Hypothesis H0 : 
It is hypothesized that the four experimental sessions 
will not differ in their effects on 1 the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors for moody vs. non-moody subjects. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 : 
It is hypothesized that the four experimental sessions 
will yield different effects on the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors for moody vs. non-moody subjects. 
Tables 43-46 present the results for the MAT criterion (self-
opinion criterion) of moodiness for each of the four experimental 
sessions. 
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TABLE 43 
.HOTELLINGS T2 TEST BETWEEN NON-MOODY AND HOODY SUBJECTS 
DESIGNATED ON THE MAT, ON THE 12 NOWLIS FACTORS ACROSS 
SESSION 1 (See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data) 
I Factor 
1 
Aggression 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
Elation 
5 
Concentrating 
6 
Fatigue 
7 
Vigor 
8 
Social Affection 
9 
Sadc.ess 
10 
Egotism 
11 
Deactivation 
. 12 
Scepticism 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Hotellings T2 df F-Value 
12,29 12 0,91 
Non-Moody Noody 
M 
-0,19 
-0,16 
-0,94 
0,97 
0,19 
0,39 
-0,71 
-0,23 
-0,68 
-0,03 
-0,23 
-0,19 
STD STD t-V:..~lu.: 
1,64 -0,47 1,88 0, 72 
------~---- --
0,93 -0,72 1,79 1,63 
1,79 -0,96 2,14 0,05 
7,62 -0,51 2,42 1,51 
2,56 0,47 2,53 -0,51 
2,46 0, 26 3,12 0,21 
2,19 -0,66 2,59 -0,09 
4,11 -0,91 2,17 1,11 
1,38 -0,57 1,49 -0,35 
1,05 -0,47 1,11 1,88 
2,31 
-0' 14 3,10 -0,15 
2,54 -1,19 2,31 1,96 
Sample size for non-moody is 31. 
Sample size for moody is 74. 
Degrees of freedom are 103 throughout. 
HOTELLINGS 
DESIGNATED 
SESSION 2 
Factor 
1 
Aggression 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
Elation 
5 
Concentrating 
6 
Fatigue 
7 
Vigor 
8 
~ocia1 Affection 
9 
Sadness 
lD 
Egotism 
11 
Deactive:tion 
1.2 
Scepticism 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
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TABLE 44 
T2 TEST BETWEEN NON-MOODY AND MOODY SUBJECTS 
ON THE MAT, ON THE 12 NOWLIS FACTORS ACROSS 
(See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data) 
__ H_o~t_e~l~l_i~n~g~s~T_2 ___ d~f~~F_-_V_a~l~u~e-
12 11,41 0,85 
N on-N d OOIV t OOll Y 
M STD M STD 
-0,10 1,40 0,05 2,09 
t'-Value 
-0,37 
"--~-------- --··--T-
-0,29 
' 
-0,26 
-0,06 
0,52 
0,39 
0,23 
-0,13 
0,26 
-0,10 
-0,19 
-0,35 
1,85 -0,09 2' l3 -0,45 
1,97 0,00 2,33 -0,54 
2,14 -0,08 2,53 0,03 
2,25 0,26 2,14 0,56 
2,32 -0,18 2,59 1,05 
2,14 -0,49 2,85 1,25 
2,19 0,14 2,47 -0,52 
1,50 0,12 1,97 0,35 
1,04 0,28 1,57 -1,24 
2,21 -0,05 2,86 -0,24 
1,20 -0,30 1,94 -0,15 
Sample size for non-moody is 31. 
Sample size for moody is 74. 
Degrees of freedom are 103 throughout. 
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TABLE 45 
HOTELLINGS T2 TEST BETWEEN NON-t-lOODY AND HOODY SUBJECTS 
DESIGNATED ON THE MAT, ON THE 12 NOWLIS FACTORS ACROSS 
SESSION 3 (See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data) 
Factor 
1 
Aggression 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
Elation 
5 
Concentrating 
6 
Fatigue 
7 
Vigor 
8 
~ocial Affection 
9 
Sadness 
10 
Egotism 
11 
Deactivation 
12 
Scepticism 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Hotellings T2 
13,02 
df 
12 
92 
F-Va1ue 
0,97 
N on-t-loodv Noodv 
M 
-0,52 
-0,29 
0,45 
-0,26 
-0,19 
0, 71 
-0,16 
0,03 
-0,06 
-0,35 
0,55 
-0,23 
STD H STD t-V;.tlUL! 
1,50 -0,69 1,67 0,50 
---
1,40 -0,57 1,55 0,86 
2,43 -0,45 2,06 1,93 
2,24 -0,22 2,06 -0,09 
2,57 0,22 2,05 -0,86 
2,36 0,70 2,45 0,01 
2,24 -1,12 2,15 2,07* 
2,18 -0,27 1,71 0,76 
0,57 -0,09 1,54 0,11 
0,75 -0,22 1, 21 -0,59 
1,65_ 0,27 2,28 0,61 
0,80 -0,31 1,10 0,39 
Sample size for non-ruoody is 31. 
Sample size for moody is 74. 
Degrees of freedom are 103 throughout. 
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TABLE 46 
HOTELLINGS T2 TEST BETWEEN NON-MOODY AND HOODY SUBJECTS 
DESIGNATED ON THE MAT, ON THE 12 NOWLIS FACTORS ACROSS 
SESSION 4 (See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data) 
Factor 
1 
Aggr~sslun 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
Elation 
5 
Concentrating 
6 
Fatigue 
7 
Vigor 
8 
!Social Affection 
9 
Sadness 
lC 
Egotism 
11 
Deactivation 
12 
Scepticism 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Hotellings T2 df F-Value 
10,95 12 0,81 
Non-Moodv ~looJ v 
H 
-0,13 
. 0, 35 
-0,06 
-0,03 
0,58 
0,35 
-0,13 
-0,39 
0,45 
0,23 
0,29 
0,06 
STD H STD t-Valuc 
1,34 0,09 1, 7l -0,65 
----~------ ~ 
1,80 -0,18 1,62 1,48 
' 
1,29 -0,53 2,09 1,14 
1,20 -:-0,47 2,11 1,09 
1,86 0,57 2,35 0,03 
1, 72 0,22 1,68 0,38 
1,38 -0,46 2,38 0, 72 
1,54 -0,24 2,14 -0,34 
1,59. 
-0,03 1,82 1,27 
1,41 0,20 1,09 0,09 
1,85 0,39 2,14 -0,23 
1,18 0,09 1,61 -0,09 
Sample size for non-moody is 31. 
Sample size for moody is 74. 
Degrees of freedom are 103 throughout. 
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Tables 43-46 have shown that all the Hotelling T2 tests are non-
significant, and hence subjects designated "moody" and "non-moody" 
by the MAT criterion do not differ across the four experimental 
sessions on the 12. Nowlis Mood Factors simultaneously. 
Tables 47-50 present the results for the high and low mean 
variability criterion of moodiness across the four experimental 
sessions on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors. 
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TABLE 47 
HOTELLINGS T2 TEST BETWEEN NON-MOODY AND HOODY SUBJECTS 
DESIGNATED BY HIGH AND LOW MEAN VARIABILITY, ON THE 12 
NOWLIS FACTORS ACROSS SESSION 1 (See Appendix D, Tables 
G-J for data) 
Factor 
1 
Aggression 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
Elation 
5 
Concentrating 
6 . 
Fatigue 
7 
Vigor 
8 
!Social Affection 
9 
Sadness 
10 
Egotism 
11 
·Deactivation 
12 
Scepticism 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Hotellings T2 df F-Value 
20,14 
N on-
M 
-0,18 
-0,24 
-0,29 
2,29 
-0,06 
-0,12 
-0,35 
0,24 
-0,18 
-0,41 
-0,18 
0,12 
M d 00 IV 
12 
21 
STD 
1,13 
0,56 
1,21 
9,85 
1,85 
2,03 
1,27 
5,25 
0,64 
0,87 
2,30 
3,10 
1,10 
M 
-0,29 
-1~18 
-1,29 
-0,76 
0,41 
-0,82 
-0,41 
/ 
-1,76 
-1,00 
-0,53 
-0,41 
-1,41 
OO(IY 
STO t-V;.duL' 
2,66 0,17 
1,91 1,95 
3,24 1,19 
3,58 1,20 
3,34 -0,51 
4,75 0,56 
2,87 0,08 
2,75 1,39 
1,17 2,55* 
1,81 0,24 
2,92 0,26 
2,60 1,56 
Sample size for non-moody is 17. 
Sample size for moody is 17. 
Degrees of freedom are 32 throughout. 
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TABLE 48 
HOTELLINGS T2 TEST BETWEEN NON-MOODY AND NOODY SUBJECTS 
DESIGNATED BY HIGH AND LOW MEAN VARIABILITY, ON THE 12 
NOWLIS FACTORS ACROSS SESSION 2 (See Appendix D, Tables 
G-J for data) 
Factor 
1 
Aggression 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
ELition 
5 
Concentrating 
6 
Fatigue 
7 
Vigor 
8 
:social Affection 
9 
Sadness 
10 
Egotism 
11 
Deactivation 
12 
Scepticism 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
. 
Hotellings T2 
15,61 
df 
12 
21 
F-Value 
0,85 
Non-Noodv N d 00 :v 
M 
0,12 
-0,06 
-0,06 
0,18 
0,12 
0,12 
-0,41 
0,18 
0,24 
0,00 
0,00 
-0,18 
STD H STU t-Valu·.; 
0, 78 -0,35 2,32 0,79 
0,43 -1,06 2,79 1,46 
0,75 -0,06 3,99 0,00 
1,24 0,41 3,79 -0,24 
2,09 0,18 2,24 -0,08 
1,65 -1,24 2,99 1,63 
1,73 0,94 4,26 -1,21 
1,94 0,24 3,23 -0,06 
0,83 0,12 3,08 0,15 
0,35 ·-0,06 2,19 0,11 
1,54 0,65 3, 90' -0,64 
1,07 0,06 2,82 -0,32 
Sample size for non-moody is 17. 
Sample size for moody is· 17. 
Degrees of freedom are 32 throughout. 
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TABLE 49 
HOTELLINGS T2 TEST BETWEEN NON-MOODY AND MOODY SUBJECTS 
DESIGNATED BY HIGH AND LOW MEAN VARIABILITY, ON THE 12 
NOWLIS FACTORS ACROSS SESSION 3 (See Appendix D, Tables 
G-J for data) 
' 
Factor 
1 
Aggression 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
Elation 
5 
Concentrating 
6 
Fatigue 
7 
Vigor 
8 
~ocial Affection 
9 
Sadness 
10 
Egotism 
11 
Deactivation 
12 
Scepticism 
Note: 
Hotellings T2 df 
23,94 
N on-
M 
-0,12 
-0,29 
-0,12 
-0,18 
0,18 
0,88 
-0,59 
-0,12 
-0;12 
0,00 
0,88 
-0,12 
12 
2 
M d OOIV 
STD 
0,33 
1,10 
0,78 
1,38 
1,33 
1,83 
1,54 
1,11 
0,33 
0, 71 
::.,69 
0,60 
F-Value 
1,31 
too tv 
M STO 
-0,76 2,28 
-1,71 1,83 
0,18 3,34 
0,41 3,36 
-0,88 3,26 
1,53 3,28 
-1,29 3,53 
0,12 3,35 
0,24 2,17 
-0,24 1,15 
1,35 2,12 
-0,18 0,95 
t-V;:;lu~ 
1,16 ' 
2,72* 
-0,35 
-0,67 
1,24 
-0,71 
0,76 
-0,27 
-0,66 
0, 72 
-0,72 
0,22 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Sample size for non-moody is 17. 
Sample size for moody is 17. 
~ 
Degrees of freedom are 32 throughout. 
\ 
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TABLE 50 
HOT~LLINGS T2 TEST BETWEEN NON-MOODY AND l'lOODY SUBJECTS 
DESIGNATED BY HIGH AND LOW ~lliAN VARIABILITY, ON THE 12 
NOWLIS FACTORS ACROSS SESSION 4 (See Appendix D, Tables 
G-J for data) 
Factor 
1 
Aggression 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
Elation 
5 
Concentrating 
.6 
Fatigue 
7 
Vigor. 
8 
$ocial Affection 
9 
Sadness 
lG 
Egotism 
11 
Deactivation 
12 
Scepticism 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Hofellings T2 
18,49 
df 
12 
2 
F-Value 
1,01 
N on-H d oo lY too y_ 
M 
-0,18 
-0,06 
-0,18 
-0,12 
0,35 
0,35 
0,00 
0,12 
0,06 
0,18 
0,65 
-0,06 
STD M STD t-Va1u..: 
0,64 1,06 2,70 -1,83 
0,24 1,06 2,30. -1,99 
1,33 -0,94 2,30 1,18 
' 
0,86 -0,76 3,19 0,81 
1,66 0,94 3,27 -0,66 
1,32 0,18 1,51 0,36 
1,50 -0,88 3,00 1,09 
1,41 -0,88 2,87 1,29 
0,24 0,18 1,78 -0,27 
1,07 0,06 1,39 0,28 
1,06 -0,24 3,07 1,12 
0,24 0,76 2,33 -1,45 
Sample size for non-moody is 17. 
Sample size for moody is 17. 
Degrees o£ freedom are 32 throughout. 
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Tables 4·7-50 have shown that none of the Hotelling T2 tests are 
significant, and hence subjects designated "moody" and "non-moody" 
by the high and low mean variability criterion do not differ 
across the four experimental sessions on the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors simultaneously. 
Acceptance or Rejection of Hypotheses 
These results, Tables 43-50, show that subjects designated "moody" 
and "non-moody" by both the MAT criterion and the high and lmv 
mean variability criterion do not differ across the four experi-
mental sessions on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors. Hence the Null 
hypothesis (4.4.1.1) that the four experimental sessions will 
not differ in their effects on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors for 
moody vs. non-moody subjects, is accepted. 
This finding suggests that overall the four different experimental 
sess~ons were influencing moody and non-moody subjects in similar 
ways. 
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4.5 The Effect of Session 2, the Experimenter Administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT) on Moods Classified as Positive, Neutral and Negative 
Introduction 
In this section a further more detailed examination of the effects 
of Session 2 on subjects' moods is carried out. The preceding 
.sections have shown that Session 2, the experimenter administered 
Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) influences the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Dimensions across all moods in ways different from the other 
experimental sessions. The next step taken is to find out if 
Session 2 is influencing different affective states (subjects' 
moods) in different ways. 
Subjects' descriptive classifications of their affective state at 
the beginning of Session 2 were divided into three groups: Group 1 
(positive moods), Group 2 (neutral moods), and Group 3 (negative 
moods). These categories cannot be assumed to be entirely homo-
geneous, e.g. Group 1 contains affective states classified as 
"happy" and affective states classified as "curious". 
the classification system is not arbitrary. 
However, 
To be included in Group 1 (positive moods) an affective state had 
to have either a positive tone and high energy level (e.g. 
"elated") or simply a positive feeling tone (e.g. "curious" and 
"expectant"). To be included in Group 2 (neutral moods) an 
affective state had to have a moderate to low energy level with 
neither a high positive nor high negative feeling tone; this 
included such classifications as "detached", "drowsyn, "pleased", 
"relaxed" and "apathetic". It is possible that there is a small 
degree of overlap between the "pleased" moods of Group 2 and the 
''good" moods of Group 1 (positive moods). But the overlap is not 
great because the "good" moods of Group 1 had high energy levels. 
To be included in Group 3 (negative moods) an affective state had 
to have either a negative tone and high energy level (e.g. "angry") 
or simply a negative feeling tone (e.g. "apprehensive"). In 
general, the moods of Group 3 were moods of negative tone and low 
energy level, due to the preponderance of depressed moods in this 
Group. 
The clinical value of the MAT will be enhanced if it can be shoWn 
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to influence Group 3 (negative moods) in positive ways, i.e. if 
it can decrease their intensity or facilitate their change into 
more positive moods. 
Summary of Results 
1. Group 3 (negative moods) show a greater absolute magnitude of 
change than Group 2 (neutral moods) p<O,Ol. 
2. The three mood groups were statistically distinguished from 
each other on the Nowlis Mood Factors: Anxiety p<O,Ol, 
Surgency p<O,Ol, and Elation p<0,05. 
3. For the Nowlis Mood Factor Anxiety: Group 3 (negative moods) 
showed a decrease in the mood factor-Anxiety and Groups 1 and 
2 showed an increase in Anxiety. A decrease in the mood 
factor Anxiety for negative moods is taken to be an improve-
ment in these negative moods. 
For the Nowlis Mood Factor Surgency: Group 3 (negative moods) 
showed an increase in the mood factor Surgency and Groups 1 
and 2 showed a decrease in Surgency. An increase in the 
mood factor Surgency for negative moods is taken to be an 
improvement in these negative moods. 
For the Nowlis Mood Factor Elation: Group 3 (negative moods) 
showed an increase in the mood factor Elation and Group 1 
showed a decrease in Elation. An increase in the mood factor 
Elation for negative moods is taken to be an improvement in 
negative moods. 
Hypotheses 
4.5.1.1 Null Hypothesis H0 : 
4.5.1.2 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) will not 
differ in its effect on the absolute magnitude of change 
scores for the three mood groups. 
Alternative Hypothesis H1 : 
It is hypothesized that Session 2, the experimenter, 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) will differ 
Results 
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in its effect on the absolute magnitude of change 
scores for the three mood groups. 
Table 51 presents the one-way analysis of variance comparing the 
absolute magnitude of change of the three mood groups on Session 
2. (See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data, and Appendix F, Table N1 
for the analysis of variance). 
Table 52 is a summary table showing significant absolute magnitude 
of change scores of the three mood groups on Session 2. 
Mean 
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TABLE 51 
ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE COMPARING THE ABSOLUTE 
MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE OF THE THREE MOOD GROUPS ON SESSION 2 
(See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data 
Appendix F, Table N1 for the analysis) 
Table of Means 
Group 1 
(positive moods) 
16,97 
Group 2 
(neutral moods) 
13,58 
Group 3 
(negative mood::;) 
20,82 
Sample size 37 34 34 
Analysis of Variance 
Source df s.s. rl. s. 
Between Groups 2 916,99 458,50 
Within Groups 102 7674,n6 75,24 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0, 01. 
TABLE 52 
SUMHARY TABLE SHOWING SIGNIFICANT ABSOLUTE MAGNITUDE 
OF CHANGE SCORES OF THE THREE MOOD GROUPS ON SESSION 2 
Session 2 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
Direction 
Group 3 (negative moods) show 
greater absolute magnitude of 
change than Group 2 (neutral 
moods) 
t-Value 
3, 66 ** 
F-Value 
6,09 ** 
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Table 51 has shown that overall there is a significant difference 
in the absolute magnitude of change scores between the three mood 
groups. This is established at the 0,01 level of significance. 
Table 52 has shown that the greatest absolute magnitude of change 
occurs for negative moods as compared with neutral moods. 
Statistically, Group 3, negative moods, show a greater mean 
absolute magnitude of change than Group 2, the neutral mood group. 
Acceptance or Rejection of Hypotheses 
The Null Hypothesis (4.5.1.1) that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis·Technique (MAT), will not differ in 
its effect on the absolute magnitude of change scores for the 
three mood groups, is rejected. 
It has been shown that Group 3, negative moods, have a greater 
mean absolute magnitude of change scores than Group 2, neutral' 
moods, (p<O,Ol). Hence the experimental data is consonant with 
the alternative hypothesis. 
It must now be shown that this greater global effect on Group 3 
(negative moods) represents an improvement in these moods. This 
can be done by (a) examining the means of magnitude of change 
scores on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors and (b) examining qualitative 
.data which indicates whether the subjects in Group.3 experienced 
a change in intensity or a change in quality in their negative 
mood at the conclusion of Session 2. 
Table 53 presents the means of magnitude of change scores on the 
12 Nowlis Mood Factors for the three mood groups (See Appendix D, 
Tables G-J for data; and Appendix F, Table ~for analysis of 
variance tables). Table 54 is a summary table presenting the 
Nowlis Mood Factors that sho~ significant magnitude of change 
scores for the three mood groups and the significant inter-group 
comparisons. Tables 53 and S.lf will provide evidence for whether 
or not the greater absolute magnitude of change for negative moods 
represents an improvement in these moods. 
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TABLE 53 
TABLE OF MEANS OF MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE ON THE TWELVE 
NOWLIS MOOD FACTORS FOR THE THREE MOOD GROUPS ON SESSION 2 
(See Appendix D, Tables G-J for data; and Appendix F, Table N2for analysis of variance tables) 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Overall F-Value Positive Moods Neutral Hoods Negative Moods He an 
Factor 1 
(Aggression) 
2 
(Anxiety) 
3 
(Surgency) 
4 
(Elation) 
5 
(Concentrating) 
6 
(Fatigue) 
7 
(Vigour) 
8 
(Social Affection) 
9 
(Sadness) 
10 
(Egotism) 
11 
(Deactivation) 
12 
(Sceptic ism) 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
-0,17 
0, 57 
-0,91 
-0,91 
0,49 
0,49 
-1,03 
-0,17 
0,49 
0,26 
0,09 
-0,23 
0,08 0,12 0,01 
0,08 -1,15 -0,15 
-0,14 0,85 -0,08 
0,14 0,56 -0,08 
0,19 0,32 0,33 
0,03 -0,56 -0,01 
-0,19 0,41 -0,28 
-0,17 0,53 0,06 
0,17 -0,18· 0,16 
-0,19 0,47 0,17 
-0,44 0,09 -0,10 
-0,4 7 -0,24 -0,31 
Group 1 contains all moods classified as active, happy, good, excited, curious, 
energetic, elated and expectant. 
n = 37 
0,24 
7,21** 
6,00** 
3,60* 
0,16 
1,51 
2,61 
0,99 
1,13 
2,00 
0,46 
0,23 
Group 2 contains all moods classified as content, apathetic, sluggish, quiet, calm, 
listless, detached, pleased, drowsy, thoughtful, relaxed, indifferent, 
. fragile, restful, comfortable and indecisive. 
n = 34 
Group 3 contains all moods classified as depressed, angry, anxious, tired, defiant, 
sceptical, apprehensive, frustrated, upset and dissatisfied. 
n : 34 
Factor 
2 
Anxiety 
3 
Surgency 
4 
Elation 
Note: 
* p <0,05. 
** p <0,01. 
TABLE 54 
SU}~~RY TABLE SHOWING FACTORS WITH SIGNIFICANT MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE SCORES AND 
THE SIGNIFICANT COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE THREE MOOD GROUPS ON SESSION 2 
F-Value 
7,21** 
6,00** 
3,60* 
Direction 
Group 3 (negative moods) shows a decrease on Anxiety and 
Group 1 (positive moods) shows an increase on Anxiety 
Group 3 (negative moods) shows a decrease on Anxiety and 
Group 2 (neutral moods) shows an increase on Anxiety 
Group 3 (negative moods) shows an increase on Surgency and 
Group 1 (positive moods) shows a decrease on Surgency. 
Group 3 (negative moods) shows an increase on Surgency and 
Group 2 (neutral moods) shows a decrease on Surgency 
Group 3 (negative moods) shows an increase on Elation and 
Group 1 (positive moods) shows a decrease on Elation 
Sample size is 35; 36; 34 for the three mood groups. 
Degrees of freedom are 2 and 102. 
t-Value 
-3,44** 
-2,53* 
3,03** I 
w 
w 
...... 
2,25* I 
-
2,32* 
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Table 53 has shown that the three mood groups are distinguished 
from each other at different levels of statistical significance 
on the Nowlis Mood Factors: Anxiety, Surgency and Elation. 
Anxiety and Surgency are significant at the 0,01 level, and 
Elation is significant at the 0,05 level. 
Table 54 has shown that for the Nowlis Mood Factor Anxiety: 
Group 3, negative moods, showed a decrease in Anxiety and Groups 
1 and 2 showed an increase in Anxiety (p<O,Ol, p<0,05 respectively). 
A decrease in the mood factor Anxiety for negative moods is taken 
to be an improvement in these negative moods. 
For the Nowlis Mood Factor Surgency: Group 3, negative moods, 
showed an increase in the mood factor Surgency and Groups 1 and 2 
showed a decrease inSurgency (p<O,Ol, p<0,05 respectively). 
An increase in the mood factor Surgency for negative moods is 
taken to be an improvement in these negative moods. 
For the Nowlis Mood Factor Elation: Group 3, negative moods, 
showed an increase in the mood factor Elation and Group 1 showed 
a decrease in Elation (p<O,OS). An increase in the mood factor 
Elation for negative moods is taken to be an improvement in 
negative moods. 
The next section presents qualitative data for the three mood 
groups. 
Table 55 shows the change in Group 3, negative moods, resulting 
from Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique. 
TABLE 55 
GROUP 3 NEGATIVE HOODS 
Depressed, Angry, Anxious, Tired, Defiant, Sceptical, Apprehensive, Frustrated, Upset, Dissatisfied 
Subject Hean Vari- Pre-Test Mood Intensity Post-Test Hood Intensity Change in Change in No. ability Quality Intensity 
7 21.75 Depressed +3 Calm +l X 
9 19.00 Depressed +3 Depressed +2 
-1 
51 27.50 Depressed +3 Happy +2 X 
62 7.80 Depressed +3 Depressed +l 
-2 
65 26.75 Depressed +1 Happy +3 X 
68 12.75 Depressed +2 Depressed +l 
-1 
69 23.25 Depressed +3 Depressed +2 
-1 
84 16.50 Depressed +2 Doubtful +2 X 
lOS 12.00 Depressed (tired) +2 Happy +2 X 
10 24.20 Tired +3 Actl.ve +2 X 
13 20.60 Tired (anxious; depressed) +2 Tired +1 
-1 I 15 17.80 Tired (cramps) +2 Tired +2 w 
22 15.75 Tired +l Tired 0 w -J_ w 
30 21.50 Tired (sluggish; vulnerable) +1 Confused (but more aware) +2 X I 
36 29.40 Tired (worried; concerned) +3 Relaxed 0 X 
40 22.75 Tired +2 Thoughtful +3 X 
41 14.50 Tired +2 Tired (impatient) +3 +l 
80 13.00 Tired (slightly depressed) +2 Anticipation +1 X 
86 17.75 Tired (a little tense) +2 Slightly energetic +1 X 
91 23.00 Tired (worried) +1 Pensive +2 X 
45 12.50 Anxious +3 Anxious +l 
-2 
46 25.75 Anxious +3 Confused +2 X 
so 21.50 Anxious +2 Anxious -1 
-3 
31 18.80 Frustrated +1 Frustrated +2 H 
55 11.00 Frustrated (tense; bothered) +2 Sulky +3 X 
89 22.25 Frustrated (angry) +2 Frustrated +3 +1 
27 15.25 Apprehensive +2 Wistful +3 X 
98 17.60 Apprehensive +3 Apprehensive +1 
-2 
33 26.60 Upset +3 Upset +1 -2 
34 17.25 Upset +3 Upset +3 
32 11.20 Angry +3 Angry +l -2 
19 25.00 Defiant +3 Thoughtful +2 X 
44 15.00 Dissatisfied (hindered) +3 Dissatisfied +3 
3 11.00 Sceptical +2 Sceptical +3 +1 
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Table 55 shows: 
Depressed ·moods 
For the nine pre-test moods classified as depressed by the 
subjects, four underwent a change in intensity (Subjects Nos.· 
9, 62, 68 and 69), and five underwent a change ~n quality 
(Subjects Nos. 7, 51, 65, 84 and 105). For those Depressed 
moods that showed a change in intensity, in each case the 
change was a decrease in intensity. 
For those five moods that underwent a change in quality, three 
went from Depressed to Happy, one went from Depressed to 
Doubtful, and the fifth went from Depressed to Calm. 
A decrease in the intensity of Depressed moods is taken as an 
improvement in those moods; for the three moods that went 
from Depressed to Happy, this change in quality is taken as an 
improvement. The Depressed mood that changed to Calm also 
represents an improvement. In the case of the one mood that 
went from Depressed to Doubtful, this may perhaps be classified 
as a slight improvement in the sense of a relief or lightening 
of depression. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Depressed moods by changing either their 
intensity or their quality. In each case the change in mood 
could be viewed as an improvement. 
Tired moods 
For the eleven pre-test moods classified as Tired by the subjects, 
three underwent a change in intensity (Subjects Nos. 13, 22 and 
41) and seven underwent a change in quality (Subjects Nos. 10, 30, 
36, 40, 80, 86 and 91), one mood underwent neither change in 
intensity nor quality (Subject No. 15), but this was a Tired mood 
due to menstruation. For those Tired moods that showed a change 
in intensity, two showed a decrease in intensity and one showe.d an 
increase in intensity. 
-335-
For those seven moo~s that underwent a change in quality: one went 
from Tired to Active, one went from Tired to Confused (but more 
aware), one ~Jent from Tired to Relaxed, one \vent from Tired to 
Thoughtful, one went from Tired to Anticipation, one went from Tired 
to Pensive, and one went from Tired to Slightly Energetic. Thus 
two-thirds of the moods .that showed a change in intensity improved; 
and it is believed that it is reasonable to say that the moods that 
went from Tired to Active, Relaxed, Thoughtful, Pensive, Anticipation, 
Slightly Energetic, and Confused (but more aware) showed an improve-
ment. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Tired moods, in general, by changing ther their 
intensity or their quality. Changes in quality predominated. For 
those Tired moods that showed a change in intensity, two-thirds 
decreased in intensity. For those Tired moods that showed a change 
in quality, all seven could be viewed as an improvement. 
Anxious moods 
For the three pre-test moods classified as Anxious by the subjects, 
t\ve underwent a change 1n intensity (Subjects Nos. 45 and 50) and 
one underwent a change 1n quality (Subject No. 46). For the Anxious 
moods that showed a change in intensity, in each case the change was 
a decrease in intensity. 
In the case of one Anxious mood that showed a change 1n quality, the 
change was from Anxious to Confused. 
The decrease in intensity for the two Anxious moods is taken as an 
improvement. In the case of the Anxious mood that changed to 
Confused, this is taken as a slight improvement. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Anxious moods by changing either their inte~sity 
or their quality. For the Anxious moods that shmved a change in 
intensity, the change in each case was a decrease. The Anxious 
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mood that showed a change in quality can be viewed as a slight 
improvement. 
Frustrated moods 
For the three pre-test moods classified as Frustrated by the 
subjects, two underwent a change in intensity (Subjects Nos. 31 
and 89) and one underwent a change in quality (Subject No. 55). 
For the Frustrated moods that showed a change in intensity, in 
each ·case the change was an increase in intensity. 
In the case of the one Frustrated mood that showed a change in 
quality, the change was from Frustrated to Sulky. 
The increase in intensity for the two Frustrated moods cannot be 
taken as an improvement. In the case of the Frustrated mood 
that changed to Sulky, this can perhaps be taken as a slight 
improvement as the original mood contained elements of "tense" 
and "bothered". 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Frustrated moods by changing either their 
intensity or their quality. For the Frustrated moods that 
showed a change in intensity, the change in each case was an 
increase. This cannot be taken as an improvement. The Frustrated 
mood that showed a change in quality can be viewed as a slight 
improvement. 
Apprehensive moods 
For the two pre-test moods classified as Apprehensive by the 
subjects, one underwent a change in intensity (Subject No. 98) 
and one underwent a change in quality (Subject No. 27)-. 
The Apprehensive mood that showed a change in intensity decreased 
in intensity. The Apprehensive mood that showed a change in 
quality changed from Apprehensive to Wistful. The decrease in 
intensity can be taken as an improvement. The change from 
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Apprehensive to Wistful can also be taken as an improvement. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Apprehensive moods by changing either their 
intensity or their quality. For the Apprehensive mood that 
showed a change in intensity, the charrge was a decrease. This 
can be taken as an improvement. For the one Apprehensive mood 
that showed a change in quality, the change can be taken as a 
slight improvement. 
Upset moods 
For the two pre-test moods classified as Upset by the subjects, 
one underwent a change in intensity (Subject No. 33) and one 
showed no change (Subject No. 34). 
The one Upset mood that showed a change in intensity, decreased 
in intensity. This is taken as an improvement. 
Angry moods 
For the one mood classified as Angry (Subject No. 32), the change 
was a decrease in intensity. This is taken as an improvement. 
Defiant moods 
For the one mood classified as Defiant (Subject No. 19), the change 
was a change in quality. This mood changed from Defiant to 
Thoughtful. This is taken as an improvement. 
Dissatisfied moods 
For the one mood classified as Dissatisfied (Subject No. 44), 
there was neither change in intensity nor quality. 
Sceptical moods 
For the one mood classified as Sceptical (Subject No. 3), the 
change was an increase in intensity. This cannot be taken as an 
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improvement. 
Sunnnary Group 3 (negative moods) 
In summary Session 2 influenced the mood categories: Depressed, 
Tired, Anxious, Apprehensive, Upset, Angry and Defiant in pre-
dominantly positive ways. 
For the mood category Frustrated, Session 2 appeared to have a 
largely negative effect; for the category Sceptical there was 
also a negative effect. 
For the mood category Dissatisfied there was no change. 
In general the effect of Session 2, the experimenter administered 
Hood Analysis Technique (HAT) on Group 3 (negative moods), has 
been shown to be a positive effect. 
Table 56 shows the change in Group 2 (neutral moods) resulting 
from Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (HAT). 
TABLE 56 
GROUP 2 NEUTRAL MOODS 
Content, Apathetic, Sluggish, -Quiet, Calm, Listless, Detached, Pleased, Drowsy, Thoughtful, Relaxed, Indifferent, Fragile, Restful, Comfortable, Indecisive 
Subject Mean Vari- Pre-Test Mood Intensity Post-Test Mood Intensity Change in Change in No. ability Quality Intensity 
4 12.75 Contented +2 Contented +1 
-1 
26 12.00 Contented +2 Contented +3 +1 
35 19.50 Contented +2 Happy (light and airy) +3 X 
54 17.40 Contented +1 Intent (serious) +1 X 
67 9.80 Contented +2 Contented +2 
87 14.75 Contented +1 Contented +1 +2 
95 31.40 Contented +2 Relaxed +1 X 
66 10.50 Relaxed +2 Relaxed +2 
70 15.80 R~laxed +2 Relaxed (mood goes through a +3 +1 
cycle: relaxed-anxious-
relaxed) 
75 8.75 Relaxed +2 Relaxed +3 +l 
77 18.75 Relaxed +1 Relaxed +2 +1 
81 20.50 Relaxed +2 Relaxed +3 +1 I 
90 12.80 Relaxed +2 Concentrating +2 w X w 
104 26.40 Relaxed +2 Affectionate +1 X 
"' I 23 10.25 Calm (detached, relaxed) +1 Calm +3 +2 
38 21.50 Calm +2 Active +2 X 
56 12.50 Calm +1 Tired +1 X 
57 22.60 Calm (quiet) +1 Apprehensive +l X 
101 11.60 Calm +3 Calm +3 
52 22.00 Pleased +2 Peaceful +3 X 
59 9.60 Pleased +2 Pleased +3 +1 
78 15.80 Listless (thoughtful) +3 Energetic +1 X 
25 21.25 Listless (and irritable) +2 Listless +2 
8 13.40 Apathetic +3 Apathetic +3 
85 9.25 Comfortable +1 Comfortable +2 +1 
43 13.40 Detached , uninvolved) +3 Detached (frustrated) +2 
-1 
53 9.75 Drowsy (calm) +2 Drowsy +1 
74 22.80 Fragile +2 Bitter +2 X 
92 10.40 Indecisive +2 Indecisive +2 
71 18.20 Indifferent --detached +1 Confused - carefree +2 X 
17 26.50 Sluggish +2 Energetic +2 X 
21 10.25 Quiet (aimless) +2 Quiet +2 
82 13.75 Restful +2 Restful (more in touch) +1 
-1 
60 12.25 Thoughtful +2 Calm +2 X 
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Table 5.6 has shown: 
Contented moods 
For the seven pre-test moods classified as Contented by the 
subjects, two underwent a change in intensity (Subject Nos. 4 and 
26), and three underwent a change in quality (Subject Nos. 35, 54 
and 95). In two cases there was neither change in intensity nor 
in quality (Subject Nos. 67 and 87). 
For those Contented moods that showed a change in intensity, one 
increased and one decreased. 
For the three Contented moods that underwent a change in quality, 
one went from Contented to.Happy, one went from Contented to 
Intent, and one 'vent from Contented to . Relaxed. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(~ffiT), influenced Contented moods in five out of seven cases by 
changing either their intensity or their quality. For those 
Contented moods that changed in intensity the effect was mixed, 
one mood increasing in intensity and the other decreasing. For 
those Contented moods that showed a change in quality, in two out 
of the three cases the results could be viewed as a shift to a 
mood state of either higher physical or mental energy, e.g. 
Contented to Happy, Contented to Intent. In the third case the 
change can be viewed as a shift to a related mood of neutral 
feeling tone. 
Relaxed moods 
For the seven pre-test moods classified as Relaxed by the subjects, 
four undenvent a change in intensity (Subject Nos. 70, 75, 77 and 
81) and two underwent a change in quality (Subject Nos. 90 and 104). 
In one case there was neither a change in intensity nor in quality 
(Subject No. 66). 
For those Relaxed moods that showed a change in intensity, the 
change in each case was an increase in intensity. 
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For those Relaxed moods that showed a change in quality, in each 
case the results could be viewed as a shift to a mood state of 
either higher physical or mental energy, e.g. Relaxed to 
Affectionate and Relaxed to Concentrating. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Relaxed moods in six out of seven cases by 
changing either their intensity or their quality. For those 
Relaxed moods that changed intensity the effect was the same in 
eacb case, an increase in intensity. For those Relaxed moods 
that showed a change in quality, in each case the change could be 
viewed as a shift to a mood state of either higher physical or 
mental energy. 
Calm moods 
For the five pre-test moods classified as Calm by the subjects, 
one underwent a change in intensity (Subject No. 23) and three 
underwent a change in quality (Subject Nos. 38, 56 and 59). In 
one case there was neither a change in intensity nor quality 
(Subject No. 101). 
For the Calm mood that showed a change in intensity, the change 
was an increase. 
For those Calm moods that showed a change in quality, one went 
from Calm to Active, one went from Calm to Tired, and one went 
from Calm to Apprehensive. 
Only one mood changed to a mood of higher energy with a positive 
feeling tone (Calm to Active). 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Calm moods in four out of five cases by changing 
either their intensity or their quality. For the Calm mood that 
showed a change in intensity, the change was an increase. For 
those Calm moods that showed a change in quality, only one mood 
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changed to a mood of higher energy level and positive feeling 
tone (Calm to Active). 
Pleased moods 
For the two pre-test moods classified as Pleased by the subjects, 
one underwent a change in intensity (Subject No. 59) and one 
underwent a change in quality (Subject No. 52). For the Pleased 
mood that underwent a change in intensity, the change was an 
increase. For the one Pleased mood that underwent a change in 
quality, the change was to a mood of positive feeling tone and 
higher intensity (Pleased +2 to Peaceful +3). 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Pleased moods in every case by changing either 
their intensity or their quality. For the Pleased mood that 
showed a change in intensity, the change was an increase. For 
the Pleased mood that showed a change in quality, the change was 
to a mood of positive feeling tone and higher intensity (Pleased 
+2 to Active +3). 
Listless 
For the two pre-test moods classified as Listless by the subjects, 
one underwent a change in quality (Subject No. 78) and one showed 
no change (Subject No. 25). For the Listless mood that showed a 
change in quality, the change was to a mood of more positive 
feeling tone (Listless to Energetic). 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Listless moods in one out of two cases by 
changing the quality of the mood. The change was to a mood of 
more positive feeling tone. 
Apathetic moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Apathetic (Subject No. 8), 
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there was neither a change in intensity nor quality. 
Comfortable moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Comfortable (Subject No. 
85), there was a change of increased intensity. 
Detached moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Detached (Subject No. 43), 
there was a change of decreased intensity. 
Drowsy moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Drowsy (Subject No. 53), 
there was a change of decreased intensity. 
Fragile moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Fragile (Subject No. 74), 
there was a change of quality to a mood of more negative feeling 
tone. \ 
Indecisive moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Indecisive (S~bject No. 
92), there was neither a change in intensity nor quality. 
Indifferent moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Indifferent (Subject No. 
71), there was a change in quality to a mood of more negative 
feeling tone but containing a new positive element (carefree), 
and this mood had a higher intensity level. 
Sluggish moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Sluggish (Subject No .. l7), 
there was a change in quality to a more positive feeling tone. · 
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Quiet moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Quiet (Subject No. 21), 
there was neither a change in intensity nor quality. 
Restful moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Restful (Subject No. 82), 
there was a decrease in intensity and the subject reported feeling 
more in touch. 
Thoughtful moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Thoughtful (Subject No. 
60), there was a change in quality (Thoughtful to Calm). 
Summary Group 2 (neutral moods) 
In general, Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), influenced the mood categories Contented (n=7), 
• 
Relaxed (n=7), Pleased (n=2), Listless (n=2), Comfortable (n=l) by 
either increasing the intensity of the mood, or shifting the mood 
to one of higher mental or physical energy. 
For the mood category Calm (n=S), one mood increased intensity, 
but only one out of three moods that changed quality changed. to a 
mood with positive feeling tone. 
For the mood categories Apathetic (n=l), Indecisive (n=l), and 
Quiet (n=l), there was neither change in intensity nor quality. 
For the mood categories Detached (n=l), Drowsy (n=l) and Restful 
(n=l), there was a decrease in intensity. The Restful mood that 
decreased intensity also showed a new element.- "being in touch". 
For the mood category Sluggish (n=l), there was a change in quality 
to a more positive feeling tone. For the mood category Thoughtful 
(n=l), there was a shift to another mood of neutral feeling tone. 
For the mood categories Fragile (n=l) and Indifferent (n=l), there 
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was a change to a mood of more negative feeling tone. However 
the Indifferent mood had a "carefree" element and a higher intensity 
level. 
Table 57 shows the change in Group 1 (positive moods) resulting 
from Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT). 
TABLE 57 
GROUP 1 POSITIVE HOODS 
Active, Happy, Good, Excited, Curious, Energetic, Elated, Expectant 
Subject Mean Vari- Pre-Test Mood Intensity Post-Test Mood Intensity Change in Change in No. ability Quality Intensity 
5 14.25 Happy (apprehension; sad) +1 Happy +3 +2 
6 12.00 Happy (anticipating; content) +3 Happy +2 
-1 
14 19.50 Happy (amused; expectant) +2 Happy +1 -1 
16 20.60 Happy (but worried) +3 l..rorried +3 X 
18 13.50 Happy +2 Confident +2 X 
29 19.50 Happy· +3 Confident - Elated +3 X 
39 17.75 Happy +2 Pent up +3 X 
48 20.50 Happy (carefree) +2 Calm 0 X 
49 12.50 Happy (relaxed; interested) +2 Anticipating +2 X 
63 16.50 Happy (elated; anxious) +2 Irritated -1 X 
64 18.25 Happy (keen; fresh) +2 Happy +3 +1 
72 8.25 Happy +1 Happy +2 +1 I w 
73 17.75 Happy (carefree) +2 Calm +2 X .10-
76 8.60 Happy +2 Happy +3 +1 0'\ I 
79 12.00 Happy (physically tired) 0 Calm +1 X 
88 29.00 Happy +3 Restless +2 X 
93 12.25 Happy +l Happy +2 +1 
94 23.40 Happy (carefree) +2 Happy -1 -3 
96 3.00 Happy +3 Happy +3 
97 28.80 Happy (held in energy) +2 Sad (wistful) +2 X 
99 12.75 Happy +1 Happy +2 +1 
100 20.50 Happy (energetic; thoughtful) +3 Elated +3 X 
103 11.60 Happy +3 Happy +1 -2 
11 16.40 Excited +3 Reflective +2 X 
24 19.00 Excited (vaguely anxious) +l Excited +2 +1 
28 16.00 Excited (yet apprehensive) +3 Excited +3 
61 13.50 Excited (optimistic; physically +3 Excited +2 
-1 
fit) 
1 17.80 Active +3 Tense (but calm) +3 X 
20 31.25 Active (elated; anxious) +3 Anxious +3 X 
2 16.75 Good +2 Good +3 +1 
42 16.25 Good (amiable) +2 Good +3 +l 
58 13.75 Good 0 Detached +l X 
12 19.25 Curious +2 Relaxed 0 X 
102 6.60 Curious +3 Tired +2 X 
37 22.80 Energetic +3 Serene +3 X 
47 22.50 Elated +3 Worried +2 X 
83 24.25 Expectant +3 Languid +3 X 
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Table 57 shows: 
Happy moods 
For the twenty-three pre-test moods classified by subjects as 
Happy, ten.showed a change in intensity (Subject Nos. 5, 6, 14, 
64, 72, 76, 93, 94, 99 and 103), and twelve showed a change in 
qualit~ (Subject Nos. 16, 18, 29, 39, 48, 49, 63, 73, 79, 88, 97 
and 100). For one Happy mood there was neither change in 
intensity nor quality (Subject No. 96). 
For those Happy moods that showed a change in intensity, six 
showed an increase, and four showed a decrease. 
For those Happy moods that showed a change in quality, three went 
to Calm, one went to Confident, one went to Confident-Elated, one 
'Went to Elated, and one went to Anticipating. These changes can 
be viewed as representing a shift to other moods of positive 
feeling tone. Five moods that changed quality can be viewed as 
representing a shift to moods of negative feeling tone, i.e. one 
went to Worried, one went to Pent-up, one went to Irritated, one 
\Jen t to Restless and one went to Sad. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Happy moods in 22 out of 23 cases by changing 
either their intensity or their quality. For those moods that 
showed a change in intensity, six increased and four decreased. 
For those moods that showed a change in quality, seven can be 
viewed as shifting to other moods of positive feeling tone, and 
five can be viewed as shifting to moods of negative feeling tone. 
Excited moods 
For the four pre-test moods classified by subjects as .Excited, 
two showed a change in intensity (Subject Nos. f4 and 61)' and 
one showed a change in quality (Subject No. 11). For one Excited 
mood there was neither a change in intensity nor in quality 
(Subject No. 28). 
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For those Excited moods that showed a change in intensity, one 
showed an increase, and one showed a decrease. 
For the Excited mood that showed a change in quality, the change 
was to another mood of positive feeling tone with cognitive 
elements, a Reflective mood. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter. administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Exc.ited moods in three out of four cases by 
changing either their intensity or theii quality. For those 
moods that showed a change in intensity, one showed an increase 
and one showed a decrease. For the one Excited mood that showed 
a change in quality, the change was to a mood with a greater 
predominance of cognitive elements. 
Active moods 
For the two pre-test moods classified by subjects as Active, both 
moods showed a change in quality (Subject Nos. 1 and 20). One 
Active mood changed to Tense (but Calm), and the other changed to 
an Anxious mood. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(MAT), influenced Active moods in each case by bringing about a 
change in quality. In each case the change was to a mood of 
more negative feeling tone. 
Curious moods 
For the two pre-test moods classified by subjects as Curious, 
both moods showed a change in quality (Subject Nos. 12 and 102). 
One Curious mood changed to Relaxed, and the other changed to a 
Tired mood. 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Techn~que 
(MAT), influenced Curious moods in each case by bringing about. a 
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change in quality. In one case the change was to a mood of 
neutral feeling tone, and in the other the change was to a mood 
of negative feeling tone. 
Good moods 
For the three pre-test moods classified by subjects as Good, two 
showed a change in intensity (Subject Nos. 2 and 42), and one 
showed a change in quality (Subject No. 58). 
For the two moods that showed a change in intensity, in each case 
the change was an increase. 
For the mood that showed a change in quality, the change was to a 
mood of neutral feeling tone (Detached). 
Summary 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique 
(r~T), influenced Good moods in each case by changing either their 
intensity or their quality. For the two moods that showed a 
change in intensity, in each case the change was an increase. The 
one mood that showed a change in quality shifted to a mood of 
neutral feeling tone. 
Energetic moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Energetic (Subject No. 37) 
the change was one of quality, to a mood of neutral feeling tone 
(Serene). 
Elated moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Elated (Subject No. 47) 
the change was one of quality to a mood of negative feeling tone 
(Worried). 
Expectant moods 
For the one pre-test mood classified as Expectant (Subject No. 83) 
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the change was one of quality to a mood of neutral feeling tone 
(Languid). 
Summary Group 1 (po·sitive moods) 
In general, Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT), influenced Group 1 (positive moods) by changing 
either their intensity or their quality. 
For Happy moods (n=23) the effect was mixed, an almost equal 
number of moods increasing and decreasing in intensity (six 
increased and four decreased). Seven out of the twelve quali-
tative shifts were to other moods of positive feeling tone and 
five were to moods of negative feeling tone. 
For Excited moods (n=4) an equal number of moods showed an increase 
and decrease in intensity;' the one qualitative shift was to a 
mood with cognitive elements. 
For Good moods (n=3) two moods showed an increase in intensity 
and the third mood changed in quality to a mood of neutral feeling 
tone. 
For Active moods (n=2) both moods showed a qualitative change to 
moods of negative feeling tone. 
For Curious moods (n=2) both moods shmved a qualitative change; 
one mood shifting to a neutral feeling tone, and one shifting to 
a negative feeling tone. 
For Energetic (n=l) and Expectant (n=l) moods the changes were 
qualitative, to moods of neutral feeling tone. 
For Elated moods (n=l) the change was qualitative, to a mood of 
negative feeling tone. 
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4.6 An Analysis of Subjects' Comments upon completion of Session 2, 
the Experimenter Administered Mood Analysis Technique 
Description 
Upon completion of Session 2, subjects were asked to give comments 
concerning the session. The experimenter stressed that negative 
comments were especially welcome as they could provide information 
useful in improving the content and/or format of the Mood Analysis 
Questionnaire. The subjects' comments appear in full in Appendix 
G. The entire set of comments was read through by the experimenter 
in order to determine descriptive categories most consonant with the 
data. The categories employed are: Changed Mood, Increased Aware-
ness, Overall Positive Effect, Interesting-Stimulating, Liked 
Imagination Questions, No Comments, Too Long-Tedious, Didn't Change 
Mood, Overall Negative Effect, Found Questions Difficult, Frustra-
ting-Irritating, and Didn't Like Imagination Questions. Frequency 
counts and percentages for each category were obtained and a x2 
test of homogeneity was performed. The results are shown in Table 
58. It should be noted that the statistical results are directly 
dependent upon the definition of the categories, and the reliability 
of their application. 
Summary of Findings 
Categories with particularly high frequencies were: 
Changed Mood 
Increased Awareness 
Categories with particularly low frequencies were: 
Didn't Like Imagination Questions 
Frustrating-Irritating 
Results 
Table 58 presents ~he observed frequencies for the categories and 
the x2 test of homogeneity. The descriptive categories are rank 
ordered according to their frequency. 
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TABLE 58 
x2 TEST OF HOMOGENEITY ON SUBJECTS' COMMENTS 
UPON COMPLETION OF SESSION 2 
(See Appendix G for data) 
Category Observed Frequency 
l. Changed Mood 36 
2. Increased Awareness 33 
3. Overall Positive Effect 26 
4. Interesting-Stimulating 23 
5. Liked Imagination Questions 18 
6. Too Long-Tedious 12 
7. No Comments 10 
8. Didn't Change Mood 9 
9. Overall Negative Effe·ct 8 
10. Found Questions Difficult 8 
11. Frustrating-Irritating 7 
12. Didn't Like Imagination Questions 4 
Expected percentage is 8,32 for each category 
x2 80,14 ** 
df 1 
Note: 
'~ p<O ,05. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Expected 
Frequency 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
16,14 
% 
18,56 
17,00 
13,40 
11,86 
9,28 
6,19 
5,15 
4,64 
4,12 
4,12 
3,61 
2,06 
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Table 58 has shown that the x2 test of homogeneity is significant 
at the 0,01 level of significance. The expected percentage for 
each category is 8,32 throughout. Taking a percentage of 16,00 
as a cut-off point for high scores, and 4,00 as a cut-off point 
for low scores it was found: 
High Scores 
Changed Mood 
Increased Awareness 
Low 
18,56% 
17,00% 
Didn't Like Imagination Questions 
Frustrating-Irritating 
2,06% 
3,61% 
Overall positive comments appeared to predominate, accounting for 
70,1% of the responses. This is despite encouragement to give 
negative or critical opinions. 
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4. 7 An Analysis of Suhl_ects' Definition of Mood 
Description 
The concept of mood, as regards the type of entity the word "mood" 
is used to denote, the range of applicability of the· term, and the 
specification of those situations in which it is legitimate to 
em~loy the term, is far from clear. This has been shown in 
section 1.11 and in the review of the experimental literature. 
Although the term "mood" occurs with relative frequency in the 
current psychological literature, it is difficult to see how 
different studies can be compared, or to what extent generalizations 
can be made, when there is such confusion over the basic parameters 
of mood. This section is an initial attempt to establish basic 
parameters of mood by considering how students define mood in terms 
of their own experience. 
Each student was asked to define, in terms of their own experience, 
the nature of mood. The student definitions were considered in 
light of the conceptual categories inherent in the psychological 
and philosophical literatures. These categories are given in 
the summary sections of the ten viewpoints on mood (Section 1.11). 
Initially, the experimenter hoped to assess each viewpoint in terms 
of its ability to incorporate or account for the student definitional 
elements. It soon became apparent that a direct correspondence 
between the elements of the various conceptual viewpoints and the 
student definitions would not occur. This, of course, is due to 
the level of generality required of the theoretical viewpoints if 
they are to be explanatory. However, it is the burden of any 
psychological theory to provide the correspondence rules that will 
link its higher-order theoretical propositions to lower-level 
empirical situations and events. There is a tendency in mood 
theorizing to assign explanatory value to propositions expressed 
in higher-order theoretical terms at the expense of developing 
low-level inferences from lower-order descriptive statements. In 
the author's view this is an erosion of the validity of the higher-
order propositions. 
As a result, this section moved from an emphasis on the assessment 
of particular theories (although some general recommendations can 
be made), to the establishment of base data that any conceptualization 
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of mood should be able to account for. There exists then an 
emphasis in this section on the utilization of "ordinary language" 
and the states of affairs it presents for the establishment of 
the parameters (the required emphases and boundaries) for an 
adequate viewpoint on mood. Bird (1972) provides the justifi-
cation for a utilization of ordinary language in such a task: 
Ordinary language may be regarded as historically prior 
to the technical languages which deviate from it. It 
may even be regarded as logically prior in providing 
for those languages a background against which to under-
stand those deviations and in terms of which ultimately 
to justify them. For ordinary language may also be 
regarded as containing a basic observation language by 
reference to which even technical theories may have to 
be supported and understood (pp. 129-130). 
Summary of Findings 
The x2 test of homogeneity was significant at the 0,01 level of 
significance. 
Categories with particularly high frequencies were: 
Mood as a state of mind or feeling 
Hood characterized as "pervasive" 
Hood as having a causal effect 
Hood as the result of both internal and external factors 
Mood as an attitude 
Categories with particularly low frequencies were: 
Mood as a sensation 
Mood as having unconscious determinants 
Mood as a transient phenomenon alone 
The possibility of different moods co-existing 
Mood as a barrier to understanding people 
Mood as the result of previous moods 
Mood as the result of external factors alone 
Mood as an in depth experience 
Results 
Table 59 presents the observed frequencies for the subjects' 
definition elements of mood and the x2 test of homogeneity. The 
definition elements are rank ordered according to frequency (See 
Appendix H for definitions and scoring paradigms). 
-356-
TABLE 59 
x2 TEST OF HOMOGENEITY ON THE ELEMENTS OF STUDENT DEFINITIONS OF MOOD 
Definition Element Observed Expected Frequency Frequency 
1. Mood as a state of mind or feeling 
2. Mood characterized as "pervasive" 
3. Mood as having a causal effect 
4. Mood as the result of both internal 
and external factors 
5. Mood as an attitude 
6. Mood as internally complex 
7. Mood as both transient and enduring 
8. Mood as intangible and inexplicable 
9. Mood as a cumulative effect 
10. Mood as serving a controlling, 
monitoring or directing function 
11. Mood as a means of defining or 
manifesting oneself 
12. Mood as a state or stage oC 1being" 
13. Mood as a spontaneous occurrence 
14. Mood as the result of internal 
factors alone 
15. Mood as serving a basic need or 
performing a basic function 
16. Mood as an in depth experience 
17. Mood as the result of external 
factors alone 
18. Mood as the result of previous moods 
19. Mood as a barrier to understanding 
people 
, 
20. Mood as having unconscious 
determinants 
21. Mood as a transient phenomenon alone 
22. The possibility of different moods 
coexisting 
23. Mood as a sensation 
61 
39 
32 
30 
26 
21 
18. 
11 
10 
10 
8 
6 
6 
6 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Expected percentage is 4,35 for each group. 
x2 = 366,066** df 22 
Note: 
* P<o,o5. 
** p<O ,01. 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13.57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
13,57 
% 
19,50 
12,50 
10,50 
9,60 
8,30 
6,70 
5,80 
3,50 
3,20 
3,20 
2,60 
1,90 
1,90 
1,90 
1,60 
1,30 
1,30 
1,30 
1,00 
0,60 
0,60 
0,60 
0,60 
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Table 59 .. has shown that the :X2 test of homogeneity is significant 
at the 0,01 level of significance. The expected percentage for 
each category is 4,35. The percentage of 8,30 was taken as a 
cut-off point for high scores and the percentage of 1,30 was taken 
as a cut-off point for low scores. 
The definition elements with a percentage of 8,30 or greater were: 
1. Mood as a state of mind or feeling 19,50% 
2. Mood characterized as "pervasive" 12,50% 
3. Mood as having a causal effect 10,50% 
4. Mood as the result of both internal and external factors 9,60% 
5. Mood as an attitude 8,30% 
The definition elements with a percentage of 1,30 or lower were: 
1. Mood as a sensation 0,60% 
2. Mood as having unconscious determinants 0,60% 
3. Mood as a transient phenomena alone 0,60% 
4. The possibility of different moods coexisting 0,60% 
5. Mood as a barrier to understanding people 1,00% 
6. Mood as a result of previous moods 1,30% 
7. Mood as the result of external factors alone 1,30% 
8. Mood as an in depth experience 1,30% 
The meaning and import of these elements with respect to the 
experience of mood, a concept of mood, and theoretical attempts to 
systematize mood data, must be clearly established. 
considered in the Discussion Chapter, section 5.9. 
This will be 
-358-
4.8 An Analysis of Language Acts using the Word Hood 
Description 
This section. is part of the continuing effort to determine the 
parameters of what can meaningfully be said about "mood 11 both as 
a concept and as an empirical state. The present approach 
utilizes a concept from linguistic philosophy--the notion of a 
"language act", i.e. roughly the idea that language is used to 
perform actions of various sorts within a particular context, in 
conjunction with empirical data in order to determine the major 
functions of the word "mood" within the context of behaviour, 
intentions, and social actions. 
The subjects were asked to use the word mood in four different 
grammatical sentences. They were asked to generate sentences 
that they could imagine themselves saying to a friend. The 
subjects were acquainted with categories of language acts adapted 
from the work of Wittgenstein (1972), Strawson (1970), and Austin 
(1963), and asked to make determinations for their sentences. 
They were asked: 'In this situation this sentence is being used 
I 
to .•..• ? ' In cases of doubt reference was made to the probable 
psychological state or disposition state of the hypothetical 
subject of the sentence. Frequency counts and percentages were 
determined for each category and a x2 test of homogeneity was 
performed. The results are given in Table 60. 
It should be noted that if our examination of these sentences were 
limited to the semantic and grammatical features of the sentence 
alone, then our conclusions would have to be restricted to the 
concept of mood.. However by further considering the subjects' 
projected intentions, implied behaviours, and social actions, we 
may be justified in establishing conclusions about the experience 
of mood~ bearing in mind that initially with a presuppositionless 
attitude we cannot be sure that anything empirical corresponds to 
the concept mood. 
The first general point that should be noted is that language is 
capable of serving a variety of functions, functions we usually 
disregard when operating within the realm of scientific discourse, 
a realm which stresses the clear and concise communication of 
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facts, i.e. the functions of naming, referring and objectively 
describing. Taking a broader view, language may be used to 
commend, exhort and encourage, prohibit, solidify cultural 
identity, express an article of belief, search for and articulate 
personal identity (as in some poetry), or to constitute an 
inchoate mode of awareness, to name just a few para-scientific 
functions. 
Specifically, what we wish to know is the way in which mood terms 
may be said to function, the different types of action mood terms 
can perform. Bedford (1956) examining the concept of "emotion", 
and the use of emotion words, attempted to establish that an 
emotion is not a process or an experience. He writes: 
..... my contention is that it would be a mistake to 
imagine that the primary function of these statements 
(statements that refer to emotions) is to communicate 
psychological facts. Their principle functions are 
judicial, not informative, and when they are informa-
tive, it is often not merely psychological information 
that they give ... Emotion concepts, I have argued, are 
not purely psychological: they presuppose concepts 
of social relationships and institutions, and concepts 
belonging to systems of judgement, moral, aesthetic, 
and legal. In using emotion words we are able there-
fore, to relate behaviour to the complex background in 
which it is enacted, and so to make human actions 
intelligible (pp. 93 and 98). 
There exists what may be termed a strong and a weak form of 
Bedford's thesis. ·He maintains that an emotion "is not any sort 
of experience or process" (p.87). This I shall call the strong 
form of his thesis. Elsewhere, e.g. in the above quotation, he 
is primarily concerned to show that linguistic expressions 
referring to emo't·ions, are not necessarily functioning to inform 
of psychological facts and that these expressions presuppose 
various social and institutional concepts. 
the weak form of his thesis. 
This I shall call 
Bedford bases his conclusions on the examination of only eight 
statements, each using an emotion word: 
1. They are very jealous of one another. 
2. I envy Schnabel's technique. 
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3. Well, I hope you are ashamed of yourself. 
4. I never feel the slightest pang of regret for what I did. 
5. I am quite disgusted with the literary men. 
6. I feel ashamed about it now. 
7. His pride in the Company's record is unjustified. 
8. He is very disappointed in you. 
In criticism of Bedford, we have no way of knowing to what extent 
this is a representative sample of sentences employing emotion 
words. It is certainly possible that certain of these statements 
could be functioning with equal probability as either reports of 
feeling states or as criticisms and appraisals. It is precisely 
because we do not have contextual information of behaviour, 
intention and actions subsequent to the statements, that we cannot 
decide which function is being performed. It is suggested that 
the empirical data provided in this section will give evidence for 
or against the view that the chief function of affective words 
(in particular mood terms) is to make appraisals and criticisms, 
i.e. that mood discourse functions primarily non-descriptively, 
as well as indicating the range of functions inherent in such 
discourse. 
Summary of Findings 
The x2 test of homogeneity was significant at the 0,01 level of 
significance. (See Table 60 for a presentation of the categories 
of language acts.) 
High Scores 
(C4) Language Acts of Performing Social-Judgemental Actions 
Judgements concerning others 
to evaluate others 
(B3) Language Acts of Reporting One's Own Experience 
to give grarnrnatical objects that indicate systematic 
influences 
(C3) Language Acts of Performing Social-Judgemental Actions 
Judgements concerning the self 
to give warnings, to surprise, to request information 
-361-
(Cl) Language Acts of Performing Social-Juftgemental Actions 
Judgements concerning the self 
to evaluate the self 
(Bl) Language Acts of Reporting One's Own Experience 
to give grammatical objects that are mood words 
(E3) Language Acts of Characterizing Mood Experience Itself 
to give grammatical objects that indicate systematic 
influences 
Low Scores 
(A3) Language Acts of Expression 
metaphorical expressions 
(D9) Language Acts of Ascribing Mood to Others 
To groups 
to give action/behavioural consequents of mood states 
(F2) Language Acts of Referring to the Human Condition 
to refer to adults 
(F4) Language Acts of Referring to the Human Condition 
to refer to children 
(Gl) Language Acts of Ascribing Mood Qualities to Environmental 
Objects 
to ascribe mood qualities to natural or physical objects 
(ES) Language Acts of Characterizing Mood Experience Itself 
to give reasons or causes for mood states generally 
(A2) Language Acts of Expression 
conventional expression 
(F3) Language Acts of Referring to the Human Condition 
to refer to adolescents 
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Results 
Table 60 presents the observed frequencies for the different 
categories of language acts and the x2 test of homogeneity. 
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TABLE 60 
x2 TEST OF HOMOGENEITY ON LANGUAGE ACTS OF SENTENCES USING THE WORD MOOD 
(See Appendix I for subjects' sentences) 
Note: illustrative examples used in this table are subjects' own 
sentences. 
Category·of Language Act 
A. Language Acts of Expression 
1. natural or spontaneous expressions 
e.g. 'I'm in a tremendous mood 
today!' 
2. conventional expressions 
e.g. 'I'm enjoying my mood!' 
3. metaphorical expressions 
e.g. 'A mood is like a leaf, which 
can be brought by the wind and 
swept away by a breeze!' 
B. Language Acts of Reporting One's Own 
Experience 
1. to give grammatical objects that are 
mood words 
e.g. 'My mood was ecstatic, I felt 
like leaping for joy!' 
2. to give grammatical objects that 
denote bodily states 
3. to give grammatical objects that 
indicate systematic influences 
e.g. 'Hy moods while affecting my 
daily interactions do not alter my 
opinions on intellectual subjects.' 
Observed Expected 
frequency frequency 
10 7,73 
1 7,73 
3 7,73 
16 7,73 
7,73 
27 7,73 
4. to give action/behavioural coQsequents 
of mood states 9 7,73 
e.g. 'I was in such a bad mood that I 
started an unnecessary argument with 
her.' 
5. to give reasons or causes for one's 
mood state 
e.g. 'The fact that it was raining 
all day put me in a low mood.' 
11 7,73 
% 
3,50 
0,35 
1,05 
5,59 
9,44 
3,15 
3,85 
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C. Language Acts of Performing Social-
Judgemental Actions 
Judgements concerning the self 
1. to evaluate the self 
e.g. 'I want to be without moods, 
they are selfish.' 
2. to justify one's actions and 
behaviours; to give excuses 
e.g. 'My mood has overtaken me and 
I cannot act any differently.' 
3. to give warnings, to surprise, to 
request information 
e.g. 'Don't take your bad mood out 
on me'; 'I'm in such a good mood 
today that I'm game to do anything'; 
'Sometimes a mood falls over me 
which I can't understand. 1 
Judgements concerning others 
4. to evaluate others 
e.g. 'His lack of moods made me 
respect him more.' 
5. to justify the actions and behaviours 
of others; to give excuses for others 
e.g. 'Her moods were an excuse to 
escape from reality. 1 
6. to express puzzlement about others; 
to defer to others 
e.g. 'What on earth put you in such a 
mood?'; 'When you are in a bad mood 
you are overpowering.' 
D. Language Acts of Ascribing Hood to Others 
To individuals 
1. to give grammatical objects that are 
mood words 
e.g. 'The student was in an anxious, 
worried mood for several days during 
his exams. 1 
2. to give grammatical objects that 
denote bodily states 
3. to give grammatical objects that 
indicate systematic influences 
e.g. 'John was moody, inclined to 
Observed 
frequency 
16 
5 
17 
48 
5 
12 
8 
8 
Expected 
frequency 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
% 
r 
5,59 
1,75 
5,94 
16,78 
1,75 
4,20 
2,80 
2,80 
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rather sudden and intense changes 
of feeling. ' 
4. to give action/behavioural conse-
quents of mood states 
e.g. 'Her happy mood caused her to 
kiss her little brother whom usually 
she could not stand the sight of. 
5. to give reasons or causes for mood 
states 
e.g. 'The way the interview had 
gone put him in a hopeful mood.' 
To groups 
6. to give grammatical objects that are 
mood words 
e.g. 'He told the group to break up 
because he could sense an agitated 
mood.' 
7. to give grammatical objects that 
denote bodily states 
8. to give grammatical objects that 
indicate systematic influences 
e.g. 'The mood of the party was 
altered by playing faster records.' 
9. to give action/behavioural conse-
quents of mood states 
e.g. 'The students' lighthearted 
mood lead to many jokes and 
amusing stories.' 
10. to give reasons or causes for the 
mood of groups 
e.g. 'The mood of the audience was 
one of great expectation at the 
thought of the excellent play they 
wer~ about to see.' 
E. Language Acts of Characterizing Mood 
Experience Itself (an observational and 
reflective enterprise) 
1. to give grammatical objects that are 
mood words 
e.g. 'A moody person is usually 
regarded as somebody depressed· rather 
than the opposite, i.e. elated or 
cheerful.' 
2. to give grammatical objects that 
denote bodily states 
Observed 
frequency 
11 
3 
4 
6 
2 
3 
3 
Expected 
frequency 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
% 
3,85 
1,05 
1,40 
2,10 
0,70 
1,05 
1,05 
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3. to give grammatical objects that 
indicate systematic influences 
e.g. 'Certain moods can take over 
one's perception completely, 
altering the way one sees things.' 
4. to characterize mood experience as 
causally efficacious 
e.g. 'A mood can make you do any-
thing. 1 
5. to give reasons or causes for mood 
states generally 
e.g. 'Moods are often the after 
effects of emotion.' 
F. Language Acts of Referring to the Human 
Condition 
1. to refer to the human condition most 
generally 
e.g. 'I think each person has violent 
changes of mood and so few admit this 
fact.' 
2. to refer to adults 
e.g. 'Adults show their bad mood by 
quarrelling and being irritable. 1 
3. to refer to adolescents 
e.g. 'Mood and changes thereof are 
more often perceptible in adolescents.' 
4. to refer to children 
e.g. 'A mood is something little 
children change as often as their needs 
change.' 
G. Language Acts of Ascribing Mood Qualities 
to Environmental Objects 
1. to ascribe mood qualities to natural or 
physical objects 
e.g. 'The mood of the countryside is 
threatening under a stormy sky.' 
2. to ascribe mood qualities to cultural 
objects · 
e.g. 'The mood of the painting is 
violent and restless.' 
H. Language Acts of Idiomatic Use 
(inclinations, social trends, atmosphere) 
e.g. 'I'm in the mood for a thick bar of 
Dutch chocolate and a cowboy movie.' 
Observed 
frequency 
15 
3 
2 
3 
2 
1 
2 
2 
6 
12 
Expected 
frequency 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
7,73 
% 
5,24 
1,05 
0,70 
1,05 
0,70 
0,35 
0,70 
0,70 
2,10 
4,20 
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I. Language Acts of Idiosyncratic Use 
(humour, irony, paradox) 
e.g. 'The cow mood at the cantankerous 
farmer who was standing on his head in 
the stable because he felt that he 
needed to.'; 'The word "mood" can be 
written back to front as "doom" - the 
ultimate ironicism.'; 'I can't really 
think of another sentence to use the 
word mood in.' 
Expected percentage 1s 2,70 throughout. 
x2 = 388,27** 
df = 36 
Note: 
* p<O,OS. 
** p<O,Ol. 
Observed 
Frequency 
10 
Expected 
Frequency 
7,73 
% 
3,50 
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Table 60 has shown that the x2 test of homogeneity is significant at 
the 0,01 level of significance. The expected percentage for each 
category of language act is 2)70 throughout. Taking a percentage of 
5,00 as a cut-off point for high scores and 1,35 as a cut-off point 
for low scores, it was found: 
High Scores 
(C4) Language Acts of Performing Social-Judgemental Actions 
Judgements concerning others 
to evaluate others 16,78% 
(B3) Language Acts of Reporting One's Own Experience 
to give grammatical objects that indicate systematic 
influences 9,44% 
(C3) Language Acts of Performing Social-Judgemental Actions 
Judgements concerning the self 
to give warnings, to surprise, to request information 5,94% 
(Cl) Language Acts of Performing Social-Judgemental Actions 
Judgements concerning the self 
to evaluate the self 5,59% 
(Bl) Language Acts of Reporting One's Own Experience 
to give grammatical objects that are mood words 5,59% 
(E3) Language Acts of Characterizing Mood Experience Itself 
to give grammatical objects that indicate systematic 
influences 5,24% 
Low Scores 
(A3) Language Acts of Expression 
metaphorical expressions 1,05% 
(D9) Language Acts of Ascribing Mood to Others 
To groups 
to give action/behavioural consequents of mood states 0,70% 
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(F2) Language Acts of Referring to the Human Condition 
to refer to adults 0~70% 
(F4) Language Acts of Referring to the Human Condition 
to refer to children 0,70% 
(Gl) Language Acts of Ascribing Mood Qualities to Environment 
Objects 0,70% 
(E5) Language Acts of Characterizing Mood Experience Itself 
to give reasons or causes for mood states generally 
(A2) Language Acts of Expression 
conventional expressions 0,35% 
(F3) Language Acts of Referring to the Human Condition 
to refer to adolescents 0' 35% 
0,70% 
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4.9 Qualitative Data 
Description 
Fifteen subjects volunteered to participate 1n an investigation 
that sought to obtain descriptions of basic recurring moorls. A 
series of questions was designed to elicit information concern-
1ng fundamental dimensions, components and parameters of mood. 
The volunteers \vere informed of the purpose of the investigation 
and their individual affective life was discussed. Having 
determined which were the basic moods for a particular subject, 
the subject was then asked to write dmvn a description of the 
mood the next time it occurred. Each subject was encouraged to 
describe the mood in any way she saw fit, as long as it \vas a 
portrayal of the affective state that was meaningful to her. 
Eleven subjects provided data in sufficient detail for presenta-
tion. 
Subjects met with the experimenter on a weekly basis to discuss 
the mood states of the preceding week. If the subject had 
experienced one of her basic moods, she was asked a ser1es of 
standard questions pertinent to mood. Thus in most cases the 
mood descriptions were obtained while the subject was in the 
particular mood, and the discussion questions were answered 
subsequent to the mood.experience (See Appendix K for data and 
format of questions). 
Results 
Table 61 presents an overv1ew of the eleven subjects and their 
recurring moods. 
TABLE 61 
Subject 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
SUBJECTS' RECURRING MOODS 
He an Positive Moods Variability. Neutral Moods 
26.40 Restless Creativity 
22.80 Happy 1. Nothingness 2. Fragile 
24.20 Happy Indefinite 
23.40 Elated Nothing 
20.60 1. Kind-Warmhearted 2. Carefree Serious-Concentrating 
12.80 Elated 1. Fragile 2. Detached 
31.40 1. Elated 2. Ecstatic 
16.00 Very Happy 
9 1. Contented 12.00 Elated 2. Quiet-Introverted 
10 16.40 1. Elated 2. Sensitive-Aware Indifferent 
11 6.60 _ 1. Content 
·-·. Quiet 
For positive moods n = 13. 
For neutral moods n = 12. 
For negative moods n = 11. 
Negative Moods 
1. Tense 
2. Irritable 
1. Depressed 
2. Deflated-Confused 
Depressed 
Depressed 
Self-Blaming 
1. Depressed 
2. Restless 
Tense 
1. Depressed 
2. Self-:-Pitying 
Depressed 
1. Depressed 
2. Restless 
3. Irritable 
Insecure 
I 
w 
-....J 
~ 
I 
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Table 61 has shown: 
1. Positive Moods 
Comprises moods categorized by the subjects as: Restless 
Creativity (n=l), Happy (n=2), Very Happy (n=l), Elated 
(n=S), Kind-Warmhearted (n=l), Carefree (n=l), Ecstatic 
(n=l), and Sensitive-Aware (n=l). All were moods of 
moderate to high energy level with either a positive feeling 
tone or had positive connotations for the subject. 
Total n=l3. 
2. Neutral Moods 
Comprises moods categorized by the subjects as: Nothingness 
or Nothing (n=2), Indefinite (n=l), Serious-Concentrating 
(n=l), Fragile (n=2), Detached (n=l), Content or Contented 
(n=2), Quiet-Introverted or Quiet (n=2), and Indifferent 
(n=l). All were moods of moderate energy level with neither 
a strongly positive nor strongly negative feeling tone. 
Total n=l2. 
3. Negative Moods 
Comprises moods categorized by the subjects as: Tense (n=2), 
Irritable (n=2), Depressed (n=7), Deflated-Confused (n=l), 
Self-Blaming (n=l), Restless (n=2), Self-Pitying (n=l) and 
Insecure (n=l). All were moods of moderate to high energy 
level with either a negative feeling tone or had largely 
negative connotations for the subject. 
Total n=l7. 
In addition it should be noted that the majority of subjects 
(seven out of eleven) had moods that fell into each of the three 
general categories. This suggests the possibility of mood 
systems, e.g. moods of positive and negative feeling tone 
oscillating around a relative balance point of neutral affect. 
The mean variability, or measure of changeability of mood over a 
given unit of time, is listed for each subject. It is interesting 
to note that the two subjects with the highest mean variabilities 
(Subject Nos. 1 and 7) both lacked neutral moods and. had more than 
I 
\ 
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one mood in either the positive or negative category. This 
implies the possibility of fairly rapid change within a category 
(e.g. positive or negative) and then rapid change across cate-
gories to a mood of opposite quality. The three subjects with 
the lowest mean variabilities (Subject Nos. 6, 9 and 11) were 
distinguished from the subjects of higher mean variability by 
having more than one mood in the neutral category. This suggests 
that subjects of low mean variability may have more neutral moods 
and spend more time in these moods. 
In the presentation that follows subjects' moods will be con-
sidered collectively under the general headings positive, 
neutral and negative moods. The experimenter's intent is not 
only to show commonalities and basic features, but also to give 
an idea of what it is like to be experiencing these moods. 
Dissection and analysis lead to abstract understanding--but 
concrete inter-personal understanding and communication can also 
be increased if we realize that to be in a mood is to perceive, 
feel, and act under various constraints that arise from the mood 
states themselves. 
1. Positive Moods 
Analytic categories 
(the analytic categories contain statements from all 
subjects' moods falling in the "positive" category) 
Descriptive elements: It's a concentration of energy ...•. 
I have to express it, it comes from me and I have to find 
expression for it .... ! kind of float, relish in the sun and 
rain alike- full of the joys of life .... ! become very talk-
ative and light-hearted, joking and laughing a lot .... Not 
worrying about the future and taking everything as it comes 
.... Determination in this mood, makes me more confident .... 
My optimism takes over completely •.•• Everyone around me 
seems beautiful and nice .... ! want to reach out and touch 
things •..• Feel like flying and talking to the birds and 
people ..•. Feel friendly and want to smile at others, make 
them happy .••. ! feel very much on the earth, and happy where 
I am .... It's a completed so~t of 'couldn't,care less' 
attitude.when I bury everything for a few minutes and just 
forget and feel free to be me .... It tends to take over 
completely .... It makes me feel very lively and bubbly, and 
to envelop everyone else in my happiness .••. It's a feeling 
of self-sufficiency, that all is right with myself, a self-
acceptance that makes things right again.~ .. There is a 
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general feeling of wellbeing .... ! want to take hold of life 
and swing it around me .... I'm intensely aware of my body-
all parts of it •.•. My brain, mind, does not make itself felt 
when I am elated •..• ! feel as if I could do anything, 
achieve everything. 
Summary 
In general, the positive moods appear to be characterized by 
an increase in mental and physical energy, the awareness of 
personal vitality is enhanced, optimistic attitudes pre-
dominate, there is an energetic and even hedonic response to 
the environment, a desire to express and share the feeling 
with peers, and personal anxieties and self-criticisms ebb 
away. All suggesting a smooth, vibrant and equilibrated 
functioning at increased energy levels. In some cases, how-
ever, the vibrant feelings appear to be a "magical happiness" 
with inadequate reality-testing. The pre-emptive quality of 
these moods should also be noted. 
Metaphorical portrayals: I feel like a pelican, graceful, 
with freedom of flight .... Champagne in a glass--some of the 
bubbles, most of them, escape by jumping right out of the 
glass--the lightness I feel within me and without, totally 
free and happy .... ! feel like a beachball because it is so 
light and bounces all over always coming up again .... I'd be 
a bird or a small aeroplane--but rather a bird, because it's 
so much more alive .•.. A smiling sun--1 don't feel mature or 
sophisticated at all ..•. A bunch of scented flowers which 
bave been given to someone with a smile .•.. A purring kitten 
.... This mood feels like a crystal clear mountain stream 
bubbling over dark as well as sunlit sections of the mountain 
.... The body of a dolphin diving in gay abandon .... A nightin-
gale .... A butterfly (very brightly coloured) ...• Bubbles 
inside me--all coming out of me with all beautiful colours 
reflected in them .... A robin .... I would be a beautiful fire-
work .... A candystriped body .... I feel very aware of every-
thing and as a body to the mood I can see an insect with 
little a~tennae flickering all over ..•. A proverbial fountain 
-~I feel so great that my laughs just want to jump out .... 
I'd be a kite in this mood, soaring right up there in the 
sky ..•. 
Summary 
In general, the self-expressive images suggest rarified 
space, soaring flight, effervescent energy, scintillating 
light, resplendent colour, beauty, clarity and purity. 
There is a sense of expanded horizons, positive emotional 
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acceleration, affectionate and warm feelings and a time and 
space of personal freedom. 
Causal factors: It can be a reaction to things I have been 
doing, e.g. if I have not been spending my time construct-
ively. I think here it's more a frustration that has to be 
gotten rid of. If I read something, or participate in an 
excellent discussion I can get overwhelmed, it's fantastic, 
I absorb it and then have to express it. In this case the 
energy is more directed, I know what I want to do with it! 
Things people say, if they are people I like, or even 
strangers sometimes, or just the day - thoughts and expecta-
tions. I think there are two factors responsible for the 
mood. I'm getting on especially well with people in general, 
i.e. with lots of particular people and the weather is a 
factor too. I think getting on with people is the most 
important thing. But I don't always have my happy mood when 
I'm getting on well with people. Receiving a letter, work 
going well, and actively working and achieving things can 
all by themselves produce the mood. I think what is 
necessary is an evaluation that things are going well and 
therefore I feel more confident and happy about myself. 
When the mood is at its strongest, I'd say it was because 
of other people, this leads to the evaluation that things 
are going well, which in turn gives me confidence and 
produces the mood. When I'm at home, most of the time it's 
my happy mood. I think it's because of a lot of little 
things at home, e.g. I'm more relaxed and feel more secure. 
The pressure of work at Varsity worries me, I'm duty 
conscious, I panic and get upset. But I have more friends 
here at Varsity, so I don't know why - there's only my sister 
at home. We're quite protective towards one another - it's 
a deep unspoken bond, that's probably what it is. Here you 
just see your friends at lunch, everything on the surface 
comes out - there's no depth to the relationships. Here I 
think the mood comes on \vhen there is no worry about work, 
tests and essays, etc., and when things are going well with 
my flatmates, or if I've had a good weekend. I think other 
people being friendly is most likely to bring it on. The 
mood can be brought on by even one or a series of events. 
If it's a series of events, it's a calmer happiness, less 
intense, but it w~ll probably last longer. If it's one 
event, I think it's then a more intense happiness. 
I'd say mainly external influences bring it on. I feel the 
potential is .there inside me and it just needs something to 
bring it out. Music I like is sufficient to bring it on. 
Sometimes lectures are sufficient to bring it on. It's 
strongest when I'm with people and communicating well. 
It comes from within with the help of other people and 
situations, e.g. over the holiday mother and I were sewing 
and chatting. I realized how much more I had to say to her 
this year than ever before. It's often difficult to say. 
right off what situations it is linked to. I feel it comes 
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from within me regardless of the situation. Of all my moods 
this is the one which is least directly linked to specific 
situations. Possibly, if someone else appeared in need of a 
kind, warm-hearted person, that could produce it. I think 
that's about it as far as outside situations evoking it. 
I think being with friends in happy surroundings and happy 
situations and any little thing like getting a letter, or 
going to town looking at'shop windows- things going right 
tend to produce the mood. All those little things are 
sufficient to produce the mood. I tend to have a happy con-
tent attitude and those things would make it more so. The 
happy content attitude is produced when things are going well 
for me in general. So a series of small things would produce 
the attitude and then just one little thing added to that 
would produce the mood. 
Summary 
In general, psycho-social factors acting upon internal 
potentials seem to be responsible for these moods. The 
external factors most frequently cited are: the quality or 
depth of social relations, good communication with others, 
work proceeding well, and an absence of external coercions 
and pressures. Cognitive factors also seem to be important, 
e.g. thoughts and expectations, evaluations that all is 
going well, and positive seLf-judgements. (See also the two 
following analytic categories). 
The causal matrix of these moods appears to be complex. 
Psycho-social factors and cognitive judgements may be the 
definite eliciting factors, but predisposing factors such as 
personality structure, salient events and behaviour patterns 
from the life-history, as well as general patterns of 
fluctuation in mental and physical energy, are equally 
important. 
Goals as a determining factor: Goals are very important 
in producing and maintaining this mood •... Goals are important, 
but not totally overwhelmingly. They are part of it, a 
contribution but not essential ...• The accomplishment of a 
goal can play a part, but it doesn't make the mood intense 
or elated, e.g. work can make me feel happy but doesn't 
produce elation •••. This (attaining or not attaining a goal) 
is not important •.•. I'm uncertain about this. If I feel 
completed, i.e. if nothing is bothering me at the moment it 
could contribute ••.. Goals are important, i.e. they would· 
contribute to forming the happy content attitude ••.• That's 
the something special inside me, if I feel I've achieved 
-377-
something, if something has been fulfilled. 
Summary 
The attainment or non-attainment of goals appears to be a 
contributing factor, but not a sufficient condition in most 
cases. The responses to this question ranged from 'very 
important' to 'not important'. Perhaps the most prudent 
conclusion is to say that for positive moods the attainment 
of goals facilitates the production of the mood, or increases 
the intensity, but by itself it is not the only relevant 
factor. 
The role of self-esteem: If something occurs to enhance 
·my self-esteem I think it could both produce and maintain 
the mood. If something happened to damage my self-esteem I 
think that could produce the mood but not maintain it. Some-
thing negative could lead to the feeling of frustration and 
that to the restless creativity •..• Yes, definitely this is 
an important factor as we said .... I think the friendliness 
coming from other people touches my self-esteem and this 
makes me feel more confident and worthwhile .... This (self-
esteem) is a part of it, can either maintain or produce the 
mood. I think it could be an evaluation of how things are 
going for me .... I .think if I feel complete and happy with 
myself, I'm more willing to give to others. Also how events 
in general affect my self-esteem can contribute to producing 
the mood .•.. If something positive happened to enhance my 
self-esteem, it would maintain the mood or help to produce 
it, but the happy content attitude would have to be there 
first •... I think if events just make me feel self-satisfied, 
that produces the mood, it seems to work directly, almost 
automatically .... 
Summary 
The manner in which events affect the individual's self-
esteem appears to be an important variable. In most cases 
subjects indicated that enhanced self-esteem would be 
sufficient to produce a positive mood. In particular 
enhanced self-esteem leads to greater confidence and bolsters 
the positive self-image. However, one subject indicated that 
enhanced self-esteem would only produce the mood, not 
maintain it. Also, this data may shed some light on the 
preceding category - goals as a determining factor. The 
attainment of goals enhances self-esteem which may then 
produce a positive mood. Again, the data. suggests enhan~ed 
self-esteem is not the only relevant factor. 
-378-
Creation or choice: 
(whether or not the subject feels she herself plays a 
conscious, active and decisive role in producing the mood) 
I can talk myself into it, it's a form of it, but not the 
mood at its most creative ••.• The mood just happens, I can't 
decide to be in it or choose to be in it •.•• The mood depends 
mainly on something outside of myself. But if my prior 
state was one of upset or worry, it would depend on what's 
happening inside •••. I think I do play an active role in 
creating it •... I can't decide to make it happen, it must be 
released from within me .•.. I can try hard to bring the mood 
about, but on my own - I can't bring it about in its full 
strength •... If I'm tired, I think I can actively aid in 
creating the mood, I can give it the final push. If I'm not 
feeling tired I play much less of an active role in its 
creation ..•. 
Sunnnary 
In general, subjects maintained that they did not, through 
conscious choice or action, produce the mood at its full 
strength or quality. Subjects could however choose to aid 
or facilitate the mood. In one case a subject maintained 
that she did play an active role in "creating" her positive 
mood. 
I? 
ic identity the subject believes is being manifested 
in the mood) 
A person that wants and yearns to be creative, to establish 
and create something, anything. A person that wants to find 
expression for all that is me .... I'm (subject gives her name] 
and very full. I feel like a teddy bear, very contented -
people are almost cuddling .•.. In this mood I feel I have 
everything I want, and I especially want to really get 
through to people, to go even deeper in my communication with 
them and to share it with other people .... A person that wants 
things to stay the way they are. I feel the happy mood is 
pointed at everything and everyone .... What I desire most is 
to have people around me, people I know- but I don't have 
to like them. For the mood to function I have to have other 
people. I desire a balance between giving and taking between 
myself and other people .•.. A person who desires freedom and 
space to be able to do the things I want to do. I would 
express it by going to nature or to town, that would add to 
it .... I want everyone to be in the mood, for everyone to 
experience it. I feel so relaxed and happy, why shouldn't 
they? .•.. 
Summary 
A major identity theme was that of someone who wanted or 
needed to express her moods (either as an act of self-
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definition or self-sharing). In several cases there was a 
predominant self-orientation, a need for self-satisfaction, 
personal gratification, to enjoy the freedom and independence 
of the mood. For one subject the identity theme was that of 
a perso~ who needed balance, giving and receiving. 
Relating to other people in the mood: It's a totally ego-
centric mood. Expressing the creativity is all that matters 
...• I want to talk to others, to laugh and share things or 
sit and just listen, feeling their warmth .... ! become very 
outgoing, do a lot of communicating, I~m willing to do any-
. thing others are doing. Probably I would most like to go 
somewhere, to go and do something ..•. It's mainly a ,.,ranting 
to do things for others .•.. In this mood it's nice being with 
people, but I'd be even happier on my own. I'd sing to 
myself, go for a walk or go shopping .... In this mood I'm 
terribly kind and affectionate and tolerant. People say I'm 
usually on the critical side and not tolerant ..•. 
Summary 
Relations with other people in these positive moods appear 
to be of three types: there is a genuine outgoing benevolent 
mood, a mood with a more restrained self-sufficiency as a 
primary foc~s and out of which the subject can confidently 
participate with others, and a mood with a more introverted 
type of self-involvement. 
\mat the subject is most aware of 
a) about herself: My mind working .... That I'm a person 
capable of relating to other people .... ! am most aware, 
concerning myself, that I am confident and full of life 
•... \.Jhat I'm most aware of about myself is that I like 
being myself ..•. My skin, there is a radiating glow about 
it. I feel energetic and sensitive to things. It's an 
expression of how I am feeling toward other people ...• 
I am most aware of my arms, they feel light, buoyant and 
energetic. My mouth is smiling and it wants to sing and 
be energetic .... ! would say that an important thing 
about this mood is that I'm not aware of myself, because 
I do get self-conscious ••.. 
b) the environment I'm aware of very little. I 
an important thing is that I'm aware of my mind, I 
can see everything flowing together, normally my mind is 
just. skimming along. I feel I am really.inside my head 
.... That people prefer me in this type of mood, they 
relate better to me .... I am most aware, concerning my 
environment of other people - their warmth toward me and 
my response to that .... The whole world seems more al1ve 
.... The warmth of the sun, flowers, nature in general,· 
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and the fact that people care about each other and communi-
cate. People are the objects on to which I project this 
mood, and the environment affects the mood .... I'm very aware 
of nature - trees, flowers, sunlight and breezes. Also 
people - but they are just there, milling around me, they 
have no real significance ...• I'm very aware of nature and 
less aware of other people - I'm usually very aware of other 
people, conversations, what they are wearing, etc. Instead 
I have a smooth feeling all around •..• 
Summary 
In terms of self-perception, subjects frequently indicated 
an awareness of pristine energy, well-being, and confidence. 
For several subjects there was a more sensitive and 
differentiated awareness of positive aspects of the self and 
its functioning. In one case it was the lack of self-
awareness which gave the mood its positive quality. There 
~ 
was evidence to suggest a greater awareness of both bodily 
surfaces and extremities; sensations and/or feelings of 
"buoyancy", "energy", and "radiating glow". 
In terms of environment-perception, subjects seemed to 
indicate two main types of perception. The first type 
involved the recognition of people, their personal warmth, 
and its contribution to the mood. The second type involved 
the recognition of the natural world, its diversity, harmony 
and inherent beauty. Usually, when one type of perception 
predominated the other was held in abeyance. 
Function: It enables me to grow, to integrate myself, to 
be fully aware, to express myself and it opens me up to 
experience .... This mood gives me a centre of worth and cuddly 
confidence .... I think the mood does serve a function. It 
enables you to get rid of everything in you, anything that 
has been worrying you, can be expressed. I hold nothing 
back, all my secrets and fears come out. Also when I'm 
happy things aren't centralized on me, more on others. 
Everything is more we, we this and we that. I don't think 
why did so and so do this and that .... It gives me independence 
and freedom, it revitalizes me and gives me a new energy. I 
feel unified with my own god .... It's the mood where I'm 
really me and my true self can come out .•.. I feel that the 
. mood is in some way necessary to my personality, maybe 
because it is rewarding for me to be kind to people. I 
definitely give myself a chance in this mood, I'm kinder to 
myself. It makes me feel good, I feel complete and hence 
c~n get on with other things - activities or work - I don't 
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worry about things. I relax and expand and open outwards ... 
I think the mood does serve a function. I'd say I'm very 
highly strung and this mood enables me to totally relax~ I 
can accept everything, I stop asking why this and why that? 
It's a complete break, it recharges and revitalizes me. 
Also it lets people see that I'm not so picky ...• 
Summary 
Subjects expressed a variety of opinions concerning the 
' functions of their positive moods. Classifying their responses 
into general categories yields these major functions -
1. provides a sense of worth and self-confidence 
2. promotes growth, openness and integration 
3. permits self-expression 
4. facilitates positive qualities in personal relationships 
5. gives relaxation; revitalizes. 
2 •. Neutral Moods 
Analytic categories 
(the analytic categories contain statements from all 
subjects' moods falling in the "neutral" category) 
Descriptive elements: Nothingness, where nothing penetrates, 
nothing is relevant and I float along with a vacuum in my 
head and body. I'm most aware of the emptiness inside and 
try to look at the bright side in order to lift myself out 
and up again. I have no body, I'm just floating in a world 
of oblivion and unmvareness. A useless, pointless mood. 
Nothingness, emptiness, a really colourless, harmless existence, 
...• In this mood I just drift along, usually thinking of 
nothing - slightly happy, slightly sad and if anything 
happened, it could switch my mood either way. I don't really 
notice things around me, especially not people - little things 
like a pretty leaf or feather I'd stop and admire, pick it up 
and keep it. Nothing matters much to me •... I feel sort of 
drowsy and not so sure of what is going on. I feel like 
lying and sleeping in the sun, or floating on water, or in 
the air. I don't feel in the least bit energetic. I don't 
feel like doing anything. Although this is a nothing mood, 
I'm not at all depressed or insensitive to things that I like 
- clouds, sky, grass~ ~tt. They help to put me into a dream 
world. I think I'm most aware of my head, because it feels 
heavy. My eyes do too. I feel almost as if I'm in a different 
world from other people, and I don't much like it when people 
talk to me because they interrupt the floating sensations. 
I would like to curl up like an animal and hibernate for a 
while •... lJhen I 1 m in this mood I want to be alone, alone with 
my thoughts. I don't mind it if there are people around.me 
as long as they don't hassle me in any way. This is a 
moderately strong mood in which I find it very difficult to 
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be sociable .... In this mood I feel very delicate, as if, if 
someone had to poke me, ltd fall apart. It is a mood where 
my feelings are just balanced, but where I am very vulnerable, 
i.e. I would be very easily affected by what people say to 
me. In fact, "vulnerable" is the key word as regards this 
mood. This mood makes me feel like being alone. In this 
mood I feel as if I need someone very soothing and under-
standing around. I feel my little bubble or protective 
covering, itts a just balanced mood that could go either way, 
to happiness or more likely sadness. The protective covering 
is vulnerable, somebody could break through it rather easily. 
It's a keyed up mood. You aren't really anything and it 
depends on outside forces for what you are about to become. 
Yet there is a tension inside- a balance but it's not calm 
.... I am so detached that it is almost trance-like. I don't 
know why it is, but sometimes I have this need to switch off 
completely and think my own thoughts, regardless of what is 
going on around me .... Firstly, I am not experiencing this 
mood intensely. I am more contented than cheerful and not 
"bouncy" or "communicating" more than usual. I am fairly 
optimistic. I see this mood as part of an unwinding process 
after a period of tension and unhappiness. It is both 
relatively happy and relatively unhappy, i.e. I feel better 
than before but not as good as I have often felt. A fair 
degree of contentment, moments of cheerfulness, even moments 
of bounciness. Feel things will improve in the immediate 
future •... 
My "indifference" is a blank feeling - one of no motivation. 
I don't feel like doing anything- I just sit, not only doing 
nothing but thinking nothing too. I'm not aware of any 
special parts of my body, in fact I'm not aware of it at all. 
Another component of my mood is one of bitterness I think. 
I feel cynical because one can kill oneself doing something 
and often it is to no avail. Everything is so pointless some-
how. People also are very unreal to me and do not affect me 
at all in this mood ...• ! just feel warm and calm- not 
ecstatic but just pleased to be alive •... ! feel sort of empty 
inside and I just have to get away because I feel as though 
there is something inside me preventing me from talking or 
even listening to anyone else. This mood really swamps me, 
it affects me mentally in that I want to go somewhere quiet 
where my thoughts can continue undisturbed, and it affects me 
physically - I feel heavy and sluggish, but if there was 
somewhere where I could walk amongst beauty, I could walk for 
the rest of my life .•.. 
Summary 
The category "neutral moods" is not a unifo:r;m set. Neverthe-
less some general trends can be identified. Subjects' 
descriptions suggest major qualitative shifts from their 
positive moods. Whereas organismic energy was liberated in 
the positive moods, in the neutral moods it is frequently 
experienced as bound, congealed, or of a viscous quality. 
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These moods have a tendency to promote physical lassitude; 
available energy may become attenuated, or conversely, dis-
tended. In either case it is energy of an inferior quality 
and magnitude, There may be a mental inertia, an involution 
of will and effort, often a sense of futility. However, 
beneath the surface dispassion some subjects report a sense 
of interior movements--a developing surge and flux awaiting 
manifestation. Sensations of "floating" were mentioned by 
several subjects; also a detached sensitivity, a trance-like 
dream world, a personal delicacy, and vulnerability. In 
personal relations there is a sense of isolation as opposed 
to the coalescent qual~ty of the positive moods. For some 
subjects these moods seem to represent not an intermediate 
stability, but rather a precarious balance point between 
opposing emotions. 
Metaphorical portrayals: I feel like the sound of the 
cuckoo- you can hear its call, but rarely see it .... I think 
I '"auld be an animal, hibernating, not disturbed by anyone; 
or maybe a baby, curled up in its mother's body. I would be 
nothing, so that I could dream without being disturbed. How-
ever, to make myself a bit warmer, cosier, my body might be 
a round ball, very soft .•.. I feel solid inside, sort of like 
an old wooden grandfather clock performing its duty. This 
mood would be suited to an old body - weather-beaten and a 
serene face with small piercing eyes .... A cloud .... An air 
particle suspended in space .... An eagle soaring high amongst 
the peaks .... A majestic, quiet, dignified mountain •... A big 
old grandfather clock just mechanically ticking away, watching 
but not participating, having however a function in the home, 
commanding love and respect through its qualities, i.e. 
design and age .... I don't know- big human eyes capable of 
perceiving, a mind capable of translating, interpreting, 
rationalising the actions of others. But an animal body - a 
vulnerable creature, fallible, helpless .... I'd be a loaf of 
bread but without the yeast; all flat and doughy •... If my 
mood had a body to suit it, the body ,.,auld be a glass egg-
shaped one, completely transparent and empty .... I would be a 
little fat puppy who has just had a bowl of warm milk and who 
is curling up in his basket for a little sleep .... I'd be a 
ro.ck that seems to be dead with no feeling but that is really 
moving and thinking so fast that you can't see it. It hasn't 
moved physically, but its mind has been everywhere and it can 
see everything .... My mood would have the body of an owl during 
the day, for in the light the owl just sits and protects his 
eyes but he is very much alive - is he asleep or is he just 
thinking? .... 
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Surrnnary 
Subjects gave a variety of self-expressive images, a spectrum 
ranging from emptiness, through detached vigilance, to quiet 
calmness. The imagery of several subjects suggested the 
pressure of emptiness, a solution of continuity, a pervasive 
indeterrninancy or a homogeneous tranquility spread over interior 
activity. Interesting themes that emerged were: the tension 
between rational thought and tender feelings, the personal need 
for regularity and order, the sense of being suspended between 
the pulses of alternative emotions, and the presence of an · 
ancient maturity or wisdom called into existence. 
Causal factors: Work situations, e.g. when I get an essay 
back, when I realize what I'll have to do, and also the 
realization of opportunities missed. It doesn't come from 
other people •... When I'm with people I like, but who are not 
totally me. It irritates me, they are fond of me and start 
worrying about me but they start asking questions about 
things - I want to be totally unknown. I am swamped by the 
relationship, their "goodness" can be a bit much. It also 
occurs when I get very tense from my relationships with 
people, or all of the \vork, or exam tension. 
I think there are about three different situations that 
produce this mood. One is if I'm disappointed in myself or 
in other people - or both. I think this is sufficient by 
itself to produce the mood. Another situation is if I have 
lots of Varsity work to do, especially if I know I had the 
time to do it and then let it slip. This situation is not 
sufficient by itself to produce the mood. The other situation 
is if there is something I like - something I want to do but 
have to put it off, e.g. reading a book. This situation is 
not sufficient by itself to produce the mood. I can be 
thinking in this mood, but all striving falls away, I feel 
drugged, everything seems like a haze - there are no strong 
emotions. 
When the weather is not very hot, but surrnnery, with a slight 
breeze. This is not sufficient by itself. ~men everything 
seems calm and still. I can't imagine it calm and still in 
winter. This is not sufficient by itself. If my friends 
were in the same mood it could bring the mood on. It might 
be sufficient if they described to me what they were feeling. 
I think the mood mainly comes from nature. 
It can be produced by other people, if they make some remark 
that sets me thinking. This sort of situation can singly 
produ.ce it, but the mood itself would develop when I'm on my 
own, with my own thoughts, and thinking about it. If every-
thing is going reasonably OKAY for me, but there are one ,or 
two small things on my mind. This can produce the mood by 
itself. It's when I'm not unhappy, but things aren't going 
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quite as they should, e.g. last vacation wasn't like it 
used to be since we moved. The routine was changed, e.g. 
eating times, father is now working at night, the evening 
scene of everybody relaxing by the fire is gone - mother 
goes to work with him now. It's routine that I love, it 
holds so many memories for me. If I consider other people 
to be acting silly, I refuse to take part. This situation 
can also produce the mood by itself. I think this situation 
is responsible for the mood when it lasts a long time, \vhen 
it settles in. The other two situations tend to spark off 
the mood when it lasts for a short period. 
It's not necessarily connected with definite situations and 
events. I can wake up feeling that way. Events play a role 
in that you tend to switch off from some events, e.g. things 
I feel I have to do and I don't really want to do- sitting 
in on classes and watching how they teach. You go but 
you're not really there. It's an uncertainty or unsureness 
over events and myself. 
The mood was born of improved relationships in the family 
and a slightly better atmosphere in the home - more relaxed. 
Also, caused probably by the fact that I have been putting 
tasks which must be done behind me. Look forward to having 
a friend to stay with me next week. Also, was able to get 
out this afternoon and by a great coincidence, saw an old 
acquaintance - very unexpected and pleasant. I see this mood 
as part of an unwinding process after a period of tension and 
unhappiness ...• 
Summary 
In general, psycho-social factors and external pressures 
acting upon internal potentials seem to be responsible for 
these moods. The factors most frequently cited were: 
pressure of university work, particularly when work on 
assignments was postponed, deferred activity generally 
(either work or pleasure), disappointment (in oneself or 
others), interaction with people who are not congruent with 
one's personality, cogent or stimulating thoughts from others, 
and changes in consciousness due to solitary contact with 
nature. For the subjects who stressed internal origination 
- uncertainty over oneself and events was most frequently 
cited. In some cases the mood was a deliberate "switching 
off" from persistent environmental pressure. 
Goals as a determining factor: Goals are not important for 
this mood •••. Goals- are important for this mood, especially 
goals relative to work. Or, if I've been depressed and I've 
said to myself - from now on I will be mote friendly and 
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approachable and I fail to accomplish this, I get angry at 
myself, it wouldn't be enough to cause a depressed mood but 
rather an indefinite mood ..•. The fulfilment of a goal would 
be more likely to change my mood, e.g. if I were successful 
with some work assignment, I would become determined to do 
more ..•. Goals.are also important. If I were thinking that I 
wasn't making progress toward a goal, that would contribute 
to the mood ••.. Yes, goals are important (Subject reports that 
she wants to get a flat of her own, but her parents would 
like her to stay at horne. She wants to leave horne but is 
unsure) •• ~. 
Summary 
The attainment or non-attainment of goals appears to be a 
contributing factor. The responses ranged from 'important' 
to 'not important'. .It was also indicated that the achieve-
ment of a goal can motivate change within a mood. The 
assessment of having made progress towards a goal can be a 
contributor. There is some evidence to suggest that the 
attainment of self-imposed goals relative to externally 
imposed requirements, is important. 
The role of self-esteem: Self-esteem is not important for 
this rnood .... I think that if events happen which make me feel 
poorly of myself this can produce the mood. Or it could help 
maintain the mood, if something else had produced the mood .. : 
Self-esteem can't produce the mood, but it \vould help to 
maintain the mood if it were already there .•.. I think my self-
esteem or self-concept is involved in producing or maintain-
ing the mood, because it is usually an event that reminds me 
I am a serious person .... Yes, you want to be independent, but 
you don't want to hurt them (parents) •... 
Summary 
In general, self-esteem appears to be an important variable. 
Subjects were not however unanimous in ascribing a causal 
power to vicissitudes in self-esteem. For several subjects 
changes in self-esteem were viewed as only maintaining or 
modifying the mood. One subject excluded self-esteem as a 
major factor. 
Creation .or choice: 
(whether or not the subject feels she herself plays a conscious, 
active and decisive role in producing the mood) 
I don't choose to be in this mood, but at some level it's 
almost an escape route to get away from those people .... I do 
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choose this mood in a way - I could have a reason for wanting 
it. It forces me to quiet down so I can do work. This plus 
a series of events usually produce the mood •••• I can choose 
to be in this mood, and the more I think about it the more I 
become it .••. I think it's more likely that I try to get myself 
out of this mood than a creation of it or choosing to be in 
it .... I think you do create it, you lapse into a reflective 
state. I feel responsible for it, but don't actively create 
it. I could take positive action, going out with people, 
something definite, to disperse it .••• 
Summary 
In general, subjects affirmed that they themselves played a 
determining role in the production of the mood. In most cases 
it was neither a deliberate choice nor a passive subliminal 
creation. Reflection upon the nature and causes of the mood 
heightened the sense of personal responsibility for the mood. 
\fuo am I? 
basic identity the subject believes is being manifested 
in the mood) 
In this mood what I desire most is to go my own way, free 
from people who have no right hassling you .... \fuat I desire 
most when in this mood is to be happy and to have good friends. 
I am someone drifting along without specific goals; restless, 
waiting for something to happen; anticipating something 
unknmvn; impatient, uncommunicative, a daydreamer; someone 
feeling tied do~vn by obligations to friends, towards work; 
a loner wanting to be alone; slightly irritated by those 
around me .... A person who yearns for the same as everything 
is now, everyone and everything to be just drifting and 
floating, and silent and peaceful- for it to go on awhile ... 
In this mood I strive for perfect happiness and to know 
exactly where I'm heading and what I want to do. Also I want 
something better, to be with different people or in a different 
place, there's some dissatisfaction in the mood. I am some-
one who is: unresponsive, a stone; a passive observer, a 
camera; tense, troubled and critical; indifferent, restless 
•... A person that wants a solution that will make everyone 
happy. I am someone who is vulnerable; someone unimportant; 
one amongst millions; a female; an individual and yet lost 
in the masses; a lover of nature; a lover of things genuine, 
natural, and sincere; a lover of respect by people for each 
other; someone both introvert and extrovert; idealistic and 
romantic; stubborn and argumentative; someone who hates 
violence of any kind, especially by people to people, or 
animals •... 
Summary 
The major identity themes that emerged suggest: 
1) a need for: personal freedom, peace, harmony, emotional 
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equilibrium and mutual respect 
2) a feeling of being in: a state of isolation, impatience, 
passivity, dissatisfaction 
3) a sense of: conflicting needs and attitudes, uncertainty, 
and sometimes an awareness of discrepancies between ideals 
and realities. 
Relating to other people in the mood: I can relate to some 
people but not all people when in this mood. I prefer to be 
by myself, if I had to socialize I'd just observe, unless I 
was with someone I really liked •... I don't communicate in 
this mood, I tend to ignore other people, and others irritate 
me especially much .... It makes me want to be with people who 
are in the same mood .... It does affect my relationship to 
people - I become quieter and tend to keep my thoughts to 
myself .•.. I was tired and only just getting on with people. 
Perhaps unconsciously I felt it was up to them .•.. 
Summary 
Relating to other people is generally characterized by inhibition 
and a degree of irritability. Subjects tend to be uncommunica-
tive and withdraw into themselves. They prefer the role of 
silent observer, quiet and emotionally aloof. 
ifuat the subject is most aware of 
a) about herself: That I'm being a bit vain or crazy to 
think that others aren't like me, but I can get on top 
of those feelings .... ! am most aware of the fact that I 
am dissatisfied with myself and the whole time I'm 
thinking about what I do want~ that I want to go to a 
particular place and do a particular thing. Or I want 
to be in the company of particular people. This process 
tends to heighten the mood ...• I'm not sure •... I am most 
aware of a tense feeling all over. I just don't relax. 
I feel tense in my head and there is a nervousness in my 
hands. I'm aware of negative qualities about myself, 
it's a forerunner of my self-blaming mood, indecision 
and dithering .... 
b) about the environment: People look different in this 
mood in two ways. For one I see only their negative 
points, their bitchiness, shallowness or stupidity. But 
I also think that's how they are, let them be, they are 
happy like that, don't let them irritate you and don't 
irritate them. Physically people look different, I 
notice more about them, if they are looking ill or pretty. 
I tend to see them more positively in a physical way •••• 
I'm most aware of the weather, the trees and flowers~ 
their delicacy and beauty •... I'm most.aware of the beauty 
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of my environment .... I don't think I am especially 
aware of my environment - perhaps I do realize the 
seriousness of things around me, things I wouldn't 
usually feel so serious about, e.g. I take university 
seriously, I seclude myself in my room and ask myself 
do I really want to be at university,and I realize it 
is a serious choice. I notice people, I analyze them 
and put them into categories. I am serious and their 
sayings seem to have more than face value .... 
Summary 
In terms of self-perception subjects frequently indicated an 
awareness of negative qualities concerning the self. Dis-
satisfaction, anxious indecision, tension and nervousness 
were frequently reported. For at least one subject there 
was insight into the primary importance of her own 
individuality. 
In terms of environment-perception subjects generally 
reported a change in the way people and nature were dis-
cerned. There was a tendency towards a greater cognitive 
and perceptual differentiation. For one subject people's 
personality faults were more clearly perceived, and 
physically, their appearance and state of health were high-
lighted. For another subject, people were more easily 
categorized and their communications took on a deeper 
meaning. For some subjects the physical environment 
acquired new variations, shadings, and nuances. There was 
a sense of delicacy, pattern, and internal order. 
Function: The mood makes me realize that people are people 
and you must accept them. Also that I am different from 
them, but not inseparably removed from them .... I think this 
mood makes me see things more clearly. If I'm depressed I 
see everything negatively, if I'm happy I don't see things 
at all. It gives me a lot of time to think things out and 
sort myself out. Also it enables me to work, it's a good 
mood to work in. Sometimes the mood is without the splash 
of happiness and closer to the sadness and at times there 
is. no feeling at all. I'm really not in touch with what is 
going on around me .... It's a time that takes me away from 
hassles and tension. It enables me to relax and be myself. 
Things just pass over me .... It makes me think and face 
reality, I don't .push aside some of the things I normally 
do. Sometimes it's uncomfortable it becomes so serious. I 
exaggerate things, it makes me reason and think deeply, by 
exaggerating things it makes me act, I only act under 
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pressure .••. It allows you to float away from what's going on 
and look from the outside in, you can look at it dis-
passionately as if it's not happening to you ...• 
Summary 
Subjects gave a range of responses to this question. The 
responses can be classified under four general headings: 
1) Neutral moods may facilitate acceptance of the human 
world- highlighting the individual's general humanity 
and their specific individuality. 
2) Neutral moods may promote intellectual and emotional 
clarity through either providing a multi-face ted vie\v-
point or a detached and balanced attitude. 
3) Neutral moods may foster an equilibrium of energies, 
permitting an efficient deployment of those energies to 
selected tasks, e.g. work requirements. 
4) Neutral moods may relieve to a certain extent internal 
tension and conflict, as well as increasing the capacity 
to deal with environmental stress. 
3. Negative Moods 
Analytic categories 
(the analytic categories contain statements from all 
subjects' moods falling in the "negative" category) 
Descriptive elements: Everything is pulled tight, 
contracted, I feel tense inside my body and mind. Something 
has got to happen and it's just a matter of time before 
something violent and explosive does happen. It's like 
holding your breath, it gets worse and worse and then you 
have to let go. I can still do other things when I'm in 
this mood, but all the time there is this feeling and then 
it takes over. I feel there are forces pushing outward 
from within, and outside forces pushing in on me. It's a 
very physical feeling, there seems to be too much of every-
thing pushing in. My thoughts become hard like a knot or a 
clenched fist, there is so much energy tensed up it makes 
me feel hard. The thoughts won't peel off each other, you 
can't think, all your thoughts stick together. I get so 
hard and restless and tense--but I can't do anything. I 
feel prickly, the smallest thing irritates me .... It's a 
feeling of frustration - edginess, I can't relax - it's 
something abrasive and intrusive. My thoughts go very 
fast - it's what I'd like to say and do in the particular 
situation. I imagine the conversation in my head .... This 
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is a frustrating mood to be in. I'm unable to work things 
out in my mind and I feel totally flat from the deflation 
of expectation and thoughts. I feel overpowered and completely 
deflated. I sort of feel aimless and non-thinking. I'm 
aware of failures within myself and am most aware of myself 
in this mood in a critical way - literally on the verge of 
self-hate. It makes me feel like dwelling in self-pity which 
I actually hate doing .... This mood of depression is actually 
somehow a really beautiful mood. Because I don't feel totally 
black, just a sad rainy feeling. I'm closest to nature in 
this mood, sensitive to the undersides of little daisies 
growing in the grass, etc. A gentle blowing-in-the-wind 
sadness reigns over my body bringing almost a halt to the 
goings on inside. I'm so full of everything that I'm sad, 
but not a black sad. It's a greyness with black and white 
spots and with occasionally splashes of rainbow colours .... 
I become quiet and just sit in my room, most likely listening 
to music, and thinking back over the good times in the past, 
analyzing them, trying to see where I went wrong. I relive 
every minute. I get very aware of my whole body - it feels 
so big and coarse, out of place and I never know what to do 
with my hands and where to look. I feel awkward and restless 
-something inside me wants to escape but can't .... ! don't 
feel like doing anything. \.Jhatever I do, or force myself 
to do is an effort. I find that things I usually like doing 
become meaningless and not worth the trouble. I feel dead 
in a way. I think I am most aware of my head and possibly 
my·legs. Everything feels heavier than usual. There seems 
to be a heavy weight sitting on top of my head, pushing me 
dmm., making it difficult to move. · Hy legs feel lazy and 
useless, as if they're a part of my body that isn't necessary. 
I feel as if I, myself, am an unnecessary part of this world. 
I'm just being dragged along, unnecessarily, a hindrance and 
a burden. I feel as if the world is moving along and leaving 
me behind, except that I am being forced to trail along and 
try to keep up with it. I feel useless and unwanted, and 
that I have no real place in life. I feel drowsy and energy-
less. I am bored but can't seem to think of anything to do 
that will lift the boredom and the useless feeling. If I 
think of something I can't bring myself to get up and do it 
...• I feel like a useless blob. I really am depressed by 
my feebleness. I become so absorbed in myself, trying to 
think of ways of bettering myself that I am oblivious of 
others which makes me dislike myself even more. I try my 
best to look happy and fulfilled but I know I don't succeed. 
I am angry at my laziness and all sorts of "failures" 
(according to my standards) flash through my mind- why can't 
I do something about myself. In this mood I feel as though 
I need to be in good company, company which can set me an 
example and wake me up. Hy body feels awkward in this mood. 
I feel intense self-pity and self-hate opposing each other 
within me .... In this mood I tend to feel a bit disconcerted 
as well, as the urge to change my surroundings or occupation 
stems from discontent with the present occupation or 
surroundings. However, it won't last very long as something 
new and stimulating comes up. Rather it is a temporary 
feeling of wanting to get away from it all, and a holid~y 
in a different part completely and with different people will 
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usually do the trick. I feel as if I can't possibly sit 
still and must do something to keep me busy until the rest-
lessness wears off •.•. I am becoming very uncommunicative 
and the mood overrides everything else. It comes on when I 
have a problem that there doesn't seem to be an answer to, 
i.e. there doesn't seem to be anything positive I can do 
about it. I feel a general heaviness, a restless heaviness. 
In this mood I feel as if I could scream from frustration 
to try and get rid of the bottled-up feeling which almost 
invariably accompanies the mood .•.. In this mood I want to 
cry and sleep. I have no energy or enthusiasm for doing 
anything, especially anything requiring effort. I am most 
aware of my head, which usually aches. I feel as if my 
eyes are burning and my body is about to sink through the 
ground. I feel hopeless, futile, irritable, angry and 
anxious .... In this mood I want to be comforted. I want my 
mother to tuck me into bed and brush my hair off my fore-
head and hold my hand and tell me it's alright. I am most 
aware of my eyes and head, which feel heavy and sore. I 
feel as if the world has hit me hard and doesn't care that 
I'm bleeding and in pain. I \vant to hurt the world back 
because it won't comfort me .... A feeling of misery and 
struggle, struggle between solutions for solving causes of 
depression. I feel introverted and quiet. I brood, the 
more I think about my depression, the more reasons for 
depression I find to think about. This increases the 
feelings of misery ...• This mood makes me feel like hiber-
nating. The only part of my body I am aware of in this 
mood is my stomach and the area of my rib cage becau~e I 
feel hollow there and sort of hurting. Most intensely I 
feel this cut off feeling, divorced entirely from people 
I love and whom I know love me. I can feel this self-pity 
in me when in this mood. I know I \val low when depressed and 
I can't seem able to make a strong enough effort to lift 
myself out of it .... Yes, I feel damn restless. It's a weird 
feeling because it is not actually a mood. In my heart and 
soul I feel almost impatient or indifferent. It is my body 
that reflects this mood because I feel I want to do some-
thing but don't know what. I'd say it was because of the 
need to expend physical energy that this frustrated, rest-
less feeling develops into a mood. It's a discontented 
feeling .... I almost feel too impatient and irritable to 
describe the mood and yet this is such a brilliant oppor-
tunity to describe it because I feel intensely irritable. 
Most intensely, I feel a keyed-up sensation, as if I've been 
wound up on a winch and I can actually see that as a body 
for my mood. Every now and then, a friend says something 
or does something and the winch tightens up a bit. I feel 
that suddenly the tension will be too much and the whole 
winch (me) will completely snap .... I feel all empty inside, 
as though I'm foundering in water where there is nothing I 
can hang on to. In this mood I like to have lots of objects 
around me. I love my room to be in a mess because then I 
know I've got to come back and tidy it, but if it is all 
neat I feel as though it is throwing me out and I have no 
ties to it. But the more people I have around me, the less 
secure I feel, I would like just one very special friend to 
be with me. This mood makes me feel like curling up some-
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where where it is safe and where I wouldn't have to think or 
speak. I am most aware of all inside my body in this mood, 
it feels empty but tight. In this mood I feel as if I'm 
grasping for something which is always moving too fast for me 
to reach. I feel mixed up inside. I feel as though some-
thing is moving inside me but I don't know where to .... 
Summary 
In general, the negative moods appear to be characterized by 
frustration, fretfulness, a captious and abrasive tension. 
Cognitive processes often move in recursive cycles leaving 
the subjects enervated and confused. Self-critical attitudes 
may dominate, abruptly passing over into self-pity and self-
hate. The mood can assume an overwhelming self-encapsulated 
quality, subjects become unable to perform any action to 
extricate themselves, unable to conceive alternative possi-
bilities. In the most extreme examples there is an inimical 
dilating-in-the-present darkness. 
Subjects frequently reported altered perceptions of body 
image, the body appearing large, coarse, and clumsy. This 
was sometimes coupled with impatience, an inability to bear 
the standard flow of time, an emotional unease, pulses and 
waves of agitation. Specific bodily areas often appeared 
drained of energy. Phantom pressures and feelings of being 
dragged along as a useless appendage to an accelerating 
world were sometimes noted. 
There was occasionally a sense of being abandoned without 
resources in a hostile world, being the recipient of jarring 
and hurtful thrusts from a callous environment, being swept 
away by a whirlwind of inexorable strife without justice or 
adjudication. One subject reported a feeling of being 
adrift, without adequate moorings for her sense of self, a 
sense of her body as being a constricted emptiness. 
Metaphorical portrayals: It's like holding your breath, 
it gets worse and worse and then you have to let go ..•. I 
feel like a hippo - clumsy 'coz of the confusion, neighing 
and plainly stupid, wallowing in a mud bath or what might 
be called a touch of self-pity. But I can lift myself out 
of this a bit to become like a buck having nothing else to. 
do but graze all day and escape from preying beasts ... This 
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depressed mood is soft like the Cape Town rain and often 
lasts .a long time 'coz I enjoy it. I look to the clouds and 
see thejr mood in me .... I'd be a heavy stone or a very clumsy 
animal- big .... I would be a dead cat. My body would be a 
once round object that has been squashed flat and out of 
shape. It would be very big and conspicuous and heavy. It 
may be a big ball that has no air in it, and that has there-
fore lost its shape. Almost as if somebody punctured it and 
sat on it to squash all the life out of it .... I feel like a 
tennis ball, being hit against a hard wall but bouncing off 
every time only to be hit again. The body that would suit 
this mood is a fat uncomfortable body .... Molten lava under-
ground (I chose molten lava because this is a very under-
ground sort of feeling, there is heaviness, darkness~ a 
feeling of being trapped, and perhaps a feeling of confusion 
and being lost, yet a restless tension inside) a gorilla (I 
chose a gorilla because it's usually considered fearsome and 
ugly when it's really quite gentle inside - a much misunder-
stood animal) .... An animal in a cage at the zoo; a baby bird 
almost able to fly, but not quite .... I would like to be a 
mound of old dough; either a hedgehog or a snake .... An 
eiderdown; a tiny, beautiful baby girl .... An ugly little 
brown crawling mean animal, slow and stupid; a round, heavy 
fat body-smooth and impenetrable, solid .... I'd be a weeping 
willow - bent or bowed over and not strong and upright like 
a pine, say. A body that would suit my mood would be that 
of a sad clmro with a big red nose, but sorrowful - deep 
eyes with painted tears on his face, all alone .... If the 
mood was transformed into a material object it would be an 
electrical current with little sparks occurring at inter-
mittent periods .... If my mood were a material object, I 
think it would be a thin spider on a very light string of 
web, and there is a strong wind blowing the spider about, 
which is frantically trying to grab something to secure it-
self. If my mood had a body, it would be a little bush baby 
with such big eyes that are desperately looking around for 
something to hang on to .... 
Summary 
In general, the self-expressive images suggest energy under 
pressure or retroverted, ponderous density, constrained and 
detached emotion, and bodily discomfort. For some subjects 
there is a sense of fragile opalescence, an airy thinness, 
a poignant vulnerability; for others a welling sorrow, a 
punctured aspiration, or an underworld like progression -
heavy, dark, and burning. 
Causal factors: I feel there is never a definite cause. 
I'm not aware of any reasons for this mood. It could be 
something I keep out of my awareness. I think the mood 
began when I first started fighting with my mother. I think 
it could be influenced by my periods as well, but I think 
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something over and above that is also involved. It feels 
physical, my whole skin feels too tight, it's the most 
physical of all my moods. I feel fuzzy in the head but it's 
not actually a headache ..•• 
The mood occurs when I've been hurt in some way by other 
people and there are things I can't escape from. In this 
mood, when you've been hurt by someone you lose the pain in 
nature, somehow to hurt is okay, you become bigger than it 
is, and you are filled with everything - hurt, happiness and 
sadness. Then I can see all the good in people even though 
they have hurt me in some way. And yet the mood seeks a 
happiness without people, because you don't want to see 
through people to know what's going on. It sickens me that 
people deceive. The mood has latent phases, when there is 
a collection of moods all together at once. The production 
of a mood depends on the dominant mood previously there. 
It starts off with something unrelated to me, confusion about 
work, or about my friends, me asking questions why they did 
or said what they did, it's frustrating. Then the confusion 
increases, I can't sort things out, then the self-hate. 
I think there are three types of situation that can produce 
the mood. If friends ignore me, or are much less considerate 
than usual, this can produce the mood. If there is a b 
disappointment in a person or an event, if I were looking 
forward to an event and it didn't happen. If I lose trust 
or confidence in someone important to me, that could produce 
the mood. I think it's more a collection of events than one 
single event that produces the mood, e.g. if everything was 
going well for me but I failed an essay - it would upset me, 
but it 'tvouldn' t be a depression. As I think about it it's 
definitely a collection of events unless it's one single 
thing in communicating with people ...• 
My boyfriend left for England on Saturday night .•.. It had 
been coming on for the whole week, because I knew he was 
leaving. Hhen I'm depressed there is usually a reason I can 
identify but not always .... 
When I feel myself not responding to other people in the way 
that would be expected of me, e.g. if you told a very 
fantastic story, I'd let the others respond to it and keep 
silent myself. This could produce the mood by itself. lfhen 
things occur and I feel I am not appreciating the things 
I've got, e.g. if I saw a handicapped person and say I had 
just argued with my mother. This is not sufficient to produce 
the mood by itself, but it could help to maintain the mood. 
When I compare myself to other people and I feel I am not 
meeting their standards, what I call my feebleness. This 
could produce the mood by itself .... 
It occurs mainly because of the heavy demands of my ballet 
schedule, e.g. on Saturday I had ballet all afternoon and 
evening. It was such a nice day, I was at a cricket gam,e 
and could only stay for half an hour, it seemed a waste. 
In the afternoon we were just shadowing our seconds and then 
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in the evening it was actively rehearsing. In general, I 
think the same ballet day after day gradually builds up into 
this mood. 
As we said, it occurs in response to exams~ sometimes my 
friends and the situation at home. 
I have been thinking about how much work I have to do before 
exams. Also, a dilemma concerning a love relationship which 
I am seeing in another perspective as the r~sult of having, 
at the same time; a potential love relationship. Questioning 
of self as regards own worth. Identity cr1s1s - who am I, 
what sort of person am I, how do others see me? 
I've been thinking about joining my brother. 
entirely certain. He's sure about going but 
about when. Also, leaving my family to come 
I think is also responsible for it. 
Summary 
He's not 
not definite 
back to Varsity, 
In general, psycho-social factors and external pressures 
acting on internal potentials seem to be responsible for 
these moods. In some cases there was clearly a major physio-
logical contribution. The psycho-social factors most fre-
quently cited were: losing trust and confidence in others, 
being confronted with problems that appear to have no 
solution, uncertainty and confusion concerning work and 
friends, dissatisfaction with one's own social skills and 
responsiveness, and monotony or tedium in daily routine. 
Subjects sometimes reported it was a collection of events 
whose cumulative effect produced the mood. Some of the 
negative moods could not be linked with specific causes. 
They were often characterized as being physical moods -
involving tension, bodily discomfort, and a general sense 
of confinement. 
Goals as a determining factor: I don't think goals are 
involved, maybe if there is something I should do and I 
don't really feel like doing it, this could contribute to 
the mood .... This could be important in producing or main-
taining the mood, e.g. if people frustrate me in small and 
unnecessary ways .... Goals are not important in this mood ... 
Work-wise goals don't seem to be involved~ which is bad. 
I feel if I haven't done the work, I haven't done it, but I 
don't become upset by it .... The lack of fulfilment of some 
goal can contribute to the mood, but wouldn't produce it, 
e.g. goals concerning my work .... This is not important ..... 
Not fulfilling goals can be a part. It's tied in with self-
esteem. When I don't achieve my goals, my self~esteem is 
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lowered .... It comes on when I have a problem .... Goals are 
not important in this mood .... I'm not sure, I think you don't 
always recognize all your goals ...• 
Summary 
Subjects' responses to this question ranged from 'not 
important' through 'could contribute' to 'could be important'. 
Subjects appeared to assign a lesser importance to goals with 
respect to producing their negative moods, than either their 
neutral or positive moods. The attainment or non-attainment 
of goals was predominantly a contributing factor, not a 
necessary or sufficient factor. 
The role of self-esteem: I don't think self-esteem is 
involved, I don't feel anything about myself, I don't think 
about it, I don't experience emotions or thoughts .... I don't 
think self-esteem is important in this mood .... I don't think 
self-esteem is important in producing this mood, it figures 
more in my happy and my deflated-confused mood .... Yes, this 
is very important in producing the mood. At Varsity you are 
nothing amongst all the people and anything which damages 
your self-concept has a bad effect on you. You are trying 
to build yourself up most of the time. Your self-concept 
can only be badly damaged by people. I think damaged self-
esteem can either cause or maintain the mood. If I'm 
confused about friends this lowers my self-esteem and 
produces the mood. If I'm doing badly with work, I become 
confused and ask myself why can't I do the work?, and this 
maintains the mood, but only because lowered self-esteem 
from friends had been operating earlier .... Self-esteem does 
contribute to producing the mood. If something negative 
takes place and as a result I think poorly of myself, this 
is important. Also, if I'm too optimistic, if I expect 
there to be a shining light and everything to work out and 
then it doesn't, I think oh you fool, you should have known 
it wouldn't work. This by it~elf could produce the mood ..•. 
My self-esteem decreases in this mood and I feel sorry for 
myself. Self-esteem helps to maintain this mood. What 
makes me feel useless and not worthwhile is the feeling of 
not being needed by the other person .... Yes, this is very 
important in the mood, i.e. my lack of self-confidence .... 
I think self-esteem helps to maintain the mood but not 
produce it. I say to myself what am I doing this for, it's 
useless .... Yes, self-esteem plays an important role. I see 
myself in a certain way and if I'm not measuring _up I become 
tense .... 
Summary 
In general, subjects ascribed an important role to self-
esteem in producing or contributing to their negative moods. 
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The rigours of university study and the social round fre~ 
quently decreased self-esteem. A feeling of being 
inessential, an unnecessary adjunct to others, an under-
mining of optimism and idealistic attitudes, and eroded 
self-confidence, were all mentioned. 
Creation or choice: 
(whether or not the subject feels she herself plays a 
conscious, active and decisive role in producing the mood) 
No,, this is one of my moods where I have no choice .... I 
would say I have no choice about this mood .... I have no 
choice concerning this mood, it just comes over me· .... I 
don't create or decide to be in this mood .... In a way I do 
create it myself. Well, it's more I'm halfway there - I 
could talk myself out of it, but I let myself go on into it 
•... I think it's usually beyond creation or choice. In this 
case, maybe I felt I had to be depressed because I knew I 
was going to be. It was the natural culmination of what I'd 
been feeling all week. I expected to be depressed, so I 
became depressed .... ! feel a large part of the mood is 
created by myself. I build up a large part of it. It's 
because I'm comparing myself all of the time and I often 
have a distorted view of what others see and think. I need 
to know what others think because I am lacking in self-
confidence .... I'd say no creation or choice. I was in a 
happy mood and didn't want to be restless, it was the 
circumstances .... ! can aggravate the mood by what I'm 
thinking but I can't lessen it. I don't choose it nr create 
it. ... 
Summary 
In general, subjects affirmed that they did not actively· 
create or choose the negative mood. However, several subjects 
indicated that they let the mood envelop them when preventa-
tive measures could have been taken. If a negative mood was 
anticipated through circumstances, the anticipation would 
most likely be fulfilled. There may occasionally be deliberate 
"aggravation" of the negative mood. 
I? 
the basic identity the subject believes is being manifested 
in the mood) 
A person who wants to get the energy out. 'It's got to 
out by itself, it's a separate entity and must discharge it-
self. It doesn't make me feel energetic, it's more like 
something foreign inside, it's there and separate from me, 
not the sort of thing that running around the block would 
diminish .••. I have no desires in this mood, no goals or 
specific desires- I just want the irritation to terminate •.• 
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There is no desire or wanting in this mood. It's. just there, 
it's peaceful, I can experience all that is there •••. ! am a 
person who yearns for clarity and understanding and somebody 
I could talk deeply to. But this refers more to earlier this 
term .•.. What I want and desire most in this mood is for some-
body to really care about me. I am unhappy, lonely, irritable, 
dissatisfied, feeling revengeful, restless, missing certain 
people, withdrawn, waiting for something pleasant to happen 
and get me out of this mood, feeling angry towards most 
people, feeling hurt and sensitive, optimistic in believing 
that somet?ing good and much longed for will happen sometime, 
bottled up inside, unapproachable, and unfriendly .•.. I yearn 
to be the opposite of everything I'm criticizing. I am: 
dull, a rag doll, neglected, lazy, disappointing, regretful, 
condemning, irrational, a coward, immature, filled with self-
pity, filled with self-hate, striving for order, a procras-
tinator and longing for compliments to be paid to me ... \\~hat 
I want most is just for everything to be nice for a change. 
I don't feel understood and this ties in with the persecuted 
feeling. They don't seem to care, I feel I'm the scapegoat 
in the family ... I am someone who is fallible, who feels 
world weary, the product of a home where feelings are fought 
shy of, one small person among millions of millions, one 
who is sensitive to the opinion of others, one who hates to 
think very deeply about herself - can't but wish in a way I 
could, and one who still seeks to find what she wants ..... 
I am alone, without anyone to turn to, unsure of my future, 
unsure of my capabilities, lacking in strength, lacking in 
confidence, without roots, in need of someone to give me 
strength, unsure of which path to take, unable to reach out 
to anyone, without trust, pessimistic, all mixed up inside, 
unhappy, and standing on a little raft in a turbulent sea ... 
Summary 
The major identity themes emphasize the need to express or 
release internal tension, sometimes perceived as a foreign 
intruding entity; for some subjects there is a yearning 
for clarity and understanding, to be the object of affection, 
to have communication and communion. There is often a need 
for inward and outward harmony, a surcease of hostile 
emotions and demands. There occurs an identity theme of 
personal insignificance, aloneness, uncertainty, confusion; 
for some subjects irrational thoughts and impulses arise 
unbidden and take root. There is often a yearning for 
negative aspects of the personality to be nullified and 
replaced by positive aspects - a desire to be able to define 
the core aspect of the self, to have a knowledge of what one 
truly wants. 
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Relating to other people in the mood: Others irritate me, 
I don't feel like talking, there seems to be no reason to 
talk. If I do, I get bored pretty quickly, especially by 
people's normal slow way of talking - it irritates me when 
I'm alive and jumping with energy .... If I'm with people who 
are close to me I can be snappy and tend to express the 
feeling. With others it comes out more indirectly in my 
behaviour. I deliberately try not to express it toward 
people socially. It's not their fault that they irritate 
me .... I want to withdraw, and I can't relate to them because 
I'm involved inside. It's a selfish mood .... I withdraw into 
myself, I can't communicate at all to other people, I tend 
to feel inferior to others. I criticize myself and others. 
It's bad enough when you aren't pleased with things - but 
when you feel they don't understand and are being critical 
of you then you become critical back and at the same time 
you are asking them inside yourself -Why can't you under-
stand? .... To people I'm close to I'm abrupt and take it out 
on them. If they are not close I manage to be civil .... I 
withdraw from other people, if I'm forced to interact - I 
tend to be cross and nasty and to take it out on them .... I'm 
not very pleasant when I'm in this mood, it makes me less 
tolerant. It comes to a point where I start snapping at 
people - there's no other way to express it, Mom gets it the 
most .... I stop relating to others, I expect them to relate 
to me. I sit around waiting to be entertained, and people 
don't usually realise this .... I know when I'm feeling 
depressed, I'm very aware of other people nearby, and they 
seem to be happy and so totally insensitive to your mood or 
you can recognise other isolated, solitary people and imagine 
their being depressed .... 
Surrunary 
Relating to other people is characterized by high levels of 
irritation, intolerance and boredom. Negative feelings are 
most forcefully expressed towards those with whom the subject 
has close contact. Subjects mention an inability to 
corrununicate, feelings of inferiority, and withdrawal tendencies. 
There is a tendency to perceive others as unduly critical, 
recalcitrant, and insensitive. At the same time there may be 
an interior voice asking 'Hhy can't you understand?'. 
What the subject is most aware of 
a) about herself: Agitation and tension - I want to say or 
do something - I want to make my reaction known. I want 
to express it in some way .... I'm not aware of myself in 
this mood .... The confusion in my head, an asking: Why 
can't I this and that? I'm totally involved in myself 
.... I am most aware of my dissatisfaction in myself, 
that I am misunderstood and unloved .... My laziness in 
the sense of not responding or doing anything .... My 
fidgetiness .... I'm aware of my neck and eyes- things 
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seem to get darker •.•. 
b) about the environment: I'm more aware of everything 
superfluous, mechanical, invalid, or trivial and that 
makes the irritation worse. Once I find one thing that 
irritates me I seem to find many more •.•• I'm most aware 
of trees, flowers, and nature and I love reading poetry 
..•. The environment doesn't penetrate, it's totally self-
involved .•.• That the environment is cold, detached and 
there is a barrier between me and it .•.. Physically I 
don't notice nature at all, maybe people comparatively. 
I realise what a wonderful place the world is and that 
I'm not using it properly ..•. Its irritating quality •••• 
I'm aware of other people's faults more ..•. 
Summary 
In terms of self-perception subjects most frequently indicated 
an awareness of negative qualities. In particular subjects 
indicated a predominance of confusion, tension, and either a 
general agitated surgency or dull lethargy. 
In terms of environment-perception some subjects reported an 
. 
increased awareness of hostile, mechanical, and contingent 
world qualities; others were struck by the qualities of 
nature. For another group the self-involvement and inward 
spiralling movement of the mood predominated. 
Function: I don't think it has a function, it's useless. 
It makes me irritable and achieves nothing. I feel I can 
control the mood more now, I can detach myself from the 
situation and not actually feel irritated. I don't take 
things as personally or get as involved. I don't see every-
thing as relevant to me, I'm less egocentric and there's 
more detachment, more tolerance. I don't care or expect 
others to be anything. I don't expect them to be how I 
would like them to be .... This mood me away from hassles, 
afterwards I feel a better person - able to appreciate things. 
I realise the mood will come back and I'll have it again, 
even though the sensitivity is gone. Also the mood gets me 
away from having to make an effort to penetrate and see 
through people. You can put yourself out of the picture, 
and look down and see more clearly, then you can go back 
and ·your insights will sustain you. There is a danger in 
getting totally absorbed back in things - it's a threat, 
like looking into a mirror - you see what you want to see, 
but occasionally you get a glimpse of what's really there, 
then you have to reconcile that with what you want to see ••• 
I think the mood does draw my attention to a problem or 
suggests that I may be doing things the wrong way. It 
I 1 ' perhaps helps me to get to know myself. You don t a ways 
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think what you really think - it helps you to get into 
your thought processes .... It gives me a chance to be on my 
own and think things over. I can think with "some clarity 
even though I tend to be overly negative ...• It shakes and 
wakes me up a bit, but still it's pretty useless ..•. ! think 
the mood reminds me that there are many different things to 
do in life, and when the mood starts wearing off you realise 
it's not so bad what you are doing - why not do one thing 
well and do little pieces of other things too. As you 
suggest, it presents different possibilities to me, confirms 
me in what I'm doing and reminds me that I don't want to 
do it for ever •••. This mood points out to others that I'm 
not exactly what they think - easy-going, easy to get on 
with and entertaining .•.. 
Summary 
Subjects expressed a variety of opinions concerning the 
functions of their negative moods. In some cases subjects 
believed that their mood served no function, was useless 
and a liability. However, examining the affirmative 
responses, these functions can be extracted: 
1. provides more detachment, impartiality, and ultimately 
a greater tolerance 
2. removes and sequesters the individual from outside 
stress 
3. increases personal independence, can contribute to self-
knowledge 
4. serves as a catalyst for change 
5. prevents others from stereotyping oneself. 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Suuunary 
Personality sketches of the two types of moody individual. 
Sketch (1): the individual is suspicious, tense, apprehensive, knows doubt and self-division, 
and above all is strongly affected by feelings. 
Sketch (2): the individual is impulsive, emotionally explosive, and unpredictable. 
Absolute magnitude of change scores: the similarities and differences between the experimental 
sessions are explained in terms of the cognitive processes instituted and experimental order 
effects. 
Magnitude of change scores and component change scores: the results are expla'ined in terms of 
subjects' inherent tendencies, ast•ects of the experimental situation, and the structure and 
design of the ~\AT. 
The ~\AT influences the mood states of "moody" and "non-moody" subjects to an equal degree. 
The MAT influences negative moods in predominantly positive ways. Overall, subjects find that 
the ~\AT operates to change mood and increase awareness. 
Subjects' definition of "mood": mood as a "state of mind" is susceptible to several inter-
pretations; "pervasiveness" an indispensable element; "mood" as "causal" and "pre-emptive"; 
the concept "mood" generated at the interface of at least two unique domains; areas of 
similarity and difference to the concept "attitude". 
Language acts of sentences using the word "mood": the mood domain "x" can be interpreted to 
consist of two main elements--the experience of the vectors of mood and tendencies to make 
social-evaluative judgements. The data resist any single factor simplification. 
Qualitative data: composite representations and specific examples of positive, neutral and 
negative moods are provided. A structural analysis establishes basic qualitative, systemic 
and "grammatical" features. 
Conclusions 
Mood as a concept and experience; general and perspectival mood attributes. The structure 
and functioning of mood--a psycho-dynamic construction. The Hood Analysis Technique ntAT) 
functions to bring new feeling elements into awareness, reveal potentials for feeling, and 
improves negative moods. Personality data permits the conclusion that "moody" subjects may 
be different from their "non-moody" counterparts; personality patterns associated with the 
different types of moody individual; conceptual and empirical implications. 
Content Sununary 
Discussion 
5~1 Personality variables that significantly distinguish "moody" from "non-moody" subjects 
5.2 Absolute magnitude of change scores across the four experimental sessions 
5.3 Magnitude of change scores across the four experimental sessions 
5.4 Component change scores for mood factors that showed significant magnitude of change scores 
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5.5 Component change scores for mood factors that did not show significant magnitude of 
scores 
5.6 The effect of the four experimental sessions on "moody" vs. "non-moody" subjects 
5.7 The effect of Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), 
on moods classified as positive, neutral and negative 
5.8 Subjects' comments upon completing the Mood Analysis Technique 
5.9 An analysis of subjects' definition of "mood" 
5.10 An analysis of the language acts of sentences using the word "mood" 
5.11 A structural analysis of the qualitative mood data 
Conclusions 
Mood as concept and experience 
Mood attributes 
The structure and functioning of mood 
The Hood Analysis Technique 
Personality variables 
Suggestions for further research 
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CHAPTER 5 
5.1 Personality Variables that Significantly Distinguish "Moody" from 
"Non-Moody" Subjects 
Null Hypothesis 4.1.1.1, that the two different criteria of moodiness 
(the self-opinion criterion and the criterion of high and low mean 
variability) will not yield different patterns of significant 
personality variables, has been rejected. 
Section 4.1 has shown that the two different criteria of moodiness 
(self-opinion and high and low mean variability), corresponding to 
two different ways of defining and identifying a "moody" individual, 
are each significantly correlated with standard personality variables. 
Each criterion revealed both common and unique personality variables 
(see Table 10). The data will be integrated in this section by the 
formulation of general personality sketches (clinically impressionistic 
but empirically grounded) of the two types of moody individual. 
The Self-Opinion Criterion 
(moody in the sense of having spells of irritability and/or protracted 
feeling states of moderate intensity) 
From the vantage point of this criterion the "moody" female university 
student emerges, as assessed by the 16PF, Edwards and ACL, as an 
individual of diverse facets and potentials. Against the background 
of her self-identity, she is an individual of strong exhibitionistic 
and heterosexual needs. Her need for autonomy gives her a determination 
that is not to be contravened. Yet she suspicious, tense, appre-
hensive--she knows doubt and self-division, and above all is strongly 
affected by her feelings. This suggests viability and sensitivity of 
feeling, but also an equal possibility of stubbornness or inde s1on 
in the face of circumstances that contradict her feeling. Her 
irritability may be the reverse side of her sensitivity. Her behaviour 
may be further complicated by the fact that she sees herself .in a less 
favourable light than her peers. She usually has poor personal 
adjustment, but is open about her needs and feelings. She is frequently 
atvare of the conflicts in her personality and when desirous of 
counselling, she had a good potential. 
In her contacts with the external world her high autonomy needs, low 
need for affiliation and nurturance may lend an air of confident· 
-406-
superiority to her actions, but her internal matrix of feelings 
and attitudes belies this confidence. Her energy and emotional 
acuity often lead others to seek out her company, and in a good 
mood the world seems to respond to her wishes, but in a bad mood 
she may become a veritable destructive fury. She is probably 
often misunderstood and this can contribute to her frustration, 
tension and moodiness. 
She may be genuinely struggling to find her way among the 
variegated elements and fragments of her personality, searching 
for a new perspective of herself, mediating among her different 
aspects to find a vital expressive pattern of integration and 
responsiveness. This can be a formidable task requiring the 
blending, balancing, resolving, or separating and restraining 
of sometimes antagonistic needs and feelings. 
It will be useful to bear in mind the distinguishing characteristics 
of this category of mood individual, relative to the next category: 
her apprehensiveness and being affected by her feelings 
(16PF); her relatively high autonomy need and relatively 
low need for affiliation (Edwards). 
The High and Low Mean Variability Criterion 
(moody in the sense of variability in feelings over a given unit 
of time) 
From the vantage point of this criterion the "moody" female 
university student, as assessed by the 16PF, Edwards, and ACL, 
confirmed ten of the significant personality factors found for 
the first category of moody individual (see Table 10). Four 
significant personality variables were unique to this criterion. 
They were the factors Assertive, Happy-go-lucky, Undisciplined 
self-conflict, and low Self-control. From the data, one gains the 
impression of an impulsive, emotionally explosive, and unpredictable 
individual. Her aggressive assertiveness tends to establish its 
own law and authority. If constrained she may seek ways to punish 
those who have trespassed upon her sovereign territory. This 
alienates her even further from her peers who may be perplexeq 
or devastated by her uncompromising attitudes. Her subborn self-
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affirmati~n may be coupled with a brutal shortsightedness that 
commits her to extreme positions that she cannot relinquish because 
of the force of her emotion. Yet the variability of her feeling 
makes all her interests spasmodic, former urgencies are forgotten 
as new emotions demand different investments. 
Her impulsive liveliness, the mercurial nature of her feelings--
vaporous, combustible, and fluid, may be projected outward into 
an anarchy of behaviour. In a good mood she is likely to be 
cheerful, active, talkative and carefree, a tonic for those about 
her who are less vital, but the slightest agitation may be 
sufficient to activate her negative and opinionated character. 
Her low integration, disregard for social demands and restrictions, 
propel her into difficult and complex interpersonal situations. 
She finds that she cannot trust her judgement because of her 
changing feelings. The multiform nature of her affective life 
--the reverberating trills, echoes, harmonic variations, and 
disconnected feedback from recently spent feelings may combine 
to produce confusion, a sense of maladjustment, and discontent. 
The distinguishing characteristics of this category of moody 
individual relative to the first category are: 
her Assertiveness, Happy-go-lucky nature and Self-
conflict (16PF); and a lesser degree of Self-control 
(ACL). 
Moodiness and variability of feeling 
H·essman and Ricks (1966) in a study of· mood variability found 
female university students who scored high on emotional var~­
ability (measured across a single bipolar dimension, Elation-
Depression) to be more independent, introspective and less 
conforming than their emotionally stable counterparts. In their 
research the most general characteristic related to mood vari-
ability was the emotional openness of the variable individuals 
relative to the more stable individuals. The former had a 
livelier, more textured fantasy life, with little or no 
suppression of feeling. In addition, for the variable women,' 
the general energy level was higher, more dynamic and future 
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orientated. The present study generally supports the \,;Tessman and 
Ricks findings. However, this study is distinguished from the 
Wessman and Ricks study by its statistically establishing the 
traits of self-conflict (16PF) and low degree of self-control 
(ACL) with mean variability across multiple mood dimensions. 
Also this study found no support for the hypothesis that mood 
variability is significantly related to introspective needs. 
Fiske (196~) has suggested that variability in feeling 1s not 
necessarily a liability, but rather may serve an adaptive function. 
In his view, variability of feeling primes the organism to perform 
a range of alternative responses, thereby enabling him to respond 
in a differentiated and effective manner. Variability 1n feeling 
enables the individual to adapt to and cope with ambiguity in the 
environment; it further increases the amount of stimulation that 
may be received from the environment. It is most likely that 
consistency and conservatism of emotional response are of greatest 
utility in an environment which undergoes a slow rate of change, 
where a premium is placed on regulated and convergent responses. 
Variability of emotional response on the other hand, is of 
greatest utility when tentative, exploratory and expressive 
responses are required. Thus under certain conditions variability 
of feeling is associated with adaptation, equilibrium and develop-
ment. 
In many cases variability in feeling may be related to a physio-
logical substrate, or to a personality or temperamental pattern. 
Hmvever, it is my experience that variability of feeling may also 
serve a defensive function, 1.e. it can be an acquired psycho-
dynamic trait. Therapeutic work with women of high mood var1-
ability has indicated several defensive functions. They are: 
Variability in feeling as a flight from fear, or from what 1s too 
painful to bear, e.g. being too close to a person where it is 
feared that one's individuality will be lost or overwhelmed; it 
can represent avoidance of disappointment or fear of failure; 
variability in feeling in the sense of fluctuating pleasure and 
displeasure, acceptance and rejection of people, can represent a 
search for an ideal relationship--a relationship which is 
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desperately sought but seen as fraught with danger; it can be an 
attempt to find the vital and the new, to avoid the debilitated, 
the worn out, and the mundane; an attempt to be stimulated, a 
greed for excitement, a need for energy to revitalise an unhappy, 
exhausted, or lethargic self; variability in feeling can be 
deliberate change resulting from curiosity, to see what effects a 
new self and feeling will have on the external world, it may be a 
need to shock, to surprise, or to get others to notice, to find 
out about oneself by demonstrating many facets and waiting for the 
mirrored response from the environment. Above all the variable 
woman is defending herself against a personal and emotional vacuum 
--the threat of enveloping darkness or her own disorganization into 
tesserae of corpuscular light. 
Variability ~n feeling may be an attempt to conceal and camouflage, 
to keep the inner desires protected and free. When the self-concept 
low, the variable individual may feel she safe only if no one 
sees or knows her true self; variability in feeling may represent 
an attempt to meet all the demands of other people, to placate and 
please, to be what others want. This is especially likely when the 
individual occupies multiple dependent roles. In several of these 
cases one of the parents was unstable or unreliable--the subject 
tried to please the parent, found she couldn't, changed again to 
the parent, failed again, and a vicious pattern was 
established. 
Similarities between the two criteria 
It should be emphasized that although each criterion of moodiness 
revealed unique personality characteristics, at the same time ten 
personality variables were constant for each criterion. Thus 
despite unique personality variables there is a common and definitive 
cluster of variables which spans the two common conceptions of 
moodiness. This suggests a core structure of attributes that ~s 
further supplemented according to the specific definition of 
moodiness. The nomothetic contribution to an understanding of the 
moody individual may be enhanced if research can establish relation-
ships between this basal configuration and other cognitive, 
tuational and affective variables. 
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5.2 Absolute Magnitude of Change Scores across the Four Experimental 
Sessions 
Null Hypothesis 4.2.1.3, that the mean absolute magnitude of change 
score for Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT) will not differ from the mean absolute magnitude of 
change score for Session 3, the quiet activities session, has been 
rejected. 
Section 4.2 has shown that Session 2 has a greater mean absolute 
magnitude of change score than Session 3. 
Null Hypothesis 4.2.1.5, that the mean absolute magnitude of change 
score for Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT) will not differ from the mean absolute magnitude of 
change s~ore for Session 4, the self-administered MAT, has been 
rejected. 
Section 4.2 has shown that Session 2 has a greater mean absolute 
magnitude of change score than Session 4. However: 
Null Hypothesis 4.2.1.1, that the mean absolute magnitude of change 
score for Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT) will not differ from the mean absolute magnitude of 
change score for Session 1, the personality testing session, has 
been accepted. 
Section 4.2 has shown that Session 2 cannot be statistically dis-
tinguished from Session 1, in terms of mean absolute magnitude of 
change scores. 
For interpretive analysis it should be stressed that the absolute 
magnitude of change scores are summary measures, implying no 
reference per se to modulations in specific mood factors. To 
establish the necessary perspective and arrive at the. true signi-
fication of these scores, the. individual magnitude of change scores 
and component change scores must be examined. 
The absolute magnitude of change scores as indicators of overall 
or global change provide the first element in the chain of evidence 
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used to support the contention that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) has a determinate and 
specifiable effect on mood. Both Session 2 and Session 1, the 
personality testing session, had greater mean absolute magnitude 
of change scores than either Session 3, the quiet activities 
session or Session 4, the self-administered }~T. This has 
established that Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood 
Analys Technique (MAT) 1s having a major effect in terms of 
global influence, but its effect is not greater than Session 1. 
What might the reason be for the lack of statistical difference 
between Session 2 and Session 1? I would speculate that the lack 
of difference lies in the similarity of the cognitive processes 
instituted by the two sessions. Both sessions constitute a serious 
probing of the subject's affects and beh$viour (although the 
personality tests have a more shallow and scattered effect); they 
both involve decision making concerning patterns of behaviour and 
feeling, evaluations of thoughts and action tendencies, and require 
a reflexive awareness of present, past and possible future affective 
states. It is this general activation of thought and feeling which 
distinguishes Sessions 1 and 2 from Session 3, the quiet activities 
session. The question that remains is why Session 4 (which was 
also a probing session) did not have a higher absolute magnitude 
of change score, in particular a greater absolute magnitude of 
change score than Session 3? The most likely explanation can be 
framed in terms of experimental procedure. Session 4, the self-
administered MAT was the final experimental session, thus it did 
not have the novelty of Session 1, and it is also reasonable to 
assume a lingering practice effect operating from Session 2. This 
points to a deficiency in the experimental procedure. If the order 
of presentation of sessions had been randomized, a more experimentally 
valid result might have been obtained. However, owing to the 
relatively unstructured nature of the MAT, it was believed that 
subjects might have had difficulty with a self-administration 
without prior exposure to the questions and format. 
5.3 Magnitude of Change Scores across the Four Experimental Sessions 
Null Hypothesis 4.3.1.3(a) that Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
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tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) will not differ from Session 1, 
the personality testing session and Session 3, the quiet activities 
session, in terms of the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowlis Mood Adjective Check List, MACL, has been 
ected. 
Section 4.31 has shown that Session 2 influences the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors in ways different from Sessions. 1 and 3. 
Null Hypothesis 4.3.1.5(a) that Session 4, the self-administered 
Hood Analysis Technique (MAT) will not differ from Session 1, the 
personality testing session, and Session 3, the quiet activities 
session, in terms of the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis 
Mood Factors of the Nowl Mood Adjective Check List, MACL, has been 
rejected. 
Section 4.31 has shown that Session 4 influences the 12 Nowlis Nood 
Factors in ways different from Session 1 and 3. However: 
Null Hypothesis 4.3.l.l(a) that Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Hood Analysis Technique (MAT) Hill not differ from Session 4, 
the self-administered Hood Analysis Technique, in terms of the 
magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis Hood Factors of the 
Nowlis Mood Adjective Check List, has been accepted. 
Section 4.31 has shown that Sessions 2 and 4 cannot be distinguished 
from each other in terms of their influence on the magnitude of 
change scores for the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors. 
In discussing the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis Mood 
Factors the salient effects of each experimental session will be 
considered, followed by a comparison of these effects across 
sessions, and finally a consideration of the experimental effects 
in terms of influencing "energy" mood factors, "emotion" and 
"cognitive" mood factors. 
The salient effects of Session 1, the personality testing sess1on, 
were decreases on the mood factors Scepticism, Social Affection, 
Sadness and Egotism. None of the mood factors were increased by 
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Session 1. It would appear that Session 1 was generally acting to 
inhibit or suppress emotional levels present at the beginning of 
the experimental session. This is perhaps not surprising, because 
although the personality tests require the subject to reflect upon 
the thoughts, feelings, and actions, it is basically a surface 
level reflection and does not encourage the exploration and 
unfolding of affect. But we may still wish to inquire why it 
decreased these particular factors? I believe that there was a 
general tendency, irrespective of the experimental conditions, 
for subjects to manifest the affects represented by these factors. 
This could be due to the pressures and frustrations of university 
life, the close companionship and social warmth shared between 
f~iends, and sadness or nostalgic unhappiness at being away from 
home and family. Session 1 did not resolve these emotions but 
shunted them aside, subordinating their expression to the demands 
of the task imposed. 
The salient effects of Session 2, the experimenter administered 
Hood Analysis Technique (HAT), \vere increases on the mood factors 
Aggression, Social Affection, Sadness and Egotism. It is most 
likely that in-depth and concerted attention on needs and feelings 
was responsible for the increase in Egotism. But this in itself 
does not e~plain the increases on such widely divergent factors 
as Aggression, Social Affection and Sadness. In order to put this 
finding into perspective, it should be re-emphasized that the Hood 
Analysis Technique was designed to focus on present feeling, to 
encourage its intens cation and unfolding into new affect. In 
addition, it brought background and peripheral feelings to the 
foreground. Emphasis was also placed on "protensional vectors", 
i.e. the revelation of potentials for feeling through the postulation 
of possible feelings in the near future (e.g. the questions 'Do 
you think your mood needs something to be completed or fulfilled? 
Do you think the mood is stable, or will it change into a different 
mood?'), as well as the imaginative portrayal of immediate feelings 
against both 1.nner and outer horizons (proximal .and distal limiting 
conditions). This is to say that in addition to the intensi cation 
and unfolding of present feeling, the questions of the Mood Analysis 
Technique were such that present feeling was situated in terms of 
past feeling, the latent and shadow aspects of present feeling, and 
• 
-414-
the projection of future feeling. All aspects being made immanent 
through the search for expressive metaphors. Thus although it 
a post hoc argument, it becomes comprehensible that such diverse 
factors were increased, and that such a basic, almost primitive 
affective cluster as Aggression, Social Affection and Sadness was 
activated, manifested, and developed. At this point the argument 
can only be adumbrated, it will be more finely articulated and 
strengthened when the component change scores are discussed. 
The salient effects of Session 3, the quiet activi session, 
were decreases on the mood factors Aggression, Egotism and 
Scepticism. Thus the general trend for this session was a 
reduction 1n intensity for three out of the twelve mood factors. 
It may be that the experimental situation itself. had a tendency 
to activate Scepticism, hence the quiet activities of doing work 
assignments or reading periodical literature might be expected to 
relax the subjects and diminish their suspicion. If, as already 
noted, it reasonable to assume a general disposition for 
subjects to manifest emotional responses of an aggressive nature, 
the relaxing activities of the session would tend to decrease the 
associated factor. 
The salient effects of Session 4, the self-administered Mood 
Analysis Technique (MAT), were increases on the mood factors 
Aggression, Sadness, Egotism and Scepticism. Session 4 is 
essentially the ~~T with the experimenter's verbal involvement 
removed. I.Je should expect this session to parallel Session 1, 
the personality testing session, if the two activities are 
congruent with respect to their major features. However, we find 
the pattern of increases on the mood factors Aggression, Sadness 
and Egotism, which has been linked to the reflective activity 
initiated by the MAT on Session 2. Nevertheless there is one 
modification--Scepticism appears as a statistically significant 
factor. The increase on Scepticism is probably an artifact of 
the experimental procedure. On Session 4 subjects were required 
to complete the ~~T a second time. As there had been no feedback 
to subjects from Session 2, they may have become doubtful about 
the whole procedure . 
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Sessions 1 and 3 presented similar patterns of statistically s1gn1-
ficant mood dimensions. The effects of these sessions resemble 
each other to a greater extent than either the effects of Session i 
or Session 4. Sessions 2 and 4 presented similar patterns of 
statistically significant mood dimensions. The effects of these 
sessions resemble each other to a greater extent than either the 
e cts of Session 1 or Session 3. Hence with some acution it may 
be empirically concluded that the activities of Sessions 2 and 4 
were fundamentally different from the activities of Sessions 1 and 3. 
Some of the differences can be further highlighted by considering 
the statistically significant mood factors under the headings: 
affective factors (Aggression, Social Affection, and Sadness), 
energy factors (Surgency), and cognitive factors (Egotism and 
Scepticism). For the affective mood factors, Session 2 in each 
case showed a statistically significant increase on the respective 
dimensions. This effect has already been explicated in terms of 
the design and structure of the ~~T. For the one significant 
energy mood factor (Surgency), Session 1 consistently showed a 
greater decrease than the other experimental sessions. This 1s 
to say that although all the sessions were energy absorbing, 
Session 1 which probably inhibited affective expression because 
it required standard categorical answers, also dissipated the 
initial levels of exuberant energy in the majority of cases. 
For the cognitive mood factors the two factors apposite to this 
category must be considered separately. In the case of Egotism, 
Sessions 2 and 4 both showed an increase and Sessions 1 and 3 
both showed a decrease. This suggests that Sessions 2 and 4 
established an intense degree of self-involvement, the type of 
thematic self-reflection that is a necessary prerequisite to 
affective change. For the factor Scepticism, Session 4, the self-
administered ~T, showed a significant increase relative to 
Sessions 1 and 3. This has already been attributed to the exper 
mental procedure. Session 1 tshowed a greater decrease than 
either Sessions 2 or 3. This may again be a function of the 
rationally convergent, affectively controlled, and energy reducing 
characteristics of this session. 
The examination of the significant mood factors under these three 
I 
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categories permits the conclusion that the r~T 1s basically affect 
stimulating, energy reducing (but less so than Session 1), and 
cognition promoting with respect to the factor Egotism which is 
an indicator of self-involvement and self-concern. This self-
concern is interpreted not as a stagnant or morbid self-concern 
but as a dynamic self-awareness that is a prerequisite of affective 
change. 
5.4 Component Change Scores for Hood Factors that shmved Significant 
Hagnitude of Change Scores 
Null Hypothesis 4.3.l.l(b) that Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) ,will not differ from Session 4, 
the self-administered Mood Analysis Technique, in terms of the 
number of mood components increased, decreased, disappeared, new 
and total change in mood components, has been rejected. 
Section 4.32 has shown that Sessions 2 and 4 have influenced the 
component change scores in different ways. 
Null Hypothesis 4.3.1.3(b) that Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Hood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not differ from Session 1, 
the personality testing session, and Session 3, the quiet activities 
session, in terms of the number of mood components increased, 
decreased, disappeared, new and total change in mood components, 
has been rejected. 
Section 4.32 has shown that Session 2 has influenced the component 
change scores in ways different from Sessions 1 and 3. 
Null Hypoth.esis 4. 3. 1. 5 (b) that Session 4, the self-administered 
Mood Analysis'Technique, will not differ from Session 1, the 
personality testing session, and Session 3, the quiet activities 
session, in terms of the number of mood components increased, 
decreased, disappeared, new and total change in,mood components, 
has been rejected. 
Section 4.32 has shown that Session 4 has influenced the component 
change scores in way different from Sessions 1 and 3L 
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It will be recalled that component change scores refer to internal 
change on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors. Each mood factor is composed 
of three defining elements or components; internal change on a 
factor is indicated by these individual components increasing, 
decreasing, appearing for the first time (new), or disappearing. 
Thus each magnitude of,change score is the result of individual 
component changes or a pattern of change across components. What 
we wish to determine is whether the argument that Session 2 1s 
functioning to bring latent or peripheral feeling elements into 
awareness and reveal potentials for feeling, is cogent. If it is, 
then we should expect Session 2 to be associated with a greater 
number of new components. In addition we wish to know if Session 2, 
the experimenter administered Nood Analysis Technique (MAT), and 
Session 4, the self-administered MAT, showed characteristic 
patterns of change for the statistically significant magnitude of 
change scores. 
For the statistically significant factor Aggression, both Sessions 
2 and 4 brought about significant 1ncreases in Aggression and this 
was achieved through the generation of more new components (see 
Table 41). Session 2 in particular relative to Sessions 1 and 3 
had the ability to generate new components. Thus the component 
changes on the,mood factor Aggression provide support for the 
argument. 
For the statistically significant factor Surgency, Session 2 
generated significantly more new components than Session 1. 
Despite the fact that none of the experimental sessions showed a 
net increase in magnitude of change scores, both Sessions 2 and 3 
showed more new components and fetver components disappeared than 
Session 1. Thus the argument receives some support from.the 
component changes on the mood factor Surgency. It is also 
interesting to note that on the energy factor Surgency, Session 2 
seemed to parallel Session 3, the quiet activities session. 
Possibly Session 2 in addition to activating se~eral affective 
dimensions, also had a relaxing or stabilizing effect. 
For the statistically significant factor Social Affection, Session 2 
was distinguished from each of the other experimental sessions by 
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its greater number of new components. It was the most influential 
session not only in terms of generating more new components, but 
also in terms of total change in components. This suggests that 
in addition to generating new components Session 2 may have had 
an important effect on other basic components. Thus Social 
Affection in particular provides strong support for the argument. 
For the statistically significant factor Sadness, Session 2 is 
distinguished in three ways: this session generated more new 
components than Session l, showed more components increased than 
either Sessions l and 3, and showed more total change than Sessions 
3 and 4. Session 2 appeared to generate new elements, intensify 
elements already existing, and generally facilitate internal change. 
As in the case of Social Affection, the mood factor Sadness 
provides strong support for the argument. 
For the statistically significant factor Egotism, Sessions 2 and 4 
generated more new components than the other t\..ro experimental 
sessions. This finding supports the point already made that the 
r~T encourages a self-reflective attitude in the service of 
affective differentiation and change. 
For the statistically significant factor Scepticism, the component 
changes do not support the ·argument that Session 2 intensified 
existing components or brought new components into awareness. 
Since this factor is a general indicator of subjects' doubt and 
suspicion concerning the experimental activities, it is both 
comprehensible and reassuring that 1n this one case the data was 
not consonant with the argument. 
Comparison of Sessions 2 and 4 
It should be noted that there were some differences between Sessions 
2 and 4 on the significant mood factors just considered. For Social 
Affection Session 2 showed more new components and more total change 
than Session 4. For Sadness Session 2 showed more total change than 
on Session 4. 
The differences can be vie\..red in either one or both of two way.s. 
The experimenter's verbal involvement on Session 2 may have been 
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responsible for greater changes in Sadness and Social Affection, 
or Session 4 being the final experimental session and basically a 
repetition of Session 2 may have produced less change in Sadness 
and Social Affection. A consideration relevant to this issue is 
the degree of the experimenter's verbal involvement on Session 1, 
the personality testing session. The experimenter read the test 
directions including sample test items, and answered subjects' 
questions. In spite of this verbal involvement Session 1 was 
significantly different from Sessions 2 and 4. In my opinion the 
differences between Sessions 2 and 4 (which are less salient than 
the similarities) cannot be wholly attributed to the experimenter's 
verbal involvement; it is more likely a joint function of experi~ 
mental order and verbal involvement. 
5.5 Component Change Scores for Mood Factors that did not show 
Significant Magnitude of Change Scores 
There were several major mood factors which did not show significant 
magnitude of change scores across the four experimental sessions but 
which nevertheless did show significant component change scores. We 
will turn to these factors in order to collect further evidence for 
the argument that Session 2 was functioning to intensify mood, bring 
new feeling elements into awareness, and promote affective change. 
For the mood factor Anxiety, Session 2, the experimenter administered 
Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), generated more new components than 
either Sessions 1 or 3. Session 2 also showed more total change than 
either Sessions 3 or 4. Session 2 was the most active experimental 
session in terms of influencing the mood dimension Anxiety. It had 
the ability both to generate new components and to make components 
disappear. Thus the factor Anxiety tends to support the argument. 
None of the other three factors showing significant component changes 
(Fatigue, Vigour and Deactivation) revealed significant new components 
or components increased for any of the experimental sess1ons; 
Comparison of Sessions 2 and 4 
Session 2 appeared to differ from Session 4 in terms of total change 
in components and number of components disappeared. For the factors 
Anxiety, Fatigue and Deactivation, Session 2 in each case showed 
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more total change. For the factors Anxiety and Deactivation, 
Session 2 in each case showed more components disappeared. It 
would appear that relative to Session 4, Session 2 was having 
a wider effect (more total change). Interestingly, Session 2 
appeared to be reducing anxiety relative to Session 4 Hhile at 
the same time reducing general enervation and emotional complacency. 
The ability of Session 2 to generate more new components over 
several mood dimensions provides substantial support for the 
argument that Session 2 is functioning to bring new feeling 
elements into awareness and to reveal potentials for feeling. 
5.6 The Effect of the Four Experimental Sessions on1"Hoody" vs. 
"Non-Hoody" Subjects 
Null Hypothesis _4. 4. l.l that the four experimental sess1.ons \vi 11 
not differ in their effects on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors for 
"Moody" vs. "Non-moody" subjects, has been accepted. 
Section 4.4 has shown that subjects designated "moody" and "non-
moody" by both the HAT criterion (self-opinion criterion) and the 
high and lmv mean variability criterion do not differ across the 
four experimental sess1.ons on the 12 Nm..rlis Hood Factors. 
This analysis suggests that the four experimental sess1.ons were 
not influencing "moody" individuals differently from "non-moody" 
individuals. Focusing on Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Hood Analysis Technique (~~T), this result failed to fulfil 
the experimenter's expectations. It had been expected that since 
by one definition the moody individual is a subject whose feelings 
tend to change under affective provocation, the HAT might provide 
the stimulus for affective change to such individuals, relative 
to the non-moody. individuals. However, the experimental results 
indicate this was not the case. This finding suggests. two 
possibilities--either the HAT is deficient and ~ot influencing 
11 moody" individuals or the HAT influences mood irrespective of 
whether or not the individual can be classified as "moody". It 
is my belief from examining the magnitude of change scores and the 
component change scores, subjects' comments upon completion of 
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Session 2, and the effects of Session 2 on positive, neutral and 
negative moods (to be discussed belo~v) that the MAT influences 
mood independently of the individual's affective variability or 
stability. If this belief warranted, it becomes prudent to 
say: the MAT does influence the moods of moody subjects, but 
it also influences the moods of non-moody subjects to an equal 
degree. 
5.7 The Effect of Session 2, the Experimenter Administered Mood 
Analysis Technique (MAT) on Hoods Classified as Positive, 
Neutral and Negative 
Null Hypothesis 4.5.1.1 that Session 2, the experimenter adminis-
tered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), will not differ in its 
effect on the absolute magnitude of change scores for the three 
mood groups, is rejected. 
Section 4.5 has shmvn that Session 2 has a greater global effect 
on Group 3 (negative moods) than Group 2 (neutral moods). 
This section will discuss and integr~te the effects of Session 2, 
the experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (lv1AT) on 
moods classified as positive, neutral and negative. The preceding 
sections have shown that across all moods Session 2 is: having 
a major effect in terms of global influence (absolute magnitude 
of change scores), has a salient effect on specific mood dimensions 
(magnitude of change scores), and in general operates to intensify 
existing mood components and bring new mood components into aware-
ness (component change scores). Now we wish to understand in what 
way Session 2 influences particular categories of mood in terms of 
its ability to change their quality and intensity. Subjects' 
moods ~vere assigned to one of three groups: Group 1 (positive 
moods), Group 2 (neutral moods) and Group 3 (negative moods). 
Confidence ~n the utility of the 1'1AT will be enhanced if it shmvs 
that Group 3 (negative moods) decrease their intensity or change 
their quality. 
In terms of absolute magnitude of change (global influence) Session 
2 influenced Group 3 (negative moods) more than Group 2 (neutral 
moods). This suggests that overall the negative moods are amenable 
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to change, and less resistant to change than the more neutral moods. 
Thus it is incorrect to assume that these negative moods construct 
an inviolable space which is impervious to external influence. But 
it must be clearly .established that this greater global effect on 
Group 3 (negative moods) represents an improvement in these moods. 
This will be achieved by examining the means of magnitude of change 
scores on the 12 Nowl Mood Factors and subjects' indications of 
changes in intensity and quality in their mood state upon completion 
of Session 2. 
The mood factors Anxiety, Surgency and Elation were statistically 
significant across the three mood groups. For the mood factor 
Anxiety, Group 3 (ne ive moods) decreased on this factor \-'hile 
Group 1 (positive moods) and Group 2 (neutral moods) increased. 
It appears that Session 2 was influencing negative moods by 
decreasing their anxiety dimension. It 1s possible that the 
dimension of anxiety was already active 1n the negative moods and 
Session 2 reduced its magnitude by permitting expression of the 
mood, exploring its roots, thematizing its intentional structure, 
and situating it amongst other relevant feel The mood 
dimension Anxiety could have been increased in the positive and 
neutral moods because anxiety was a basic background element. 
This would be consonant with the demonstrated ability of the MAT 
to bring new element.s into awareness and to reveal potentials for 
feeling. 
For the mood factor Surgency, Group 3 (negative moods) increased 
on this factor while Group l (positive moods) and Group 2 (neutral 
moods) showed a decrease on this factor. It appears that Session 
2 was influencing negative moods by increasing their base level of 
exuberant energy. 
For the mood factor Elation, Group 3 (negative moods) increased on 
this factor and Group 1 (positive moods) showed a decrease. It 
appears that Session 2 was also influencing negat moods by 
ing th~ upsurge of vitality, vibrancy and warm excitement; 
Thus the magnitude of change scores on the 12 Nowlis Mood Factors 
suggest that Session 2 was influencing negativ~ moods by reducing 
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tension, uncertainty and apprehension; increasing the availability 
of exuberant energy, and increasing vitality, vibrancy and warm 
excitement. 
The three mood groups (Group 1 positive moods, Group 2 neutral moods 
and Group 3 negative moods) were assessed for mood change in terms 
of whether the subject gave a different categorization at the end 
of Session 2 (qualitative change) or whether the intensity rating 
increased or decreased (intensity change). If neither thecate-
gorization changed nor the intensity rating, the mood was 
characterized as not changing or remaining stable. Appendix J, 
Tables P, Q and R establish that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), had the follmving 
effects across all three mood groups: 
Improvements 
Sixty-two negative, neutral and positive moods improved on qualita-
t and intensity assessments, representing a total improvement 
of 62/105 or 59,05%; breaking this down in terms of specific mood 
groups: Twenty-seven out of 34 negative moods improved, 18 out of 
34 neutral moods improved, and 17 out of 37 positive moods improved 
or shifted to other positive moods on the qualitative and intensity 
ratings. The improvement of 27/34 or 79,41% of all the negative 
moods is substantial and supports the claim that the MAT is 
par cularly effective in improving negative moods. 
Stabil 
Session 2, the experimenter administered Hood Analysis Technique 
(~~T), did not affect 13/105 or 12,38% of all moods, in terms of 
neither changing their categorization nor their intensity rating; 
breaking this down in terms of specific mood groups: eight out of 
34 neutral moods remained the same, two out of 37 positive moods 
remained the same, and three out of 34 negative moods remained the 
same. The stabilization of 12,38% of all moods, a low.rate relative 
to the improvement rate, can be used to further ?upport the claim 
that the MAT induces mood change, and influences all categories of 
mood. 
Deteriorations 
Twenty-four negative, neutral and positive moods or 22,86% of all 
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moods deteriorated; breaking this down in terms of specific mood 
groups: four out of 34 negative moods deteriorated, 14 out of 37 
positive moods deteriorated, and six out of 34 neutral moods 
deteriorated. The deterioration of 22,86% of all moods (based on 
decreases in intensity for positive moods, increases in intensity 
for negative moods, and qualitative shifts of moods to a more 
n~gative feeling tone) is an intermediately high rate. However, 
in many cases despite the deterioration, subjects reported 
increased awareness concerning the source of their mood, and an 
ability to adjust to its negative aspects. 
\lliat is responsible for the deterioration of the positive moods? 
I would offer three basic reasons: 
1. Four out of the n1ne instances of positive moods shifting to 
a more negative feeling tone (see Appendix J, TableR) are 
the moods of subjects that had a statistically high mean 
variability; it would appear that the MAT acted to stimulate 
their inherent variability. However, once the negative shift 
took place and as a result of undergoing Session 2, subjects 
were 1n a position to utilize the knowledge gained and 
establish a balance between the extremes of their feeling 
spectrum. 
2. Many of the moods classified as positive nevertheless had 
latent negative elements; some of the positive moods may 
have been a magical attempt to deny or banish negative 
circumstances or feelings. .The ability of the MAT to bring 
latent feeling elements into a\vareness has already been 
established. If a number of the positive moods were being 
used to deny negative circumstances, then these shifts to 
greater negativity implies that the MAT enhanced reality 
testing, decreased avoidance reactions, and may have brought 
the negative circumstances under the executive control of 
rational and adaptation orientated processe~. 
3. For the positive moods there were five reductions in intensity 
(see Appendix J, TableR). This reduction in intensity may be 
due to the expenditure of energy required to instigate and · 
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maintain the expressive and self-reflective attitude required 
by the MAT. If this is the case, then the basic feeling 
energy was not-lost but largely rechanneled into expressive 
activities. 
Examining the neutral moods that deteriorated (see Appendix J, 
Tables 0 and Q) two out of the four instances of neutral moods 
shifting to a more negative feeling tone are the moods of subjects 
that had a statistically high mean variability: the same reason1ng 
that applied in the case of the positive moods applies here in the 
same v;ay. For the two neutral moods that showed a reduction in 
intensity, in one case the reduction was small (Contented +2 to 
Contented +1) and in the other case the reduction was small 
(Restful +2 to Restful +1) and the subject reported "being more 1n 
touch". 
In order to finalise the argument that Session 2, the experimenter 
administered Mood Analysis Technique, was influencing negative 
moods in predominantly positive ways, let us return to the negative 
moods that were found to have deteriorated (negative moods that 
increased their intensity). I would like to individually examine 
each negative mood that deteriorated, to assess to what extent it 
was a deterioration, and also to give some examples of how the MAT 
operates in actual practice. 
ect No. 31 (Frustrated +1 to Frustrated +2) 
The subject was frustrated over the demands of her univer$ity work. 
In her words: "I feel the need to work harder but no matter how 
much I tell myself this I seem never to be able to get down to it 
but shirk it by making excuses. My concentration is bad and my 
conscience suffers as a result." The subject believed that her 
work was lagging because she was becoming increasingly fond of her 
boyfriend and could feel her doubts about him evaporating. As the 
mood analysis progressed she felt her frustration growing stronger 
and she began to feel increasingly guilty. Sh~ realised her 
frustration was due to a "bad conscience", self-disdain, and envy 
of others whom she perceived as having more willpower. She 
indicated that in the background were threats of disillusionment 
and boredom. She then began to search within herself for more · 
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self-control and an enthusiasm to work. She perceived her problem 
as like 'alleyways and cobbled streets running in patterns like a 
maze'. This she found oppressive and depressing. At the same 
time she perceived the potential of the mood to transform itself 
into a state of relief and gaiety. The frustration returned and 
she felt she was like a "slot machine" because--'! feel frustrated 
by my own incompetence and feel the need of someone to "switch me 
on". 1 Thus she perceived her willingness to be distracted from 
what she knew she should be doing, i.e. concentrating on her work. 
The overall effect of Session 2 was an increase in her frustration, 
but she became more aware of its external source, hm..r the situation 
was priming opposing tendencies within herself, and that if she was 
to avoid being swept into the whirlpool of her emotion, she would 
have to make an important decision. 
ect No. 89 (Frustrated +2 to Frustrated +3) 
The subject was feeling frustrated, angry, and in the mood to be un-
pleasant to everyone. In her words: 'It's a sort of self-superior 
feeling not wanting to be outdone by anybody. At the same time I 
feel restless, impatient, \.Jhich causes the mood. Also irritable 
and touchy - FRUSTRATED. 1 The subject was able to identify the 
environmental source of her mood as the arrival of an ex-boyfriend, 
whom she hadn't seen for some time, in Cape Town. She felt cast 
aside because she hadn't seen him yet--or v~ce versa. She expressed 
the situation by saying: 'I feel as if I were an actress on a stage 
having a raging argument with my husband because he has been having 
an affair with another woman.' This metaphor rather aptly 
established her predicament and the nature of her feeling. 
As the mood analysis progressed the mood became even more intense, 
she felt more angry and frustrated to the point of tears. She 
believed that in principle she knew how to handle the situation, 
but a need for some form of violence to relieve the frustration 
was becoming paramount. At the same time she became aware that she 
was enjoying the feeling of superiority and power that the mood 
conferred. There \..ras a grm..ring awareness that she had a tendency 
to feel sorry for herself but this was urgently suppressed. T,his 
background element nevertheless exerted pressure on her. She said: 
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'Through the anger and nastiness on the surface, there 1s a streak 
of blatant unhappiness emerging which changes the mood because I 
don't feel so joyful in my bitchiness~-it isn't giving me so much 
satisfaction anymore, but the will to be bitchy is still there.' 
A new need suddenly emerged, to be alone, where nothing common-
place or demeaning could touch or reach her. She then expressed 
her self-identity when in this mood as being like that of a cat, 
and with this expression came an insight. She said: 'Cats scratch 
and sort of give the impression that they want to scratch and 
destroy--but it's still playful destruction. Sometimes they can 
play too far and then hurt badly--! feel like that, wanting to 
playfully hurt, maybe even hurt deeply. I realise that I have a 
nasty streak inside me, I'm touchy, sensitive, and easily irritated.' 
The overall effect of Session 2 was an increase 1n her frustration, 
however the mood had become more exact and speci c. She became 
aware of both the internal detail and the range of her feelings. 
She felt that the mood was accurately telling her something about 
herself and her potential; her identity had become more articulated 
through the search for expressive metaphors, and the background 
structure that she preferred not to experience was brought to 
light and its relevance established. 
Subject No. 41 (Tired +2 to Tired +3) 
The subject initially reported feeling contentedly tired after a 
long afternoon walk. She was physically tired but not unpleasantly 
so, it was more a peaceful lulling fatigue. As the mood analysis 
progressed she became aware of disturbing elements impinging at the 
periphery of her mood, e.g. a test in Xhosa that needed intense 
study. Along with these disquieting elements, she became more aware 
of the demands of her tired body--aching feet and drooping eyelids. 
There seemed to be competing elements of a desire to sleep and to 
be actively involved.with friends. The pace of the temporal present 
seemed retarded, and she was future orientated. At this point there 
was an upsurge of impatience and a need to rele~se energy, she felt 
an urge to laugh and her legs became tingly. She reported she now 
felt more tired and less content. She realised her tiredness would 
be a good feeling to have at the end of the day, but would not be a 
good feeling for her lectures. No particular feeling element was 
I 
-428-
dominant, but everything seemed to be blending together. In her 
words: 'If one thing was big I would get upset and then I wouldn't 
feel content--right?' She appeared to be struggling to retain the 
cosy enervated quality of her fatigue, afraid to lose the mood, yet 
aware that there were pressures to manifest more energy for practical 
tasks. Her reluctance to forsake the languid ambience of the mood 
was reflected in the imagery she produced, e.g. 'A beautiful sunset 
over a lake with a sailboat on it'; 'a forest with the sun streaking 
through'; and 'I feel like lying under trees with green green leaves 
with the sun warming me up'. ~.Jith this last image she became aware 
of a general debility and a chilliness which her fatigue \vas 
producing. A degree of impatience and anger then reasserted itself. 
The overall effect of Session 2 was an 1ncrease 1n her tiredness, 
however she became aware that her body was presenting a genuine and 
legitimate demand for rest, she realised that her work demands and 
desire for social activity were 1n conflict, and that this conflict 
in conjunction with the langour of her body was making her feel 
impatient and restless. Her restlessness and frustration were 
further draining her body's energy, increasing the fatigue and 
abolishing the contented feeling. 
Subject No. 3 (Sceptical +2 to Sceptical +3) 
At the beginning of the session the subject reported that she was 
feeling 'slightly sceptical, but at ease'. She indicated that she 
was doubtful about the purpose of the study (despite the fact that 
the purpose and aim had been explained), but did not mind partici-
pating. She expressed a degree of curiosity and eagerness, 1n her 
words: 'It makes me feel like carrying on with the session to 
find out what is involved'. Her senses \vere sharpened and her 
attitudes vigilant, she was aware of everything around her in the 
.room. She revealed that she had received a high mark on a class 
test and that this was responsible for her feeling at ease. She 
was orientated towards the present but her spatial experience had 
changed, objects seemed more close together, spa,ce was constricted. 
As the mood analysis progressed her scepticism became even more 
intense; yet inwardly she became divided, she reported that she 
was not in favour of her sceptical mood. This self-division seemed 
to produce an intense concentration, and accompanying this concen-
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tration was doubt and anxiety. She reported: 'I am aware that I 
am not prepared to answer these questions just for the sake of 
answering but that I am wary of them'. It appeared that in the 
face of anxiety and dissatisfaction with her scepticism, the 
scepticism redoubled its intensity and clamour. Her curiosity, 
self-dissatisfaction and scepticism were waging a battle in which 
scepticism was victorious. She detected a background element of 
uncertainty concerning social relations with a particular person, 
but she remained guarded about this and did not elaborate. Her 
self-expressive imagery reflected turbulence and powerful emotion, 
e.g. 'waves in the sea hitting against rocks and the shore'. She 
experienced the imagery as unpleasant. A second vivid image 
produced was that of a mountain, it expressed the dominance of the 
mood and its recalcitrant immovable quality. The mood was telling 
her something about herself, in her words: 'It is telling me that 
I am capable of moods that I would normally not have and which are 
not pleasant, that is, moods which I would not choose to have. 1 
The overall effect of Session 2 was an increase in her scepticism, 
however background elements of uncertainty and anxiety were brought 
to the fore, the subject became aware of discomposure and agitation 
with respect to an important social relationship, her express1ve 
imagery revealed to her that she was not quite the calm and self-
controlled individual she usually experienced herself as being; 
she saw that there were stubborn and cognitively aggressive aspects 
to her personality that ideally she would choose not to possess. 
It has been shown that for the great majority of Group 3 (negative 
moods), Session 2 acted to improve these moods. The individual 
examination of the four negative moods that deteriorated (increased 
in intensity) has established that in each case along with the 
deterioration there were new elements of understanding, an increased 
awareness of the total problem, the satisfaction of integration 
through self-expression, and cognizance of the range, potential 
and pressure of feeling processes. 
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5.8 Subjects' Comments upon Completion gf Session 2, the Experimenter 
Administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT) 
By and large subjects' comments indicate that the MAT had the 
ability to influence mood, and did so in such a way that the mood 
experience was altered in predominantly positive ways and resulted 
' in increased understanding and insight. The data comprising 
subjects' comments and the data showing the influence of the MAT 
on positive, neutral and negative moods is congruent and consistent. 
It has also been shown (section 5.7) that even when subjects were 
unaware of mood improvements, there is reason to believe they 
benefited from an increased understanding of the generative 
conditions, the general trend, and possible conditions for 
termination of the mood. 
Those.cases where subjects gave negative comments (and it was part 
of the design to encourage this in order to avoid "acquiescent" 
and "socially desirable" responses) occurred in physically tired 
and irritable moods, or moods demanding immediate action and 
energetic physical responses. There was evidence to suggest that 
some subjects would have benefited from a shortened version of the 
MAT, more simplified questions, and fe\ver imagination questions--
but these comments were not statistically significant. 
5.9 An Analysis of Subjects' Definition of Mood 
This section utilizes both a conceptual and an empirical approach 
in order to partially clarify the concept of mood and to suggest 
requirements that should be met by a comprehensive model of mood. 
At present there exists a diversity of viewpoints concerning mood, 
and several of the perspectives offered have incompatible features. 
There is also uncertainty about what the base data is, how it 
should be approached and utilized. In order to suggest constructive 
directions, the subjects' definition elements of mood are presented 
and analysed. It is maintained that the definition elements can 
be used to: 
1. Assess the various conceptualisations of mood, in a general 
way, in terms of the ability of a particular viewpoint to 
incorporate or account for them. 
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2. Provide the type of base data that any conceptualisation of 
mood should be able to account for. 
We will turn to examining the mean1ng and import of the statist-
ically significant definition elements. 
Mood as a state of mind or feeling 
Mood as a state of mind or feeling is part of our general linguistic 
usage, i.e. even a pocket dictionary will yield this definition, 
but subjects were instructed to define mood 'in terms of their own 
experience' and to the extent that this instruction was heeded we 
have a definition element that 1s more than linguistic convention. 
On at least one interpretation of the disposition view, a mood is 
not primarily a state or process, but rather a tendency to feel 
and behave. However it makes little sense to speak of a tendency 
or capacity unless it is manifested on at least some occasions--
with this the disposition theorist would concur. But the dis-
position view emphasizes the tendency aspect and de-emphasizes 
mood as a phenomenal state of mind or feeling. 
We do not expect to disclaim an ent theoretical system on the 
basis of one definition element, but we would like to see the 
emphasis correctly placed and the predominance of this definition 
element suggests that the emphasis should be on mood as a state 
of consciousness. In support of this view Wilson (1972) writes: 
But other mental reports do seem to report something 
about a person's present state of consciousness. If 
A is in pain and B is not, the difference between 
them is not just a disposition difference, but is a 
difference in the way they now feel. Reports that 
someone is now feeling an emotion (though not 
necessarily all reports that might be called emotion 
reports) seem to be of this latter kind. To say that 
someone is now feeling angry, or afraid, is to say 
something about what he is now feeling - it is not 
just to ascribe a disposition to him. To feel an. 
emotion is to be in a certain phenomenal state of 
. mind (p.70). 
This phenomenal aspect is not the entire story, as Wilson has hinted 
and as will be shown in section 5.10. The use of mood terms 
encompasses a wide variety of language actions in addition to 
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reporting feeling qualities, 1n particular there is a significant 
domain of social-judgemental actions. This aspect of mood dis-
course and its implications for a theory of mood are amenable to 
a disposition formulation. Thus certain aspects and functions of 
the word "mood" do point to realities consonant with a disposition 
analysis. 
How could other theoretical perspectives accommodate this 
definition element? Mood as a state of mind or feeling can 
suggest a condition of the mind, the self, the doer and the 
observer. t.Jith this emphasis the existential view of mood as 
II II d II !I • 1 . 11 d . . A . 1 tone an attunement 1s ana og1ca y escr1pt1ve. mus1ca 
instrument is tuned to sound higher or lower, to give a modulated 
sound. In doing so, the strings are stretched or made more flaccid 
their tension is increased or decreased. Then, by metaphorical 
transfer the individual's mood in a similar way is both attunement 
and tone, i.e. the state of feeling constituting mood is also 
preparedness, general condition and temper, the ability to perform 
various modes, and the actual performance. Mood then becomes 
the inner experience of this general condition or set of conditions. 
In less metaphorical language mood as a state of mind or feeling 
can also be accommodated in Arnold's view of mood as the feeling 
response to general organismic functioning, and to Nowlis' view of 
mood as the effect on the individual of his own configuration of 
activities. In fact the two views are essentially similar, the 
difference lies in Nowlis' listing of various configurations of 
activity and his mechanistic feedback model. 
Interesting questions arise if we examine more C'losely the notion 
of mood as a general condition of the organism. Some theorists, 
e.g. Konig (1973) would maintain that mood is a general state, not 
a special element or a new and singular quality of sentiment, but 
rather the inner experience of a condition, a state of being. With 
respect to the empirical data of this section, ~his viewpoint offers 
difficult In most cases it was not possible to distinguish 
retrospectively whether subjects intended a feeling, a general 
feeling, or an overarching state of mind or state of being. In at 
least three cases, however, subjects offered definitions which may 
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be considered consonant with Konig's view: 
1. 'A mood is an individual's state of being; of sensing 
and perceiving; of feeling towards themselves and 
other individuals. It is mainly affected by a state 
of mind at a particular time and I think it can be 
influenced by different situations and different 
people. It hangs basically on what is happening now 
but is also influenced by past events and future 
obstacles.' 
2. 'A mood is a feeling or sense of being which comes over 
the organism. 1 
3. 'A mood is a state and stage of being. A mood is a 
movement. A mood is a reflection. A mood is a 
question and then it is an answer, and then again it 
is a question, etc. 1 
A difficulty with this vie,~oint 1s the achievement of clarity 
concerning the way in which "general", "feeling", and "condition" 
are being employed, and their meaningful interconnection. A 
feeling is concrete, immediate, a qualitative inflection. Its 
object may be vague or ill-defined, its quality may be difficult 
to describe, but it 1s a concrete given, a primitive (or refined) 
dynamic unit or vector of experience. To speak of a general 
feeling in any sense other than as "dominant", "overriding", 
"pervasive", "diversely influential", "exclusive", or "resultant" 
(the product of several strains of feeling) is ambiguous. However, 
if all that is intended is mood as the feeling exper1ence of the 
general (overall) mind-body condition, then the concept is reason-
ably clear and approximates Arnold's view of mood as the feeling 
response to general organismic functioning. However, in principle 
Konig's view could be suggesting that mood is the state of being 
itself; the total configuration taken uniquely, independent of 
feeling or any other specific sub-units. 
The definition of the first subject quoted above also suggests 
that mood can exist conceptually, or may be experienced as a unity 
of awareness (sensing, perceiving, conceiving, experiencing 
through feeling, taken immediately and synthetically); this implies 
a colligation, a co-ordination, an interdependency of elements, 
and an interanimation of dimensions. It becomes clear that mood 
as a state of mind or feeling is susceptible to more than one 
interpretation and features in one or another form in most con-
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ceptions of mood, although it ~s de-emphasized by most adherents 
of disposition conceptions. 
Mood characterized as "pervasive" 
This category is comprised of definition elements that conform 
closely to the usage of the adjective "pervasive", i.e. indicates 
the quality of something wbich permeates, saturates, or d fuses 
through; but no commitment made to an hydraulic model, it is 
rather a metaphorical indication of general influence. It also 
refers to statements that indicate that the total person is 
involved. This is demonstrated ~n pictorial style by the following 
subjects' statements: 
1. It comes out of every vessel in one's body and captures you. 
2. A mood is a deep feeling that swamps your mind and body. 
3. It takes over all of you. 
4. It influences your whole being to feel, behave, and react ~n 
a certain \vay. 
As indicated ~n section 1.6, "pervasiveness" can be reconstructed 
and inserted into human feeling and activity in two ways: 
In the first way it can be reconstructed as the experience of 
.pervasiveness, in this form it bears affinities to the psycho-
analytic idea of "colouration" and the existential ideas of "tone", 
"reverberation" and "attunement". 
In the second way it can be reconstructed as the avowal of 
pervasiveness, in the sense that the individual is willing to say 
that the mood influences everything he thinks, feels, says, and 
does. This reconstruction is in accord with several of the dis-
position approaches, e.g. Cattell's view that mood should be con-
ceptualised as a higher order factor which sensitizes other factors, 
producing a modulation involving multi-dimensional change within 
the organism. Nowlis also sees mood as a type 'Of multiple change 
or general influence on major organismic variables. He writes: 
The layman attributes mood to the total person or self, 
not to any of his separate organs or indi~idual acts. 
Ryle finds that mood refers to the "total set of a 
person during a short term''; Jacobson refers to mood 
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, 
as a "cross section of the entire state of the ego"; 
and Skinner to "the whole repertoire of behavior". 
Thus in studying mood we are concerned with temporary 
changes in the person or self. (Nowlis, 1963, p.79) 
Thus "pervasive" as the quality of general influence cuts through 
particular theoretical perspectives to emerge as a foundational 
element. This is a prime example of theories saying substantially 
the same thing although in different languages; or to state it 
as an article and vindication of method--the search for logical 
form reveals constancies beneath surface images and elaborations. 
It is because the subject may experience mood as arising, con-
* centrating its potential, and exerting a rressure • that subjects 
can speak in terms of ''capture", "swamp", and "takes over". Hood 
does in many instances modulate feel , perceiving, and behaving 
in special ways. Nevertheless 3 ~ubjects do have the ability to 
adopt a neutral stance, thematize their mood and mood systems, 
and achieve a degree of understanding that persists even within 
the mood-specific modulations. I might add that this is close to 
one goal of self-understanding--to maintain a space of clarity 
(albeit narrow) above the sinusoidal swirling of overriding affect. 
A deficiency of the psychoanalytic and existential approaches with 
respect to the experience of pervasiveness, is their lure to 
recognise or accept that mood as the product of the total organism 
can to some degree be formulated as a range of.values on statist-
ically and organismically derived dimensions, e.g. factor-analytic 
dimensions. On the other hand, the presence of moderator variables, 
i.e. variables which systematically affect the magnitude and 
direction of relation between two sets of variables, poses internal 
difficulties for the statistical approach (Brody, 1972). To define 
* Note: Again, this is a way of speaking, a portrayal of animating 
aspects, and an "as if" approximation which points to experience 
and its organisation but does not intend to reify it. However, 
it is the quality and intensity of the experience which nec~ssitates 
this and not some other more neutral way of speaking. 
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mood as a particular set of personality-specific moderator 
variables merely elevates the problem to a higher level of 
abstraction. In addition the existential approach and to a 
lesser extent the psychoanalytic approach, tend to neglect that 
the individual may be physiologically constrained to think, feel, 
and behave in a particular way. 
A deficiency of the disposition and stati cal approaches with 
respect to the avowal of general influence, is that mood for many 
subjects is primarily a qualitative experience. It 1s something 
undergone, suffered or enjoyed, an experience with the palpitation 
and resonance of a complex and vivific process. It is often a 
process that requires physical release, self-expression, and 
symbolic completion. 
Mood characterized as having a causal effect 
This definition element suggests that "mood" may have a direct 
and readily discernible effect on the individual. Under the 
rubric "causal" we can distinguish a strong sense of causal effect, 
where mood operates directly and immediately to determine one's 
thoughts, feelings, and actions--though not in the sense of 
implying an antecedent that invariably and unconditionally 
produces a specific set of responses. There is also a weaker 
sense of "causal", where mood operates to influence, to stimulate, 
and functions as a co-determinator of one's thoughts, feel 
and actions. Representative examples from subjects' definitions 
include: 
1. 'It causes you to act in var1ous ways.' 
2. 'A sensation that gives rise to actions which would not 
normally happen.' 
3. 'It influences how you think and also hm.; you act.' 
One or both of these two senses of "causal" are compatible ~ith 
most of the theoret vie\vS of mood. An exception is the 
stential viewpoint. Here mood is not so much causal as "pre-
emptive" and "prepotent". How are we to understand mood as not 
causal but as pre-emptive? The "cognates" of pre-empt are 
engage, prepossess; and preoccupy. In the existential view there 
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1s a basic sympathy between the individual and his environment, 
the environment is the preordained shaping space for the integrity 
of consciousness; it is his hearth and hard declivity, and the 
possibility of his endeavours and realisations. The individual 
is therefore bound over, or pre-engaged, to this environment 
from the very beginning, before any of his projects take form or 
place. Mood then represents an 1nner complicity, a mutual pre-
possessing, that supports his actions which shape the world that 
shapes him (mood as pre-emption and recursive rule). From the 
existential viewpoint mood is also the prepotent experience and 
relational vector by which the self discovers its agency and 
freedom in relation to a world. Mood reverberates between the 
twin boundaries of self and world; it may infiltrate, penetrate, 
recoil from, or disassemble (the possibilities are many) before 
the integument of both "world-substance" and "self-substance". 
It is through this pre-eminent mood movement and its inherent 
revealing power, that the individual may gradually learn that he 
discovers only his own inventions, that scepticism too, is only 
a game. He may see that simultaneously the "world" is only \vhat 
he has already abstracted from the indeterminate, and an unyielding 
boundary intercalated by the mind. Whether or not we choose to 
adopt this existential recommendation (it is not clear what · 
precisely we would be committing ourselves to) and substitute the 
concept of "pre-emption" for the concept of "causality", the issue 
of the way in which mood 1s causal still challenges the standard 
empirical view of causation as regularity of association. Indeed, 
each of the major viewpoints on mood propose at least moderately 
divergent models. The disposition and statistical viewpoints 
adopt an inductive-hierarchical model which postulates powers 
and tendencies - a mediated type of causality; and the psycho-
analytic view sees causality in terms of "reasons", topographic 
structures, and dynamic systems of internalised object relations. 
If "mood" is to be inserted into the world of personal action and 
agency, then the sens~ in which it can be said to be causal will 
become dependent most generally on the type of explanation we 
accept for human behaviour and action. It may or may not be 
advantageous to consider the "causal power" of mood as logically 
distinct and untranslatable into the causal explanations of physical 
sc1ence. However, at the present time the consensus of theoretical 
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opinion 1n the social sc1ences leans toward a sense of cause 
independent of the physical science paradigm. 
Mood characterised as the result of both internal and external 
factors 
Subjects provided definition elements that suggest, logically, 
that the locus of formation for mood concepts should lie in a 
region that integrates external factors (environment) and internal 
factors (feelings, associations--a personal network). This is 
illustrated by the following examples: 
1. It is an emotional state influenced by inner feelings and 
outer occurrences. 
2. A particular state of mind brought on by the environment 
and background, especially associations. 
3. A mood is a feeling that can·come from within you but at 
the same time can be created by your surroundings. 
The most common tendency \vas to ascribe formative po..,.er to internal 
and external factors acting conjointly. This suggests that the 
concept mood may stand (or be generated) at the interface of at 
least two unique but interpenetrating domains. It is for this 
reason that section 1.7 argued for a concept of mood that could be 
made to span both the feeling and behavioural or environmental 
realms. However, most theoretical and conceptual approaches have 
stressed either the "inner" feeling aspects or the "outer" environ-
mental aspects. This dichotomy was shown in section 2.32 to have 
been explicit as early as 1938 in the studies of Young (1937) and 
Johnston (1938). 
Is it possible to formulate a general configuration for a concept 
or model that spans both feeling and behaviour, as well as 
accommodating physiological and social dimensions? I would 
suggest that such a configuration would have to accommodate the 
data of three different but interrelated regions, and it would have 
to be framed in language that was congruent with each region and 
compatible across regions. The configuration that I think wo~ld 
be consistent and most adequate, consists of a psycho-social 
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domaint and an affective domain. The three domains would be 
linked by 8a general connecting principle (the accountability of 
each structure to environmental factors) and several internal 
conceptual vectors. I envision it in this way: 
The Psycho-social Domain This domain would comprise the needs, 
goals, and intentions of an individual who acts within a context 
of social regulations. Descriptions of mood would be in terms of 
motives, choices, and pragmatic concerns of a primarily (but not 
exclusively) rational self-interest that was either facilitated 
or inhibited by the environment. For example, elation would be 
accounted for in terms of a patterned structure of goal achieve-
ment, the quality of interpersonal relationships, events that. 
encouraged a positive self-concept, accumulated confidence in 
personal capability, pleasant surprises, lack of conflict or 
dissonance, and an increased sense of personal freedom. 
The Physiological Domain This domain would comprise major 
physiological and organismic variables such as Nowlis (1965; 1970) 
has identified and worked into his feedback model. Minimally, 
this would include: level of activation, level of surgency, 
level of vLgour, and level of fatigue. These dimensions are 
directly related to physiological variables and would express the 
direct constraints of physiology. Initially, it might appear 
that these dimensions of a physiologically grounded feedback model 
might be in conflict with the constructs of the social action 
formulation of the psycho-social domain. However, I believe the 
conflict is more apparent than it is real. Although the organismic 
dimensions are related to physiology, they are defined verbally 
by factor-analytic clusters of approximately synonymous \vords, 
and these are word clusters that subjects themselves find meaning-
ful with respect to their moods. Furthermore, Schachter and 
Singer (1962) have provided evidence that affective states are 
joint functions of physiological arousal and the cognitions avail-
able to the subject, hence there is some basis for viewing the 
physiological substrate and' cognitive processes as primitively 
and fundamentally interrelated. The validity of the psycho-social 
formulation would still stand, however it would be seen to have, 
Ln a certain sense, been "promulgated" by the organismic substrate. 
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In this domain elation would be described and explained ~n terms 
of levels of general activation, surgency, and vigour; elation. 
would be a socially orientated manifestation augmented by a 
particular physiological substrate. 
Zaner (1971) has provided a connecting principle that could con-
tribute to rendering the physiological and psycho-social dimensions 
logically, and experientially complementary, i.e. the phenomeno-
logical principle of the "lived body". For Zaner the body as 
experienced is the locus of the sentient animate organism; it 
is the centre around which activities are thought and enacted. 
The body as lived incarnates and anchors the individual awareness 
by means of which the environment takes on its cardinal points 
and meaning for the individual. The body with its coeval aware-
ness opens outward to the environment at the same time that it 
experiences itself as one synthetic corporeal system, centered 
in its own synergistic subsystems. As such it is lived, 
experienced, undergone, and fully mobilized. It is not "its" 
own centre of reference, so much as it is "my mvn" centre of 
reference, by which consciousness, motives, goals and intentions 
are enacted and dynamically experienced. 
A second connecting principle between the physiological and 
psycho-social realms is the body in its role as a medium for 
express~on. The body "transmits" the physiological level into 
psycho-social meaning. "Body" is simultaneously a mechanical, 
topographic, andsymbolic complex (Benthall, 1975); it is a 
radix, a point of origination for individual expression, and the 
convergence point for social, economic, and political pressures. 
The body communicates information for and from the social system 
of which it is part (Douglas, 1971), while it promotes individual 
needs and feelings. The body is both test and limitation of 
physiological and psycho-social pressures. Body expression 
however, is not language-like in a dessicated sign-signified 
sense, it is rather an independent channel of communicative power. 
In summary, the body as physical entity and logical construct is 
a "natural" mediator between the psycho-social and physiological 
realms; it is lived as a primary source of awareness and action; 
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it ~s constituted by pressures from all domains and as a medium 
of expression it is a double reflection of 11 private 11 and "public11 
sectors; it is also an independent channel of meaning and 
communication operating across the physiological and psycho-social 
realms. Moods then are always bodily orientated, in the special 
sense of 11 body11 here provided. 
The Affective Domain An adequate concept or model of mood must 
provide for the flux and intensity of affect, the presence of 
passion, emotionally rooted phantasy, and the inner tempest which 
is a commitment to or investiture of: obsessions, chimeras, and 
emotional debacles. This domain presupposes the physiological 
domain and is articulated by the psycho-social domain. It is 
experienced as a movement with quality, magnitude, and direction. 
It can be compared with a current under pressure, with its own 
eddies and turbulences, or a collection of internal agitations, 
excitations, heated abrasions, forming, dissolving, and re-
absorbing itself. It is internally complex, unfolds on several 
levels simultaneously--a surge of images, presences, murmurs, 
contending voices; al~vays projecting a fragmentary knowledge from 
its mvn intimacies, its discontinuities and dispossessions. 
In this domain elation would be described and explicated in terms 
of affective processes and changes in awareness, i.e. the 
affectively provoked revaluing of concepts, events, and external 
objects. The impulsion of cheerfulness, the resurgence of hope 
and the sense of aesthetic harmony, the dialectic of emotional 
release and internal appropriation, might all feature as component 
elements or processes. Energetically, the supercharging, the 
enervation by pristine forces, the dilated fullness, might all 
predominate. But by itself this remains mere descriptive imagery, 
united only by its pictorial coherence. It is for this reason 
that the affective domain must also be historical, must indicate 
hmv a network of movements and qualities came to serve. the needs 
of the total organism; this is the point for t~e introduction of 
psychological mechanisms, the concepts of adaptation and defence. 
It is the time to question the limits of the overall system, the 
source of its inherent energy, the conditions contributing to-the 
achievement of balance points which adjudicate between suppression 
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and complex liberation. It is the place to adjure adequate reasons 
for how the component elements are combined into particular con-
stituted products, to determine what limitations Here assumed or 
which fetters deliberately cast aside to give the particular 
sentience the mood represents. 
Mood characterised as an attitude 
Although this was not one of the very highest statistically signi-
ficant definition elements, it is important to determine to '"hat 
extent the two concepts "mood" and "attitude" are similar. The 
differentiation of "mood" from "attitude" is a difficult problem 
both theoretically and empirically. Some conceptualisations of 
attitude are so global that almost any affective or cognitive 
phenomenon (or disposition) could be subsumed under them. Fishbein 
(1967) has pointed out some of the difficulties: 
It is not easy to construct a definition sufficiently 
broad to cover the many kinds of attitudinal determination 
which psychologists today recognise, and at the same time 
narrow enough to exclude those types of determination 
which are not ordinarily referred to as attitudes (p.8). 
Campbell (1963) has suggested that there are 80 psychological 
concepts that share the same operational definition as the concept 
attitude. In light of this chaotic state of affairs it becomes 
important to ask whether the concept of mood can be allocated an 
independent status within the family of affective and cognitive 
constructs. In particular, when comparing the concept of mood 
with the concept of attitude, and granting that there may be 
important similarities, can distinguishing elements (or less 
adequately relative emphases) of the concept of mood. be advanced? 
In search of some tentative answers we turn to the major theoretical 
v1.ews. 
Several authors have argued (e.g. Wilson, 1972) that attitudes are 
always dispositions toward particular objects or, a class of objects, 
they are not phenomenal states of the individual. Wilson writes: 
An attitude, on the other hand, is not phenomenal; it 
is not a present state of consciousness; to have a 
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certain attitude towards someone is to have a dis-
position. One could not, or at any rate one could 
not generally, talk about how an attitude felt to 
the person who had , as one can talk about hO\v an 
emotion feels to the person who has it (pp.74-75). 
Other authors have taken a diametrically opposed view, conceiving 
of attitude as the total amount of affect towards an object 
(Thurstone, 1931; Doob, 1957; Fishbein, 1967). 
It may be the case that attitudes involve an internal structure of 
ideas, beliefs, and preferences, which are revealed when we 
challenge an individual to justify their attitude. In the case of 
attitude, the request for a justification makes sense in a way that 
would not be appropriate for all moods. Harre and Secord (1972) 
point out that a justification of an attitude will make reference 
to two types of statement, i.e. statements referring to the 
qualities of the attitude object, and statements referring to lvhy 
these are advanced as preferable or desirable along with avowals 
of feeling and emotion. It is uncertain whether it would make sense 
to ask subjects to justify their moods in pre ely this way. This 
is due to the fact that not all moods have objects, nor do they 
necessarily establish an explicit awareness of reasons for the 
preferences that do occur. 
The major alternative to the total affect and cognitive Vlews ls 
the multidimensional vie~Y of attitude. Triandis (1971) has provided 
an exemplary definition: "An attitude is an idea charged ~.Jith 
emotion >Vhich predisposes to a class·of actions to a particular 
class of social situations" (p.2). As Triandis points out, this 
tion implies that attitudes have a cognitive, an affective, 
and .a behavioural component. Thomas (1971) outl the difficulty 
of actually applying the multidimensional perspective: 
Attitude in this sense a 'hidden mechanism' which 
directs behaviour. But few empirical studies of 
attitudes operational the concept in this complex 
way. Many papers introduce research by def{ning 
attitudes.as multidimensional and then measure one or 
perhaps two aspects of the concept. Frequently the 
empirical measures are unrelated to any theoretical 
position. The conclusions, however, tend to be referred 
to the three components of the attitude construct. 
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None of the multidimensional definitions of attitude 
discuss the quantitative nature of the relations between 
the components, so that where attempts are made to 
measure affect, cognition and connation there are no 
rules for combination of the data. It follmvs that 
even where a simple relationship between multidimensional 
attitude and overt behaviour is predicted it cannot be 
tested (p.lO). 
Thus, although the multidimensional v1ew is comprehensive and syn-
thetic on a conceptual level, the diverse aspects have not been 
operationalized; internal interaction effects are hypothesized 
but not clearly demonstrated. The result has been a glib conceptual 
lity that lacks an organized data base with adequately marked 
empirical relationships; and withholds a specification of the 
interconnecting links between conceptual and empirical elements. 
As there is no one ly accepted concept of attitude, it 
becomes very difficult ( not impossible) to make major distinc-
tions between the concept attitude and the concept mood, nor 1s it 
my intention to attempt a resolution of this sue; however, I 
think there are some possible distinctions that should be kept in 
mind. They are: 
1. Mood is primarily a phenomenal state with a central feeling 
component, which can usually be characterized as pervasive. 
Those "moods" Hhich we tend to conceptualize as dispositions 
(one thinks here of Ryle's "frivolous mood"), could perhaps 
be conceptualized as attitudes. On the other hand, if we 
wished to maintain that there are mooods best conceptualized 
as dispositions but which are not equivalent to attitudes, 
we could maintain that they involve diverse tendencies to 
action--but not neces 
class of objects. 
ly towards a particular object or 
2. The cognitive element of mood is often less marked, sometimes 
absent, and not necessary to the concept of mood. In the case 
of attitude, some central idea, evaluation, dognitively 
deployed preference or judgement does seem to be essential. 
3. The relationship between mood and behaviour may be more direct 
than the relationship between attitude and behaviour, i.e. for 
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mood as opposed to attitude there ~s not usually the intermediate 
stage of having a determining set toward the performance of the 
behaviour (or act) itself (Fishbein, 1967). 
4. Triandis (1971) has suggested that attitudes serve in assisting 
the individual to "adjust, to defend their egos, to express their 
values, and to understand their world around the~'. It is 
possible that moods can be distinguished in terms of their 
performing different functions; however, it should be noted 
that Triandis has listed general parameters of functioning, not 
situation specific functions that could be compared with situation 
specific mood functions. 
5. Hoods are probably more closely linked to physiological variables 
than attitudes are, but both "entities" are closely linked to 
psycho-social variables. 
5. 10 An Analysis of Language Acts of Sentences Using the \.,lord "Mood" 
This section schematizes and discusses the linguistic actions 
performed by sentences using the word "mood". It is suggested that 
this has empirical as well as logical and grammatical implications. 
Section 4.8 has established the range and internal divisions of this 
term's common functioning. Here, we are concerned with providing 
evidence to confirm or disconfirm two theses: 
1) that mood is not any sort of experience or process 
(to be determined by extrapolations from an examination of how 
"mood" functions) 
This is the application of Bedford's strong the~is to mood 
discourse--advocated in section 4.8 
2) that linguistic expressions referring to moods are not 
necessarily functioning to inform of psychological facts and 
that these expressions presuppose various social and institu-
tional concepts 
(to be determined by examining how "mood" functions) 
This is the application of Bedford's weak thesis to mood dis~ 
course. 
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In addition we wish to consider how this data 1n its interpreted 
form might contribute to the configuration of a comprehensive 
concept or model for mood. 
Before proceeding we must try to achieve an unobstructed and un-
equivocal understanding concerning the status of vhe data. Framed 
verbally and denotatively, the data is a collection of sentences 
each employing the term "mood". They were generated in response 
to this instruction: 'Please write four grammatical sentences 
employing the word "mood" that you could imagine yourself saying 
to a friend'. Further, the sentences were classified by the 
subjects according to the action(s) each sentence was most likely 
performing, e.g. reporting feeling experience, making a social 
judgement, characterizing mood experience itself, etc. Primarily 
the focus was on the action implied by the sentence and the 
subject's probable intentions with respect to the sentence. 
In order to obtain a more precise resolution of the data, its 
interpreted form, and the goal towards which we are progressing, 
a schematic construction is provided. From this schematic view-
point (which is already to introduce a perspectival constraint) 
the data "appears'' in this way: 
A. Empirical Phase *1 
1. There is a mood domain "x" uninterpreted but defined 
uniformly by one primary element: 
(a) The collection of subjects' individual experience 
in the sphere of mood and their ability and 
facility in translating experience into language. 
*Note No.1 The phases given are a schematic representation of the 
overall empirical endeavour; strictly speaking the phases are 
neither continuous nor sequential--they are static constructions 
that approximate an encapsulation of the data, and the mood domain 
"x" uninterpreted persists throughout. It should be pointed out 
that properties of each phase are defined terms of the psycho-
logical or formal constructs postulated for each phase; the phases 
are organizational, the constructs are definitive. 
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2. The mood domain "x" can be interpreted such that it 
consists of one or two possible elements: 
(b) [The experience of the vectors of mood] *2 AND/OR 
(c) [Tendencies to make social-evaluative judgements] 
The mood domain "x" consists primordially of (a), which is 
made accessible through the interpretations (b) and (c). 
Hence for our purposes the mood domain "x" is fully described 
by (b) AND/OR (c). 
B. Operations Phase 
(stimulus encoding and response phase) 
This is the phase whose end product ~s sentences employing the 
term "mood". If (b) AND/OR (c) are adequate representations 
of (a), then the operations phase will permit a symbolic 
reflection of (a) through (b) ili~D/OR (c). 
This phase provides: 
Sentences [formulating or express~ng (b) AND/OR (c)] 
C. Metalogical Phase 
This phase is the sentence analysis by linguistic actions, and 
the constructive synthesis towards the configuration of a theory 
accounting for Sentences [formulating or expressing (b) AND/OR 
(c)] . 
The Empirical Phase is formulated and set out, the Operations Phase 
is collected and analysed, and we are working towards the Met~logical 
Phase. How the stimulus input was decoded and processed is beyond 
our investigation. However, due to the standard sequential grammatical 
form of the stimulus (Please use the word "mood" in four grammatical 
sentences you could imagine yourself saying to a friend), we may 
minimally assume that there were approximately four units of 
*Note No.2 Wherever brackets occur this indicates that the 
empirical data is being interpreted in a particular way, or ~s 
being viewed from a special perspective. Also, by "vector" ~s 
intended any dynamic relational unit of experience. 
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information conveyed to the subjects. This well within the 
standard capacity of immediate memory and codification. 
We should also be aware of a possible implicit bias 1n the nature 
of the stimulus (the instructions).· There may have been a psycho-
social bias, i.e. the stimulus suggests a constraint to produce 
inter-subjective, easily communicable sentences, that could 1n 
icular be expressed to a friend. This may increase the likel 
hood of somewhat more open, more socially orientated, more conf 
dential types of sentences. 
Section 4.8 and the x2 test of homogeneity have established three 
subdivisions of Language Acts of Performing So al-Judgemental 
Actions that are statistically significant. They are: 
C4. Judgements concerning others (to evaluate others) 
e.g. 'His lack of moods made me respect him more.' 
'She 1s a very moody person and you must be careful 
how you behave towards her.' 
This category accounted for 16,78% of all the responses. 
C3. Judgements concerning the self (to give warnings, to surprise, 
to request information) 
e.g. 'Don't take out your bad mood on me.' 
'I'm in such a good mood today that I'm game to do 
anything. ' 
'Sometimes a mood falls over me which I can't understand.' 
This category accounted for 5,94% of all the responses. 
Cl. Judgements concerning the self (to evaluate the self) 
e.g. 'I am impossible when 1n a self-pitying mood.' 
'I want to be without moods, they are selfish.' 
This category accounted for 5,59% of all the responses. 
There are two subdivisions of Language Acts of ~eporting One's Own 
Experience that were stat tically significant. They are: 
B3. To g1ve grammatical objects that indicate systematic influence 
e.g. 'My moods while affecting my daily interactions do not 
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alter my opinions on intellectual subjects.' 
'when I am in a 11 bad 11 mood I think I am a moody person, 
but when ~n a "good" mood I think I am balanced and 
placid.' 
This category accounted for 9,44% of all the responses~ 
Bl. To give grammatical objects that are mood words 
e.g. 'My mood was ecstatic, I felt like leaping for joy.' 
'The music of Debussy puts me ~n a melancholic and 
relaxed mood.' 
This category accounted for 5,59% of all the responses. 
In addition the category Language Acts of Characterizing Mood 
Experience Itself, sub-category: To give grammatical objects that 
indicate systematic influences, what I have called an observational 
and reflective enterprise (which may presuppose mood experience), 
was also statistically significant. This category is represented 
by such sentences as: 'Certain moods can take over one's perception 
completely, altering the way one sees things', 'The mood is the 
variable and is dependent on the constant of circumstance.' 
Thus considering the total percentage for significant response 
categories, Social-Judgemental Actions predominate, but not to the 
exclusion of Language Acts of Reporting One's Own Experience. I 
believe that these findings permit us to reje~t Bedford's strong 
thes as applied to "mood 11 , i.e. that mood is not any sort of 
experience or process. If we extrapolate from the subjects' own 
avowals concerning their sentences, '"e must conclude that a signi-
ficant proportion of mood discourse is involved with stating or 
reporting qualities of experience. However, Bedford's weak thesis, 
that linguistic expressions referring to moods are not necessarily 
functioning to inform of psychological facts and that these 
expressions presuppose various social and institutional concepts, 
must be accepted. 
Some qualifications should be noted: 
1) If there were a psycho-social b ~n the stimulus, this ~ould 
then suggest that more neutral instructions might have decreased 
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the number of responses classifiable as Language Acts of 
Performing Social-Judgemental Actions and/or increased the 
number of responses classifiable as Language Acts of 
Reporting One's Own Experience. This implies that we may 
have an arti cially low percentage of Language Acts of 
Reporting One's Own Experience. 
2) The category Language Acts of Characterizing Hood Experience 
Itself, to the extent that it presupposes familiarity with 
mood experience, could be considered an indirect expression 
of the reporting of feeling qualities. 
3) The category Language Acts of Social-Judgemental Actions, 
Judgements concerning the self (to evaluate the self) suggests 
a possible interpenetration of what conceptually appeared to 
be independent, i.e. social judgement and feeling quality. 
In the final analysis it is likely that empirically many 
cases, judgements and feeling qualities may be mutually deter-
m~n~ng. This militates against a sharp dichotomy between the 
two general interpretations. 
Qualitatively; a number of the sentences suggest the coercive pmver 
of mood, and its general modulating effect, e.g. 'Certain moods can 
take over one's perception completely, altering the way one sees 
things.' This supports the data of section 4.7 and the interpreta-
tions of section 5. 8 which found the definition elements "pervasive'' 
and "causal". to be fundamental to an understanding of mood. It is 
interesting to note that a high proportion of the Language Acts of 
Performing Social-Judgemental Actions were made with respect to the 
self, and here some of the mood sentences functioned either as self-
criticisms, or as confessions of helplessness, as pleas and excuses. 
This suggests that "mood" could be understood solely as a tendency 
towards negative self-ascriptions, as a type of self-denigration; 
however it may be that mood as an experience leads to feelings of 
helplessness, and an attitude of self-dissatisf~ction. This latter 
view would te~d to be supported by the personality data of section 
4.1, where moody subjects were found to score low on Personal 
Adjustment (ACL) and the qualitative data of section 4.10 which 
showed the prevalence of self-criticisms in negatively toned feeling 
states. 
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It is also noteworthy to compare these two sentences: 
1. 'My moods while affecting my daily interactions do not alter 
my opinions on intellectual subjects. 1 and 
2. 'When I am in a llbad" mood I think I am a moody person, but 
when in a 11 good" mood I think I am balanced and placid. 1 
The important difference between the two sentences is the implied 
range and "depth" of mood modulation. The first sentence suggests 
a relatively narrow range modulation of factors, while the second 
sentence suggests a relatively wide range modulation--a change in 
individual elements and the total arrangement of factors. Perhaps 
mood can interact with the individual's personality or defensive 
structure, the more defensive individual experiencing mood as a 
limited type of overall influence, and the more open individual 
experiencing mood as a total global modulation. 
Clinically, the latter individual while appeanng more affectively 
vital and involved, would herself find the radical shift in outlook, 
attitudes and self-evaluation an unsettling state of affairs. 
Hm.,rever, to recognise this plurality of attitudes, this community 
.of selves, and to give each voice a hearing, is a step towards 
attaining the "truth" of subjectivity. 
Returning to the schematic presentation, it 1.s suggested that 
interpretations (b) and (c) are adequate representations of the 
mood domain "x11 uninterpreted, but as we have seen they are not 
in all cases mutually exclusive. Thus Sentences [formulating or 
expressing (b) AND/OR (c)] 1.s accepted in its conjunctive form as 
an adequate representation of the mood doman "x". uninterpreted, 
1.n terms of the empirical data provided. \{hat can now be said 
about the Metalogical Phase, i.e. a theory for Sentences 
[formulating or expressing (b) AND/OR (c)]? 
Firstly, we have established that the use of linguistic expressions 
employing the.term "mood" indicates that the term is linked with: 
1) Phenomena capable of being reported as felt and concerning 
which various discriminations can be made, including the 
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notion of systematic regularities, correlations with 
different types of circumstance, and with specific cognitive 
and behavioural consequences, as well as 
2) Tendencies tmvards making judgements and appraisals concerning 
oneself and others. 
However, the possibility has been raised that only on a conceptual 
plane can there be a complete separation of these aspects. 
Secondly, ip the abstract it is difficult to see how these disparate 
meaning components or aspects (the one favouring a state and process 
view, the other favouring a cognitive and disposition view) can be 
reconciled. We have also seen that in at least some cases the two 
aspects may be complementary. The solution to the difficulty may 
1 in establishing a two factor model, one that will permit the 
predominance of one factor in some cases and the equal co-existence 
of both factors in other cases. 
A conservative conclusion would be to say that the social-judgemental 
function of mood discourse predominates, but not to the exclusion of 
the function of reporting qualities of affective exper1ence. It is 
most likely that both general functions are necessary to encompass 
the diversity of mood discourse and constitute the core meanings of 
mood terms. A less conservative conclusion would be to say that 
this dual functioning points to two interdependent experiential 
realms: 
1) A realm of the individualts making and projecting affectively 
prompted judgements and evaluations, and 
2) A realm of "private", perhaps socially initiated, but never-
theless felt quali 
Both realms being expressed and made public through mood discourse. 
In any case whichever conclusion is preferred, the data seems to 
resist any sirigle factor simplification. 
The wider ramifications of these issues suggest that the identifi-
cation and re-identification of mood is partially dependent on a 
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public language embedded in a background of social convention, 
habits, traditions, and personal intentions. But what makes mood 
identifiable as a particular individual's mood is its quality of 
feeling, its g~neral interconnectedness, its outward movement or 
its self-encapsulation. This is not to ignore that the quality 
is to some extent parasi c upon the forms of description avail-
able to the individual, and the symbolic portrayals, stabilizations 
and transformations, that he is capable of enacting--be they meagre 
or full; nqr is it to deny that the mood quality may be both 
situated and engendered in a social nexus. It is to stress that 
the quality and energising characteristic of the ~eeling may be 
simultaneously definitive and directional in a wide sense. This 
directional quality of mood is generally given by: 
a longing for; a disappointment over; a questing after 
(though the quest may be uncertain, discontinuous, or 
"poorly inked"); a being or dwelling in self-sequestered 
feeling; a knowing transitively, intransitively or pan-
transitively (feeling arcing over its objects precipitates 
awareness); a sustaining equilibrium between perception 
and bodily need; a movement on behalf of; a placing of 
the self in relation to; an assimilating and accommodating 
of self-qualities and world-qualities; and a succumbing 
over the imperatives of feeling. 
This protean capability of mood, its ability to "infuse" actions, 
and shape attitudes on a natural or constructed horizon, may modify 
the initial primary quality or instigate internal motion that 
results in a change of quality. But it does not eradicate the 
presence of quality, logically or experientially, because simply 
and unavoidably for some subjects mood can· be a style of living 
through the changing qualitative voice of feeling. Certainly it 
1s a "voice" that is socially acquired and moulded, but nonetheless 
it is one \vhich also retains an inner allegiance to its own 
identity and potential; to deny either social r~ality or individual 
unity and self-motion is to have an incomplete understanding of mood. 
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5.11 A Structural Analysis of the Qualitative Data 
In this section I would like to endeavour: to construct a composite 
representation within each of the three categories of mood, positive, 
neutral and negative; and to highlight the salient features both 
within individual representations and across representations. The 
analysis is structural in that the composite representations construe 
mood as a system and seek to articulate this system and the 11 laws" 
or "rules" that govern it. Attention is given to the smooth or 
reticulated surfaces of phenomena, and contributions are made to 
their elaboration, but the primary intent is always a seeking to 
fathom underlying levels and generative conditions. This is to say 
that the surface of all phenomena will be accepted in their engorged 
fullness, but co-ordinately an attempt ~s made to animate, to mark, 
to reveal, and to hand over what is deemed essential, i.e. the 
systemic structures and basic movements. 
The procedure will be to consider in advance the mood descriptions 
and metaphorical portrayals as expressions of mood as a system; the 
causal factors ident ied by subjects themselves will then provide 
the major elements to be related to each other and to the system as 
a whole. In other \.,rords the general structure of the mood category 
is broken down into a set of elements, and the relationships between 
these elements are seen as mutually defining, supporting, and 
amplifying the structure as a whole. Particular stress is g~ven to 
those equivalences or relationships th~t thread, buttress, and 
establish the character and equilibrium of the entire system. 
The analysis adopts both an immanent and a transcendent perspective. 
It locates itself within the textuie of the particular mood system 
and frames an independent vie\vpoint. The system of a particular 
mood category is constructed in order to gain insight into the manner 
of its functioning. In this sense we will have constructed a 
simulacrum (Barthes, 1973), a new meaning in the imitation, a 
refraction through an expressive medium, a presentation of a range 
of moods that is formally coherent and animated by the vectors 
provided by subjects' own descriptions. We thus create a free 
reduplicated organisation of the data that both renders it 
intelligible and provides a route of access into the experien~e of 
mood. 
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Positive Moods 
Descriptive elements s.nd metaphorical portrayals* 
The descriptive elements and metaphorical portrayals are united 
around approximately four themes. The themes are: 
1. The concentration of energy 
2. An irradiation of the environment 
3. Untrammelled movement and communication 
4. Feeling natural and bound to the earth. 
Focusing on the most "elevated" and dynamically charged positive 
moods: the subjects all experienced concentration of energy, 
dilated fullness, they themselves became an irradiating source. 
This concentration of energy may operate as wilful determination, 
proud self-sufficiency, liberating self-acceptance, or as an in-
transitive union 1n consciousness with an ideal object, without 
the intercession of mind or brain. The irradiation comes from 
within as a renaissance of life, a genesis of creative force, a 
spiral ascent between the poles of exaltation and rootedness in 
the earth. This basic expansive movement, which is like an energy 
seeking to spread out and overflow boundaries, is transformed into 
interpersonal sympathy, energetic kindness and appreciation. Its 
social aspect is a natural voluble communication. 
A slight faltering and subliminal disharmony are the first intimation 
that the mood carries within itself its own destruction. Dissolution 
.1s inevitable, for the mood is internally mediated and sustained only 
by its unique intensity--actions are performed because of, on the 
occasion. of, the intensity manifesting. And that which emanates and 
forges an external relationship, no matter the degree of inherent 
purity, creates qualitative division. As a result, there can be a 
dramatic self-immolation in the rift of division before fulfilment 
is achieved, or a more subtle leakage of energy in the production of 
*Note: In these sections the properties of language as an exRressive 
medium are utilized. Facts are presented and the language quality 
"echoes" the mood quality. 
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doubt; a doubt which is a necessary self-constrictive check 
arising from the knowledge of having over-extended oneself. 
Hence the final tentative quality of these moods, the confusion, 
hesitancy and uncertainty that follows in their wake. 
Expressed in grammatical imagery, what was prepositional and con-
junctive becomes an adverbal relation--suddenly there is a 11 \vhen", 
a "whilst", a sundering "whereas". The unity of the mood is lost, 
blown past its peak, and the saffron-scented magical world 
collapses. The vitality and bright illumination are seen to have 
been obversely--the vanguard, herald and corona of disillusion-
ment. Still in the mood's passing something was achieved and one 
particular role in the overall system was enacted, the lineaments 
of a particular type of understanding were drawn. 
The achievement can be gauged from the subjects' mm considerations 
concerning the mood's functioning. The major functions were found 
to be classifiable in this way: 
1. promotes growth, openness and integration 
2. permits self-expression 
3. provides a sense of worth and self-confidence 
4. facilitates positive qualities in personal relationships 
5. gives relaxation; revitalizes. 
The moments of expansion do bring a new percipience--like a fire in 
the dry leaves of everyday life, the limitations and confinements 
of suspicion, indolence and lethargy are consumed; the retarding 
moisture of all things trivial is volatilized to produce trans-
lucently a sense of suspension which is freedom and non-attachment. 
But it is not primarily a particular content of experience that 
predominates, as it is the superorganic process of dimensions 
melding, sources interflowing, and elements being released. The 
mundane ego temporarily dissolves into a pure accelerated conscious-
ness, the time line of cumulative duration bursts outward, the 
curvature of space arcs exponentially, the matrix of localized 
objects and events is absorbed (or immersed) in a greater context. 
This is the "knowledge" of growth, openness and integration. 
Bodily, it is as if the dull machinery of the body had droned itself 
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into oblivion, to be replaced by minutely interwoven sentient 
fibres, the entire body becoming a homogeneous organ of perception; 
parenthetically this is what the classical Greeks called the 
"augoeides" or radiant body. 
In its deeper structure the mood 1s an annihilating appropriation 
of some value or exalted flavour of life--a node of seemingly 
permanent value, or a gravid stasis between the antipodes of un-
restricted excitement and personal security. Hhile these moods 
last they permit a joyful acceptance of facts and events that 
ordinarily would appear foreign or incongruous, and they may 
condone actions that would otherwise be considered excessive or 
even abhorrent. There is a release from the self, a going over 
to others, but it often occurs in a basically impersonal way. 
In these cases the social environment serves as receptacle to the 
mood's turgid dynamism, for the sociable self is often merely the 
veneer of intensity. Should the individual's ft of sharing be 
rebuffed, the generosity transforms into an unpleasant desire for 
retribution. This is the sometimes conditional broadening of 
qualities in inter-personal relationships, given under this condition. 
Yet the mood intermittently shmvs a milder facet, an interfolded 
mysterious silence that bridges turbulent emotion to achieve a 
fulfilment where the irradiating source is itself irradiated. Here 
the mood rests on or overshadows the subject in a warm tranquiliiy, 
a mello,vness .and nurturant interchange. At its best the mood 
becomes a compassion of justice and mercy, the strength of receptivity, 
intuition and creativity--the choice to flow with natural process. 
However, its lmver form is a sentimental outpouring unalloyed by 
resolve or determination. 
There can be a playful exuberance in personal relationships, a 
teasing bantering give and take, or a more serious transvaluation 
of people and activities. Here a sense of worth and self-confidence 
accrues from both self-expression and the reflected warmth of others. 
However, when the subject learns that openness brings its own kind 
of pain and vulnerability, that strife and change are the pre-
condition of achieved stability, a new inflection may occur .. With 
time there comes a congealing hardness, a protective chitinous shell 
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formed from the insufficiency and disappointment of pr1or effusions. 
This may be accompanied by a &-toic pessimism that labours narrotvly 
but diligently "building walls around its own garden", or the 
bitterness of deflated hope leading to a nettled complacency that 
has abdicated from its appointed task--realizing the potential to 
contain all things and create beyond them. 
In the later phases of the experience, fear almost invariably sweats 
to the surface, the mood is almost literally a pressing out of fear. 
As one subject phrased it: 'It enables you to get rid of everything 
within you, anything that has been worrying you, can be expressed. 
I hold nothing back, all my secrets and fears come out.' Figuratively, 
the fear is the concrescence, the bringing to concreteness exteriorly 
of the immaterially compacted collection of threats and o.nxieties 
acquired over a lifetime. What is the connection between the re-
vitalizing function of the mood and fear? I would speculate that 
assuredly the mood revitalizes, it infuses >vhere something has been 
lost--the inner conviction of the supportive quality of life. \.Jho.t 
is the fear? There is a fore-knowledge of the mood's collapse, the 
approaching divestment of strength. The vitality of the mood is in 
part the negativity of fear, a fear feeding off the psychological 
forcefield of "death". This "death" exists on several levels and 1s 
not so much physical dissolution, as the symbol of all absences, 
abandonments, and disabilities. On the most concrete level it is 
a fear of failure in emotional relationships, financial insecurity, 
social disapproval, growing old and losing physical attractiveness 
or desirability, having no one to lean on, or conversely losing 
* one's individuality. Hore abstractly it is a fear of "corruption" , 
'\vorld pollution", "evil", "the untrustworthiness of the world", 
"the condition that things often are not what they appear to be" 
.and "a small inner door opening on the abyss of eternity". 
*Note: Inverted commas indicate that these are provisional contents 
of the fear. 'They are not necessarily a full description of the 
source or objects of th~ fear; they are more forms the fear takes as 
it traverses its own development. 
I have chosen to call them fears rather than anxieties because of 
their defined (though unstable) content, and their directionality. 
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Causal Factors 
The majority of the subjects were of the opinion that their positive 
mood resulted from the interaction between internal potentials and 
external factors. The subjects often stressed the primary role of 
internal potentials: 
'I feel the potential is there inside me and it just needs something 
to bring it out.' 
Here the state of af 1s clear-cut, there is an internal potential 
that can be elicited under the proper conditions; for this subject, 
it was almost as if she were waiting for the correct conjunction of 
conditions in order to express the potential. In this case, as in 
many others, there was a basic need to release and liberate energy, 
and in some way to complete the mood. 
1 
•••• the energy 1s more cted, I know what I want to do with it.' 
This subject had a generally high energy level and strong self-
expressive needs. For her, it was not so much that the mood was 
evoked in her by environmental stimuli, but rather that she was 
constantly seeking to adequate objects to express the energy 
towards. In her case, she was "absorbing" (her \vord) environmental 
stimuli, being activated by and dra\ving vitality from this act of 
absorption; she Has then able to reciprocate with her own inherent 
* energy. 
*Note: This pattern of response has been observed in other 
individuals of a similar personality type. The independent, creative, 
high energy individual util the environment a source of energy 
and stimulation. She processes all stimulation an expressive way, 
giving back, ultimately, some product (energy or construction) that 
bears her individual stamp. For these subjects to attribute the mood 
directly to social or phys logical factors is inadequate, the mood 
is more a way of living, a "form of life". 
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'It comes from within with the help of other people and situations. 1 
Again, the subject sensed the internal origin of her energy, whose 
appropriate "objective correlates" were individuals and social 
situations. 
'I think it comes from within me regardless of the situation ...• Of 
all my moods this is the one which is least directly linked to 
specific situations.' 
Here, the mood was primarily generated from within, but was most 
likely to be expressed in response to the needs of other people. 
The general picture that emerges is the existence of internal 
potentials which can be stimulated, triggered, activated, or drawn 
into mani tation (the word we use will be determined by the 
theoretical orientation that most closely matches the subject's 
experience) by ther one small event (occasionally it is a 
cumulative effect) or larger events. This occurs against a back-
ground of positive social relationships (especially those that give 
a feeling of in-depth communication), and this may result 1n an 
evaluation that all is going well, which will then augment the 
original energy level. This line of reasoning emphasizes the 
possibility that it is the personal value of environmental factors 
aligning with or gear1ng into internal ptitentials and rhythms, 
which responsible for the positive moods. 
How do these causal factors modi the composite representation 
given above? Firstly, they support the contention that the 
energeti~ quality stems from internal potentials. Secondly, they 
also suggest that the energetic quality has a range of pre-conditions, 
which include social and evaluative factors--the energetic quality 
occurs within a matrix of other relevant factors. It is most likely 
that the impetus of the mood arises internally, the form it takes, 
how it is manifested, is influenced by a wider matrix.· The composite 
representation has indicated some of the major variations on this 
theme. It should be pointed out that we have not be~n able to 
demonstrate a necessary causal sequence for these moods, however we 
have presented the major causal elements and indicated some of their 
interconnections. 
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Neutral Moods 
'" Descriptive elements and metaphorical portrayals 
In this section attention is devoted to one type of neutral mood, 
i.e. detached passivity, it is a mood of common occurrence that has 
received relatively little clinical attention in comparison with 
elated and depressed moods. Evidence is provided to suggest that 
"detached passivity" is a class composed of more than one type, 
each type however is integrated around one or more of these themes: 
1. A suspens1on of affect which represents a balancing of forces 
e.g. 'I feel calm, but it's a tense sort of calm. I feel relaxed 
and have no need to do anything active. I 1 relaxed like 
a piece of foam rubber and watch the trees and grass and 
water. Thoughts pass through my head like butterflies. 
Somehow this calm doesn't feel so natural. Maybe it's a 
deliberate effort. I suspect that it is.' 
While on the surface the subject's mood is pass1ve, impartible, 
vapidly impoverished, inwardly her thoughts and deeper feelings are 
in conflict, energetically opposed; the surface balance is 
momentary, a balance point of minutely adjusted tensions. 
2. A saturation of affect following over-stimulation 
e.g. 'I see grey clouds and all shades of grey shadows. I feel 
indifferent and anaesthetised. I feel like being completely 
alone and unproductive, and I wish I could go a\vay some 
place where there were no people for a while. I feel the 
need to recuperate.' 
This muzzy, muggy, grey saturation is a uniform quality that dominates 
the sensorium, inhibiting any interests, strivings, or motor tendencies. 
The subject is unable to escape the event-horizon of her mvn lavish 
inertia. Her resources have been exhausted--bleached, benumbed, 
*Note: Again, the language employed will attempt to reflect 'the 
quality of the moods themselves--repetitive, contingent, slightly 
disconnected, yet with occasional flashes of energy. 
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becalmed, she is separated from vitality by the measureless distance 
of indifference. The only solution appears to be retreat for the 
sake of recuperation. 
3. A detached clarity 
e.g. 'I am relaxed and detached, as a body I seem to float away 
from people and things. But my awareness deepens, things 
look clearer and sharper. It tends to happen when I am 
with people who annoy or irritate me, or it can occur in 
natural surroundings. I think this detachment helps me to 
see and understand all ~he things that are happening around 
me. It's a mood I value because I am there and clear, not 
clouded by distracting thoughts and feelings.' 
The subject disengages from her habitual pattern of awareness, 
personal concerns are calcined into a subtle vehicle for vi lant 
attention. She is not body, not object, not quite pure awareness 
--yet the ego stands down, stands aside, relinquishes its control 
to a silent passivity. She .becomes an emptiness that watches but 
does not judge, touches but does not enclose, receives but does not 
possess, gives but will not be abused. Desires, expectations, all 
instrumental strivings are abandoned, and the environment 1s 
permitted to shine forth in its "original" qual-ities. 
4. A lethargy ~•hich 1s the beginning of depression 
e.g. 'This mood is a sort of blanking out of everything so I 
don't even have to think. That would be too much effort 
and the actual thoughts \Wuld be depressing they'd be so 
negative. Also, everything seems so still like there's 
no movement. The air around me feels heavy just as I 
feel heavy with negat dull emotion. My heart hardly 
beats like even that's too much effort. There is a dull 
core inside me compelling me to inaction. I feel compelled 
to stay still as though I were made of stone.' 
This mood combines an element of saturation (theme 2 above) with 
a lethargy drifting toward depression. There is a core of dull 
emotion--monotonous, monopolar, mononucleated; gradually 
encroaching upon and enveloping the subject, the mood becomes an 
overriding modulation of all major organismic factors. The subject's 
additional comment gives further insight into the mood: 'It 
originates from being disturbed of peace, by being disrupted of 
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peace. From frustrations, irritations, aggravations, insecurity 
and a sense of unhappiness, discontent and instability. My not 
having the ability to cope with bad situations and overlook or 
surpass them. ' 
These detached passive moods sometimes follow a prescribed sequence, 
with an initial phase, an intermediate phase, and a terminal phase. 
An overview suggests that initially there can be a detached sensi-
tivity, this may be follm..red by an intermediate phase of 
indifference, confusion, or fragility, which has the pm..rer to pass 
over into a terminal phase comprising a depression streaked \vith 
anxiety, or on the other hand, it may result in the beginning of a 
positive mood. In many cases (though not all) the detached passivity 
is a transition mood between elation and depression. This is, 
however, only a general trend, there are many exceptions and no 
invariant sequence. 
The onset of the passive detached mood is usually gradual, the 
individual may feel drowsy and uncertain about what is going on 
around her. Typically, there is enervation and sensations of 
"floating". As the mood progresses and assumes a definite quality 
and character, the individual develops a heightened awareness of 
environmental detail, the perception of form, texture, and density 
is differentiated (though colour perception is usually inhibited). 
One subject described her heightened a\..rareness as: ' .... like an 
insect with little antennae flickering all over'. The body as a 
kinesthetic field is experienced as a 'floating non-descriptive 
mass' whose importance recedes into the background. The ordinary 
concrete schema of mental functioning is absorbed by the evanescent 
quality of the sense data received and projected. The sense of 
material properties is replaced by patterns of form and quality 
held in existence by particular prominent details. The individual 
is not aware of herself, but rather of subtleties and nuances 1.n 
objects around her. She moves and behaves without conscious will 
--drifting, floating, she is silent and calm, enclosed in the 
diaphanous gauze of muted thoughts and feelings. The mood is 
vulnerable to disruption and termination at this point by any strong 
external stimulation. 
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From this initial state several different transformations are 
possible, the detachment may devolve into a kind of indifference, 
confusion may set in, or the original sensitivity may develop into 
fragility--a condition where the individual feels open and 
vulnerable, incapable of meeting the demands of her environment. 
In the case of indifference, there is a blank feeling, a recycling 
dull apathy, a motionless lethargy which recalls and amplifies past 
happiness, views the future with uncertainty and trepidation, and 
abides with an increasing tension, futility, and a sense of bi'tter-
ness. In the case of confusion, the individual is unable to work 
problems out in her mind, difficulties and complications loom 
large, there may be a sense of deflation from unfulfilled ideals 
and expectations. There is a sense of being overpowered by every-
thing. This often combines ~vith an a\vareness of personal failures 
and shortcomings, which solidifies into an unmitigated self-
criticism. Generally, the individual feels confined within her 
thoughts, unable to break out--limited, restricted and stifled. 
The mood may terminate at this point should problems begin to work 
out, or if the possibility of a clear solution opens up the way. 
In the fragile inflection, the individual feels like cringing back, 
creeping away into a protective shell, but she knmvs the fear that 
the shell may crack. She experiences a desire to escape but is 
unable to do so, the mood itself prohibits it. The individual may 
feel awkward, clumsy, restless, but she is afraid to move to act. 
A balance point is established where she can be pushed any way by 
external events; she needs to remain still, she needs something to 
happen, but her brittle condition is threatened by the disorganizing 
power of external stimulation. Bodily perception is relatively 
heightened in this inflection, but it has a negative quality. As 
one subject put it: 'If my mood had a body to suit it, the body 
would be a glass egg-shaped one, completely transparent and empty. 1 
These different variations tend to converge on a uniform terminal 
state, an anxious emptiness on the borderline of. depression. Here, 
both reliable aspects of the environment and determinate aspects of 
the self-concept are lost. Consequently there may be a need to 
collect objects around one for the reassurance of their palpability, 
or a need to "ingest" food, ideas, personal relationships, to feel 
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solid and corporeal. Yet there is a fear of multiplicity - of 
people, of objects, none offering the required intimacy, the 
concrete rootedness, the density of security. Lethargy, confusion, 
fragility, have passed over into a tense void, the sense of frag-
mented darkness, enveloping darkness, a burgeoning darkness, and 
immanent personal collapse. Again, there often the sense of 
interior movements, primitive atavistic swirlings, the correlative 
need to grasp onto something, the need to be accepted, reassured, 
embraced and guided by something more powerful than the self. In 
this state the bodily perception given by organic sensations 
which suggest compression and standing waves within a hollow 
darkness. As one subject phrased it: 'I am most a\oJare of all 
inside my body in this mood, it feels empty but tight .... I feel 
mixed up inside. I feel as though something is moving inside me 
but I don't know where to.' 
The structure of these detached pass~ve moods, their qualitative 
uniformity supported by inward planes of feeling, capable of a 
series of transformations and thematic inflections, invites the 
linguistic comparison to a language whose idiographic roots can 
be brought together to form meaning clusters and permutations with 
either harmonious or disharmonious results. If we consider the 
passive detached moods from th perspective two roots would be 
discerned--a root of "stagnation" united to a root of "interior 
movements" to produce an entity suggesting the general condition 
of motion bounded by insufficient means, i.e. motion arrested 
through lack of a proper vehicle. 
The mood itself as a "language" or "system of discourse" would 
employ verbs of action tending towards a des end, but with 
action aborted, retroverted, or restrained from within. There 
would be a high frequency for the prepositive "or", the conditionals 
"if", "depending upon", and "in conjunction <-Jith". General relations 
would be commonly framed, but of a tenuous nature, always qualif 
by the particular (as the grey of the sensorium ,was orientated 
around prominent details). The greatest deficiency of this 
"language" would be the overall lack of assimilation of its component 
grammatical parts, its insufficient syntax, i.e. the terminal,phase 
of the mood which may be an anxious vacuity--a fulfilment of the 
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mood's threat, and the denial of its prom1se. 
Causal Factors 
One key to the presence and operation of causal factors for this 
mood is indicated by the gradual build-up of the mood. This 
suggests a ser1es of external events interacting with internal 
potentials and culminating in the passive detached type of mood. 
Subjects most frequently affirmed that the onset appeared to be 
the end point of a step-wise progression, rather than an acute 
precipitation. The environmental input or triggers most often 
cited were psycho-social situations where the individual found 
herself in uncongenial company--with the anticipation of it being 
a "no-exit" type of situation. However, it should also be noted 
that the occurrence of almost any sudden and unexpected stimulation 
that affects the individual's sensibility may produce a similar 
detached, depersonalised reaction. In addition it was not unusual 
for the individual to find herself Ln such a mood upon waking--
suggesting the role of dream activity as a causal factor. It may 
be that vivid dream imagery makes the transition to normal waking 
consc1ousness especially difficult. 
The general picture that emerges is that of an open, sensitive, 
susceptible individual coping with a range and variety of intense 
stimulation--interpersonal situations, work demands, and the rush 
of daily activity. She is required to divide and parcel her time, 
to distribute herself perspicaciously between interests, responsL-
bilities, and commitments. At the same time she is possessed of 
ideals and expectations for the future~ which may be discrepant 
with her actual activities. She senses a mounting tension, 
engendered conjointly by pressures, an impinging environment (or 
the mood may make the environment appear impinging), and strong 
emotions, all occurring amidst her own natural cycle of emotion, 
her fluctuating self-concept--a self-concept that is attenuated, 
buffeted and shaped, divided from its original unity by the environ-
ment. In the midst of this complex state of affairs, triggered by 
a cumulative overload of stimulation (or a single event profoundly 
affecting her sensibility), she consciously or unconsciously closes 
herself off, partially shuts down, and englobes herself in the 
protective covering of the mood. She becomes absorbed in its 
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inward orientated quality, and the external appreciation of minute 
and aesthetic detail. In this state her different potentials for 
feeling are muted (in some cases entirely blanked out), but their 
vaporous shadows continue to recycle through her mind. 
Hm-1 do the causal factors modify the composite representation given 
above? Firstly they support the contention that in many cases 
there exists a microstructure (which is a collection of individually 
divergent feelings) underlying and contributing to the mood's 
uniform quality. Again, as in the case of the positive moods, the 
neutral moods occur within a matrix of other relevant factors. 
Secondly, the gradual onset of the mood suggests that the mood may 
represent a cumulative effect. There may be a critical point 
beyond which the degree of intensity and complexity of stimulation 
consciously or unconsciously induces the mood. The mood then 
becomes an affective "energency reaction" serving an adaptational 
function. 
\~e have perhaps understressed the role of personal disappointment 
and its accompanying sadness, certainly ~n some cases it is an 
important aspect. The overall evidence suggests that the mood ~s 
determined both by internal conditions--individual needs, the 
cyclical flux of affect, the priming of different facets of the 
self-concept, and environmental stimulation. 
Negative Hoods 
Descriptive elements and metaphorical portrayals 
In this section subjects' depressed moods will be considered. They 
represented a spectrum ranging from what by standard classification 
would be termed: endogenous depressions (depression arising from 
within, having a sudden onset, and not obviously correlated with 
environmental circumstances) through agitated depressions, to 
reactive depressions (depression externally precipitated, with often 
a more gradual onset, and correlated with known 'environmental circum-
stances). In terms of qualitative descriptions and portrayals, 
there appeared to be relatively little differentiation between the 
endogenous and reactive types. However, the agitated depressions 
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were distinguished by strong elements of tension, restlessness and 
anxiety. 
Subjects reported that their depressions were lead-weighted, without 
light, airless, dense, a series of clumsy and restricted motions. 
In many cases the depression could be assigned a general bodily 
locus with a definite pattern of progression, i.e. for some it 
often began as a weight in the head or throat area, gradually 
"dragging itself" down and through the entire body. For others it 
was a hurt and hollow feeling in the body cavity, radiating out\vard 
to be terminated in exhausted ineffective limbs. Cognitively, the 
result is a pessimistic outlook and a type of tunnel vision. As 
one subject metaphorically expressed it: 'I see green grass, 
thick bush, but there are enormous dark trees restricting my 
vision, they are forming a canopy and obstructing a wider view.' 
Perception and interpretation are altered so that commonplace 
objects take on a new penumbra of meanlng; distorted by the mood 
quality, they are seen out of perspective, displaced, dislocated 
and dispossessed. 
Particularly in the cases of more endogenous depressions, there 
may be·the feeling of stimulus abundance and overflow, of being 
unable to act efficiently and adjust adequately in the face of 
disorganization and an increasing heaviness and lethargy. In the 
words of one subject: 'You try to stop it and can't. You can only 
stop it by ceasing to exist. Not because you don't care, but 
because it is too overwhelming, you are dragged dmm and quartered 
by the feeling.' Acutely stressful to the subjects is the painful 
self-awareness of not being able to adjust, to adapt, or to 
accommodate--the imperatives of the mood being beyond rational, 
wilful, or affective control. The environment is encountered as 
an inescapable reflection of the depression: dark shadows, 
suspended animation, disorder, disarray, disarrangement, and active 
hostility. This reduplication of negative qualities produces 
feelings and attitudes of self-pity, self-indulgence, self-
centredness arid despair. Physically, there is an inability to 
stir or respond, a loss of all elasticity. 
Subjects often express the mood's negativity to the people closest 
to them. They become hostile, critical, irritably destructive, yet 
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there is often an ~nner vo~ce saying: 'This is not me', 'This is 
my chemistry', 'It is my mood speaking not me', 'You don't under-
stand how bad it is inside'. As one subject said: 'You are 
willing to take responsibility for your words and actions but 
somehow it isn't what you wanted to say, it's too negative, 
critical, offensive. Others resent it, and a vicious circle ~s 
established.' The subject may see calm composed people around 
her and try to emulate them, to be lightly rhythmical with a 
facade of self-control, but the attempt fails, nothing happens, 
body and mind refuse to ease off--the desire for oblivion returns 
triumphant. The subject may then wait for the pro~ess to run its 
course, but the ponderous density becomes too much to bear. Then 
suddenly as quickly as it appeared, the mood lifts, and the subject 
is feeling energised and active. 
In the more reactive type depressions the subject typically feels 
deflated, discouraged and fatigued. She feels like sitting alone 
and thinking, everything appears inertial and devitalised, nothing 
worthwhile ever seems to happen. The subject is often confused, 
feels she is a failure both socially and academically. She commonly 
reports she is ''trying to find herself'', to comprehend what she ~s 
doing in these circumstances, what meaning her activities have, 
where the larger perspective is, how to obtain a clear view of 
herself and those around her. In the background of the mood is 
often a potential for happiness that seeks fulfilment, to break 
the surface and overflow her life. As one subject put it: 'The 
mood is reaching out at someone whom I can't find. I desire to be 
independent and free to search, at times to drift peacefully, I'm 
looking for something--peace, happiness, intimacy, maybe it's a 
way of life.' 
The agitated depressions are characterised by high levels of 
anxiety, tension and restlessness. The body may be perceived as 
giving rise to contradictory sensations and feelings, e.g. 'My 
body is uncomfortable, restless, and lethargic. Ideally, it 
would sleep first, then go flying above the whole world surveying 
the mess.' The subject typically feels very jittery, extremely 
restless, and prognosticates that the whole world is going to,fall 
down and collapse on her. Irritability, annoyance and a general 
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intolerance may come to the fore, in one subject's v~ew: 'I tend 
to get annoyed at everything and anything. I snap back at any-
thing, lack a lot of confidence and also hate being alone doing 
anything in a crowd of people, yet can't stand having anyone 
around me when alone. I feel like shutting myself off from any-
thing that might annoy or upset me, living in a dream world. A 
desire to be completely inanimate and feelingless.' 
Subjects tend to feel hopeless about their ability to change, and 
can feel the mood becoming what seems like a permanent part of them. 
However, this may alternate with periods of weeping and hysteria--
the subject coming to the conclusion that she's made a bie mistake 
in everything she's ever done or decided to do. She develops a 
great distrust in everything, a sense of inferiority in comparison 
with everything and everyone. In the terminal phase she is in-
different, exhausted and everything appears unreal. (The emphasis 
on the words "anything", "everything", "everyone", "nothing" in 
subjects' descriptions indicate the global pervasive influence of 
these moods.) 
The mood may produce a desire for an empty void of blackness where 
there is absolute quiet, yet the hope persists for some type of 
alleviation from the dark flux of feelings. In one subject's 
words: 'I feel dark and would like to be quiet. I feel hollow 
and empty, I have a need to touch and feel the warmth and contact 
of a living thing. I am depressed, tense, sad, tired, vague and 
disquieted.' In its extreme form the mood may combine exceptionally 
high levels of tension with the heaviness, confusion, and self-
depreciation of other forms of depression, e.g. 'There ~s a terrible 
tension around my neck area--l feel like screaming, my \vhole body 
aches with tension. I feel in a mess. I don't know where to go 
or where I'm going. I feel so helpless and stupid.' 
In the most extreme form, the subject may be filled with disgust, 
rage, and phantasies of mutilation. The more typical depressive 
aspects recede into the background and an intense loathing emerges: 
I'm so full of fury and disgust, I don't know where to 
begin. I'm tongue-tied with disgusted feelings. People 
are the most loathesome creatures, I wish I \vas ·out of 
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this dirty world or a cat or dog. Nothing misses out 
on my repulsion for the world. A bad spirit has jinxed 
my day and is on my trail hijacking all the moves I try 
to make. I feel like spitting out my hatred to everyone. 
I feel I just want to out of this terrible world and 
escape all repulsive' situations. I feel so helpless, 
depressed and sad. I feel so polluted by the world, 
what's in it, and my anti-feelings. I'm so trapped I 
feel like crying and swearing, and destroying. I'd love 
to get a loathesome person and torture them and tear them 
slowly into tiny pieces and make a pattern out of their 
mutilated bodies, teeth, hair, blood, bones, skin, 
internal organs, etc. I want to rot away and be completely 
depraved so I can fit safely into this world. 
The factors responsible for this energetic rage and loathing within 
the context of depression were disappointment and a loss of 
confidence in interpersonal relationships where the subject had 
entrusted her feelings, sensitivity, and emotional dependency. 
She had permitted herself to rely upon the strength and integrity 
of others, only to find them deficient and inconsistent. Yet at 
the same time the mood was an exemplar of a series of such moods 
that had a pattern of cyclical recurrence. That is to say, 
internal conditions of bodily weakness, tension, anxiety, and 
emotional instability when coupled with the subject's idealistic 
value system predetermined the necessary occurrence of this type 
of mood. The collapse of hope and idealism (as well as their 
resurgence) was guaranteed by the very psycho-physiological 
structures that promulgated them in the first place. Thus the 
mood \vas hope disappointed, confidence betrayed, an energetic 
catharsis, and a type of adaptation to a more fundamental psycho-
physiological constitution and personality structure. 
It should also be noted that some subjects, over a given period of 
time, may experience all three types of standard depression. The 
forlm.;ring example is data for a single subject collected over a 
one month period. The first report indicates a reactive depression 
(of comparatively short duration) occurring in. response to environ-
mental pressures, the second report suggests a relatively endogenous 
depression, and the last report portrays an agitated depression. 
First Report: 
I had all different feelings today. Firstly, I was 
pressurized and tense, but it levelled off; then a bit 
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undecided, uncertain, confused, then everything was 
alright. And I'm just feeling hot and sweaty but quite 
happy and relaxed. Afterwards I felt depressed and 
unhappy and wandered about sort of demented. Then I 
heard uplifting music and. it lifted me out of my trance 
and depression. 
(Incidently, this is also a.-good example of "mood11 as variability 
in feeling.) 
Second Report: 
There's no reason I just feel depressed and disorientated. 
I'm tired of not doing anything productive. I'm too 
lethargic to make a real effort to get out of this rut. 
Third Report: 
I have this hard core of agony inside myself. My problems 
seem so trivial but I'm helpless as though some terrible 
parasite has attacked me. I feel I'm bleeding from within. 
I feel on the verge of nausea, great insecurity and fear. 
I feel so small and helpless and soft and aching, a painful 
gnawing of my insides. I'm tense and getting all in a 
panic, I'm nervous and jittery, it's got to the stage where 
I \vish I could run away from all people and situations and 
do nothing. 
Although as in the case of the data just presented depression may 
be heavy, oppressive, 'a hard core of agony' without remittal, it 
can also be the vehicle for cognitive and emotional change. 
Depression can be the beginning of understanding and a new self-
development. It may incite a comprehension that can accept the 
separation between individual desires and the norms or trends 
.sponsored by wider social, biological and environmental realms. 
It may show the individual that what is desired or deemed important 
will always be tested by the biological mechanics of her own body, 
the collective pathways offered by society, and the natural laws 
of the environment; that the best solutions must harmonize these 
three realms. From another perspective depress~on may permit the 
struggle for change and the voyage of self-discovery--a night 
passage over bitter-sweet waters which laves mind and body 
abrasively clean. It may illuminate the gulf and secure the 
perennial tension between !!ideals!! and !!concrete givens", an 
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irremediable tension that is the prerequisite for assimilation 
and forward motion. It may create and open up the wound of all 
differences, failures, and insufficiencies, but it also instills 
the dynamic stress felt before all thresholds or new beginnings. 
' It may show the individual that discouragement, loss, dis-
appointment, emotional decay--each catabolic process is tangible 
and given with the world, yet constituted by subjectivity as a 
value and meaning structure. 
Through depression, the individual may "see" her own tendencies 
to misperceive and misconceive; may "see" the instability and 
unreliability of any single world-view or value, the distortions 
established by her own limited experience, particular physiology, 
and personal history. It may suggest to the individual that 
"reality" is brought from the indeterminate to the determinate 
whenever .any choice is made, value invested, or action performed; 
that these "elements" are given validity by the consistency with 
which they are lived. It may provide an insight that clarity and 
harmony are simple openness, even within the internal opposition 
of depression. It may suggest that to lose what she cherishes 
most (at the moment) also to relinquish a sentimental clinging, 
to slough off one pattern for a new energy and continuing growth. 
Considering the depressive moods from the perspective of an idio-
graphic language two roots would be discerned--a root of "tense 
compression" united to a root of "impeded motion" to produce an 
entity suggesting the condition of being extended but not 
established, constituted but not supported or strengthened, being 
inflexible and refractory as well as adverse and rebellious; an 
entity tending towards emptiness, but contained by density and 
oppression. 
Causal Factors 
Some subjects reported that they were not aware of reasons for 
their depressed moods, which is consonant with the classification 
of endogenous depression--a mood produced by internal, biochemical, 
often cyclically organized factors. These moods were often 
characterized by the subjects as "physical moods" with qualitative 
attributes of "ponderous density" and general bodily discomfort~ 
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Despite the physiological contributions, in almost all cases, 
psycho-social conditions and the individual's personality structure 
were either primary or contributing factors. As shown in section 
4.9 the psycho-social factors most frequently cited were: losing 
trust and confidence in others, being confronted by problems that 
appear to have no solution, uncertainty and confusion conc'erning 
work and friends, dissatisfaction with one's own social skills 
and responsiveness, and monotony or tedium in daily routine. The 
quality, depth, and integrity of personal relationships is one of 
the most common and important factors. One subject expressed this 
is a particularly clear, insightful, and ingenuous way: 
The mood occurs when I've been hurt in some way by other 
people and there are things I can't escape from. In this 
mood, when you've been hurt by someone you lose the pain 
in nature, somehow to hurt is okay, you become bigger 
than it is, and you are filled with everything hurt, 
happiness and sadness. Then I can see all the good in 
people even though they have hurt me in some way. And 
yet the mood seeks a happiness without people, because 
you don't want to see through people to know what's going 
on. It sickens me that people deceive. The mood has 
latent phases, when there is a collection of moods all 
together at once. The production of a mood depends upon 
the dominant mood previously there. 
The maJOr theme of causal significance is an injured sensitivity 
from interpersonal relationships, but it is supported and shaped 
into the quality of the mood by the subject's own personality. 
She is able to surmount the personal injury and transmute the pain 
into a sharper perception and a deeper understanding. The presence 
of different affects, intense, poignant, penetrating, combined with 
a degree of optimism, enable her to distinguish and accept the co-
existence of positive and negative qualit s 1n other people. 
Happiness becomes something that is created by the self independ-
ently of personal contact, not that it excludes personal intimacy, 
but rather refuses to make it instrumental to happiness. An 
interesting aspect (expressed with some frequency) contributing to 
the qualitative character of the mood, is not wanting to see 
through other people or strip their masks from them, recognising 
their inability to withstand their own individual "truth". 
The general picture of causal factors that emerges is one of a 
complex interaction between internal biochemical factors, hier-
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archically ordered personality factors, cognitive and affective 
factors, and environmental input especially psycho-social factors. 
The relative contribution of each type of factor will vary from 
individual to individual and from mood to mood for a particular 
individual. It is not possible at this juncture to establish 
(isolate and measure) the vectorial effect in each case. However, 
as an overall schema, it may be said that there is a physiological 
base, often functioning cyclically, that provides the impetus and 
the preconditions for the felt quality of the mood. Closely 
associated with this physiological substrate is the personality 
structure, the total collection and predominant subsets of dis-
positions to act, feel, and respond. Refining this generalisation 
somewhat, the dimensions of personality structure and physiological 
substrate are ~n interaction with each other. Conceptually, they 
are independent, but most likely mutually influencing on levels of 
lower-order abstraction. The personality structure in particular 
may be a reaction to, or ~n some cases a defence against, an 
unstable or vacillating physiology. 
The physiological substrate (with its possibly cyclical alterations) 
tends to promulgate a sequence of qualitative feelings and an 
impetus, e.g. dynamic qualities experienced as "bad", "good", 
"neutral" ... etc. The personality structure mediates between this 
domain and the environmental domain. It is important to see that 
the environmental domain also manifests conditions sequentially 
(though not usually cyclically) that are favourable or unfavourable 
to facilitating or inhibiting particular phases of the physiological 
domain. Thus environmental conditions that may appear generally 
"positive" to the average person, may not be consonant with a 
particular phase of the physiological substrate for another 
individual. There can be a summation .effect where the quality and 
intensity of environmental events combine with the quality and 
intensity of the mood cycle phase. In other cases environmental 
I 
events may be interpreted in terms of the physiological phase that 
predominates. This LS the converse of the principle that physio-
logical arousal may be interpreted in terms of environmental 
stimulation and the cognitions available to the individual. It 
is my experience that in some cases this interaction between Rhysio-
logical phases and personality structure is what gives the mood its 
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pervasive quality and influence. 
The individual who is "moody" in this way will have needs, goals, 
and a multi-faceted self-concept determined by prior learning and 
situated within the matrix of physiological and personality factors. 
She will learn, mature, and progress and meet with the same develop-
mental crises as anyone else, however, all events will turn through 
the poles of her qualitative mood cycle precipitating psychological 
structures with just this polar foundation. For example, a crisis 
experienced when 1n a good mood (energetic, optimistic, dutwardly 
orientated) will be interpreted, responded to, and accommodated 
differently than it would .be in a more negative mood, and in the 
absence of salient environmental events, the mood cycle may "create" 
events and circumstances to match the particular mood. 
How do the causal factors modify the composite representations 
given above? Firstly, they support the contention that psycho-
social factors play either an important secondary role, or a primary 
role in the production and maintenance of the depressive mood. 
Secondly, for some subjects there is a definite often cyclically 
operating physiological contribution. The subjects who experience 
these rhythmical alterations in feeling tone may exhibit all three 
types of depression--endogenous, agitated and reactive. In the 
"neutral phase" of the cycle psycho-social conditions may precip-
itate a reactive depression, while the "negative phase" may bring 
the heavy endogenous type depression and/or an agitated depression. 
Thirdly, it is important to stress that 1n some cases environmental 
and cognitive factors may determine the type of interpretation 
placed on the physiological arousal, while in other cases the 
physiological activation will determine the interpretation and 
evaluation of environmental and cognitive conditions. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Mood as Concept and Experience 
The Concept 
"Mood" is not exclusively a logical form (~a logical form applied, it 
is the most general affective parameter); "mood" is not completely 
reducible to grammatical vectors and restraints (as a vector it functions 
prepositionally and connectively, lodged in the "gap" between personality 
and behaviour, or between "self" anq "world"); mood is not exclusively 
a boundary form of affective discourse (as a boundary form it is capable 
of positing both individual qualitative-experience and social intentions); 
"mood" not exclusively a class of functions and behaviours (as such a 
class it is highly elastic, defined by a range of idiosyncratic functions 
and behaviours). "Mood" refers to a type of organized inflection in the 
subtle or mundane current of affective life. Mood is (and may denote) 
not only a personal liability, but also a sensitivity, an appropriation 
of individuality and a self-revealing in an inimical or nurturant world. 
Metaphysically, this points to the partial "truth" and "error" of mood. 
The world is perhaps humanistically neutral, but capable of receiving 
and corroborating (for a time) any value consistently projected. 
It is important to take cognizance of the oscillation ~n reference 
peculiar to the concept of mood. "Hood" operating in a discriminate or. 
indiscriminate mode may sequentially, simultaneously, or cyclically, 
refer to any of these conceptions: 
1. protracted feeling states of moderate or high intensity 
2. quickly changing or vacillating elements of affect 
3. general feeling tone 
4. susceptibility to spells of irritability and bad temper 
5. peripheral affective shadings, background elements and structures 
of potential affect 
6. basic desires or inclinations 
7. some combination of affect, attitude, self-concept and perceptual 
set 
8. a collection of behaviours, or higher order organizations of affect 
and behaviour 
9. a synthetic unit of "seeing", "feeling" and "being"; a sensitivity 
and resonance uniting consciousness with the environment and 
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revealing aspects of the self structure. 
An analysis of the concept mood has suggested these elements as conceptually 
necessary: "state of mind", "feeling", "inclination", "disposition" and 
"pervasiveness". 
An analysis of the concept 11 mood" based on empirical data provided by this 
study has suggested these elements as conceptually necessary: "mood" 
should be viewed as: a state of mind or feeling, pervasive in nature, 
having a causal effect, resulting from both internal and external factors, 
and bearing some similarities to the concept "attitude". 
The psycho-linguistic approach v~a language acts has established "mood" 
as referring both to feeling qualities and acts of social-evaluative 
i udgement. 
The Experience 
(enumeration and linguistic portrayal) 
The author is aware of the inadequacy of definition by enumeration--its 
arbitrariness, its disunity and potential capitulation to emotional 
dictates; nevertheless having "listened" to many moods, and to speak 
them in a language more symbolic than standard scientific discourse, ~n 
a language as densely compact as some moods themselves, I would say: 
mood can be an enthusiasm, ~ filling in or up, a pour~ng out, or a quick 
evaporation; can be the scent of old secrets, stillborn hopes and 
vengeful needs; can be a clanging, clashing, clamouring will to strife; 
can be a play, rhythm, and commingling of light, or a leaden haze of 
guilt, self-pity, and estrangement; can be a stubborn self-serving pride 
of life, a shallow narcissism, and cloying illusions parading as strength; 
can be a slow wayward return to commitment, or a glimpse of harmony--
rootless, open and self-shining; can be emotion recklessly in advance 
of itself, impatient, intolerant, not-knowing, or a warm btending, a 
\veav1.ng, an elemental interlacing; can be despair spilling over, 
cosseted ~n langour, or moulded into passionless intimacy; can be dis-
satisfaction, disillusion, a mezzotint of indolent grey, or a stark 
insufficiency; can be a shrinking, a cowering, or a soft sacramental 
yielding; can be conciliation, an absolving, or a bitter vermiculated 
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understanding; can be energy sparkling, glittering, and dazzling, or 
retroverted into fear, absence, and abandonment; can be a flush of 
ecstasy, an exaltation, gall-splattering darkness, or simple trust. 
The clinical data of this study when taken in conjunction with the 
theoretical analyses of Chapter 1 suggest conclusions that can best be 
formulated as the "attributes11 of mood, The general attributes to be 
offered are formulations proceeding directly from the clinical data with 
a minimum of theoretical processing and interference. The perspectival 
attributes are features of mood established from the perspe·ctive of 
special models and metaphors of "mood". Following this presentation, 
a clinical construction of the structure and functioning of mood is set 
out. It is important to note that as a system the construction combines 
logically incongruous elements, in this sense it is not a unified 
system, but rather a collection of clinically useful principles and 
markings. 
Mood Attributes 
General Attributes 
1. Global modulation 
(a) mood influences all major psychological variables, i.e. cognitive, 
affective, conative and physiological variables; the individual 
is constrained to feel, think, speak, and act in characteristic 
ways. 
(b) this modulation sensitizes, attunes, projects values, and 
establishes a matrix of probabilistic interactions with the 
environment. 
2, Organismic arousal 
(a) mood represents an activation of the individual's physiological, 
instinctual, and motivational subsystems. 
(b) mood generates the need for discharge or energy or a particular 
quality. 
3. Perception and environmental interactions 
(a) mood alters perception and interactions with the environment 1n 
systematic ways; e.g. in an elated mood the subject perceives 
positive, energetic and beneficent qualities of the environment, 
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expands her circle of relationships, may seek out other similarly 
affected individuals. 
(b) mood produces a selective perception to maintain, confirm, augment, 
~ to overset, disconfirm and cancel its existence; e.g. 
accelerating self-depreciation in depression; elation may operate 
to overset its own energetic quality. 
4. Self-concept 
(a) mood primes particular aspects of the self-concept; e.g. neutral 
moods may activate a series of "dependent", "indifferent", 
"fragile" self-concept components. 
(b) mood expresses a particular unit of the self-concept; e.g. 
neutral moods may (depending on the environment situation and 
motivational needs) combine several aspects of the self-concept 
into determinate units, e.g. 'I am a person who is searching for 
something, a way of life.' 
Perspectival Attributes 
(attributes articulared by different theoretical perspectives) 
logical or ideal fulfilment, e.g. the terminal point of depression is 
often exhaustion and depersonalization--followed subsequently by an 
energized anticipation. 
2. From a process viewpoint (t..rhich often incorporates a teleology): 
mood has determinate stages and required balance points which it 
traverses over time, e.g. detached passivity may have a gradual onset, 
pass through a phase of confusion, a phase of lethargy, indifference, 
or fragility, before reaching a terminal phase bordering on depression. 
3. From a state viet..rpoint (which may or may not incorporate features of 
the process viewpoint): mood constitutes a psychological centre that 
is a collection of feeling?, thoughts, impulsions, etc. with a degree 
of organization and interaction between elements; it may be associated 
with the deployment of energy that has a charact~ristic intensity, 
direction, and quality; e.g. a mood of sadness may comprise regret," 
sorrow, and recriminations, organized around attempts at restitution, 
replacement and the enshrining in memory of lost or damaged "objects" 
in a tender and idealized way. It may deploy energy of moderate· 
intensity directed toward past events. 
-481-
4. From a structural viewpoint: mood is a hierarchically organized set 
of elements, often operating through a feedback mechanism, and having 
an historically determined "form" and mode of operation; e.g. some 
/ 
types of elation may have historically been generated in response to 
contact with natural surroundings and interpersonal relationships, 
but from a present time perspective they may represent an immediate 
fusion with an independent centre of energy (although the centre is 
piedetermined at subliminal levels by past events); at the most 
fundamental structural level, elation may be an organized reaction to 
threats of debility, collapse and threatened vitality; through an 
inherent negative feedback effect elation can operate to reduce or 
cancel its own intensity. 
5. From a functional viewpoint (usually rest on state and structural 
assumptions): mood operates under specific external and internal 
stimulation to ach a state or condition of the individual such 
that a particular equilibrium is established, or result achieved 
(here the equilibrium is the consequence of external stimulation and 
internal factors, but no teleological goals are assumed).· The 
equilibrium or result ~s a psycho-social resolution of factors; e.g. 
under specifiable environmental conditions, a sad mood may be defined 
by a combination of elements of regret, sorrow, and self-recrimination, 
resulting in a sense of shame and personal devaluation which produces 
a modification of various behaviours and attitudes. 
of the state, structural and functional viewpoints with a behavioural 
emphasis): mood is a tendency towards items of behaviour and 
experience elicited under specific environmental conditions; mood as 
"disposition" represents a summary statement standing for a synthesis 
of constancies in behaviour and experience over a given unit of time; 
e.g. to be in a depressed mood is to be d inclined to speak volubly, 
and to be inclined to move slowly and lethargically, to have dull and 
heavy, or hurt and hollow feelings, to think negatively and in 
repetitive cycles. 
7. From a relational viewpoint: mood brings into existence a relation-
ship bet\veen the individual and his environment in which the signifi-
cation of situations is discovered; the individual knows and under-
stands qualities, essential structures, and modes of involveme~t 
sustained by herself and the environment; e.g.· a mood of anger may 
project an attitude towards a particular situation, reveal the 
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personal qualities that underwrite such a projection, single out 
distressing and irritating facets of the environment, and establish 
a mediated relationship in which a desire to change the situation is 
formulated along with the impulse that seeks destructive activity; 
there may be the emergence of a desired ideal constituted by or 
within the destructive relationship. 
8. From a cognitive viewpoint: mood establishes a cognitive-perceptual 
stance towards the environment; to be in a mood is to be aware of 
the self and the environment in one or a variety of ways; the 
experience of mood is the experience of objects and events under 
salient descriptions; 1n particular to be aware of stability and 
permanence, or conversely change and impermanence; e.g. to be 1n 
an anxious mood, is to be aware of the contingency of objects, the 
disharmony and antagonism of the environment, to perceive the self 
as unimportant and feeble, to anticipate personal collapse and 
psychological dissolution. 
The Structure and Functioning of Mood 
(a psycho-dynamic construction--it combines elements from diverse models; 
clinically useful but systemically incongruous) 
The qualitative data of this study suggest that although moods may exhibit 
an original and prevailing feeling tone of singular quality, nevertheless 
there is often an internal complexity of various elements and processes. 
Any particular mood will be either a homogeneous qualitative field, or a 
dynamic equilibrium of its components. This dynamic equilibrium, where 
it exists, \vill have a greater or lesser degree of stability. It may 
oscillate, show several homologous configurations or conformations, and 
exercise various constraints upon the individual--imperatives that may 
collectively be complementary or dissonant. 
A mood has its own characteristic rate of change, its required phases and 
balance points. It tends to be the "image", "reduplication", "completion", 
or "compensation" for several developmentally articulated p'roto-moods. 
In each case, from a present time perspective, the dynamic equilibrium, 
or singular felt quality (transitive or intransitive) is a response to a 
stimulus (or challenge in molar terms) arising from the body and the 
environment. 
-483-
Moods tend to have dual roots, they are anchored in childhood experiences 
and needs, and in subliminal physiological processes. Intensive study 
often reveals time-specific layers of need and defence, as well as a 
representative mode of current adaptation. Hence moods ~n their affective 
density may be a recollection, a catharsis, an arousal, a sensitivity, a 
general modulation, and a type of equilibrium. There is a sense in which 
each developmental stage is present simultaneously, clamouring as it were, 
for expression; moods tend also to imaginatively postulate a future (the 
conditions of their ideal or logical fulfilment), they retain a past (as 
a matrix for the historical confluence of generating factors), while they 
vivify the present in a unique qualitative mode. 
Their evolution is primarily a cognitive differentiation (though there 
can be a monotonous non-progressive cyclical repetition), which remains 
attuned to basic physiological rhythms. Their physiological arousal 
promulgates interpretations by the individual in terms of the range of 
cognitions (including phantasies, beliefs, and values) available to the 
individual. Moods may arise fundamentally from within, or from internal 
potentials triggered by a variety of stimuli. One important class of 
triggers is psycho-social stimuli, and in this case (but not in all cases) 
the individual herself may play a relatively active role in facilitating, 
inhibiting, or suppressing the mood. The basic mood potential involves 
a sensitization to a range of factors, and the individual typically will 
be constrained to feel, perceive, evaluate and behave in characteristic 
ways. There may or may not be a second-order awareness of this overall 
modulation. The mood itself may operate to produce a feedback effect 
which maintains, supports and augments the original state (positive feed-
back), or expends, discharges, reduces, even cancels the original state 
(negative feedback). Mood may serve a gamut of functions. The present 
mood study has suggested that the function varies with the mood quality. 
The Mood Analysis Technique (~~T) 
The Mood Analysis Technique, which was designed as a facilitator of mood 
change and as an instrument to probe the different levels .of mood in order 
to bring new elements of affect into awareness, has been shown to have a 
determinate and specifiable effect on mood. Confidence in its empirical 
effect comes from statistical analyses that indicate the MAT has a'global 
effect across several mood dimensions, influences mood in ways different 
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from the other experimental sessions, may influence mood irrespective of 
whether or not the individual can be considered a "moody" person, and 
brings about intensity and quality modifications 1n mood states. 
Especially noteworthy, is the ability of the MAT to influence "negative" 
moods in predominantly positive ways, 1.e. to reduce the intensity or 
meliorate the quality of negative moods. 
The magnitude of change scores (discrete change) for Session 2, the 
experimenter administered Mood Analysis Technique (~~T), suggest that the 
mood dimensions Aggression, Social Affection, Sadness and Egotism can be 
significantly increased by the ~~T. In addition the ~~T shows a lesser 
decrease in Surgency and Scepticism than the other experimental sessions. 
These results are most adequately explained in terms of the design and 
format of the l:-~T: its tendency to locate present feeling in the context 
of past feeling, the latent and shadow aspects of present feeling, and 
the tendency to facilitate the projection of future feeling--all 
experiential aspects being made immanent through the search for expressive 
metaphors. 
The component change scores (internal change) for Session 2, the experi-
menter administered Mood Analysis Technique (MAT), suggest that the ~~T 
has a complex and in-depth effect on major dimensions of mood. Focusing 
on the most salient component change scores for Session 2, it was found: 
for the factor Aggression Session 2 had the ability to generate new 
components; for the factor Anxiety Session 2 had the ability both to 
generate ne~" components and to make components disappear; for the factor 
Social Affection Session 2 had the ability to generate more new components 
than any of the other experimental sessions; for the factor Sadness 
Session 2 showed more total change and more new components. These findings 
suggest the conclusion that the MAT can function to bring ne~,r feeling 
elements into awareness and to reveal potentials for feeling. 
When subjects' moods were divided into three groups: positive, neutral 
and negative moods, Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (f-~T) , ~vas found to either improve the quality or reduce the 
intensity of negative moods. The two sub-categories of negative moods, 
"Frustrated Hoods" and "Sceptical Hoods" which appeared to deteriorate, 
were found on closer examination to have resulted in a better understanding 
of the external sources, the presence and operation of different aff~ct 
-485-
components, and the range of feeling. Session 2 was also benefi 1n 
permitting the expression of different units of the self-concept. This 
way of viewing the effect of the MAT is consonant with subjects' comments 
upon completion of Session 2, the experimenter administered Mood Analysis 
Technique (MAT). The statistically significant response categories 
"Changed Mood" and "Increased Awareness" suggest the conclusion that even 
when subjects were unaware of improvements in their mood, they benefited 
from an increased understanding of the generative conditions, the general 
trend, and possible conditions for termination of the mood. 
Session 4, the self-administered r1AT, ~.;rhich ~•as designed as a control for 
possible experimenter effect on Session 2, was not statistically 
distinguished from Session 2, in terms of magnitude of change scores. 
However, the absolute magnitude of change score (global mood change) for 
Session 2 was greater than Session 4. In addition there were some 
differences between Sessions 2 and 4 in terms of component change scores 
(internal change). The most supportable conclusion here is that the 
differences that do exist can be attributed to the experimenter's verbal 
involvement on Session 2 and to experimental order and repetition effects. 
Personality Variables that Significantly Distinguish "Hoodl' from "Non-
Hoody" Subjects 
It has been established that "moody" subjects can be distinguished from 
"non-moody" subjects in terms of personality variables revealed by standard 
tests and that different teria of "moodiness" corresponding to different 
conceptions of "moody" are each correlated with unique sets of personality 
variables. However, ten personality variables \vere found to be common to 
the t\vo criteria and conceptions of "moodiness". 
The two criteria employed were a self-opinion criterion, corresponding to 
"moody" in the sense of having protracted feeling states of moderate 
intensity and/or having a susceptibility to tability and spells of 
bad temper: The second terion was a statistical criterion of high and 
low mean variability on the 12 Nm.rlis Mood Factors across the four experi-
mental sessions, corresponding to "moody" in the sense of variability of 
feel 
The ten personality variables common to the two criteria of moodiness were: 
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the 16PF - scored high on Trusting vs. Suspicious; scored high on 
Relaxed vs. Tense; the EPPS - scored higher on Exhibition and Hetero-
sexuality; scored lower on Deference and Nurturance; ACL - scored high 
on Counselling Readiness; scored low on Defensiveness, the Ratio of 
Favourable to Unfavourable Adjectives (saw themselves in a less 
favourable light), -and Personal Adjustment. 
The four personality variables unique to the self-opinion criterion were: 
the 16PF - scored high on Placid vs. Apprehensive; scored low on 
Affected by Feelings vs. Emotionally Stable; the EPPS - scored higher 
on Autonomy; scored lower on Affilitation. 
The four personality variables un1que to the statistical criterion were: 
the 16PF - scored high on Humble vs. Assertive, and Sober vs. Happy-go-
lucky; scored low on Undisciplined Self-Conflict vs. Controlled; the 
ACL - scored low on Self-Control. 
The personality data suggests the general conclusion that moody subjects 
can be distinguished from non-moody subjects in tetms of personality 
variables revealed by standard tests. "Hoody" subjects may be different 
from their "non-moody" counterparts in terms of their needs, values, 
actions, and modes of responding. There may also be a reliable pattern 
of personality variables associated with the different types of "moody" 
individual. 
There is also sufficient evidence to conclude, conceptually, that the 
concepts of moodiness associated with the two different criteria should 
be given a degree of logical independence, and empirically, that the unique 
variables enclose different segments of personality dispositions. 
However, the existence of a core set of variables common to both criteria 
requires the conclusion that conceptually, the two concepts of moodiness 
investigated may span a more fundamental logical entity; and empirically, 
there may be a more basic entity, pattern, or factor underlying the 
revealed variables. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The effect of the MAT on mood 
This study could be carried several steps further by applying.the same 
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treatments (Session 1 through 4) to samples from more general populations 
(males and females with a wider range of age and occupation) and other 
specifically chosen subpopulations. A defensible confidence in the MAT 
as an effective instrument for mood change might be achieved, if the 
present results were confirmed for both males and females in each of 
these categories: students vs. non-students (is the MAT only effective 
because of students' verbal facility?); students vs. a clinical sample, 
especially man1c depressives and unipolar depressives (is the MAT effective 
with a diagnosed and treated sample?). It is possible that the non-
remunerative condition of the study resulted in a disproportionately high 
percentage of "moody" subjects in the sample, i.e. subjects may have 
volunteered in order to obtain information about their mood states. 
\~ile this was desirable for the purposes of the study, in future studies 
it would be important to have a remuneration vs. a non-remuneration 
condition. 
The MAT has not been compared with other clinical treatments; it would 
be informative and useful to compare the individual MAT effect with, for 
example, a general discussion session, a session employing imagery 
techniques, a session utilizing a psychoanalytical approach, and a 
session devoted to behavioural management. 
Personality Variables 
In order to determine a series of "mood profiles" for the different types 
of "moody" individual, it would be important to utilize the same criteria 
of identification and the same personality tests across different 
populations. Additional cognitive, affective, and behavioural measures 
could be added in order to build up the correlated elements and to refine 
the overall picture. The ten common personality variables may constitute 
a "mood syndrome" for female university students but are not necessarily 
valid for other populations; this ''commonality" should be tested across 
other populations, and if possible integrated 1n terms of higher-order 
personality or temperamental patterns. 
The periodicity of mood 
With respect to a female sample, it would be a contribution to our under-
standing of mood if the degree of correlation between mood states and 
phases of the menstrual cycle could be firmly established. It is possible 
that the interaction effect varies from individual to individual, and 
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perhaps even with some variation from menstrual cycle to menstrual cycle 
for the same individual. Some estimate of the general correlation could 
be determined by employing a large sample of subjects making a daily 
rating of mood level, completing the Mood Analysis Questionnaire, and 
recording the day of the menstrual cycle. Additional information that 
could relatively easily be obtained through the same design would be a 
record of dream content and its possible effect on subsequent mood state, 
and the effect of t on mood state, especially times of eating, 
frequency of eating and types of food consumed. 
Where it was possible to establish a definite periodicity, it would be 
important to determine whether having conscious knowledge of the approxi-
mate phases would enable the subject to pace herself, anticipate, and 
take measures to reduce the intensity of the negative phase; for example, 
would planning for a reduced work load, increasing positive and energetic 
activities and avoiding known exacerbating environmental situations 
result in smoother functioning and more adaptive and satisfying inter-
actions? 
Further insight into the role of the menstrual cycle might be forthcoming 
from a comparison of mood changes in a female psychiatric population \..ri th 
mood changes in a female non-psychiatric population where the subjects 
suffered from a loss of periods, difticult or painful periods, and 
irregularly occurring periods. A control would be a female non-psychiatric 
sample with no menstrual disturbances. 
There is some evidence that lithium carbonate may meliorate premenstrual 
depression, and negative mood states in "emotionally unstable" adolescents 
(Fieve, 1976); the lithium carbonate treatment could be compared with a 
treatment programme that incorporated knowledge of the menstrual cycle 
phases with behavioural planning and environmental manipulation (as 
indicated above). The most powerful treatment might be a combination of 
these two types of treatment. However~ it should be noted that lithium 
carbonate is contraindicated in cases of heart and kidney disorder (Fieve, 
1976; Parish, 1977). For these individuals and pe:haps for many others, 
advanced planning and supportive therapy may be the best treatment. 
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